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       What explains the variation of dissent levels among party groups in the European Parliament 
and why are party group cohesion levels on the whole so high? How do party group leaders 
manage dissent and how does this impact the form of dissent expression by individual MEPs? To 
provide answers to these questions, I conducted field research consisting of eighty-four elite-
centered interviews, and observations of thirty-three party group meetings. The research was 
divided into two phases in the fall of 2011 and the spring of 2012 in Brussels, Belgium and 
Strasbourg, France where the parliament holds its sessions. Dissent is more broadly defined in 
the study to encompass outlets for expression prior to plenary (party group meetings) and options 
in plenary such as voting to abstain. In addition, cohesion is defined more broadly to encompass 
members‟ attitudes toward group unity (See Brown 2000) as well as the extent to which the party 
group is unified in roll-call votes.  
 
       I find that an MEP‟s ideology at the individual level in conjunction with a whip structure 
and socialization processes at the group level explains variation in dissent levels among party 
groups. MEP ideology refers to the proximity of an MEP‟s views to those of the party group on a 
given subject (See Hix et al. 2007). However, ideology does not explain instances where a 
dissenting MEP changes their position or decides to express dissent in a less costly manner. 
Accordingly, party group leaders acting as legislative entrepreneurs develop strategies and 
construct forums to facilitate dissent management. Dissent management or whip structures 
function as an early alert system and consist of clearly assigned roles to group leaders (president, 
vice-presidents, etc.) and group forums within a communication network in which leaders (and 
staff) share information and collaborate to ensure maximum support for the group line. 
Socialization processes facilitate lobbying efforts and consist of norms governing dissent 
announcement by MEPs as well as a shared conceptualization of the (party) group identity. In 
this sense, MEPs adopt the group line or select a less costly form of dissent because it is the 
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CHAPTER ONE: MANAGING DISSENT IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
      What explains the variation of dissent levels among party groups in the European Parliament 
and why are party group cohesion levels on the whole so high? Given such patterns, how do 
party group leaders manage dissent and how does this impact the form of dissent expression by 
individual MEPs? To provide answers to these questions, I conducted field research consisting of 
elite-centered interviews, and observations of party group meetings. A field study is necessary 
because while surveys are useful for explaining individual motivations for behavior, other 
methods are better suited to identify group level processes and structures (Kitschelt, 1989, 305). 
In turn, explanations for dissent level variation are examined in this project through a data set of 
responses from eighty-four MEPs and staff interviews acting as informed experts on group level 
processes supplemented by observations of party group meetings and other forums.  
       While past studies (See Hix et al. 2007, Kreppel 2002) have provided important analyses of 
party group cohesion and broaden our understanding of how the European Parliament is 
organized and functions, we still know very little about how party groups achieve such relatively 
high group cohesion rates. In turn, the primary goal of this study is to uncover the hidden 
processes associated with dissent management in the European Parliament in terms of the 
organizational structures and tactics employed by party group leaders. To do so requires direct 
accounts of dissent management (or the lack thereof) and assessment of those accounts primarily 
from elites within party groups as well as observing the processes associated with and the 
behavior exhibited by members in party group meetings which are normally closed to the public.  
       The impetus for this study is primarily derived from the fact that we know very little about 
the role of particular party group leaders. While past studies have clarified the role of group 
rapporteurs and committee coordinators (See Ringe 2010, Lindberg 2008, and Hix et al. 2007), 
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we know very little about the role of and the dissent management tactics employed by party 
group presidents and vice–presidents. In turn, we know little in regards to how party groups 
manage dissent where roll-call votes are absent, as well as when plenary votes are roll-called. In 
other words, we lack an explanation for how party groups address dissent both prior to a roll-call 
vote, but also in particular to the majority of instances in plenary sessions and indeed in all party 
group or legislative committee meetings where votes by individual MEPs are not recorded.  
       Obtaining a better understanding of how party groups manage dissent is important because 
party groups are the driving force behind the passage of legislation in the European Parliament. 
As Bowler et al. (1999) note, legislative parties must ensure their members are unified or at a 
minimum nearly unified. “Majorities rule, and whoever can form and keep together a majority 
wins the legislative game, through shaping policies and programs in order to keep on winning in 
the future” (Bowler et al. 1999, 3). In turn, identifying both the full extent of dissent and the 
processes through which party groups manage dissent is necessary as decision-making 
increasingly shifts from the national to the supranational level and as the European Parliament 
secures increasing authority and influence.  
       With the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the European Parliament now holds 
co-decision authority on nearly all policy areas and even prior to Lisbon its legislative impact 
was evident in that 60% of all legislation at the national level in the twenty-seven member-states 
originated at the EU level (Benoit and McElroy, 2007, 4-5). Now more than ever, it is imperative 
for group leaders to secure maximum levels of cohesion and minimal levels of dissent expression 
as the legislative stakes are much higher. As Hix and Hoyland (2011) note, “more at stake means 
more incentives to strengthen the division of labor inside the political groups to try and win votes 
to shift outcomes in a particular policy direction” (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, 143).  
3 
 
        Higher legislative stakes have in turn incentivized party group leaders and staff to monitor 
roll-call votes and identify dissent prior to plenary votes. As a party group secretary-general 
below notes, while it is rare for party group leaders or staff to „call in‟ a frequently dissenting 
member to ask them to account for their voting behavior, party groups are on the whole not 
passive bystanders but rather „legislative entrepreneurs‟ (See Cox and McCubbins 2007) who 
utilize all the tools at their disposal to ensure adherence to the group line and minimal dissent. 
“With roll call votes, and with independent monitors like VoteWatch, this has a disciplining 
effect on members, as all are aware that the strength of our group is our voting cohesion. By 
having a fully transparent way to see how members voted, there is an understanding that 
deviation from the group line must be limited to very special cases”. (July 11, 2012) 
 
       If managing dissent within party groups is crucial for EU policy-making, then how should 
dissent be defined? Ozbudun (1970) defines dissent as “when a party member acts against his or 
her party” (Ozbudun, 1970, 305). In this sense, dissent may be expressed in many forms and 
occur throughout the stages comprising the legislative process. However some expressions of 
dissent have a greater impact upon party unity and legislative outcomes than others with varying 
consequences depending in part upon the stage within the legislative process it is expressed. 
Dissent in this study is defined as opposing the party group position (or line) on legislation which 
is identified by party group leaders or attained through a majority vote in the group meeting. In 
turn, I measure dissent expression according to an eight level scale which is a modification of 
one proposed by Crowe (1983) which ranges from expressing dissent in group meetings to 
opposing the group line on an entire report in plenary (See Chapter Two for more details).  
       Upon the completion and review of field research, I find that the overall high group cohesion 
rates and the variation in party group dissent rates is a product of ideology at the individual level 
and of a dissent management or „whip‟ structure in conjunction with socialization processes at 
the party group level. 
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MEP IDEOLOGY + WHIP STRUCTURE + SOCIALIZATION = LOW DISSENT LEVELS 
       Ideology in relation to this study is defined as MEP or staff beliefs according to the 
traditional left-right axis but also on the national sovereignty-European integration spectrum. My 
assumptions in regards to the individual level are based on the findings of Hix et al. (2007), in 
that as the beliefs of an individual MEP are closer to the group ideological mean, they are more 
likely to adopt the group position on a given report and as they are more distant from the group 
ideological mean, they are more likely to dissent (Hix et al. 2007, 101). However, individual 
ideology is insufficient in providing a complete explanation for successful dissent management 
practices, particularly in instances when an MEP has decided to move away from dissent and 
support the group line or to express dissent at a less costly level (voting to abstain, etc.).  
       Building upon shared ideological foundations, leaders across party groups (apart from the 
EFD) to various extents form whip structures and rely upon socialization processes to manage 
dissent. The contribution of leaders to party group cohesion was confirmed by Bailer et al. 
(2009) in that “Voting cohesion is not only a result of ideological homogeneity but also a result 
of party discipline imposed by the party group leaders. Cohesive party groups are desirable in the 
European Parliament because they facilitate consensual and collective decision-making within 
the group and in dealings in the European Parliament, as well as with outside actors” (Bailer et 
al. 356, 2009). However, past studies have not mapped the successful dissent management 
strategies pursued by party group leaders. In turn, interview responses obtained in this field study 
(corroborated by group meeting observations) find that the more cohesive party groups are those 
that employ and fully utilize a whip structure.  
       A whip structure functions as an early alert system and consists of clearly assigned dissent 
management roles to group leaders (president, vice-presidents, coordinators and rapporteurs) and 
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operates as a communication network in which leaders (and staff) share information and 
collaborate to ensure maximum support for the group line. For example, the more cohesive 
groups are led by elites who utilize party group meetings to identify and address dissent but also 
manage dissent prior to and following the group meeting through a variety of tactics. In some 
cases, dissent is addressed by particular group leaders at specific legislative stages such as by 
coordinators in committees. However, I find that dissent in the more cohesive groups is 
monitored and addressed throughout the legislative process by a team or network of group 
leaders communicating with and acting in concert with one another. The goal of these leaders is 
to ensure widespread compliance with the group line or to at the least ensure that dissent is 
expressed by individual MEPs or national delegations at a less costly level.  
       In this sense, I contend that leaders in the more cohesive party groups are legislative 
entrepreneurs who utilize the formal and informal processes at their disposal to ensure plenary 
success. This does not translate into a „Westminster‟ model in that as Ringe (2010) noted, “party 
groups are not top-down enforcers of party discipline, but rather umbrellas for MEPs with 
similar preferences concerning the expected consequences of a law” (Ringe, 2010, 9). However, 
party groups are provided with legislative incentive through a series of treaties empowering the 
parliament with co-decision authority and with expanding European integration (in conjunction 
with individual and partisan preferences) to ensure minimal dissent through appeals and in 
compromises with dissenting or wavering members.  
        In turn, while leaders can and do lobby on the merits of legislation or make appeals centered 
on the politics of a particular vote, I find that group leaders often rely upon socialization which is 
defined by Kam (2002) as “the process of exposure or learning through which legislators acquire 
certain norms” (Kam, 2002, 194) to achieve their goals. In turn, Kam contends that norms 
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impose a sense of duty to support the leadership position and are re-enforced over time through 
experience with the legislative process and mimicking the similar behavior of colleagues. In this 
sense, socialization provides leaders with a less costly means of managing dissent in comparison 
to strictly disciplinary tactics (Kam, 2002, 194).    
       Norms may be classified as informal (customs, traditions, and practices) or formal which are 
practices codified into rules (Smith, 2004, 45). Informal norms within party groups may be 
utilized by leaders to minimize and signal dissent. For example, the more cohesive party groups 
informally require that MEPs announce voting intentions in party group meetings (Raunio, 1999, 
193). Socialization processes raise the secondary goal for the study in that I broaden the 
definition of group cohesion from solely the rate of individual members supporting the group 
line reflected in roll-call votes to encompass the extent to which an MEP identifies with other 
members in the group and with the group‟s goals and values (See Brown 2000).  
       As Brown (2000) contends “Our sense of who we are and what we are worth is intimately 
bound up with our group memberships” (Brown, 2000, 28). For example, party group members 
may come to define their individual success or failure in terms of the success or failure of the 
group and accordingly make (voting) decisions based upon the likelihood their actions will 
contribute toward the group‟s success in achieving its goals. As a consequence, high group 
cohesion rates are in part attained through a series of socializing processes culminating in 
members seeing themselves as „Greens‟, or „Socialists‟, rather than solely as individuals or as 
members of particular delegations. In contrast, in the least cohesive group (EFD), while members 
share a conceptualization of their group‟s identity, it is one built on national sovereignty and 
opposition to everything „European‟ and therefore not conducive to group unity as members 
(delegations) freely pursue separate agendas rather than identify and pursue a group agenda. 
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TABLE 1.1: PARTY GROUP COHESION/DISSENT RATES   
PARTY GROUP   COHESION RATE DISSENT RATE 
GREENS/EFA .947   0.053 
EPP   .931   0.069 
S & D   .928   0.072 
ALDE   .898   0.102 
ECR   .868   0.132 
GUE   .816   0.184 
EFD   .498   0.502 
Note: Party group cohesion/dissent rates are listed in descending order and reflect plenary roll-call votes 
during the current parliament (July 2009-March 2013) prior to the accession of Croatia into the EU.  
Data Source: www.votewatch.eu 
 
       In turn, I argue that the party groups with the highest dissent levels as depicted above in 
Table 1.1 are those who do not: have high degrees of ideological homogeneity, assign clear 
dissent management roles, fully utilize group forums to build consensus, and who lack a shared 
group identity supported by informal processes governing dissent and other behavior. The table 
provides the third motivation for field research in that it reveals anomalies in regards to the 
cohesion rates of specific groups in relation to their level of plenary influence defined as the 
percentage of times the group is in the majority in plenary voting (See Figure 1.1 below). 
 
Note: Graph depicts percentage of times each party group has been in the plenary majority in the current 

























       Specifically, why are the Greens/EFA the most cohesive group yet the fourth largest and 
influential and why is the ALDE the fourth most cohesive despite their standing as the second 
most influential group in the parliament? In other words, why do the cohesion (dissent) levels of 
particular groups not correspond to their level of plenary influence given that greater plenary 
influence should provide incentive for group leaders to secure high cohesion rates? The answers 
to both questions I find relate to the extent to which all components of the equation for low 
dissent levels are present within the respective party groups.  
       The Greens/EFA are largely ideological homogeneous (See Farrell et al. 2011 and Hix et al. 
2007), but they also have a whip structure with key roles assigned to the group co-presidents, 
vice-presidents, and the secretary-general, which identifies and manages dissent at every 
legislative stage through constant lobbying and socialization. In turn, members share a positive 
conceptualization of the group identity, and are invested in the group decision-making process 
(See Garner and Letki 2005). In contrast, I find that the ALDE, while achieving relatively high 
cohesion rates, have comparatively higher dissent than the three most cohesive groups because 
they are: more ideologically heterogeneous, fail to utilize group vice-presidents in dissent 
management, lack a group whip, and because members negatively view the role of the horizontal 
working groups (group members from committees with similar policy portfolios). In turn, the 
three least cohesive party groups are far more deficient in whip structure components and 
socialization processes, and are more ideologically heterogeneous. 
       Having presented my general findings and rationale for field research, the remainder of this 
initial chapter will proceed as follows. I will first present a review of the relevant literature 
addressing party group cohesion in the European Parliament in order to lay the groundwork for 
my research analysis in subsequent chapters. Next, I consider the European Parliament as a 
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unique institution in terms of its history and organization. This section will include a brief 
assessment of whether the parliament is a true legislature in light of the obvious democratic 
deficit and the supranational organization accompanying the EU decision-making process. 
Finally, I end with a cursory review of the subsequent chapters in order to provide the reader 
with an outline of the organization of the dissertation and its findings. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
       What we know about party groups largely derives from cohesion studies involving analysis 
of plenary roll-call votes. Such studies have provided a wealth of information regarding MEP 
voting behavior and valuable insight into how the European Parliament operates as highlighted 
by the work of Hix (2002), Hix et al. (2007) and Hix and Noury (2009). From these studies, we 
have learned that: (1) party groups have become increasingly cohesive since the first parliament 
elections in 1979, (2) cross-party cooperation between the two largest groups has declined within 
the same period and (3) left-right policy preferences of national parties predict the voting 
behavior of MEPs (Hix and Noury, 2009, 1256).      
       We have also learned from recent European Parliament studies that while MEPs retain 
strong attitudinal and ideological links to their national party, MEPs have stronger regulatory 
links to their party groups in daily work than to their national parties back home (See Rasmussen 
2008). This is in part a reflection of party group influence over committee assignments, as well 
as control of speaking time in plenary, but also the extent and frequency of communication 
between party group leadership and MEPs in monitoring day-to-day behavior (Rasmussen, 2008, 
1168). As Lindberg et al. (2008) note, “MEPs are torn between their loyalty towards the national 
party, which is important for their future careers, and the transnational party group, which can be 
instrumental for their policy goals” (Lindberg et al. 2008, 1121).  
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       The divide in an MEP‟s loyalties is perhaps best evident in the debate associated with 
prominent report such as the Services Directive (See Lindberg et al. 2008 and Hix et al. 2007) 
and was also evident during my field research when cohesion rates were lower for most groups 
on the “six-pack” and two-pack” votes (banking union and fiscal integration) when compared to 
the average group cohesion rates for the current parliament as a whole (See 
www.votewatch.edu). However, I find that the more cohesive party groups have on the whole 
mitigated the competing principals‟ dilemma (See Carey 2007) in that despite their origins as a 
collection of national parties (who control re-nomination) party groups on the whole have 
maintained consistently high cohesion levels through the development of whip structures and the 
promotion of socialization processes which in conjunction mitigate levels of dissent expression.   
      It is important at this point to stress that neither Rasmussen‟s nor my findings do not conflict 
with those of Hix (2002) in which national party positions trump those of party group positions 
in influencing MEP voting behavior when the two are in conflict. Rather, I contend that in the 
bulk of voting decisions, party groups have just as much if not more impact upon MEP voting 
behavior and that dissent management by group leaders mitigates the extent and form of dissent 
expression. In this sense, because MEPs need the support of their party group to ensure that their 
legislative goals are accomplished and because party group leaders understand the importance of 
constant dialogue, intra-group communication networks have facilitated low dissent levels. In 
addition, I contend that the more cohesive party groups have instilled particular norms governing 
MEP behavior through informal communication or socialization which leads MEPs to support 
the group line as it is perceived to be the appropriate action.  
       Similarly, Ladrech (2007) concluded that weak communicative links between national 
delegations in the European Parliament and domestic national party leaders facilitated party 
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group efforts to influence MEP voting behavior. “Yet the basis upon which most MEPs make 
most of their decisions, apart from clear national priority issues, are derived from the 
positions…of their respective EP party groups” (Ladrech, 2007, 957). Despite the enormous 
contributions of these studies, we know relatively little about party groups in terms of how group 
leaders secure voting cohesion. More precisely, past studies have neglected the stage of party 
group meetings in dissent management when examining group cohesion levels and in turn have 
failed to provide a framework for how particular party group leaders (presidents and vice-
presidents.) coordinate efforts with national party delegations or appeal to individual MEPs 
within the group to ensure that dissent is both identified and minimized. As Lindberg et al. 
(2008) note, “Our understanding of the legislative interplay between national party delegations 
and fragmental party groups in the EP is still limited” (Lindberg et al. 2008, 1200).     
       This gap in the literature is in large part a product of institutional limitations in that roll-call 
votes constitute a small and unrepresentative sample of all plenary session votes (Kreppel 2002 
and Carrubba et al. 2006). For example, when the period of July 1999-July 2000 is considered, 
Carrubba et al. found that: 1. Roll-call votes were not a random sample of the population of votes 
in that they were disproportionately representative of resolutions compared to other types of 
legislation. 2. The number of roll-call votes taken at second or third reading in the co-decision 
stage was under-measured as are votes on conciliation where differences with the Council may 
be resolved (Carrubba et al. 2006, 696).   
       The authors also found that roll-call votes in plenary sessions are not representative of 
legislation from all committees. “A majority of roll-call votes originate in just a few committees. 
Three committees accounted for 63.88% of RCVS, but only 28.35% of all votes” (Carrubba et al. 
2006, 699). For example, legislation from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development 
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represented 15.69% of all roll-call votes, while no roll-call votes were ever requested during the 
investigated period for legislation from the Committee on Women‟s Rights and Equal 
Opportunities (Carrubba et al, 2006, Table 2, 699). While roll-call votes remain a useful tool for 
party group studies, the authors conclude that “The party groups are systematically hiding 
exactly the voting behavior we are interested in studying” (Carrubba et al. 2006, 699).  
       With an expanded legislative role for the European Parliament, the impetus for identifying 
and managing dissent at all levels and at every stage in the legislative process is greater than ever 
before. As Hix and Noury (2009) note, party groups have evolved into “powerful actors able to 
marshal their troops in support of the policy positions of the group leaders” (Hix and Noury 
2009, 821). The question remains of how party groups accomplish this task. While MEP 
candidate selection is controlled by the national parties, party group leaders do exert extensive 
influence over the distribution of legislative and party group offices.  
       For example, rapporteur selection is completed by group leaders to various extents with 
consideration toward group loyalty in plenary voting (Lindberg, 2008, 1190). Above all, party 
groups ultimately determine legislative outcomes through their role as amendment gatekeepers in 
plenary and in oversight of the development of legislation and the group line prior to plenary. In 
turn, MEPs, while exercising relatively greater freedom in shaping the direction of legislation 
compared to most MPs at the national level (See Simon Hix et al. 2007), must work within party 
group organizational and social structures to secure favored plenary outcomes.  
       For example, while MEPs have wider discretion in shaping legislation at the committee level 
than in national parliaments, they can only obtain their individual legislative goals with the 
backing of their party group. In addition, leaders may influence the voting behavior of group 
members through control of information and through provision of forums where the group line 
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may be formulated and where leadership can secure maximum support. Ringe (2010) 
characterized this relationship within party groups in terms of rapporteurs, coordinators and other 
policy experts setting the group line with rank-and-file MEPs following the lead of these experts 
in most votes due largely to information constraints. “EP decision-making is founded on a 
division of labor and an exchange of information between expert and non-expert legislators 
based on perceived preference coherence. Legislators are often quite uninformed about the 
policies they exact because of very real external constraints on their ability to collect 
information” (Ringe, 2010, 209).  
       Each year, MEPs are confronted with the task of voting on numerous reports and resolutions 
with each often accompanied by hundreds of amendments. Knowing each amendment or report 
inside and out is a vaunting challenge at the committee let alone at the plenary level. When 
lacking expertise on a given report or confronted with information overload, MEPs may 
conclude that the most optimal course of action to secure their policymaking preferences is to 
defer to policy experts who have invested their resources into more fully understanding the issue 
at hand (Ringe, 2010, 33). Given the influence of party group leaders, it is necessary at this stage 
of the chapter to identify both the historical foundation as well as the organizational structure of 
the European Parliament (and particularly that of the party groups). 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: A UNIQUE INSTITUTION 
      The European Parliament was the first supranational parliament in the world (there is now 
one in Latin America as well) and remains the only with legislative powers. Unlike the UN and 
other intergovernmental bodies, the European Parliament is not appointed by national 
governments and organized according to national delegations but rather since 1979 it has been 
directly elected by voters within EU member-states in a series of contests among national parties 
every five years during the month of June. Following the elections, MEPs from respective 
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national parties organize into (currently) seven ideological umbrella organizations or party 
groups across national lines or in some cases do not join party groups and remain non-attached 
(currently there are twenty-nine such MEPs). The road to political and legislative relevance has 
been a long and arduous one for the European Parliament.   
       The Treaty of Luxembourg in 1970 provided a new budgetary procedure where the 
European Parliament could reject the EU budget and amend certain budget lines excluding 
agriculture and regional spending (Hix et al. 2007, 14). Later, the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) 
placed constitutional limitations upon the Council of Ministers in that it cannot act unilaterally 
while the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) expanded the number of policy areas where the 
parliament enjoyed equal standing (co-decision) with other EU institutions (Hix et al. 2007, 14). 
The European Parliament later acquired co-decision in ninety-five percent of policy areas 
(including agriculture, immigration, and trade) through the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) which also 
removed the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditures thereby 
providing the parliament with greater flexibility to increase or cut EU spending levels across 
policy areas (Judge and Earnshaw, 2008, 65). As stated on the European Parliament‟s website, 
with the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, “the Parliament now has a role to play in 
almost all lawmaking” (www.europarl.europa.eu).  
       This evolutionary process of expanded legislative authority for the European Parliament 
raises the question of whether it is a parliament in the fullest sense given the absence of a 
government-opposition structure and the limitations placed upon it by EU constitutional law. 
Despite the advances culminating in the Treaty of Lisbon, a democratic deficit remains in that a 
handful of policy areas (foreign policy for example) do not fall under the co-decision procedure, 
but particularly in light of the fact that the European Commission retains the exclusive right to 
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initiate legislation. However, in addition to having the constitutional authority to reject reports or 
to adopt amendments to reports, the European Parliament has largely circumvented the 
Commission‟s sole right of legislative initiative through a variety of legal, political, and social 
(in regards to inter-institutional relationships) tactics.  
       As Rasmussen (2007) contends, “In reality, the Commission exercises its right of imitative 
in an exclusive manner in a very small percentage of it proposals. Its own data reveals that 
merely 5 percent of the proposals in 1998 were new initiatives from the Commission whereas the 
rest were responses to requests from other EU bodies, to international obligations, adaptations of 
Community law to new conditions, and others” (Rasmussen, 2007, 248). While the bulk of 
Commission initiatives arise from a variety of sources, the European Parliament in particular 
since Maastricht (1993) has secured the right to send proposals to the Commission for 
prospective legislation which the Commission has often felt politically obligated to respond to 
(Rasmussen, 2007, 249). In turn, the combination of constitutional reform and increased 
socialization between the Parliament and the Commission has contributed to an evolving 
influence by the Parliament in regards to agenda-setting.  
      In addition, Rasmussen notes that, “The second development which has weakened the 
Commission‟s right of initiative has been the Council and the Parliament‟s tendency to ask the 
Commission to present proposals within a certain deadline through legislative acts” (Rasmussen, 
2007, 249). The parliament may also grant „discharge‟ in which it gives formal approval of the 
Commission‟s implementation of the budget. In the absence of discharge, the parliament can 
hold the implementation of the EU budget „hostage‟ until the Commission takes-up the 
parliament‟s agenda in other areas (Judge and Earnshaw, 2008, 202). 
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       In summary, while a democratic deficit admittedly exists in regards to the Commission‟s 
exclusive right of legislative initiative, the European Parliament is a true legislature in that it is 
elected by the voters of Europe, has co-decision authority in most policy areas, and can through a 
variety of strategies ensure that its agenda is embodied within any initiative brought by the 
Commission. This raises the third aspect in which the European Parliament is unique: the 
absence of a government-opposition structure and its organization of MEPs into party groups. In 
2007, the Lisbon Treaty mandated that any party group must be representative of twenty percent 
of member-states and subsequent action by the parliament also requires that any party group also 
contain at least twenty-five MEPs (Judge and Earnshaw, 2008, 115). 
TABLE 1.2: PARTY GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
Group Name                 Number/% of MEPs  
EPP (European Peoples Party)             271/35.9% 
S & D (Socialist and Democrats)         189/25.0% 
ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats)  85/11.2% 
Greens/EFA       58/7.7% 
ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) 56/7.4% 
GUE (Union of European Left)    34/4.5% 
EFD (Europeans for a Free Democracy)  34/4.5& 
NA (Non-Attached Members)   29/3.9%  
Total       756/100% 
Note: Table depicts the number of members per party group and non-attached members in the current 
parliament prior to the accession of Croatia in 2013 as well as each group‟s percentage of all MEPs.  
Data Source: www.europarl.europa.eu 
 
       The EPP has evolved from a family grouping of Christian Democratic parties to include a 
number of other center-right parties (Judge and Earnshaw, 2008, 126). The Socialist group added 
„Democrats‟ to its name prior to the 2009 elections in order to accommodate the former Italian 
Socialist party renaming itself the Democratic Party. ALDE is a center-right/center-left group 
that features differences between UK Liberal Democrats and German Liberals but also includes a 
Eurosceptic Nordic center (Judge and Earnshaw, 2008, 128). While the Greens/EFA and the 
GUE also have deep roots in the European Parliament‟s history, the ECR and EFD are much 
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newer. Though various Eurosceptic party groups on the right have existed for decades, each have 
come and gone with successive elections. In 2009, this pattern continued with the formation of 
the EFD (Europeans for a Free Democracy) by UKIP and the Lega Nord.          
       Following the 2009 elections, the ECR was formed by UK and Czech conservative parties 
who abandoned the EPP due to disagreements concerning the extent of European integration, and 
by the Polish Law and Justice Party following the demise of the UEN party group. The interview 
response below from an ECR vice-president sheds further light on the group‟s evolution. 
“From 2006 on, we moved forward on having our own distinctive group rather than being 
aligned as we were previously to the EPP. So that came about as you know after the last 
elections in 2009. Obviously, it‟s a smaller operation than we had in the alliance with the EPP, 
but I think by and large it serves its purpose. I think it‟s quite interesting to see how it has moved 
on; it‟s got a part to play in the parliament. It offers an alternative concentrating on its main 
theme of reform, but reform not only in terms of policy areas, but also in terms of procedures” 
(October 26, 2011).  
 
       Whether legislation passes or fails is the product of cross-party group support as no single 
group has ever held a majority in the European Parliament. Furthermore, legislation is not the 
purview of a single party group or particular coalition of party groups. Instead, legislative reports 
are distributed according to party group size and passage is dependent upon a range of outcomes 
from broad consensus among most party groups to ad hoc majorities of party groups. In turn, 
while a majority of legislation enjoys broad cross-party support, divisions do arise on prominent 
reports both among and within party groups. Prior to the further expansion of legislative powers 
in 1999 (Treaty of Amsterdam), the EPP and S & D normally worked together and this pattern 
continues into the present exemplified by the altering of the office of European Parliament 
President between the two groups (See Judge and Earnshaw 2008). However, with the extension 
of co-decision authority under the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), legislative cooperation between the 
two largest party groups has declined (See Hix et al. 2007 and Hix and Noury 2009).  
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       For all the party groups, the degree to which they impact legislative outcomes is dependent 
upon two processes: securing maximum internal consensus and establishing plenary alliances 
with one or more party group. In other words, party groups are only successful in obtaining 
policymaking goals if they can maintain a unified or near-unified membership while securing 
cross-party group coalitions. Dissent management therefore is necessary in order to ensure 
minimal dissent and to maintain the group‟s institutional reputation for delivering votes. In this 
sense, cooperation and consensus have emerged as institutional norms.   
       Tables 1.3 below depicts coalition patterns for each party group encompassing the period in 
which the two phases of field research were conducted as well as the interim between phases. 
The table indicates that clear coalition patterns occur in the European Parliament but also that 
current events can influence coalition patterns. Therefore, while cooperation is the norm among 
most party groups, the table also illustrates that the European Parliament remains in many ways 
an institution containing groups bent upon pursuing partisan agendas and these agendas in turn 
incentivize group leaders to minimize dissent levels.  
TABLE 1.3: PARTY GROUP PLENARY COALITION PATTERNS 
Party Group ALDE ECR EFD EPP GREENS/EFA GUE S & D 
ALDE X 50.2 47.9 78.0 67.3 52.0 83.2 
ECR 50.2 X 63.6 55.8 37.8 38.5 41.6 
EFD 47.9 63.6 X 56.3 39.3 41.4 45.1 
EPP 78 55.8 56.3 X 59.8 48.8 72.2 
GREENS/EFA 67.3 37.8 39.3 59.8 X 72.6 71.3 
GUE/NGL 52.0 38.5 41.4 48.8 72.6 X 57.8 
S & D 83.2 41.6 45.1 72.2 71.3 57.8 X 
Note: Table depicts the extent to which the group line matches other respective party groups (August 
2011-July 2012) during and in-between each field research phase. Data Source: www.votewatch.eu 
 
       For example, the frequency of cooperation between the EPP and S & D declined from 
seventy-six to seventy-two percent during the most recent session as the groups disagreed over 
how to resolve the economic crisis. The ideological divide between the two largest party groups 
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at the time is underscored by the statement below from S & D Vice President, Stephen Hughes, 
who when commenting on the “six-pack” votes on euro zone stabilization measures including 
financial integration said, “The deal concluded by the conservatives and the liberals will lead to 
more austerity. It is not the right medicine to cure the patient” (Posted on September 23, 2011, 
www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu).     
       The debates surrounding the six-pack legislation further highlight the political reality within 
the European Parliament in that when the two largest groups (EPP and S & D) cannot agree on 
legislation both turn first to the ALDE. In previous parliaments, the ALDE have more often 
sided with the EPP than the S & D (See Hix and Noury 2009) though the table above indicates a 
slight shift toward the S & D. However, while EPP or S & D legislative objectives may be 
achieved with the support of a cohesive ALDE group, a third party group is necessary in that no 
two groups other than the EPP and S & D can provide a voting majority.  
       In turn, the table underscores clear coalition preferences for the medium-sized groups with 
the Greens/EFA preferring to vote with the S & D and the ECR voting more often with the EPP. 
The six-pack votes in the fall of 2011 highlights the key role the Greens/EFA may play at times 
such as in its decision to oppose most of the accompanying amendments offered by the EPP and 
the ALDE, but support two (September 23, 2011, www.europolitics.com). Opposition by the 
Greens/EFA required that the passage of particular amendments and ultimately the report as a 
whole through to a coalition consisting of the ALDE, ECR and the EPP. 
      As depicted below in Figure 1.1, each party group is led by a group president or in the case 
of the Greens/EFA and the EFD, co-presidents. The president is expected to preside over party 
group meetings, represent the group in the Conference of Presidents, and often articulate the 
group‟s views to the media, in plenary, and the public. However, we know very little about the 
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dissent management role of group presidents. Interviews and observations of group meetings 
underscore that group presidents play a crucial role in ensuring group unity in the more cohesive 
groups when prominent reports are at-stake. Otherwise, presidents in the more cohesive groups 
normally defer to others within the group whip structure and insert themselves only to re-enforce 
the group message and its values.  
FIGURE 1.2: PARTY GROUP LEADERSHIP AND SECRETARIAT ORGANIZATION 
GROUP PRESIDENT/CO-PRESIDENTS   SECRETARY-GENERAL 
↓        ↓ 
GROUP VICE-PRESIDENT (WHIP)   GROUP SECRETARIAT 
↓        ↓ 
COORDINATORS (22) 
↓ 
RAPPORTUERS (ONE PER REPORT) 
↓ 
RANK-AND-FILE MEPS     MEP AIDES 
 
       In contrast, group presidents in the least cohesive groups exercise a more symbolic role. 
However, there are times when the group is deadlocked or dissent is so prevalent that the 
president in the more cohesive groups will mediate between factions or even lobby members. 
The one exception I have identified from my research is the ALDE president, Guy Verhofstadt, 
who takes a much more hands-on approach to dissent management and is often the primary 
facilitator of consensus on reports regardless of their prominence.  
       Each group also elects a number of vice-presidents from ten in the EPP to six in the two 
smallest groups. As with the group president, we know very little about the dissent management 
role of group vice-presidents. The formal assignment of responsibilities to group vice-presidents 
varies among the respective groups. Three of the four largest groups have assigned a vice-
president to serve as a parliamentary secretary or whip (ECR). The responsibilities of this 
position vary as well ranging from distributing voting lists to members prior to plenary with the 
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group line (or its absence) noted alongside each report or amendment, allocating plenary 
speaking time, to acting as an mediator or lobbyist prior to or during the group meeting. 
       Most often, group vice-presidents are assigned policy portfolios and administrative duties. 
Some are expected to sit in for the group president in party group meetings and other venues, 
while others act as public spokespersons for the group and represent the group in plenary 
debates, or in the case of the three largest party groups, chair horizontal working groups. In turn, 
I find that the three most cohesive groups have assigned clear dissent management roles for 
group vice-presidents whereas the remaining groups relegate these positions to administrative 
and policy-making duties. I also find that the most cohesive groups are those that have assigned a 
parliamentary secretary or whip or in the case of the Greens/EFA have empowered the group 
secretary-general to act as a parliamentary-secretary.  
       Each party group also has twenty-two coordinators which correspond to the number of 
European Parliament Committees. For the smaller groups who often have one to three members 
on each committee, this means that nearly all group members are coordinators. Coordinators are 
the group leaders in committees and are responsible for monitoring votes at the committee level 
of their fellow group members, assigning reports, and communicating the views of group 
leadership to the committee members (Hix et al. 2007, 135). Rapporteurs are responsible for 
carrying reports when their party has successfully bid for the report or serve as shadow 
rapporteurs who follow each report and represent their group in committee and in later stages. 
Group vice-presidents will often serve as the rapporteur or shadow on the more prominent 
reports. We know far more about the dissent management role of coordinators and rapporteurs. 
They are often regarded as experts and it is common in the more cohesive groups for members to 
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defer to these experts. As Ringe (2010) notes, “The two tend to work in tandem and jointly lead 
their party groups through the decision-making process” (Ringe, 2010, 59). 
       Finally, the group secretariat often plays an important role in terms of administration but 
also at times in dissent management. This is especially evident in the Greens/EFA where as 
noted above the secretary-general is assigned the parliamentary secretary role. Similarly, I found 
that the ALDE secretary-general is responsible for allocating plenary speaking time, while their 
five counterparts play an important role as behind-the-scenes advisors. Other members of the 
secretariat including policy advisors and those aides who work directly for MEPs also play an 
influential policymaking role as an EPP aide to a coordinator below accounts.  
“We have a dossier x and you have an (group policy) advisor working on it, and the advisor 
would flag us, and tell us we have a problem here, this delegation doesn‟t like the EPP proposal. 
They have some national concerns about this and they are not in line with us. At that point, we 
try and urge the rapporteur or the shadow rapporteur, and the advisor, to try and find a position 
which can address the interests of that delegation which has particularities, to see if you can find 
a compromise which is acceptable to us but also is acceptable to them. So, that‟s our first option. 
The second option is if this fails, then the coordinator would step in and try to find common 
ground with the rapporteur or the shadow rapporteur. If this fails, then the third option would be 
to discuss the issue at the preparatory meeting before the vote”. (June 27, 2012) 
 
FIGURE 1.3: THE LEGISLATIVE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
PLENARY 
↓ 
PARTY GROUP MEETING 
↓ 




VERTICAL (COMMITTEE) WORKING GROUPS 
 
       Each party group develops policy and/or its policy positions at each of the legislative stages 
noted above in Figure 1.3. In the more cohesive party groups, rapporteurs and coordinators work 
with staff to identify problems in the vertical working groups (consisting of the party group 
members of a respective committee) and in committee. From here, in the three largest party 
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groups, group members from committees with similar policy portfolios (Foreign Policy, 
International Trade, etc.) meet in horizontal working groups chaired by group vice-presidents 
who may become involved in dissent management at this stage (unless they are also the 
rapporteur). These range in number from three in the ALDE to four in the EPP and S & D.  
        In contrast, the Greens/EFA has three working groups which are organized according to 
policy areas rather than associative committees which results in much smaller membership of 
each as only a select number of members are invited to join. The ECR do not have working 
groups but they have established a Policy Development Group which identifies potential policy 
divides and in the future may evolve into working groups on the Greens/EFA model as the ECR 
grows in size and re-organizes after its second European Parliament election.  
       Each of these first three decision-making stages (where applicable) provides opportunities 
for group leaders (and staff) to identify and resolve differences prior to the group meeting or to at 
the least identify divisions and take them to the group meeting. As Ringe (2010) notes, “The 
communication network centered on committee and in some cases also working groups is 
designed to reduce and relieve the workload of a party group and to solidify a common position 
(Ringe, 2010, 60). Ringe also contends that due to information-overload or deficiencies in 
information at the MEP level, committees and (where applicable) horizontal working groups 
provide a valuable aide for MEPs to make voting decisions. “There is no time to discuss every 
report in detail in the party group meeting. Technical issues are addressed in the working group 
or committee with broader issues discussed in the group meeting” (Ringe, 2010, 63). 
       The party group meeting is an opportunity for the group to meet as a whole and this occurs 
normally prior to plenary. The meeting agenda typically consists of reports from members on 
national political developments and discussion of legislation led by the rapporteur, coordinators, 
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and other influential members. In some groups, the meeting is a forum for resolving disputes 
through (unrecorded) votes which set the official group line when one is not clearly identified 
prior to the meeting or when a deadlock exists prior to the meeting at the horizontal working 
group level or is perceived by leadership to exist among the entire the group.  
       One goal of my study has been to clarify how working group and party group meetings 
contribute to low group dissent rates. I find that the more cohesive party groups utilize horizontal 
working groups and party group meetings to identify and address dissent through lobbying and 
socialization. For example, a rapporteur or other leader may openly respond to the points raised 
by a dissenting MEP during the course of group discussions or lobby them privately as others 
address the group. Similarly, the presidents and other leaders in the more cohesive groups make 
appeals for group unity and link its importance to the group‟s shared identity and values.  
       In turn, the more cohesive party groups are those whose members highly value the role of 
group forums (See Garner and Letki 2005). For example, I find that the Greens/EFA are in part 
the most cohesive group because their members not only value group meetings but also 
participate at far higher rates than their counterparts in other groups, while Greens/EFA leaders 
use the meeting to re-enforce a shared identity, norms governing behavior, and the 
political/policy rationale for adhering to the group line. In contrast, while the ALDE do highly 
value the role of the party group meeting and utilize it to build consensus, they on the whole do 
not share a similar view of the horizontal working groups. Meanwhile, the three smaller and least 
cohesive party groups do not fully utilize party group meetings for dissent management and their 
members regard the meetings as consensus-building forums to comparatively lesser degrees. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
       Field research was conducted in two phases with one occurring from mid-September to mid-
November 2011 and the second from mid-May to mid-July 2012 in Brussels, Belgium and 
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Strasbourg, France. The European Parliament meets for twelve four-day part-sessions in plenary 
each year in Strasbourg and six two-day part-sessions in plenary in Brussels with committee, 
working group and party group meetings making-up the bulk of the schedule over a three-week 
period each month in Brussels. However, working and party group meetings are also held in 
Strasbourg before and after plenary each day. In all, I interviewed eighty-four subjects and 
observed thirty-three party group forums. Observation not only provided greater insight into the 
role and function of party group meetings as well as committee and plenary sessions within the 
legislative process, but also helped to pinpoint the specific dissent management roles of 
particular party group leaders (group president, parliamentary secretary, etc.) as well as the 
contributions of the secretary-general and other staff. Meeting observations also served as 
corroboration or at times as challenges to assertions made by subjects during interviews. 
       Access to party group meetings varied in terms of location. For example, the EPP and S & D 
meeting rooms in Strasbourg cannot accommodate staff, so I sat with staff in another room 
listening to the meeting, whereas for EPP and S & D meetings in Brussels I was in the room with 
the MEPs and staff. Otherwise, I was always in the room with MEPs and staff in the other party 
groups at both sites. I was similarly always in the room with MEPs and staff in committee 
meetings and I was always in the public galleries when observing plenary sessions at both sites.  
       I did not bring recording devices into meetings per my agreement with each group, but I did 
take notes which were coded for reference to dissent management strategies, variations in dissent 
levels, or discussion of national politics, as well as for corroboration or challenges to the 
responses offered by interview subjects to various questions. Table 1.4 below depicts the number 
of observations of the respective party groups and horizontal working groups in each research 
phase. I will provide greater detail on meeting observations in the next chapter.  
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TABLE 1.4: OBSERVED PARTY GROUP FORUMS 
   ALDE    ECR     EFD    EPP GREENS   GUE   S & D   TOTAL 
PARTY GROUP 5    2     2    6 5        3       4           27 
WORKING GROUP 2   NA     NA    2 0        NA     2             6 
Note: Table depicts number of observations of party group and horizontal working group meetings during 
the two phases of field research (2011-2012). NA (Not Applicable) refers to groups who do not have 
horizontal working groups. N of Cases (Observations): 33 
 
        My approach to observation is influenced by Ross‟ 1995 study of the European 
Commission and heavily by Fenno‟s studies of the U.S. Congress. Observation according to 
Fenno (1990) entails the “practice of gathering data by watching and talking to people in their 
natural habitats” (Fenno, 1990, 6). The purpose of observing elected officials and other elites 
according to Fenno is exploratory-to produce ideas that might not otherwise occur without 
observing the subjects and/or processes-and requires an open mind and flexibility in approach in 
terms of the details of the research plan and in any presumptions about the subjects and processes 
to be studied (Fenno, 1990, 57).  
TABLE 1.5: INTERVIEWS BY RESEARCH PHASE AND SUBJECT CATEGORY 
RESEARCH STAGE   MEPS   STAFF    TOTAL 
ONE     21     17         38 
TWO     40      6         46 
Note: Table depicts number of interviews by research phase and by subject category broadly defined here 
as MEPs or staff.  N of Cases (Interviews): 84 
 
       In turn, interviews provide further insight that when combined with participant observation 
enables the researcher to consistently assess both data and the research plan in general. 
According to Rubin and Rubin (2005), “through qualitative interviews you can understand 
experiences and reconstruct events in which you did not participate” (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 3). 
Goldstein (2002) identifies three basic goals when conducting interviews: (1) gathering 
information from a sample of officials in order to make generalizable claims about 
characteristics or decisions, (2) discovering a particular piece of information, and (3) informing 
or guiding work that uses other sources of data (Goldstein, 2002, 669).  
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       Interviews primarily targeted elites in terms of party group leaders and within the group 
secretariat (please refer Figure 1.2 on Pg. 20) in order to assess the dissent management role and 
tactics of group leaders and to receive first-hand accounts from those responsible for dissent 
management. Additional interviews targeted frequently dissenting MEPs, new MEPs and other 
staff. For example, as we know little about the dissent management role of group presidents and 
vice-presidents, I contacted all of those holding these positions in all of the groups. Dissenting 
MEPs were identified through: roll-call votes, plenary speeches (explanations of vote), and 
information obtained during observations and other interviews. I will address the logistics 
associated with interviews and the degree to which the sample is representative of the broader 
population in more detail in the next chapter. 
       Explanations for party group unity based upon interview responses provide first-hand 
accounts of the processes and persons contributing to party group unity that cannot be obtained 
by roll-call vote studies. However, studies relying heavily on interviews as data sources must 
also take into account that responses are products of bias derived in part from individual 
characteristics and experiences, as well as from group or institutional memberships. Group 
membership may influence responses to interview questions in that a member of a group may not 
be able to maintain objectivity about the decisions taken by the group‟s leaders and by the group 
as a whole depending on the degree of closeness a member feels to a group (Russell, 2012, 6). 
For example, if an MEP strongly identifies with their party group, they may provide responses 
that place the group in the most positive light, whereas respondents with weak or negative 
associations with their party group may purposefully provide answers downplaying the influence 
of or criticizing certain persons or processes.  
28 
 
       Consequently, collecting responses from those closest to the phenomenon in question carries 
both the reward of acquiring first-hand explanations from (potentially) informed experts as well 
as the risk of deferring to biased interpretations derived from memberships and experiences.     
With these considerations in mind, explanations of party group unity by respondents familiar 
with the internal processes of the European Parliament will help to shape conclusions concerning 
party group dissent level variation. However, respondent biases are taken into account when 
analyzing data collected from interviews and are then compared to findings drawn from field 
research and previous studies of the European Parliament in order to assess their reliability as 
explanations for party group unity. Finally, responses are often placed within the context of party 
group membership in order to more thoroughly examine both perceived and actual differences 
between party groups in regards to group level organizational and socialization processes. 
       Interview content was coded from transcripts of audio recordings or written notes (when 
consent for recording by the subject was not provided) and notated for reference to the dissent 
management process, examples of dissent, and for responses following the anticipated five-
response scale developed for each question both prior to and during field research. The questions 
act as indicators of explanations for party group unity with the responses serving as dependent 
variables. In turn, a series of respondent characteristics (party group membership, position within 
the party group, length of service in the parliament, member-state background, gender, and 
previous profession) act as indicators of the likelihood of offering a given response.  
       For example, respondents were asked what role vice-presidents played in ensuring group 
unity. Responses to this question were organized into a five-scale set and analysis through Stata 
assessed the extent to which respondent characteristics indicated the likelihood of offering a 
given response (members of less cohesive groups were more likely to assign an administrative 
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role to vice-presidents, respondents with more service in the parliament were more likely to 
assign a dissent management role, etc.) In turn, as responses were of a categorical nature, 
Cramér's V scores were utilized as a measure of strength of association for each question 
between the likelihood of offering a given response and the response set as a whole with the 
statistical significance of each Cramér's V score determined by the accompanying p-value 
obtained through Stata. Finally, the discussion of responses to each question are framed in the 
respective chapters according to the overall response pattern as well as to which statistically 
significant characteristics (group membership, years of service, etc.) are the strongest predictors. 
CHAPTER PREVIEWS 
       Chapter Two (Research Design) provides a rationale for utilizing qualitative methods 
followed by a review of the field research timeline (via the European Parliament Calendar) and 
the logistical challenges associated with booking interviews and gaining access to party group 
and other meetings. The chapter next addresses specific challenges associated with qualitative 
field research (subject anonymity, the recording of interviews and observations, etc.) followed by 
an evaluation of interview participant selection and venue selection for observation including a 
review of interview question sets which form the basis of hypotheses testing throughout the 
dissertation. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of coding schemes for data obtained 
through interviews and observation. 
       Chapter Three (Properties of Dissent) defines dissent and dissent management. The chapter 
first considers explanations from respondents for why they at times dissent from the group line. 
Responses in turn suggest particular rationale (individual opinion vs. differing national line) help 
to frame approaches to dissent management by party group leaders. Dissent expression is next 
defined according to a scale created by Crowe (1983) which I have modified to reflect voting 
procedures and options in the European Parliament. The chapter also includes analysis of roll-
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call vote data collected during the two phases of field research highlighting dissent level 
variation in regards to particular forms of dissent expression (abstaining, not voting, etc.) and to 
specific stages in plenary (amendments, whole reports, etc.). The chapter concludes with a 
review of dissent management roles of particular group leaders and forums as well as possible 
dissent management tactics ranging from disciplinary measures to socialization processes.  
       Chapter Four (Explaining Party Group Unity) builds on the foundation set in the 
introduction and chapter three by identifying explanations for both the overall high group 
cohesion rates in the European Parliament as well as the variation in dissent levels among party 
groups. The chapter first considers explanations obtained through roll-call vote studies by Simon 
Hix and various co-authors, a model stressing the relationship between perceived preference by 
MEPs and voting behavior (Ringe 2010) and other models emphasizing shared 
conceptualizations of group identity (Brown 2000) and socialization through the diffusion of 
norms within groups (Garner and Letki 2005). The chapter next analyzes responses to the 
question of what explains why most of party group members vote the same way in plenary most 
of the time. Responses were organized into five categories: beliefs and values, communication, 
plenary coalitions, deferral to experts and group unity is not important, with respondents often 
offering multiple responses. The overall response pattern when considered within the context of 
group membership demonstrates that the more cohesive groups are those that build a shared 
group identity and engage in constant communication through a well-defined whip structure and 
decision-making forums (in particular party groups meetings) to identify and manage dissent.  
       Chapter Five (Discipline as a Dissent Management Tool) considers the extent to which party 
group leaders utilize disciplinary tools to ensure low dissent rates through responses to three 
questions, (1) Is dissent considered by leaders in your group when plenary speaking time is 
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allocated, (2) Is dissent considered when rapporteurs are assigned, and (3) What is the attitude by 
leaders in your group toward plenary amendments sponsored by members that are contrary to the 
group line? The more cohesive party groups consider dissent when assigning prominent reports 
but otherwise only consider expertise and committee work/attendance when assigning the bulk of 
reports. In turn, as groups have finite minutes, speaking time in plenary debates is first reserved 
for those who worked on the report with time normally allocated to dissenting members though 
in the more cohesive groups they are often assigned the last slot(s). Respondents also noted that 
MEPs have other outlets for expressing dissent such as explanations of vote which circumvent 
disciplinary efforts by leaders. Finally, respondents across party groups maintained that 
amendments tabled by individual MEPs were rare in plenary and often ignored by group leaders 
as they were almost certain to fail in the absence of group sponsorship.  
       Chapter Six (Leaders and Dissent Management) considers responses to four questions 
concerning the dissent management role of specific party group leaders. The chapter first 
considers responses to two questions concerning the role of group presidents (1) How does your 
group president(s) contribute to group unity and (2) When does your group president(s) become 
involved in ensuring group unity? Apart from ALDE respondents, those in most other groups 
were more likely to assign a consensus-building role for the group president only on prominent 
reports. In order to identify the dissent management role of group vice-presidents I asked two 
questions (1) How do vice-presidents contribute to group unity, and (2) What role does the group 
whip or parliamentary secretary play in ensuring group unity? Respondents from the most 
cohesive party groups assigned a prominent dissent management role to vice-presidents or 
secretary-generals. In contrast, respondents from the less cohesive party groups assign an 
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administrative or no role at all for vice-presidents or in the case of the ECR assign a clearly-
defined dissent management role only to the group whip.  
       Chapter Seven (Party Group Forums and Dissent Management) considers the role of 
horizontal working groups (where applicable) and party group meetings. Respondents were 
asked how working groups and party group meetings contributed to the unity of their party 
group. Most respondents from the three most cohesive party groups believed that working groups 
contributed to high cohesion levels on all reports while ALDE respondents negatively viewed 
working group meetings. In turn, respondents from the more cohesive party groups were more 
likely to view group meetings as vital forums for building support for the group line primarily on 
prominent reports. In contrast, most respondents in the two least cohesive party groups regarded 
party group meetings primarily as forums to discuss national politics. In all, group meetings 
provide an opportunity for leaders to identify and manage dissent and for members to contribute 
to the development of the group line which in turn strengthens the cohesion of the group in that 
members who regard group meetings as vital forums are more likely to support the group line 
and view themselves as group members rather than solely as individuals or as part of a national 
delegation (See Garner and Letki 2005).  
       Chapter Eight (Socialization and Party Group Cohesion) begins with a review of literature 
defining socialization, shared identity, and norms of behavior. From here, the chapter considers 
evidence of socialization through responses to two questions in the extensive Farrell et al. (2011) 
survey asking MEPs to define their identities as well as the perceived importance of party group 
unity. MEPs from the most cohesive party group, the Greens/EFA, are the most likely to self-
identify as Europeans. In contrast, MEPs from the least cohesive groups were more likely to 
view themselves according to their national origins. In turn, MEPs from the most cohesive party 
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groups were more likely to perceive that appearing unified is important for the group. As part of 
my field research, I asked when it was acceptable to dissent from the group line. Nearly all 
MEPs in the more cohesive groups maintained that there were norms in place governing dissent 
announcement. When asked to identify what help is provided to new MEPs, EPP and S & D 
respondents stated that new MEPs are primarily offered help in committees, ALDE respondents 
maintained that no help is provided for new MEPs, while ECR respondents noted that most help 
for new MEPs is provided by their delegations. In turn, though GUE and EFD respondents noted 
that extensive help was provided for new MEPs, there are no expectations for group unity.  
       Chapter Nine (Summary of Findings and Future Research) reviews the impetus for 
explaining variation in party group cohesion rates in the European Parliament and considers the 
next steps in examining the research question. After recounting the assertions made in the first 
chapter, chapter nine reviews the research design and definitions of dissent and cohesion before 
recounting the explanations for group unity offered in chapter four. From here, the chapter 
reviews the limitations associated with disciplinary tools available to party group leaders and re-
examines the role of leaders and group forums as part of a whip structure which identifies and 
addresses dissent at every legislative stage. The chapter next recounts the contributions of 
socialization processes toward fostering a shared identity and aiding in dissent management 
efforts by group leaders before presenting a summary of explanations for dissent level variation 
among party groups. The chapter concludes with consideration of future research emphasizing 
the need following new elections in May 2014 for a mass survey of MEPs to fully gauge 
perceived roles of party group leaders and the extent of socialization within party groups. The 
survey will primarily consist of questions reflecting a modification of the Isolation Index, Whip 
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
INTRODUCTION        
       In the previous chapter, I provided the rationale for a field research study examining the 
relationship between dissent management and party group dissent levels in the European 
Parliament. I proposed that MEP ideology at the individual level in conjunction with a whip 
structure and socialization processes at the group level explains dissent level variation among 
party groups. In addition to foreshadowing upcoming chapters, I briefly reviewed the evolving 
legislative powers of the European Parliament and demonstrated that it is has become a nearly 
equal EU decision-making body. In turn, the organization of MEPs into ideological umbrella 
party groups, the absence of a government-opposition structure, and the parliament‟s 
increasingly influential role in European integration provides a unique setting in which to 
examine how legislative party leaders obtain relatively high cohesion rates. 
       Why are party group cohesion levels on the whole so high and what explains the variation in 
dissent levels among party groups? While past roll-call vote studies (See Hix et al. 2007) have 
provided invaluable information about party group cohesion patterns and have contributed to a 
greater understanding of the legislative processes in the European Parliament, some unanswered 
questions remain. In part, these gaps derive from the limitations associated with roll-call vote 
studies in that they are unrepresentative of all plenary votes (See Carrubba et al. 2006). In 
addition, roll-call vote studies fail to capture hidden processes associated with dissent 
management; particularly the behind-the-scenes role of leaders and socialization processes. 
       For example, we know very little about the dissent management roles of party group 
presidents or vice-presidents, as well as about how party group leaders collaborate to identify 
dissenting members in order to convince them to follow the group line or to dissent at less costly 
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levels (voting to abstain or opposing the group on an amendment but not an entire report). It is 
this focus on leaders in terms of assigned and perceived dissent management roles that in part 
distinguishes this research project from other European Parliament studies. If dissent level 
variation among party groups is to be fully explained, I contend that it is necessary to identify 
successful dissent management strategies and structures.  
       In turn, this project differs from past studies in its consideration of the contributions of a 
shared group identity and socialization processes to lower group dissent levels. While lobbying 
by group leaders on the policy or political merits can be an effective dissent management tactic, 
it is but only one tool available to group leaders. Accordingly, a more complete explanation for 
dissent level variation requires the inclusion of other dissent management strategies; particularly 
socialization processes in that those party groups with lower dissent levels are those that have 
successfully socialized members into following particular norms of behavior and have 
established a shared conceptualization of the group identity that is conducive to group unity. In 
this sense, this project also differs from past studies in that I propose that group cohesion should 
be more broadly defined to encompass members‟ attitudes toward group unity as well as 
cohesive plenary voting patterns (See Brown 2000). 
       In this chapter, I present the research design for examining party group dissent level 
variation. The chapter begins with a brief rationale for utilizing qualitative methods followed by 
a review of the field research timeline and the logistical challenges associated with data 
collection. The chapter next addresses specific challenges associated with qualitative field 
research followed by an evaluation of interview participant and venue selection for observation 
including a review of interview question sets which form the basis of hypotheses testing. The 
chapter concludes with an evaluation of interview and observation data coding schemes. 
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WHY USE QUALITATIVE METHODS? 
       I chose to primarily utilize qualitative methods when researching party groups in the 
European Parliament because of the limitations associated with studies relying solely upon 
quantitative data. As discussed in earlier chapters, only approximately thirty-five percent of votes 
in plenary sessions are roll-called (See Roland 2009 and Kreppel 2002) while the available roll-
call votes are not representative of all plenary votes in that legislation from particular committees 
or in particular legislative stages are rarely roll-called (See Carrubba et al. 2006). In addition, 
votes taken in committees and in party group meetings are never roll-called. This means that we 
do not know the full extent of dissent in that dissent may be more common when votes are not 
roll-called or that particular forms of dissent expression (voting against the group line on an 
amendment, but not the group line on final action) may be more common as well.  
       Beyond limitations associated with data availability, there are also limitations associated 
with the available data. Roll-call votes do not tell the whole story of how particular levels of 
dissent in terms of extent and expression came about or conversely were averted (See 
Morgenstern, 2004). Accordingly, I contend that the most effective approach to identifying 
dissent management strategies by legislative party leaders and their impact upon dissent levels is 
to talk directly to the actors involved in party group decision-making and dissent management 
and to observe the venues in which MEP decision-making and socialization occurs 
       Previous field studies have provided valuable insight into EU institutions such as that by 
Ross (1995) into the activities of the European Commission. Ross observed the Commission for 
six months in 1991 after having gained access through staff contacts in meetings facilitated by 
his university. He focused primarily upon “hot dossiers” or important policy areas in his process-
tracing efforts and was given access to cabinet officials, staff, and Commission President Jacques 
Delors on several occasions (Ross, 1995, vii). 150 interviews with Commission personnel were 
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concluded along with interviews of Delors and his cabinet which supplemented observations of 
these subjects in their daily interactions and in official meetings (Ross, 1995, viii). From 
interviews and observations, Ross determined the hierarchy and communication pathways 
among the staff and between the staff and Commission officials, in addition to the actual and 
presumed expectations of all actors involved (Ross, 1995, 62).  
       Within the European Parliament literature, interviews have helped to clarify institutional 
processes and decision-making such as the interview below that provides a glimpse into dissent 
management through the roles of the group coordinator and rapporteur. 
“We have to clearly ensure that the political group is moving along the same track, so that we get 
a majority in plenary, because some rapporteurs just write a report the way they like. Of course 
as a coordinator one also has the responsibility to step back, but we have the responsibility for 
the group‟s behavior and always have to be ready to step in” (Quoted in Settembri and Neuhold, 
2009, 141-142). 
 
       While a few studies have utilized interviews to various degrees, they have not to my 
knowledge targeted party group elites en masse or considered a broad range of dissent 
management tactics to explain dissent level variation. In this sense, this study of the European 
Parliament that I have undertaken not only builds upon other past mixed method European 
Parliament studies but is also to my knowledge unique in regards to the targeting, subject area, 
and number of interviews, and also in that interviews are supplemented by observation of 
political party meetings normally closed to the public and other outside observers.  
       The research plan in the tradition of Fenno primarily targets party group elites in terms of 
leaders and within the group secretariats. Both leaders and key staff can reveal processes and 
strategies hidden in roll-call vote data with rank-and-file MEPs supplementing or disputing these 
findings. According to Crowe (1983), “Party leaders comprise the most important reference 
group about expectations about rules of the game” (Crowe, 1983, 913). Rules of the game in 
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relation to this study refer to the organizational and the tactical components of dissent 
management by group leaders who set or influence the development of and in turn pursue the 
widespread adoption of the group line. In this sense, a full explanation of dissent level variation 
among party groups requires an understanding of the assignment of particular leadership 
responsibilities and the adoption of particular dissent management strategies which in turn 
requires an elite-centered field study.  
       Though discussing the benefits of participant observation, Glaser‟s (1996) comments can 
also be applied to the use of interviews in that both provide a frame of reference for the actors in 
terms of a set of alternatives that are given consideration in the choice process in that they reveal 
how MEPs or staff reason, but also where the alternatives come from in the first place (Glaser, 
1996, 533-534). In other words, interviews and observation together can not only test hypotheses 
in the wake of quantitative data limitations but also provide frames in which to explore possible 
explanations for group dissent level variation.  
       The primary goal of the preliminary research model was to interview as many party group 
leaders as possible as well as key staff in order to obtain a representative sample within and 
across party groups for hypotheses testing. Other forms of data collection such as surveys with 
pre-determined answer sets can test hypotheses across samples of targeted populations, but 
interviews go much further in revealing hidden processes or preferred strategies because the 
subject can provide examples and clarifications through individual experiences, as well as 
personal interpretations of group orientations and structures that survey data are less effective in 
identifying (Quinn, 2002, 17). While interviews are valuable tools for examining dissent 
management and the primary focus of this field study, there are limitations to what people can 
say in terms of time constraints, recollection, or due to sentence construction (Quinn, 2002, 21). 
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       Therefore, interviews are at their most effective as methodological tools when accompanied 
by observation of the venues in which dissent management and dissent expression takes place 
and is shaped. Observation according to Fenno (1990) entails the practice of gathering data by 
watching and talking to people in their natural habitats (Fenno, 1990, 6). In turn, the purpose of 
observing elected officials and other elites is exploratory-to produce ideas that might not 
otherwise occur without observing the subjects and/or processes (Fenno, 1990, 57). Interviews 
and observations are interconnected in that each provides a frame of reference in terms of what 
to look for, who to talk to, what to ask, and how to evaluate data collected through both methods.  
RESEARCH TIMELINE  
       Field research was conducted in two phases due to financial and time constraints. The first 
occurred from September 18-November 14 2011 and the second from May 28 to June 27 2012. 
The schedule below is taken from the European Parliament Website (www.europarl.europa.eu).  
The parliament meets three weeks each month in Brussels and one week monthly in Strasbourg 
with normally a summer recess from mid-July through the end of August except every five years 
when European Parliament elections are held in June. 
PHASE ONE (2011)     PHASE TWO (2012) 
September 6-8: Group Meetings   May 29-31, June 4: Committees 
September 12-15: Plenary Week   June 5-7: Group Meetings 
September 19-22: Group Meetings   June 11-14: Plenary Week 
September 26-29: Plenary Week   June 18-21, 25: Committees 
October 3-6, 10-11: Committees   June 26-28: Group Meetings 
October 12-13: Plenary (Brussels)    
October 17: Committees 
October 18-20: Group Meetings 
October 24-27: Plenary Week 
October 31-November 4: Out of Session 
November 7: Committees 
November 8-10: Group Meetings 
 
       The parliament will occasionally hold day and a half plenary sessions in Brussels as listed 
under the first phase but otherwise plenary weeks are when the parliament sits from Monday 
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afternoon through Thursday afternoon for debates, speeches, and questioning of the members of 
other EU institutions (Commission, Ombudsman, etc.) with votes taken on Tuesday through 
Thursday. Except when votes are scheduled, the chamber is nearly empty with most MEPs either 
in their offices or in meetings, while group leaders and other key MEPs also schedule events 
such as press availability. Horizontal working group meetings are held throughout the day on 
Tuesday and Wednesday
1
. Party group meetings are scheduled for one hour on Monday evening 
and for two hours each on Tuesday and Wednesday evenings.  
       Committees conduct most of their formal business on the assigned days though individual 
MEPs or delegations will sometimes schedule meetings with constituents or policy-themed 
events on these days as well. Group meeting days are in part reserved for party groups to meet 
just before Strasbourg with each group meeting once in that week. Horizontal and vertical 
working groups are also scheduled around the group meetings. This is also the time when 
national delegations within party groups hold their private meetings and some of the more vital 
committees (Budget) meet as well. Other formal meetings across party groups are held 
infrequently each week including: rapporteurs from each group on a given report, the presidents 
of each group (Conference of Presidents), and group secretary-generals.    
TABLE 2.1: INTERVIEWS BY RESEARCH PHASE 
RESEARCH STAGE   MEPS   STAFF    TOTAL 
ONE     21     17         38 
TWO     40      6         46 
Note: N of Cases: 84 
 
       The first phase of field research occurred during the stage of parliament when the budget is 
being discussed and sent to the Council of Ministers. This complicated the booking of elite 
interviews and helps to explain as Table One above depicts why the first stage contained more 
                                                          
1
 Horizontal working groups are members from a party group across related committees like agriculture and 
environment meeting together while vertical working groups consist of members from a group in a single 
committee. As they are broader venues, I targeted horizontal working groups for observation. 
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staff than MEP interviews and fewer total interviews than the second stage. In addition to the 
complications brought on by the legislative process, the first stage also ran into an obstacle of an 
entire week in which the parliament was not in session and MEPs and staff were back in their 
member-states. Though I was able to book interviews with staff from the European parties 
during this downtime, it was on the whole a lost week for field research.  
       Having gone through the first phase, I determined that I should return in the summer rather 
than in the fall in part because there would be no weeks when the parliament was not in session. 
Table one verifies that both the overall number of interviews and specifically the number of 
MEP interviews increased in a shorter timeframe compared to the first phase of field research 
despite the schedule constraints associated with the economic crisis. When I scheduled 
interviews, I didn‟t draw from a random sample of group leaders or staff. Instead as the universe 
of leaders (as well as my time) was limited, I contacted every member of group leadership and 
every key member of the secretariat (secretary-generals, aides to group leaders, etc.) for an 
interview in order to meet with as many subjects as possible.  
       However as phase one progressed and as I prepared for phase two, I did ensure that I was 
achieving a balance in regards to group membership, leadership/staff position, as well as 
between leadership and staff. For example, in stage two, I contacted each of the twenty-two 
group coordinators in the five largest groups as well as some in the two smallest having focused 
on group presidents, vice-presidents, as well as rank-and-file MEPs and staff in the first phase.  
       In regards to scheduling observations, I attended more committee meetings and stayed 
longer to observe plenary debates in the first phase compared to the second. This was due in part 
to more interviews and more time spent on booking interviews, but also because I only obtained 
access to horizontal working group meetings just prior to or in the early stage of the second 
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phase. Once this access was obtained, I observed fewer committee meetings and plenary debates 
in the second phase as they were not the primary target of my research. 
       The parliamentary calendar had a further effect upon field research logistics in that group 
meeting weeks were the easiest to schedule interviews as much of the day was open for members 
that week, whereas I scheduled few interviews in Strasbourg with many often canceled at the last 
minute. Both phases coincided with the ongoing Euro crisis and the deepening of European 
integration which provided an informative setting for studying dissent management by leaders in 
party group meetings while also providing useful references when structuring interviews.  
       The parliamentary calendar at times complicated observation, in particular, the tendency of 
party groups to schedule their meetings largely at the same time on a particular day. For 
example, the larger party groups would each schedule as many as two horizontal working group 
meetings at the same time. At times, I would deal with this by leaving one meeting to view 
another, but on the whole I stayed for an entire meeting in order to observe its impact and 
process from start to finish. Luckily, there was usually one other meeting scheduled later in the 
day to view as well. Similarly, party group meetings in Strasbourg were all scheduled at the same 
time resulting in three complete or five partial observations that respective week.          
       One final note on scheduling is a reminder that the best research while efficiently structured 
and executed is also that which is flexible. In other words, the researcher should not be 
constrained by scheduling (Glaser, 1996, 534). For example, there were occasions in which I 
booked an interview over the phone and was told if I hurried up to the office now, the MEP 
would grant an interview. There were times when I couldn‟t accommodate these offers, but on 
the whole, I scheduled calling for interviews at times that left me available for such last minute 
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opportunities. Similarly, when an interview was re-scheduled or cancelled at the last minute, I 
either viewed some meeting or used the time to book more interviews or review media accounts.    
DATA COLLECTION 
       Field research would not have been possible without the assistance of the European 
parliament staff as well as select staff among the party groups (please refer to 
acknowledgements). Just as Fenno (1990) utilized staff and elected official contacts to access 
events and schedule other interviews, I utilized relationships and applied the lessons learned 
from each phase toward obtaining interviews and securing access to particular meetings or 
events. I had first visited with senior members of most of the group secretariats in October of 
2009 in order to gain access to party group meetings. After spending a year trying to obtain 
funding, I approached the remaining group secretariats through emails prior to the first phase and 
obtained access which in part was the result of references by key staff in other groups and my 
frequent presence in a variety of settings which lent further credence to my credentials. 
        In the initial request, I included the amount of time intended for the interview, the basic 
outlines of research goals, and the name of my advisor along with contact information. Per 
Goldstein (2002), the email requesting an interview included some ground rules for the 
interview, (language, anonymity, etc.), and how the information will be gathered (audio 
recording or by taking notes) and later released to the public (Goldstein, 2002, 671).  
       Interview booking in the first phase consisted of email requests during the first week 
followed by follow-up email requests in the second week and phone calls and additional emails 
from there. I learned three valuable lessons in regards to booking. First, MEPs and their staff on 
the whole rarely check the official MEP email account. They will often only do so after you call 
and then request that you send another email and then they normally respond. Second, the initial 
email (which I sent a month prior to my arrival before each phase) should be sent to the office 
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account (name-office) of the MEP which is checked frequently each day by staff. Finally and 
perhaps most importantly, persistent phone calls are required in order to obtain even 
consideration for interviews. As a result, the average interview was secured only after a 
minimum of two emails AND at least two phone calls, with some bookings requiring as many as 
twelve attempts at communication on my part.  
       This is in some ways similar to the experience of Britton (2005) in her study of women MPs 
in the South African Parliament at least in regards to booking persistence. Britton selected a 
sample of thirty percent of female MPs in each party in the parliament for a total of thirty-nine 
women. The targeted sample was determined by ethnic, geographical, and socio-economic 
background. Contacting thirty women MPs typically resulted in only three interviews. Britton 
would typically speak with ten, with five agreeing to an interview and three keeping the 
appointment. The number of interviews was expanded by “squatting” in MP offices, becoming 
acquainted with staff, and through assistance of initial interviewees (Britton, 2005, 161-162).  
       I learned similar lessons from my initial research phase. First, I found that when I “name-
dropped” senior members of the group secretariat or particular MEPs it helped to secure 
additional interviews. Similarly, referencing certain MEPs in emails and phone calls to offices 
helped to secure additional interviews, particularly if they were from the same delegation or 
served on the same committee or horizontal working group. These tactics helped to transform my 
request from that of yet another graduate student wanting access to that of a person who had 
been recommended by a close friend or colleague. 
       Interviews also led to other interviews. This is sometimes referred to as “snowballing” in 
that an interview may bring up additional names or place emphasis on particular actors that was 
initially missing (Glaser, 1996, 534). Interviews at times also served to highlight the importance 
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of processes such as horizontal working groups that once I understood their importance within 
the dissent management structure led me to secure access to these meetings for the second phase 
and reference them in my interview question set.  
       Interviews were mostly recorded on a digital recorder and I always asked permission to 
record the interview. There were two occasions in the second phase in which the recorder was 
full and I had to take notes for the remainder of the interview. All interview transcripts were 
saved in three locations: a flash drive, on the laptop desktop and on a CD. Twelve of the eighty-
four interviews were not recorded. Five were due to the subject not wanting to be recorded. Two 
were on the phone instead of in-person in order to accommodate MEPs when traveling. The 
other six were email responses to questions. For example, the interview of EPP President Daul 
was by email because he didn‟t speak English and due to his busy schedule found it easier to 
reply to my questions in French at his own leisure. 
       Sharing a transcript with the subject builds trust and ensures accuracy (Rubin and Rubin, 
2005, 98). I indicated in the email and when greeting the individual at the start of the interview 
that the purpose of the research was for my dissertation with the findings to be published and that 
a transcript would be provided upon request. Interview transcripts were sent to subjects for their 
own records and for them to provide additional information or clarification as needed. As I noted 
above, only a small number of interview subjects did not want their interviews recorded. In these 
cases, I submitted a copy of notes for their review which was often necessary for clarification 
purposes given the limitations of note-taking that I mention above.  
       Parliamentary buildings in some ways impacted data collection. The parliament in Brussels 
is situated in four buildings connected by skywalks. I had to take in consideration which 
building, wing of each building, and floor I would be at for an interview or observation when 
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planning my schedule. In Strasbourg, the parliament consists of three connected buildings with 
offices in one and meeting rooms in the others. On the whole, it was easy to navigate the 
building network once I acquired greater familiarity.       
       I observed party group meetings where they took place in Brussels and for all but the EPP 
group in Strasbourg. The meeting rooms in Strasbourg were smaller and so I had to arrive early 
and often name-drop (I am a guest of so-and-so) in order to get a seat, while I sat in a separate 
room with EPP staff for their group meeting.
2
 Working group meetings were held in the same 
rooms as the party group meeting, while committees had reserved rooms elsewhere. Fenno 
always carried a notebook recording what he saw and heard and any observations he drew at or 
subsequently from the events with an overall chronological approach to organizing the notes 
(Fenno, 1990, 83). A diary is useful to describe what occurred, when it took place, and its 
duration, as well as are ongoing notes on emerging ideas or reflections upon past observations 
(Herbert and Irene Rubin, 2005, 77).  
      Interview transcripts and all field notes are organized chronologically. In addition to taking 
notes during interviews and when observing meetings, I would also jot down notes while 
walking in the parliament buildings and observing subjects in informal conditions. For example, 
I observed the Chief of Staff to EPP President Daul booking meetings and conducting 
negotiations in hallways whereas the secretary-general performed this same function in other 
groups. Either on the metro or walk back to the hotel, I assessed the day and kept a diary which 
helped in placing a particular observation or interview response in the proper context. Train trips 
to and from Strasbourg and Sundays in Brussels also provided time to reflect and review. 
                                                          
2
 The EPP were the only group to provide me with a letter for access. For the other six groups, I eventually became 
acquainted with parliamentary security and key actors, but even late into the second phase I had to resort at times to 
name-dropping in order to secure and maintain a seat, especially in Strasbourg. 
49 
 
       Fenno rarely used tape-recorders because observations were fast moving events or made 
people uncomfortable and less spontaneous (Fenno, 1990, 81). I couldn‟t use a digital recorder in 
observations of party group or working group meetings for two reasons. First, I had promised in 
my request for access that I would not record these often sensitive meetings. Even if I had not 
offered this or had groups allowed me to record, the logistics of meetings make recording 
difficult if not impossible as I often had to listen to the proceedings through headphones. In 
addition, the meetings of the larger groups consist of over hundred or more MEPs plus party 
group staff and MEP personal assistants, not counting guests of MEPs and observers from other 
EU institutions or prospective EU member-states. Even in the smaller groups like GUE and the 
EFD (thirty-eight members plus others) the audience was too large to accommodate recording.  
       The discussion of logistics above has raised the constraints brought about by my very 
limited comprehension of French. Luckily, nearly all MEPs I interviewed had a basic if not full 
grasp of the English language. Only one interview was in French, which was that of EPP 
President Daul via email. A KU French graduate student translated my questions and later Daul‟s 
responses. A follow-up interview was conducted via email in the second phase and translated 
again by the KU student. There were also five occasions in which the MEP‟s aide sat in on the 
interview to help with certain questions or particular phrases and words in their native language. 
Language constraints were non-existent in observations as parliamentary translators were 
available in plenary, party group, and working group meetings to translate the twenty-three 
languages used in the parliament while I took notes and listened through headphones. 
       The final component of data collection is ensuring the anonymity of interview subjects and 
observation participants. Fenno promised to never quote a politician or staffer without 
permission (Fenno, 1990, 64). Ensuring anonymity is important not only in an ethical sense, but 
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also in that an interview subject will feel more at ease knowing that they are not going to be cited 
and will often proceed to reveal hidden processes or provide valuable examples that would not 
be given if they were cited. It is therefore important to clarify such terms as “off the record”. The 
use of this term should literally mean that no mention of a particular statement or conversation 
will be made written or verbally elsewhere in the research or afterwards. In contrast, “not for 
attribution” means that the comments or information can be used so long as the subject is not 
directly identified (Goldstein, 2002, 671). I utilize the latter approach in this study. 
       All interviews were not attributed, which is to say that I do not cite any subject by name 
unless I am referencing a media article or other public source. In my Stata database where I 
coded interview responses, I note the leadership position, party group membership, and other 
respondent attributes and I assign a number for each subject in order to ensure anonymity. Their 
name is only referenced in the transcripts and in my interview schedule, neither of which will 
accompany the dissertation. In regards to interview responses, I disguise respondents by referring 
to the member‟s position (vice-president, coordinator, etc.) rather than their name and not citing 
their committees or other information that may reveal their identity.  
       I similarly disguise the participants and content of working group or party group meeting 
discussions in order to honor my agreement with the party groups not to reveal sensitive subjects. 
However, I do quote particular phrases used by the group president in order to illustrate their role 
as presiding officer of these meetings and at times as the focal point of dissent management. For 
example, I might note that EPP President Daul commented that “our unity will send a signal to 
the Council” without identifying the report or related information.  
CHALLENGES IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
       Data collection and logistics aside, there are other challenges related to qualitative research 
that must be addressed. Perhaps the greatest challenge of qualitative analysis lies in making 
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sense of massive amounts of data (Patton, 2002, 472). I simply cannot place every response from 
the nearly three hundred pages of interview transcripts and cite every occurrence from over a 
hundred pages of observation notes in my dissertation. For example, I chose not to include notes 
from group presidents‟ press conferences in chapter six due to the enormous amount of material 
gathered on group leaders. Once the material has been narrowed down, its utilization must be 
determined in terms of which chapter to place it in and with what topic to associate it with in 
order to provide context, support an assertion, or offer contrasting examples.   
       Compiling data according to Patton (1999) raises a set of challenges in that, “studies that use 
only one method are more vulnerable to errors linked to that particular method than are studies in 
which different types of data provide cross-data validity checks” (Patton, 1999, 1192). I address 
this in part by interviewing rank-and-file MEPs in addition to the target population of elites and 
also by observations, media accounts, and plenary speeches that provide valuable cross-checks. 
       Another challenge is that elite systems do not remain stable over time (Aberbach and 
Rockman, 2002, 675). The group secretariats remained stable during each phase though some 
staff did change positions. There was though a high MEP turnover rate with members leaving 
during the five-year parliament to assume national or local offices, or depart for health and other 
reasons. From August 2011 through July 1, 2012, forty-five MEPs were replaced out of seven 
hundred thirty-eight (www.europa.europarl.eu), with membership expanded to seven hundred 
fifty-six in January 2012 to accommodate provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. However, turnover 
and expansion provided me with additional interview contacts for new MEPs and did not detract 
from my focus on elites who remained in the parliament during both phases of field research.   
       In addition, studies relying heavily on interviews as data sources must also take into account 
that responses are products of bias derived in part from individual characteristics and 
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experiences, as well as from group or institutional memberships. As Putnam noted in his study of 
British and Italian MPs, “Politicians differ in the way they analyze policy problems…Some 
concentrate on broad social and moral principles, while others emphasize specific structures and 
details” (Putnam, 1971, 656). In turn, some respondents may define party group unity by broadly 
assessing the extent to which fellow group members have adopted common beliefs or share 
common backgrounds. Others may define party group unity more narrowly by referring to the 
success or failure of specific leadership roles, decision-making venues (party group meetings), or 
group socialization processes (norms governing dissent). 
       Group membership may also influence responses to interview questions in that a member of 
a group may not be able to maintain objectivity about the decisions taken by the group‟s leaders 
and by the group as a whole depending on the degree of closeness a member feels to a group 
(Russell, 2012, 6). For example, if an MEP strongly identifies with their party group, they may 
provide responses that place the group in the most positive light, whereas respondents with weak 
or negative associations with their party group may purposefully provide answers downplaying 
the influence of or criticizing certain persons or processes.  
       Consequently, collecting responses from those closest to the phenomenon in question carries 
both the reward of acquiring first-hand explanations from (potentially) informed experts as well 
as the risk of deferring to biased interpretations derived from memberships and experiences.     
With these considerations in mind, explanations of party group unity by respondents familiar 
with the internal processes of the European Parliament will help to shape conclusions concerning 
party group dissent level variation. However, respondent biases are taken into account when 
analyzing data collected from interviews and then compared to assessments drawn from field 
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research and previous studies of the European Parliament in order to assess their reliability as 
explanations for party group unity.  
       Other challenges can be placed in four categories: bias resulting from rapport or personal 
views, bias resulting from the presence of the researcher, issues relating to sampling including 
generalizing findings, and the competence of the researcher (Patton 1999, 1202). Spending a 
great deal of time in the same settings provides opportunities to facilitate relationships that can 
be beneficial to research as described above. On the other hand, if the researcher allows 
professional relationships to influence views of groups or individual actors, then the product of 
research and the approach to data collection will be compromised.  
       The key is to develop rapport while keeping intellectual distance (Glaser, 1996, 533). In all 
cases, just as I did not place a group in a bad light because a particular member or staffer was 
rude to me, I do not gloss over the challenges or deficiencies within a group just because 
someone was nice or helpful. Another source of bias may arise from the ideological beliefs of the 
researcher. I do not come to this research with any preferences for any of the party groups nor do 
I have any strong views on European integration. To ensure this bias was not assumed by the 
subjects of my research, I reiterated my academic status and never revealed my past experience 
in campaigns or state government except to a very small number of staffers when I thought 
collegiality might aid in gaining access to group meetings by offering reassurances that I 
understood firsthand the value of confidentiality. 
       A researcher can also impact those around them by their presence. This is many ways 
depends upon the form of observation research. In his Danish Parliament study, Damgaard 
(1980) noted that “Participant observation entails the researcher being an actor, while spectator 
observation relegates the researcher to onlooker status” (Damgaard, 1980, 107). Fenno‟s 
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observational studies of Congressmen in their home districts exemplifies participant observation 
in that the researcher took part in campaign volunteer activities, traveled with congressmen, and 
interacted with voters and others at events. My research can be classified as spectator 
observation in that I did not participate in any activities and instead sat in meetings and took 
notes, and never met with subjects outside of the parliament.  
       Observational studies have advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, as Damgaard notes, 
“observational studies place the researcher close to the subjects and processes they are in 
interested in examining and provide excellent opportunities for analyses of complex events and 
situations” (Damgaard, 1980, 107). However, the presence of the observer may contaminate the 
situation causing the people to be observed to behave differently than they otherwise might 
(Fenno, 1990, 77). The benefits though gained by extensive access outweigh the potential costs 
of subjects behaving differently and with time are reduced (Fenno, 1990, 71). 
       In the larger group meetings, I was in the back of a room with hundreds of people. Few, if 
any, MEPs noticed my presence. In the medium and smaller groups, I was more visible, but all 
groups have visitors and observers. I was never officially recognized by the president or singled 
out by others during a meeting. As far as I could tell it was business as usual and this was 
verified as the number of observations increased and I could compare proceedings. For example, 
in the smaller or medium groups (or in the horizontal working groups), particular MEPs would 
wave to me as they took their seats. Nonetheless, they went about their participation or non-
participation as they had before they met me.  
       Just as with survey research, qualitative studies must identify target populations and these in 
turn incur challenges associated with sampling, such as when generalizing. Among other 
attributes, Patton (2002) notes that sample size depends on what you know, purpose of the 
55 
 
inquiry, what will have creditability, and what can be done with applicable time and resources 
(Patton, 2002, 244). Using past cases studies as a model for sampling, I chose a strategic and 
purposeful selection model rather than random sampling in order to provide information-rich 
results (Patton, 2002, 241). As stated above, in order to understand why dissent levels are lower 
in some groups than others and to identify the roles and tactics utilized within dissent 
management by group leaders, my study required that I primarily interviewed elites among 
MEPs and staff and that I contact every member of leadership in each of the party groups. 
       A random sample of all MEPs and staff would have not captured the targeted categories 
among leaders and others. Had I in turn drawn a random sample of elites, it would have 
prevented me from speaking to as many subjects as possible and in securing sufficient data for 
analysis. In other words, a “Big N”, within a targeted population was desired in order to not only 
corroborate findings from individual interviews but also to ensure that as much of the whole 
story associated with dissent management in party groups as possible was considered.  
       Fenno never had a sample in the strictest sense in his studies of Congressmen in their home 
districts. However, he never made a decision about traveling to a district without first assessing 
or reassessing how the characteristics of the district and of the Congressmen might add to the 
study. Over time, if for example, Fenno determined that for example too many lawyers were 
represented among the sample of Congressmen, he would target non-lawyers for future 
observations (Fenno, 1990, 59).  
      In some ways, this mirrors the approach I took to booking interviews and selecting meetings 
for observation. Unlike Fenno, I tried to talk to everyone in the targeted population and attend 
every party group meeting possible rather than spend quality time with a handful of legislators 
and attend only those events associated with them. However, like Fenno, as I collected data in 
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the field, I consciously made the effort to balance the number of interviews and observations 
according to group size. In other words, while I initially contacted and later followed up at least 
once with every member of leadership in each group, when I noticed that one group was lacking 
a representative number of interviews or a comparable number of meeting observations, I re-
focused my scheduling of interviews and observations to address this imbalance.  
       The only sampling for interviews occurred when contacting MEPs who frequently dissented 
from the group line in roll-call votes. My hope was that in talking with frequently dissenting 
MEPs I could not only identify rationale for dissent but also gain some insight into the successes 
and failures of dissent management. I gathered these names from a review of votes taken in 2011 
and 2012 and then randomly selected a number that was representative of the group sizes. 
       Given these sampling strategies, can I generalize my findings? Just as Patton (1999) 
recommends, I must return to the reasons for having made initial design decisions (Patton, 1999, 
1197). The purpose of my research is case-driven that is to understand how particular processes 
work in the European Parliament and to ascertain their impact upon MEP behavior. Through 
case studies as these, we can know more about targeted populations and can hypothesize about 
larger populations in order to frame future research (Patton, 2002, 244). 
        If my research was based solely on observation, the goal of generalizing my findings to the 
current parliament in its full session (2009-2014) could not be attained in that while I can‟t 
observe every meeting, a larger sample of observations nonetheless would be needed to 
determine whether or not the observed processes and behavior are typical of such meetings. 
Instead, observations serve to corroborate or to offer exceptions to the data obtained through 
interviews. In all, my approach to field research mirrors Fenno in that he made a deliberate 
decision to sacrifice analytical range for analytical depth; that is to know more about a particular 
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phenomenon rather than to apply results to other settings (Fenno, 1990, 60). Therefore, the 
research model provides for an information-rich case study that not only helps to highlight 
particular processes in the European Parliament, but to also offer group level explanations for 
variation in dissent expression.  
       Finally, I should address whether or not I am competent to conduct the research. On one 
hand, no past experience can completely prepare a researcher for the challenges presented by 
particular settings and actors. As I was often told by MEPs, you understand this place and learn 
how to be most effective by simply going through and surviving the initial exposure to it. In 
other words, you “learn by doing”. Initial interviews and observations provided me with lessons 
on how not only to schedule similar efforts but also on how to conduct myself. On the other 
hand, I didn‟t approach this effort as a complete novice. As a political field coordinator, I 
interviewed prospective state legislative candidates and as a legislative aide I had observed 
countless party and legislative meetings.
3
 Finally, I had visited the parliament before: as a 
student at the College of Europe and in my initial visit to acquire meeting access.  
TARGETED POPULATIONS 
       As Table 2.2 below indicates, the complete set of interviews was representative across party 
groups and was similarly representative within each group in regards to leadership positions.       
There are often individual actors that a researcher wished had been included in the study. Such 
actors for me were the ECR Group President which was held by Jan Zahradil in 2011 who then 
gave way to Martin Callanan in January 2012 and the Co-Presidents of the Greens/EFA Group. 
However, I did interview five group presidents which is a representative sample of this specific 
leadership position and I further compensated by observing three of the four presidents I didn‟t 
interview in group meetings on multiple occasions. Like the Greens, the EFD have co-presidents, 
                                                          
3
 In fact, it was my experience in observing party caucus meetings that led me to this research topic as I understood 
the importance of legislative party leaders and meetings in dissent management. 
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one of whom I interviewed, while the ECR, the GUE and the Socialists elected new presidents 
halfway into the parliament. I interviewed the GUE replacement (Zimmer) in the second phase 
and both S & D presidents (Martin Schulz and Johannes Swoboda) in the first phase though 
Swoboda was the group parliamentary secretary or whip at the time.    
TABLE 2.2: INTERVIEWS BY POSITION AND PARTY GROUP 
PARTY GROUP ALDE ECR EFD EPP GREENS/EFA GUE S & D 
PRESIDENT 1 0 (2) 1 (2) 1 0 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2) 
GROUP VP 2 (8) 4 (4) 2 (6) 5 (10) 4 (7) 3 (6) 6 (9) 
COORDINATOR 4/22 2/22 2/22 Staff Only 2/22 2/22 3/22 
OTHER MEPS  8 2 0 3 3 0 3 
GROUP STAFF 2 2 2 5 1 2 4 
PARTY STAFF 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Note: The first number in each cell is the number of interviews for each position per party group and the 
number in parentheses indicates the total number holding that position per party group. N of Cases: 84 
 
       In addition, I obtained an interview sample of group vice-presidents that was representative 
within and across party groups. Four of the seven groups designate a vice president as a 
whip/parliamentary-secretary and I was fortunate to interview three of the four whips, plus the 
new S & D whip (Enrique Guerrero) when Swoboda became group president. Group 
coordinators are the group leaders in the twenty-two committees. One of the many lessons 
learned in the first phase was the importance of this leadership position. 
       Accordingly, I contacted all twenty-two coordinators in the five largest groups. The GUE 
and EFD each have only has one or two members on the various committees resulting in nearly 
every member serving as a coordinator. Interviews of coordinators in these groups therefore were 
a lower priority and often a product of coincidence. With about fifteen rejections and seven no 
replies, the absence of EPP coordinator interviews is disappointing, but the data obtained from 
other EPP interviews including aides to coordinators and from observations assisted in assessing 
dissent management practices associated with this leadership position in this group. Although the 
sample is not as representative of this particular position as I would like, when combined with 
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those of group presidents and vice presidents, the leadership sample as a whole is representative 
and provides information-rich case study data.  
       The category of “Other MEPs” was never meant to be a large sample. It consists primarily of 
new MEPs and MEPs who frequently dissented from the group line as well as members of the 
ALDE Group Bureau who were national delegation chairs or committee chairs. New MEPs 
provide a fresh perspective on party group processes and roles and may provide contrastive 
responses to those from respondents with much more extensive service. I also included this 
subject category because I was interested in the socialization processes associated with new 
MEPs. I included frequently dissenting MEPs because I wanted to acquire greater understanding 
of the rationale for dissent and the selection of dissent expression as well as to provide examples 
of the failures or limitations associated with dissent management. 
       I also interviewed three of the seven group secretary-generals and the chief of staff to the 
EPP President. The remainder of group staff included aides to coordinators, deputy secretary-
generals, aides to vice-presidents and whips, policy advisors, and communications staff. Party 
staff in Table 2.2 refers to European Party secretary-generals or staff in five of the seven 
European Parties which are organizations outside of the parliament. While my priority was to 
interview as many subjects within the targeted populations while maintaining a balance in the 
number of respondents across party groups, I also was cognizant of the need to ensure that the 
interview population was representative of respondents‟ years of service (as MEPs and/or staff) 
in the parliament and member-state origins. 
       I assumed that members with more years of service would have a greater understanding of 
and more exposure to party group level processes and role assignment, while members with 
fewer years of service would provide to various degrees a fresh and perhaps contrastive 
60 
 
perception on various group level processes and role assignments. As depicted below in Table 
2.3, the sample is fairly representative across years of service especially considering the elite 
focus of the study. I was particularly surprised to find so many of the group leaders were serving 
in their first parliament, which a study of most national parliaments would be unlikely to reveal. 
Throughout the study, I will organize respondents by years of service into three groups: 1-3 years 
of service (33 respondents), 4-10 years (30) and 11+ years (21). 
TABLE 2.3: RESPONDENTS AND YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE PARLIAMENT 
YEARS OF SERVICE RESPONDENTS YEARS OF SERVICE RESPONDENTS 
1 7 13 12 
3 26 16 1 
4 2 18 3 
5 2 23 1 
6 4 24 2 
7 1 28 1 
8 16 33 1 
9 5   
Note: Table depicts the number of respondents for a given year of service as an MEP and/or staff in the 
European Parliament. N of Cases: 84 
 
       When considering the interview sample in terms of member-state origins, I faced limitations 
of ensuring representativeness as group leadership positions do not necessarily correspond to 
delegation size or regional distributions apart from the ECR who purposefully balance UK and 
non-UK representation in group leadership. However, I was concerned that the sample would be 
too concentrated among Northern Europeans as they would be more likely to speak English. 
Nonetheless, as Table 2.4 below depicts, the interview population includes several Spanish, 
Greek, Portuguese and other respondents from Southern Europe. I also interviewed nearly every 
Eastern European holding a group leadership position as well as staff and other MEPs from this 
region though I would have preferred to have interviewed more respondents from new member-
states. Finally, I must acknowledge the inclusion of few French and Italians in the study despite 
my efforts to reach these respondents through an email in both French and English or to offer to 
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provide the questions by email in French and then translate their responses. I don‟t believe that 
the low number of French or Italian respondents detracts from the study but the study would 
have certainly benefitted from the inclusion of more respondents from these large delegations.  
TABLE 2.4: RESPONDENTS AND MEMBER-STATE ORIGINS 
MEMBER-STATE RESPONDENTS MEMBER-STATE RESPONDENTS 
AUSTRIA 4 LATVIA 0 
BELGIUM 3 LITHUANIA 0 
BULGARIA 0 LUXEMBOURG 0 
CYPRUS 2 MALTA 1 
CZECH REPUBLIC 3 NETHERLANDS 6 
DENMARK 3 POLAND 1 
ESTONIA 0 PORTUGAL 4 
FINLAND 6 ROMANIA 1 
FRANCE 4 SLOVAKIA 0 
GERMANY 13 SLOVENIA 0 
GREECE 3 SPAIN 3 
HUNGARY  3 SWEDEN 7 
IRELAND 1 UNITED KINGDOM 14 
ITALY 2   
Note: Table depicts the number of respondents from each of the twenty-seven EU member-states. A zero 
indicates that no MEPs or staff from this member-state was interviewed. N of Cases: 84 
 
       In regards to meeting observations (please refer to Table 2.5 below), as the largest group in 
parliament with over forty percent of MEPs, it was essential that I viewed as many EPP party 
group meetings as possible as they often set the agenda and determine legislative outcomes. The 
next four largest groups were also targeted for as many observations as possible and apart from 
the ECR this goal was accomplished. As I noted earlier in the chapter, horizontal working group 
meetings were added on for the second phase of research as permission to view these was 
obtained by some groups late in the first phase or for others just prior to the second phase. The 
Greens do not have fixed working groups consisting of members across related committees, but 
rather issue-themed groups that are often temporary. As a result, these meet infrequently and on 
the one day where I could attend, I was denied access as the number of participants was going to 
be so small it was held in a conference room with a single table. I compensated by attending 
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another working group meeting. The EFD and GUE do not have working groups due to their 
small size, while the ECR have a Policy Development Group which was not accessible to me. 
TABLE 2.5: OBSERVED PARTY GROUP AND WORKING GROUP MEETINGS 
MEETINGS ALDE ECR EFD EPP GREENS/EFA GUE/NGL S & D 
PARTY 
GROUP 
5 2 2 6 5 3 4 
WORKING 
GROUP 
2 NA NA 2 0 NA 2 
Note: Table depicts the number of observed party group and horizontal working group meetings for each 
of the seven party groups in the two phases of field research. N of Cases: 33 
 
INTERVIEW STRCUTURES AND TECHNIQUES 
       As Rubin and Rubin (2005) note, interviews are intended to hear the meaning of what the 
interviewees are saying and when that meaning cannot be ascertained follow-up questions are 
asked to gain clarity and precision (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 13). According to Goldstein (2002), 
there are three basic goals when conducting interviews: (1) gathering information from a sample 
of officials in order to make generalizable claims about characteristics or decisions, (2) 
discovering a particular piece of information, and (3) informing or guiding work that uses other 
sources of data (Goldstein, 2002, 669).  
        As Rubin and Rubin suggest, “one way to begin an interview is to ask for help from general 
informants who have already observed the scene” (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 65). Accordingly, I 
first met with key staff before interviewing MEPs in order to both frame and construct questions. 
Following Leech‟s (2002) advice, I led off with a question that was non-threatening in order to 
build rapport and set a graduated pace in terms of question content and intensity (Leech, 2002, 
666). I normally began my interviews with a question concerning responsibilities to staff and one 
asking an MEP‟s view on why the group was united as it was in plenary votes. I stuck to this 
pattern for staff but occasionally saved the group cohesion question for last with MEPs and 
instead led off with a question pertaining to their responsibilities. 
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      Leech categorizes interviews as structured or unstructured. The former is more of a 
conversation than an interview with even the topic open to change in the course of the 
discussion, while the latter is far more structured and centering upon the identification of 
particular information often through closed-ended questions. Unstructured interviews are often 
referred to as „soaking and poking” experiences that are useful for initiating research (Leech, 
2002, 665). My approach to interviewing was best categorized as structured due to the responses 
serving as indicators for hypotheses as I discuss below. However, this approach did not preclude 
me from asking probing or follow-up questions or to add to the question set when new material 
was brought to my attention best exemplified by the inclusion of the role of horizontal working 
groups and the group secretary-general after initial interviews identified the contributions of 
these forums and actors. Initial interviews also impacted subsequent wording such as by referring 
to the parliamentary secretary rather the whip when speaking to groups other than the ECR. 
       Leech suggests that main or initial questions may be organized into two categories. “Grand 
Tour questions ask subjects to walk through a problem or set of events or processes (sometimes 
within a prescribed timeframe) of which they are familiar and convey the intended complexity of 
the research (Leech, 2002, 667). I utilized grand tour questions by asking coordinators for 
example to walk me through how a legislative report or the person shadowing the report is 
assigned in committee or by asking an MEP to walk me through the process leading to dissenting 
from the group line or the reaction of a group leader to a dissenting MEP or national delegation. 
       Example questions are more specific in terms of content and placement within a given set of 
events (Leech, 2002, 667). On occasion, I referred to a specific report to frame dissent 
expression and management questions. The economic governance debate occurring during both 
phases of research provided such examples. I also utilized specific leaders or senior staff or at 
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times group processes as references in questions in order to put structured questions within 
context. For example, when asking about the role of horizontal working groups in dissent 
management, I might refer to the ECR Policy Development Group or offer the structure of 
another group as a contrast to stimulate discussion when meeting with MEPs from the smaller 
groups lacking working groups. 
       Rubin and Rubin further note that interviewers additionally utilize probes or follow-up 
questions to address over-simplifications, new ideas, missing information and stories introduced 
by the subjects (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 174). I utilized follow-up questions such as by asking 
the subject to provide a specific example of when the group president impacted voting outcomes 
as answers to the initial question of what makes the group president effective and how they help 
to build group unity. Another example of a probe or follow-up question in an interview was to 
ask if the issue is not resolved in the working group or if the member will not adhere to the group 
line, what happens next? Who in leadership will meet with the dissenting member or delegation? 
       In asking all questions, it is important to convey that there is no right or wrong answer as 
you are only interested in the facts and allow subjects to make corrections when your questions 
indicate you misunderstand something (they are the experts), which particularly occurs during 
probes (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 80 and 115). Regardless of whether the interview is recorded, 
writing notes during an interview helps to manage the flow and pace of the discussion. It also 
forces the interviewer to listen to the answers and encourages the formation of additional 
questions later in the interview or in a future interview (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 111). 
       One problem related to validity is whether or not to use the same questions for every 
interview. Though questions can be improved over time, Phillip Converse and others have 
recommended that the same questions should be used in later rounds thereby retaining any 
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original measurement error the original item introduced rather than comparing results from 
different questions (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, 675). The structured questions remained 
largely the same for both research phases as the hypotheses to be tested remained constant 
though the wording and order might change to fit particular subjects or reflect new information, 
but the subject of the question remained the same. However, some questions arose late in the first 
phase and had to be submitted to early interview subjects via email where applicable.  
       Rubin and Rubin note that it is common practice to prepare no more than six questions and 
to expect time for answers to no more than four with depth being more important than breadth 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 135). In her study of South African female MPs, a typical interview for 
Britton lasted one and a half to hours with many interview subjects granting supplemental 
interviews or responding to further questions though phone calls or faxes (Britton, 2005, 163).  
       An average interview in my study lasted fifteen to twenty minutes for MEPs and nearly 
thirty minutes for staff. I prepared thirteen questions related to hypotheses testing with the goal 
of asking at least six to eight if the interview was cut short. Therefore, in some circumstances, 
any remaining key questions or follow-up questions were sent via email. Supplementary 
questions in general arose due to time constraints, after new information had been obtained in 
subsequent interviews or observations, or following transcript review, and were submitted by 
email. Supplemental interviews were not possible for MEPs given their schedules. 
CODING OF INTERVIEW AND OBSERVATION DATA 
       Transcribing involves not only typing recorded interviews, or maintaining written notes 
from interviews and reflections (while preserving confidentiality), but also coding terms that 
may be identified in transcription that require defining or clarification by the interviewee or 
through other sources (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 184). Rubin and Rubin define the data unit in 
qualitative work as the exchange with a single subject containing a chain of follow-up questions 
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and their answers. Comments made during an interview are broken down into data units and 
blocks of information that are examined together. (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 202-203). In turn, the 
analysis proceeds in stages that often overlap beginning with recognition in which the concepts, 
themes, events, and topical markers in the interview are identified (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 207). 
       From here, the researcher systematically examines the different interviews to clarify specific 
concepts and themes and synthesize different versions of events to put together an understanding 
of the overall narrative (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 207). Coding can also be placed within three 
schemes. Manifest coding items involve direct responses to direct questions, whereas latent 
coding items refer to responses that were not explicitly called for by the questions, while global 
coding items reflect judgments by the coders about general traits and styles concerning the 
subjects (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, 675).  
       When conducting interviews, I employed all three categories. As my questions were on the 
whole structured and accompanied by probing, they were followed largely by direct responses. 
However, as subjects provided new information or chose at times to answer a question in a way 
that did not directly align with the purpose of the question, subsequent review resulted in latent 
coding, while global coding was largely associated with observational data in that I was making 
judgments about whether observed dialogue and behavior were critical rather than the subject 
providing that interpretation through an interview response.  
       Recording and accurate transcription (aided in its review by the subject) ensures the 
reliability of the interview. Interview transcripts are largely verbatim, except in that I removed 
hesitation words like “ah” and “um”, as well as personal exchanges such as when MEPs asked 
my opinion of particular issues or people or when they engaged in small talk about books or 
sports during the course of the recorded interview. When transcribing, I used American English 
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spelling except for names of organizations like the Labour Party. Finally, while most interview 
responses are provided in full across the chapters, some responses were so lengthy that I had to 
remove whole sentences or parts of sentences. I indicate either edits through a series of periods 
between cited words and/or sentences.  
HYPOTHESES TESTING 
       Each question addresses either a particular leadership position/group forum affiliated with 
the whip structure or dissent management tool (socialization or discipline) and frames the 
organization of the study in that each chapter considers a respective question or set of related 
questions. For example, a question about the role of group vice-presidents is one of five 
questions examining the dissent management role of group leaders in chapter six. In turn, five 
response categories are associated with each question with each response functioning as a 
dependent variable. Finally, respondent characteristics (See Table 4.4 below) will serve as 
predictors of the likelihood of offering each response to the question.  
TABLE 4.4: RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
Party Group Membership 
Party Group Position 





       In each chapter, I will provide hypotheses proposing relationships between respective 
respondent characteristics and the likelihood of offering a particular response to each question. 
Party group membership refers to affiliation with one of the seven party groups. The twenty-
seven party group members who were not members of any group were not included in the study 
as they could not account for group level processes. I anticipate that the size, plenary influence, 
and culture of each group should influence the perceptions of respondents. For example, when 
assessing the role of group forums, members from smaller groups will not reference working 
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groups as they not applicable, members of influential groups should place greater emphasis on 
the dissent management role of group forums, while Greens/EFA members will be more invested 
in party group meetings as their group culture encourages participation.  
       Party group position refers to leadership offices (president, vice-president, and coordinator), 
rank-and-file MEPs, secretary-generals and staff. I expect that respondents holding leadership 
positions should adopt different attitudes on particular questions than rank-and-file MEPs and 
staff. For example, coordinators should be more likely to contend that dissent is considered when 
assigning rapporteurs as coordinators are responsible for assignment, whereas rank-and-file 
MEPs should be more likely to take an egalitarian view and maintain that expertise matters more 
than voting behavior.  
       Years of service encompasses time spent in the parliament and/or as a member of the 
secretariat. I expect respondents with more years of service to have a greater understanding of 
organizational processes and role assignment within the group as well as having more exposure 
to socialization processes and therefore more likely to adopt norms governing dissent and other 
behavior. For example, respondents with more years of service in the parliament will be more 
likely to contend that only the last slot(s) is reserved for dissenting members in plenary debates 
whereas respondents with fewer years of service will not be as acquainted with the decision-
making associated with plenary speaking time allocation. 
       I included gender and previous profession as extraneous variables. Previous profession 
encompasses those with previous leadership experience (PM, ministers, national party leaders, or 
mayors), those having held elected office at the national, regional, or local level, those who had 
served previously as legislative or party staff, and those with other previous professions (private 
sector, education which includes academics and students) prior to service in the parliament. 
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       All statistical analysis was conducted in Stata which contains all data in regards to interview 
responses or respondent characteristics. Because the dependent variable (interview responses) is 
nominal, Cramér's V serves as a measurement of strength of association for the relationship 
between each interview response and the respondent characteristics noted above. Per Stata, the 
substantive strength of Cramér's V scores is assessed according to the following scale: 0-0.19 
(weak association), 0.20-0.49 (moderate association), and 0.50 and above (strong association) 
while the statistical significance of each response predictor is assessed through the 
accompanying p-value with values under 0.05 indicating statistical significance (Acock, 2012, 
129). Accordingly, while a strong association may occur between two variables (Ex: respondent 
member-state and a given response), the relationship may be a product of chance and not occur 
in the broader population if a statistically significant relationship between the variables is absent.   
       In turn, each question is accompanied by a set of hypotheses anticipating what respondent 
characteristics will increase the likelihood of offering particular responses. If the relationship 
between any respondent characteristic(s) and the likelihood of offering a particular response to a 
question is statistically significant, then that characteristic(s) will frame the discussion in each 
chapter. Some questions sought to provide purely informational responses that would help to 
clarify processes within the parliament (Ex: why members vote abstain). However, most 
questions are associated with hypotheses testing and are found in the chapters noted below.  
INTRODUCTORY/EXPLORATORY QUESTIONS 
Q. What are your responsibilities as a member of the group secretariat? 
Q. Why do MEPs vote abstain and how does your party group regard a vote of abstain?  
Q. When have you voted against the group line? Can you give an example? 
Q. How did your previous experience as a (X) help to prepare you for group leadership?  
 
CHAPTER FOUR: EXPLAINING PARTY GROUP UNITY 
Q. What in your opinion explains why most MEPs in your group vote the same way most of the 




CHAPTER FIVE: DISCIPLINE MEASURES 
Q. Is speaking time in plenary debates denied in your group to those who oppose the group line?  
Q. Is voting behavior considered by your group when awarding rapporteurs or assigning 
members to be shadow rapporteurs? 
Q. Do group leaders lobby members to oppose plenary amendments offered by individual group 
members that are contrary to the group line? 
 
CHAPTER SIX: ROLE OF LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP STRCUTURES 
Q. What makes (X) an effective President? 
Q. When does your group president become involved in ensuring group unity? 
Q. How does the group vice-president contribute to group unity? 
Q. How does the group whip or parliamentary-secretary contribute to group unity? 
Q. What is the role of the Secretary-General in building group unity?  
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: GROUP FORUMS 
Q. What is the role of horizontal working groups in building unity within your party group?  
Q. What is the role of party group meetings in building unity within your party group?   
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: SOCIALIZATION PROCESSES 
Q. After an election or throughout the parliament, what is done in your group to help new MEPs 
understand how the group is organized and to communicate its values or beliefs?  
Q. When does your group consider it to be acceptable for an MEP to dissent from the official 
line and how must they go about announcing dissent?  
 
       After typing transcripts, I coded responses according to the informational reference if 
introductory or for the bulk of responses related to hypotheses testing for placement within the 
anticipated response set. For the latter, I encountered two types of responses: those that directly 
address the question and those responses that contain multiple indicators. A good example of the 
latter is the question asking what in your opinion explains why your group is unified most of the 
time in plenary. The entire response may only mention ideology or the role of particular leaders. 
Many responses though contain references to two or more explanations, and accordingly were 
coded to indicate every applicable response category. For example, an S & D MEP offered this 
explanation for group cohesion in plenary votes. 
“Socialists and Social Democrats are normally disciplined at home, but I think it is also the 
strong leadership. We try to bring people together and make them not only work together but 
vote also together. Many of their voters want to have a strong voice, a common position, and as 
we are for a common Europe, a common foreign and security policy, we cannot always be 
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divided ourselves, but still I would like to have more common and cohesive voting behavior but 
still in our mind is this Pro-European attitude and therefore we more easily forget what is 
demanded from at home, because to be together is more important and of course we have many 
meetings where we bring people together and we say that we have to have a common position. 
This is done by leadership, by Mr. Schulz himself, or by the vice-president concerning for certain 
areas” (November 9, 2011).  
 
       This response contains references to leadership structure and strategy as well as to identity 
formation in that the respondent associates a conceptualization of the group identity defined as it 
being “European” as one that is conducive to group unity. In contrast, the response below by an 
EPP Vice President to the question of how the parliamentary secretary contributes to group unity 
assumes an administrative rather than a dissent management role for this particular leader.  
“Mr. Szajers is responsible for… everything that is discussed in the working groups will go to 
the office of Mr. Szajers who is the chief whip who will make sure that there is a voting list for 
each and every subject that of course come from the rapporteurs and with the approval of the 
coordinators. Secondly, he has to put a sign whether it is first line whip, second line whip or third 
line whip, which again it is not like in the House of Commons in that these lines tell the members 
the importance to which the group attaches, it is not kind of a coercive measure, it is how strong 
the recommendation is. Then, Mr. Szajers must arrange for the speakers. He will ask the working 
groups who wishes to speak and we send him this list. Most of the time, there are more people 
who wish to speak than the allocated time and then he has to decide how much time he is going 
to give to members” (November 9, 2011).  
 
       Coding of observation notes mirrors the techniques employed for interview transcripts in 
that the observed dialogue and behavior are in turn coded for institutional information as well as 
indicators of particular leadership strategies, evidence of socialization or to the general 
contributions of group forums. Perhaps the key difference is that observation notes consistently 
provide multiple indicators and also include far more references to other phenomena such as 
inter-group or inter-institutional relations when compared to interview transcripts. Another key 
difference is again the conditions for note-taking in that the data was collected through 
handwritten notes often aided by translations through headphones.  
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       For example, when coding party group meeting notes, I noted: the historical conditions in 
regards to the European political situation as referenced by members, references to other EU 
institutions such as the Commission or Council, the legislation or political matters under 
consideration, other party groups, the actors participating in discussion, the role of the group 
president and other leaders in the meeting, mention of dissent or uncertainty by members, and 
references to group socialization practices or the group identity.
4
 
       When coding observation notes, Fenno stressed that it requires an open mind and flexibility 
in approach in terms of the details of the research plan and in any presumptions about the 
subjects and processes to be studied (Fenno, 1990, 57). Fenno viewed observations as episodic 
and never continuous. This allowed for not only a focused approach to each subject, but also 
enabled the author to link each observation within a sequence over time with sequence referring 
to legislation, interviews, or surrounding events (Fenno, 1990, 116). An appreciation for context 
is gained by the researcher over time and is increasingly evident as you move from politician or 
venue to another (Fenno, 1990, 114). While observing meeting, I often linked a particular 
statement, processes, or action to those I observed in earlier meetings. 
       This was not only the case when reflecting upon party group or working group meetings for 
the same subjects, but also in terms of comparing and contrasting the meetings across party 
group lines. However, I took the advice of Fenno in that I recorded everything that I thought was 
relevant and tried to view each meeting as episodic before making generalizations and applying 
observational data to hypothesis testing. Using the Greens as an example, while noting each 
action taken by the secretary-general in the group meetings and linking these to a pre-determined 
indicator (based on earlier observations) of her role in dissent management, I also treated each 
                                                          
4
 I cannot provide specific examples as this would violate my promise not to publish party group meeting notes.  
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observation of her role as episodic in that a particular presentation from her might reference the 
role of the Council of Presidents for example that had not been noted in previous observations.  
      Interviews can also impact observation data collection and later coding. For example, 
interviews of ALDE MEPs often revealed that horizontal working group meetings were poorly 
attended and largely inconsequential for dissent management. However, the Working Group C 
(Foreign Policy) meeting was very well attended, but before I could refute earlier assertions 
made by subjects, an observation of a joint meeting of Groups A/B verified these accounts as I 
was only one of about a dozen people in the room including staff and was further corroborated 
by additional interviews. The lesson being that each meeting had to be viewed as a unique 
phenomenon prior to being linked to broader conclusions.  
        Fenno stressed that the “proper attitude toward the results should be skepticism, leading to 
re-evaluation, and, whenever possible, crosschecking” (Fenno, 1990, 82). Both the information 
provided by interviews and the observations themselves had to be treated skeptically. Skepticism 
does not equate to rejection, but rather to cross-checking and verification. When doing so, the 
researcher should keep in mind that contrastive examples will occur and should be evaluated 
only after corroborating interviews and observations can be made in order to determine if the 
collected data reflects an outlying event or idea, or evidence refuting an earlier assessment. 
       Finally, I also incorporate media accounts and plenary speeches. Media accounts are not 
used for hypotheses testing, but rather only to put each research phase into historical context or 
exemplify particular institutional processes and structures. Plenary speeches will mostly consist 
of explanations of votes by members given toward the end of the day and after votes. MEP 
speeches in plenary often contain nuanced arguments not captured by votes of yes, no, or abstain 
and unlike plenary votes, all plenary speeches are recorded (Proksch and Slapin, 2008, 6).        
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The content of MEP speeches provided in debates and explanations of vote in plenary at times 
provide insight into the decision-making processes of MEPs and the extent to which institutional 
figures and structures impact this process and the broader effort of dissent management. For 
example, explanations of vote will help to explain why MEPs vote abstain or at times offer 
insight into committee proceedings which are not recorded.  
SUMMARY 
       In this chapter, I reviewed the methods by which I collected, coded, and analyzed data from 
interviews of MEPs and key staff and from observations of party group and other political or 
legislative meetings. I began by discussing the logistics associated with obtaining access to the 
parliament, followed by the booking process of interviews and the targeting of subjects for 
interviews and observations. In addition, I discussed the types of questions asked in interviews, 
the approach to observation and the process in which interview and observational data is 
analyzed and coded. I concluded with a review of hypotheses testing. 
       In the next chapter, I will consider the properties of dissent in regards to form of expression 
by MEPs, frequency across party groups, and dissent management strategies by group leaders 
and staff. The goal of the chapter is in part to demonstrate how dissent should be more broadly 
assessed rather than characterized solely as percentage of time a member votes the group line. In 
addition, the chapter also seeks to explain how party group leaders identify and address dissent at 
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CHAPTER THREE: PROPERTIES OF DISSENT 
INTRODUCTION 
       In the previous chapter, I presented the research design for field data collection and analysis. 
In order to gain a greater understanding of the dissent management process and its impact upon 
party group cohesion levels in the European Parliament, I proposed that field research consisting 
of elite-centered interviews and observations of party group meetings was necessary to uncover 
hidden processes as well as the perceptions by the relevant actors toward dissent and dissent 
management. Accordingly, I presented a research timeline, rationale for interview subject and 
meeting observation selection, research techniques, data collection and coding, and a discussion 
of hypotheses testing and analysis. 
       In this chapter, I consider the properties of dissent which refer to both the level and 
management of dissent. Levels of dissent are defined both in terms of the overall extent of 
cohesion or agreement within legislative parties (or in this case party groups) as indicated in roll-
call votes and in other forms of dissent expressed by legislators throughout the stages of the 
legislative process such as expressing opposition in a caucus meeting. In turn, dissent 
management consists of the strategies employed by party group leaders (and staff) to either 
prevent dissent from occurring or to ensure that dissent is held to a minimum both in terms of the 
overall numbers of party group members dissenting and in the form of expression selected by 
individual MEPs at various legislative stages. 
       The chapter first examines overall party group cohesion rates as determined by roll-call 
votes in order to frame the discussion of expressing and managing dissent within the context of 
more and less cohesive party groups. I next consider explanations of MEP voting behavior 
provided through interviews which offer cues to dissent management strategies employed by 
group leaders. Having considered MEP explanations for their dissent from the group line on 
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given reports or amendments, the chapter then proceeds with a review of the options for 
expressing dissent available to MEPs throughout the legislative process: committees to plenary. 
This section examines the frequency of dissent expression levels and proposes why some forms 
of dissent expression may be more prevalent or preferable than others within particular groups.  
       The chapter next considers three dissent management models: disciplinary tools, a whip 
structure (consisting of specific leadership roles and group forums), and socialization processes 
(group norms governing behavior and appeals to a shared conceptualization of the group 
identity). In turn, I propose that whip structures and socialization at the group level in 
conjunction with MEP ideology at the individual level explains party group dissent level 
variation. In doing so, I utilize a broader definition of cohesion which encompasses a cohesive 
group identity and members‟ views toward group unity (See Brown 2000) as well as cohesive 
voting patterns or shared legislative objectives (Carey, 2007, 93). 
DISSENT AT THE PARTY GROUP LEVEL  
       Before considering dissent in terms of rationale for opposing the group line, the forms of 
expression dissent may take, and the strategies associated with managing dissent, it is first 
necessary to understand the extent of cohesion and thereby dissent at the party group level in the 
European Parliament. According to Owens (2003), “Levels of cohesiveness are important in part 
because they provide us with crucial information about how legislatures/parties function and how 
they interact with executives/governments” (Owens, 2003, 12). Group cohesion may be 
measured as the average percentage of MEPs within a party group who vote the same way on a 
given report or amendment. Utilizing this information raises two questions: why are some party 
groups more cohesive than others and why are party group cohesion levels on the whole so high?  
       The first row in Table 3.1 below lists party group cohesion rates for all roll-call plenary 
votes since the June 2009 European Parliament elections through the plenary ending in July 2012 
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coinciding with the end of field research. The second and third rows are cohesion rates for 
plenary votes during each research phase. Separating cohesion according to field research stages 
is essential to account not only for historical context, but also for potential leadership effects for 
those groups changing presidents, as well as for the inclusion of additional MEPs joining the 
parliament in December 2011 per the Lisbon Treaty which expanded or contracted the size of 
various national delegations. 
TABLE 3.1: PARTY GROUP COHESION IN THE SEVENTH PARLIAMENT  
Timelines ALDE ECR EFD EPP Greens/EFA GUE S & D 
7/2009-
7/2012 
.90 .87 .50 .93 .95 .82 .93 
9/18/2011-
11/13/2011 
.86 .78 .48 .96 .92 .79 .89 
5/28/2011-
6/28/2011 
.87 .97 .47 .96 .95 .82 .90 
Data Source: www.votewatch.eu 
 
       On one hand, each party group is unique both in terms of personalities of members and staff 
and in terms of group cultures. However, there are some shared characteristics that help to 
separate the more cohesive from the less cohesive groups. Field research has revealed that the 
Greens/EFA, EPP, and S & D, all share in common a whip structure consisting of proactive 
leaders and staff which identifies and addresses dissent throughout the legislative process in 
conjunction with socialization processes consisting of norms governing MEP behavior and group 
identities conducive to group cohesion. In contrast, the ALDE, ECR, and GUE are to various 
extents comparatively deficient in these dissent management components and in the case of the 
EFD, they are nearly absent. However, while the party groups of the European Parliament may 
be broadly categorized into the more and less cohesive, Table 3.1 raises further questions which 
highlight the unique aspects of particular groups. For example, if the ALDE are often the most 
pivotal group in terms of deciding the passage or failure of legislation, why are they less 
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cohesive than the Greens who less frequently impact plenary outcomes? In turn, how do the 
Greens ensure such high cohesion rates?  
MEP IDEOLOGY + WHIP STRUCTURES + SOCIALIZATION = LOW DISSENT 
       The equation above encompasses my proposed explanation for variation in party group 
dissent levels in that ideology at the individual level measured as the distance between an MEP‟s 
position and the group position on a given issue provides the foundation for explaining party 
group cohesion (See Hix et al. 2007). In turn, group cohesion is in part a product of members 
approximating the ideological mean of the group on the left-right and European integration axes 
with the least cohesive groups more commonly containing members who hold views farther 
apart from the group ideological mean. However, ideology alone is insufficient for explaining 
group cohesion and fails to account for dissent management successes.  
      Field research suggests that dissent level variation may be further explained at the group 
level through the extent to which particular components of dissent management or whip 
structures as well as socialization processes are present within party groups. For example, one 
group may not utilize party group meetings to secure support for the group line while another 
group may lack a whip thereby creating a gap in dissent management. Similarly, while most 
groups are perceived by respondents to possess to varying degrees a group identity which helps 
to promote a sense of fellowship among members, one group may lack norms promoting deferral 
to horizontal working groups when making voting decisions and another may contain competing 
national identities which at times clash with the otherwise prevailing group identity.  
       In other words, group cohesion rates will increase and dissent levels will be held to a 
minimum when more components of a whip structure and socialization processes are present and 
fully utilized whereas dissent levels will increase as fewer of these components are present and 
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utilized to their fullest potential. In this sense, both strategy (in terms of lobbying and 
socialization) and structure (in terms of assigned offices and decision-making venues) are 
essential for successful dissent management.  
       Rows two and three of Table 3.1 provide further evidence of the relationship between 
dissent levels and dissent management strategies within the context of the two phases of field 
research. When the stakes were at their highest in the parliament with the consideration of the 
economic governance and bailout packages, the EPP during the first phase of field research 
enjoyed extraordinarily high cohesion rates. As I will describe in subsequent chapters, higher 
than average EPP cohesion rates were ensured by a proactive whip structure and successful 
socialization practices which were present before the crisis but were employed to their fullest 
extent during the crisis. 
       Having set the stage for exploring the properties of dissent by examining party group 
cohesion rates, I now turn to explanations for dissent from MEP and staff interviews. 
Understanding why MEPs dissent helps to explain not only why cohesion rates are higher in 
some groups than in others, but the explanations also underscore components of successful 
dissent management strategies employed by party group leaders in that a prevalent rationale for 
dissent within a group will lead to particular responses or tactics by party group leaders in 
addressing dissent.  
EXPLAINING DISSENT  
       Dissent occurs in the European Parliament when an MEP votes or expresses opposition 
against the group line. The group line may be indicated by leadership and communicated to 
members in group meetings and later through a voting list passed out during plenary. The group 
line may also be the result of when a majority of MEPs advocate a particular position which 
becomes the group line. In some instances, this is done through votes in group meetings. In other 
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cases, no formal vote is taken and the group line is simply the ad hoc expression of a particular 
position by a majority of MEPs through voting and speeches. This is the norm for the EFD where 
it is rare for leaders or a majority of group members to advocate any position in the group 
meeting. As an interview with an EFD MEP began and I explained that I was examining how 
group leaders ensure members support the group line, he interjected that:  
“Well, that‟s easy we don‟t have a group line. It goes like this, if we don‟t decide on it, we don‟t 
have a group line. It is up for every delegation for them to decide. I think it has happened three 
times since the election (2009) that there actually was a group line. In most cases that doesn‟t 
relate to distribution of money where people tend to vote very nationally, in most other cases we 
seem to agree on most matters”. (October 13, 2011)     
  
       Observations provide insight into the development of the group line as voting lists 
distributed to members are not part of the public record. In my observations of group meetings, I 
found that in most instances, a group line was evident on votes whether it originated from party 
leadership or was the product of debate within the group. Usually, it was the former in that the 
group line originated from the committee, working group (where applicable), or the leadership 
bureau of the group with the secretariat playing a crucial role in its development. MEPs knew the 
group line on nearly every vote and were aware that a contrary vote of yes or no or a vote to 
abstain on a particular amendment or report was a vote against the group line. The few 
exceptions were normally social issues, some foreign policy questions or procedural matters. 
When deciding whether or not to dissent, an MEP may consider many factors  
“You shouldn‟t forget as an MEP, or at least this is how I see it, that we have three hats. I am a 
German MEP, so I must ask myself the question is this in the interest of the German citizen? 
Second, I belong to a political group, so I have basic political beliefs…I ask myself the basic 
question is this in line with my beliefs? Does this ensure that we maintain a free European 
market, that we have competition, while not increasing unnecessary state involvement? Does it 
help the individual lead their life and do what they are capable of doing.…The third is that I am a 
convinced European, so I do ask myself the question is this good for the development of the 
European Union. Now, the difficult part is that those three are not always in line with each other. 
In other words, it may be good for Europe, but it is not necessarily good for Germany or is not in 
line with my basic beliefs”. (June 20, 2012)   
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       While many MEPs and staff indicated in interviews that they share this thought process to 
one degree or another, other respondents referred to a single rationale for deciding when to 
deviate from the group line. In my interviews, I asked the question, “Have you ever voted against 
the group line? Could you provide an example?” I also asked this question of staff who were 
MEP aides and who unlike party group or European Party staff could directly account for 
individual MEP voting behavior. In all, sixty-eight of the eighty-four interview subjects were 
asked and answered this question.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentages of applicable respondents offering each explanation for why they or 
their assigned MEP dissents from the group line. N of Cases: 68 
 
       Figure 3.1 above indicates the frequency of applicable respondents offering one of the three 
broad response categories: personal differences on issues, support for the contrary national party 
delegation position, and minimal or no dissent. Nearly half of respondents explained dissent 
from the group line as a result of personal differences with the group position which refers to 
taking a different perspective from the majority view or the official group line on specific issues 

















Figure 3.1: Explanations for MEP Dissent 
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dissent and how to express dissent from the group line, these MEPs primarily review their 
personal beliefs (do I agree with the group view on this issue, is the group solution the best for 
resolving this problem?) and then indicate their intent to dissent to group leadership. The 
responses below are typical of this mindset. 
“For example, I am pro-life and when it comes to issues like abortion and euthanasia and 
homosexual marriage that are very important to (my group), but my background and my party 
have a different approach….Then, some issues concerning Eurobonds for example. Time to time, 
I vote a different way, but there is no problem”. (June 20, 2012)  
 
“If it is something where the group is fundamentally wrong, but I would always tell them when I 
was going to vote against the group line. On a fairly big issue recently, I voted against the 
financial transaction tax...The idea of the tax wasn‟t to fund the EU budget, the idea of the tax 
was to actually fund the global development mechanism, and politically I don‟t think the tax will 
fly if the proceeds are seen as a way of paying the EU budget”. (June 6, 2012) 
 
       A little over a third of respondents maintained that their dissent from the group line was 
usually due to a contrary national party delegation position. These MEPs first look to the 
delegation line when deciding whether to dissent from the group line and in turn dissent is 
communicated by the delegation leadership to group leadership. The responses below are typical 
of MEPs who explain dissent from the group line as a clash with national (party) priorities.   
“Yes, absolutely, many times. (My political party) have a number of issues where we don‟t agree 
with the European line. We have some specific issues regarding labor rights for example which 
is a huge issue for us because we have a different system than most other countries in Europe. 
For example, we always oppose the minimum wage because we don‟t want to legislate minimum 
wages”. (June 13, 2012)  
 
“Yes, it was a dossier on nuclear energy because Austria assumed conditions because of our non-
nuclear referendum. So, on certain issues I have not taken the group position. For example on 
EURATOM, the Austrian perspective is that is best just to let it die and Austria should also go 
out of EURATOM, because why should we pay for nuclear safety and security to keep nuclear 
plants in function another twenty years”. (June 20, 2012) 
 
       The final response category offered by about fifteen percent of respondents consists of those 
who said they never dissent or that they rarely dissented and couldn‟t think of an example of 
when they voted against the group line.  
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“Well, there are two different periods in my time here: when I was not vice president and when I 
was vice president. When I was not vice president, I voted several times with my delegation 
which was different for the group position. Since I have become vice president, I have never 
voted against the position of the group, if the position of the group has been clearly established in 
the group meeting. If there is a big confrontation with my national interests, I simply do not vote, 
but I only did that once”. (June 19, 2012) 
 
       As I asked each applicable respondent the question of when they dissented from the group 
line, I anticipated that certain respondent characteristics (party group membership, party group 
position, years of service in the parliament, and member-state) would influence the likelihood of 
offering one of the three response categories. In addition, I included a respondent‟s gender and 
previous profession as extraneous variables. 
H1: Respondents from the less cohesive party groups will be more likely to explain dissent as a 
result of contrary positions taken by their national delegation in the group. 
     
       Respondents from less cohesive party groups should be more likely to explain dissent from 
the group line as a result of a contrary position by their national party delegation due to weaker 
whip structure and socialization processes in these groups. For example, the absence of a shared 
concept of the group identity in the less cohesive groups should be reflected in more frequent 
national positions, while the absence of a coordinated effort by group leaders to ensure support 
for the group line should similarly leave MEPs in these groups to more readily defer to their 
national party delegation line.  
H2: Respondents who hold elite positions in group leadership will be more likely to explain 
dissent as a reflection of personal differences or offer the third response category. 
     
       Respondents who are group presidents or vice-presidents should be more likely to adopt a 
group rather than a national party delegation line as their responsibilities presumably dictate 
more attention to promotion of the group line and its successful adoption by as many members as 
possible. In turn, elites should dissent only when they have moral objections to the position 
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adopted by a majority of the group or they should offer the third response because their dissent is 
so rare when group lines accompany reports or amendments. 
H3: Respondents with more years of service in the European Parliament will be more likely to 
explain dissent as a product of personal differences with the group on issues. 
 
       With more years of service as staff and particularly as MEPs, respondents should acquire 
greater independence from their national delegation as they pursue personal goals in terms of 
legislation and parliament office (See Scully, 2005) and acquire greater familiarity with group 
level processes. In this sense, with more years of service, members, should become less reliant 
on national delegations for policy direction and grow more comfortable in their voting habits.   
H4: Respondents from the new member-states and the UK will be more likely to explain dissent 
in relation to their respective national delegation positions on legislation 
     
       As recent studies have shown (See Hix and Noury 2009), MEPs from the new member-
states (those gaining accession to the EU since 2004) are more likely to vote along national lines 
than with their party group compared to MEPs from the EU 15 states (those with membership 
prior to 2004) apart from the UK. In turn, respondents from new member-states should be more 
likely explain their dissent as a reflection of national rather than individual positions on issues. A 
respondent‟s gender and previous profession are included as extraneous variables.  
TABLE 3.2: PREDICTORS OF DISSENT EXPLANATIONS 
PARTY GROUP 0.3576* 
POSITION  0.5171*** 
YEARS  0.5060* 
MEMBER-STATE 0.5355 
GENDER  0.3048* 
PROFESSION 0.5150** 
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores measuring strength of association. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance on the .05, .01 and .001 levels. N of Cases: 68 
 
       As depicted in Table 3.2 above, when comparing respondent characteristics to the likelihood 
of offering one of the three responses, all but member-state is influential. The smaller number of 
cases for this particular question and the limited number of potential responses likely contributed 
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to the statistical significance of most variables. I believe the absence of significance for member-
state origins is reflective of the impact of particular national parties and not whole delegations 
across groups. For example, UK MEPs from the S & D or ALDE groups are normally loyal to 
the group line whereas their Conservative counterparts as members of the EPP frequently 
dissented from the group line (See Hix et al. 2007) prior to forming the ECR group. Similarly, 
whereas Greek Communists frequently dissent from the majority line in the GUE, Greek MEPs 
in the EPP or S & D groups frequently adhere to the group line. In turn, I believe that the 
influence of dissent management structures and tactics may be more readily identified when 
responses are framed according to party group position and group membership. 
TABLE 3.3: GROUP POSITION AND DISSENT EXPLANATIONS 
RESPONSE  President    Vice-President     Coordinator    MEP    Staff      N 
PERSONAL  0.60         0.42  0.45             0.58     0.43  33 
DELEGATION 0         0.35  0.55             0.37     0.43      25 
RARE/NOT SURE 0.40         0.23  0  0.05     0.14      10 
(N of CASES)  (5)         (26)  (11)  (19)       (7)       68 
Note: Table depicts percentage of respondents according to party group position offering each response 
with the last row depicting the number of respondents per party group position. N of Cases: 68 
 
      The third response as expected was offered almost exclusively by group presidents or vice-
presidents, especially those serving as parliamentary secretaries or whips. These leaders 
(together with the rapporteur on a given report) have the most to lose in plenary outcomes and in 
turn should either never dissent from the group line or do so only when a group line is absent 
leading members to vote according to their conscience. In turn, rank-and-file MEPs are more 
likely than group leaders (apart from the presidents) to cite personal differences as explanations 
for dissent which runs contrary to expectations. In part, this reflects the inclusion of frequently 
dissenting MEPs in this category who are likely to defy the group line regardless often of their 




Note: Graph depicts percentage of responses according to party group membership. Numbers in 
parentheses depict number of respondents per party group. N of Cases: 68. 
 
       In Figure 3.2 above, response frequencies are arranged according to party group membership 
from the most cohesive to the least cohesive group in terms of plenary votes in the current 
parliament. Apart from the S & D, respondents from the more cohesive party groups as expected 
are more likely to cite personal differences rather than national delegation positions as rationale 
for dissent. In turn, respondents from the least cohesive groups apart from the ECR similarly cite 
individual differences as rationale for dissent from the group line which runs counter to 
expectations. However, responses to additional interview questions reveal that in the case of the 
GUE „confederality‟ encompasses the rights of individuals as well as delegations to adopt a 
separate line and in the case of the EFD reveal that a group line is absent on nearly all reports.  
       Explanations for dissenting from the group line offered in these interviews in turn reveal 
much not only about individual thought processes, but perhaps more importantly for this study, 
they foreshadow particular dissent management strategies at the group level. In other words, the 



















Figure 3.2: Dissent Responses by Party Group 
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reflective of whether members in a party group tend to place emphasis on personal beliefs and 
individual assessment of legislation or revert to the position of the national delegation as the 
focal point for their decision-making.       
       If individual beliefs are the dominant basis for deciding when and how to dissent from the 
group line, leaders in these groups will have to directly appeal to individuals members. In such 
instances, group leaders will lobby individual MEPs in committees and (where applicable) 
working groups. When these efforts are unsuccessful or the dissenting MEPs are not members of 
these bodies, the group meetings will be formatted to accommodate debate in order to both 
identify and minimize dissent. The ALDE group meetings best epitomizes this approach in that I 
observed that the president oversaw debate among individual MEPs and then pursued a 
compromise reflecting the perceived consensus or a consensus reflecting his own preferences.  
       In contrast, when national delegation positions influence when and how to dissent from the 
group line, group leaders will appeal to or negotiate with delegation leaders rather than with 
individual members. In turn, discussion in working group and party group meetings is organized 
on the whole around the views of national delegations. When a vote is taken in group meetings, 
it is for the purpose of identifying which delegations support or oppose the group line and 
consequently any efforts to minimize dissent such as through a contrary vote on an amendment 
rather than on the full report is consists of appeals to delegations. The ECR group meetings I 
observed exemplify such approaches in that the delegation leaders would announce their stance 
to the whole group with the debate largely structured around delegation positions.   
EXPRESSING DISSENT 
       As MEPs or delegations decide whether or not to dissent, they also must consider when and 
how to dissent. Dissent may take many forms and occur at various stages throughout the 
legislative process. As in other legislatures, dissent in the European Parliament is often expressed 
89 
 
and at times addressed behind closed doors or even when in public view dissent may be 
unrecorded as are nearly two-thirds of plenary votes and indeed all votes in committee, working 
group, or party group meetings. Roll-call votes indicate the final venue for and the costliest form 
of dissent but disguise both the process that addressed dissent prior to the roll-call vote and the 
forms of dissent expressions occurring prior to the vote in plenary. As Morgenstern (2004) notes, 
“The degree of party unity revealed by voting may in fact conceal higher or lower levels of unity 
experienced prior to each vote or for that matter how the revealed degree of unity was obtained 
in the first place” (Morgenstern, 2004, 21).  
       Each level of dissent in turn incurs costs tied to the form of expression and the stage in the 
legislative process. These costs are borne not only by the member dissenting from the party line 
but also by the party as a whole. Costs range from the failure of an amendment or legislation in 
its entirety to the party‟s reputation both within the institution and externally among supporters 
and the general public. As Indridason (2008) contends, when legislators express opposition to the 
policy preferences of their party‟s leadership, they provide signals to audiences both within and 
outside the legislature indicating the degree of party unity. “Cross-voting is important, not just 
because it signals that the government lacks support among its own members, but also because it 
raises questions among voters about what policies the party stands for and the extent to which it 
is capable of delivering on its policy promises” (Indridason, 2008, 364).     
       In this sense, dissent within legislative parties results in confusion with potential 
consequences for party organization, legislative outcomes, and voter judgment in elections. For 
example, if a party group cannot maintain consistent and high levels of voting unity, not only 
will uncertainty accompany other legislative outcomes (whether particular legislation fails or 
succeeds), but the decision to dissent may also become more common among its membership. 
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Consequently, party leaders will face significant internal and external challenges to ensuring 
high levels of voting unity and minimizing the forms of dissent expression as indicated in the 
priorities stated by a group vice-president below. 
“The first stage is to try and convince them of the group line, the second is to ask them to 
abstain, the next is to ask them not to vote, and the last is to accept that they are not going in line 
with the group”. (May 29, 2012) 
 
       In the European Parliament, the absence of a government and opposition structure removes 
some of the consequences associated with dissent normally experienced in legislatures. 
Nonetheless, as the passage of legislation requires cross-party group support, maintaining high 
levels of party group unity are crucial for legislative success defined by the leadership of each 
group as either the defeat or passage of legislation. In turn, just as in other legislatures, party 
group leaders and MEPs are presented and must contend with options for dissent expression at 
each stage of the legislative process.  
       However, dissent expression is not confined to voting against the preferences of legislative 
party leadership on the floor or plenary. Accordingly, the legislative process in the European 
Parliament offers opportunities for various forms of dissent which in turn influences dissent 
management strategy. Whether dissent is expressed in a working group, through a speech, or a 
vote against an entire report, particular actors and strategies associated with dissent management 
become involved in ensuring that dissent is not expressed or is done so in a manner that is less 
costly for the party group. Below, I have arranged the potential forms of dissent available to 
MEPs according to an eight-point scale with the first level on the scale indicating the form of 
dissent expression carrying the smallest degree of consequences for party group unity and 
leadership policy preferences and the eighth level signifying the most harmful form of dissent 
expression upon party group unity and leadership preferences. The scale is modeled upon the UK 
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House of Commons study by Crowe (1983) and has been modified to conform to the European 
Parliament in terms of institutional organization, legislative stages, and voting options for MEPs. 
TABLE 3.4: LEVELS OF DISSENT EXPRESSION 
1. Voice dissent in working group meetings 
2. Voice dissent in party group meetings 
3. Not voting (or not being in attendance)  
4. Speak against the group line in plenary debates and speeches 
5. Vote Abstain  
6. Vote against the group line on amendments  
7. Vote against the group line in early reading(s) 
8. Vote against the group line in the final reading (following the conciliation committee) 
 
       The scale also contains an assumption that the selection of a particular level of dissent by 
MEPs is accompanied by a corresponding response from group leadership reflecting both 
hierarchy in regards to which leader(s) is responsible for managing dissent and variation in 
strategy appropriate to the level and timing of dissent. Leaders manage dissent through appeals 
based on the policy and/or political merits of legislation as well as references to the group‟s 
identity and to norms of behavior governing dissent announcement and expression. In this sense, 
dissent management occurs in specific circumstances in response to dissent announcement but is 
also ongoing through socialization efforts.  
       Accordingly, MEPs may express dissent in less costly forms without prodding from 
leadership because it is the rationale course of action or because they have been socialized into 
doing so. However, depending on the form of selected dissent expression and the significance of 
the given legislative report, proactive party group leaders will respond through direct appeals to 
either convince the MEP not to dissent at all or to do so at a less costly level. In turn, MEP 
dissent should be more commonly expressed at the lower end of the scale where dissent 
management (in all its forms) is at its most effective and more commonly at the higher end of the 
scale when dissent management is least effective or perhaps not present at all. 
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       The efforts of dissent management in all groups should be centered upon the goal to achieve 
consensus and otherwise to produce a compromise with delegations or individual MEPs that 
results in dissent from the group line on portions of but not the report as a whole with dissent 
preferably expressed by not voting or by voting abstain. The preferred timing and form of dissent 
expression depends upon the strategy associated with securing the group line in plenary. For 
example, a group line might favor particular amendments but oppose others. The group line may 
also reflect contingencies such as when leadership call for a vote against the whole report if a 
particular amendment does not carry in plenary.  
       Before dissent is expressed in plenary votes, it is often indicated behind-the-scenes or in 
working group and party group meetings where the group line may be defined and where dissent 
from the group line may be signified by individual MEPs or national delegations. As discussed in 
chapter one, four of the seven party groups have horizontal working groups consisting of 
members across similar committees according to policy portfolio. Where they exist and more 
importantly where they are most effectively utilized, working groups provide outlets for dissent 
expression with dissent perhaps being resolved prior to voting recommendations being made to 
the entire group. In this sense, leaders should utilize such forums to identify and manage dissent 
to not only prevent it from extending to later venues such as party group meetings but also to 
secure compromises mitigating dissent to voting abstain or opposing an amendment. 
FIGURE 3.3: WORKING GROUPS AND DISSENT MANAGEMENT 
IDENTIFY DISSENT→RESOLVE DISSENT OR SECURE LESS COSTLY FORM 
IDENTIFY DISSENT→REFER DISSENT TO LEADERSHIP FOR MEDIATION 
IDENTIFY DISSENT→RESOLVE IN PARTY GROUP MEETING 
 
       I find that the party groups with lower dissent levels are those which both utilized working 
groups to identify and mange dissent AND practiced norms which re-enforced the importance of 
members deferring to working groups. In turn, dissent levels rise as group norms re-enforcing the 
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role of working groups are absent AND as efforts by leaders at the working group level fail to 
translate into consensus later at the group meeting. In part, these findings are a function of group 
size in that the smallest and least cohesive groups do not have working groups. However, the 
example of the ALDE indicates how group size alone cannot explain dissent level variation 
given that while its members highly value the role of party group meetings they do not positively 
view the role of working groups (please refer to chapters four and seven). 
       If dissent continues on to the party group meeting or if dissent arises initially at the meeting, 
an MEP may be persuaded to adopt the group line thereby ensuring dissent does not continue on 
to plenary. Party group meetings in this sense serve a function similar to congressional caucus 
meetings in the U.S. For example, Forgette (2004) found that a member‟s attendance at a 
strategically timed U.S. congressional conference meeting resulted in an 11% increase in the 
odds of voting the party position (Forgette, 2004, 425). This stems from conference meetings 
serving not only as forums to communicate shared policy and political goals, but also as an 
opportunity to identify divisions and raise concerns (Forgette, 2004, 410-411).  
FIGURE 3.4: PARTY GROUP MEETINGS AND DISSENT MANAGEMENT 
IDENTIFY DISSENT→SECURE MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR GROUP LINE 
IDENTIFY DISSENT→IDENTIFY GROUP LINE THROUGH MAJORITY VOTING 
IDENTIFY DISSENT→VERIFY THAT NO GROUP LINE ACCOMPANIES VOTE 
 
       Party group meetings therefore provide a crucial stage for MEPs, (particularly those not 
members of responsible committees or working groups) to express dissent and for party group 
leaders to manage dissent. As with other legislative caucus meetings, party group meetings in the 
European Parliament serve as a sounding board for potential compromises within the group or 
perhaps for particular legislative priorities being abandoned (Sinclair, 1995, 107).  
       Raunio (1999) observed that especially in the larger groups, MEPs were expected to 
announce their intentions in group meetings before voting in plenary (Raunio, 1999, 193). My 
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observations of group meetings corroborated to various degrees both the role of group meetings 
in terms of pursuing consensus and the norm of announcing the intent and form of dissent in the 
meeting except for the EFD where its meetings served more as venues for communicating 
national political developments than building a group line. 
       If group leaders cannot secure unanimity in working group or party group meetings, they 
may achieve dissent levels in plenary which are less costly to the group line and potentially to 
the group‟s reputation. Dissent in plenary may take the form of publicly opposing the group line 
in a written or oral statement, not voting, voting abstain, proposing an amendment which is 
contrary to the group line, voting a contrary yes or no to the group line on an amendment, or 
opposing the report as a whole.  
       Opposing the group leadership position through speeches in a public forum draws attention 
to dissent in a direct manner that raises questions about group cohesiveness. Public objections to 
party policy puts at risk the party‟s reputation as a coherent and effective agent of government or 
in the case of the European Parliament the reputation of a party group to ensure preferred 
legislative outcomes by delivering necessary votes through cross-group coalitions (Indridason, 
2008, 364). Though the long-term impact of public speeches may be as or perhaps even more 
damaging than voting against the group position, public expressions of dissent are assigned this 
level on the scale due to the variation in legislative outcomes following the speech. 
       After expressing dissent in plenary debates, an MEP‟s group leadership may secure a 
favorable voting outcome if not on a particular amendment then perhaps upon other amendments 
or the whole report. In turn, as dissent may be later expressed according to various voting 
selections (Yes, No, Abstain, or perhaps by not voting at all) and may concern individual or 
multiple amendments or final passage, each public speech should be considered within the 
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context of subsequent voting behavior and legislative timing. Likewise, an explanation of vote 
must also be considered within such a context as the consequences of an MEP publicly 
explaining a vote of abstain or of opposing the leadership position on an amendment differs from 
that of a vote directly opposing the leadership position on an amendment or final passage. 
       The intentions behind not voting or not being in attendance in plenary may encompass a 
wide range of motivations and circumstances, but as examinations of party discipline have 
shown, in some situations it carries the same impact as having voting against the leadership. As 
Crowe (1983) notes, “Absenteeism means more than poor attendance, it is nearly as good as a 
vote for the opposition” (Crowe, 1983, 912). For example, in second and third readings of 
legislation, or when censure of the Commission is considered, an absolute majority of all 
members is required for passage and not just a majority of those present (Scully, 2005, 32).  
       A non-vote by an MEP may be an expression of opposition or simply reflect absence, but 
nonetheless the impact of not-voting may be perceived by leadership as legislative dissent 
(Remington and Smith, 2001, 165). However, not voting is placed lower on the dissent scale due 
to the ambiguities associated with it and because not voting does not carry the same level of 
impact of publicly dissenting from the group leadership position expressed through voting or 
through public speeches. My interviews indicate that MEPs are incentivized to vote in most roll-
call votes and a failure to vote is often due to the fast-paced nature of plenary voting.  
“It does happen that people don‟t vote accidentally, there is a very short voting time with lots of 
votes. They will rattle through it and sometimes there are electronic checks in a recorded but not 
a roll-call vote”. (October 5, 2011) 
 
       What the group staff person is referring to above is that an MEP often only has a few 
seconds to vote and that the number of votes on a given report may be in the hundreds due to the 
number of amendments. I observed this hectic process where a majority of votes are conducted 
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by hand which as the staffer indicates can be checked by a recorded (but not roll-called) vote. 
However, there are no re-dos for roll-call votes, as the presiding officer moves on to the next 
vote. The member can later request to have their vote counted citing perhaps a malfunctioned 
button, but this requires initiative on their part.   
“It‟s their right to not touch the button, not raise hands, not to be in the chamber. You know, 
MEPs only get their daily allowance if they are present for an x number of votes? They have to 
press the button on an x number of votes; they have to sign the registrar. So, they can maneuver 
themselves into a situation into where if they don‟t press the button, they lose their income.” 
(October 13, 2011) 
 
       Consequently as another staff person indicates, MEPs have the incentive to vote in at least a 
particular number of roll-call votes or they do not receive their salary for that given day. Not 
voting in committee does not incur monetary costs for MEPs but it is much more visible in a 
smaller venue though one coordinator (below) was blunt in that he preferred that colleagues 
didn‟t vote at all rather than oppose the group line and on the whole not voting was often viewed 
as more favorable than voting to oppose the group line, even when the vote is to abstain 
“If they are going to vote against the group line, I try to see that they aren‟t present for the vote. 
That‟s quite a good way by talking them into doing that…The practice of a constructive 
abstention is very useful. If a colleague doesn‟t agree with my line, then they often have the 
grace not to be there”. (June 25, 2012) 
 
       I assessed the prevalence of not-voting by examining plenary votes occurring in the two 
phases of field research. I anticipated that not-voting would be more common in the more 
cohesive party groups as it is a less costly form of dissent when compared to voting to abstain or 
to overtly oppose the group line by voting a contrary yes/no. In turn, I expected that percentages 
of group members not-voting would be higher on whole reports rather than on amendments as 
the legislative stakes are that their highest. I also anticipated that not-voting percentages would 
be higher in the more cohesive party groups on amendments sponsored or co-sponsored by the 
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party group when compared to all amendments as the group‟s plenary reputation as well as its 
legislative priorities is more visible.   
       The first two rows in Table 3.5 below are the percentage of MEPs in each group who were 
present but did not vote in all roll-call votes with the first row providing data from the first phase 
of field research and the second providing data from the second phase of research. The 
subsequent rows depict percentages of non-voting within groups on amendments sponsored by 
the group, on all amendments, and on whole reports.
5
  
TABLE 3.5: PERCENTAGE OF MEPS NOT VOTING BY PARTY GROUP 
Legislation Type ALDE ECR EFD EPP GREENS/
EFA 
GUE S & D 
All Votes-Phase 1 .09 .11 .16 .07 .04 .10 .08 
All-Phase Two .06 .09 .10 .05 .06 .08 .05 
Sponsored Amends .06 .10 NA .09 .06 .08 .10 
Sponsored-Phase Two .03 .03 NA .03 .06 .10 .05 
All Amends-Phase 1 .10 .12 .17 .07 .05 .10 .08 
All Amends-Phase Two .06 .09 .09 .05 .06 .08 .05 
Reports-Phase One .08 .10 .14 .07 .04 .09 .08 
Reports-Phase Two .06 .08 .13 .05 .05 .08 .04 
Note: Calculated by dividing the number of MEPs within a group who were present and did not vote by 
the number who were present and voted. Data Source: www.votewatch.eu   
 
      In contrast to expectations, the three least cohesive party groups (EFD, GUE and ECR) have 
higher non-voting levels while the three most cohesive groups (Greens/EFA, EPP, and S & D) 
have the lowest non-voting levels. Only the ALDE in the middle perform as expected. This 
unexpected pattern may be the product of two phenomena: group size and attitudes toward 
voting within each group. With only thirty-four members, it takes only three non-voting MEPs 
for the EFD to have ten percent not voting if all are in attendance, while it would take twenty-
seven for the EPP to reach ten percent not-voting given its two hundred seventy-one members 
                                                          
5
 In all, 149 roll-call votes occurred during the first phase of research consisting of 94 votes on amendments and 53 
on reports. 93 roll-call votes were taken during the second phase of research consisting of 68 votes on amendments 
and 25 on reports. Though the sample size is small, it is typical in terms of the higher frequency of votes on 
amendments than whole reports and of the policies considered by the parliament with the caveat of many EU budget 
votes having occurred during the first phase of field research. 
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and assuming all are in attendance. Non-voting may also be a product of the extent to which the 
group places importance on voting. In other words, some members may not view voting as an 
important activity (so long as they meet the quota to receive their pay). Such negative sentiments 
were evident in EFD and to an extent GUE group meetings which revealed the low regard for the 
institution as well as toward the group‟s ability to influence plenary outcomes held for example 
by UKIP in the EFD and the Greek Communists in GUE. 
       Not-voting levels decrease or stay the same for all of the groups on reports compared to 
amendments which is contrary to expectations given that not-voting levels should be higher on 
whole reports than on amendments since more is at stake. However, non-voting levels as 
expected decrease for the less cohesive groups (ECR and GUE) when they sponsor or co-sponsor 
amendments whereas the ALDE, Greens, EPP, and S & D follow the predicted direction of 
higher non-voting levels on group-sponsored amendments.   
       MEPs also have the option of voting abstain which does not signal dissent to the extent 
when compared to voting a contrary Yes or No. On the whole, MEPs vote abstain when they 
have mixed views about an amendment or an entire report, while in other cases a vote of abstain 
is a means to express disproval toward legislation in its entirety without directly challenging the 
group line or threaten cross-group agreements. Explanations of vote in the plenary record 
provide rationale for voting to abstain. 
“Under this Constitution, the uncontrolled European Court of Justice will apply judgments 
directly and unequivocally to all Community institutions…No constitutional lawyer has been 
able to show me where it is guaranteed that the Court will not infringe the various national 
competencies and policies”(Anna Zaborska, EPP Group, Slovakia, 1-12-05 on Report A6-
00700/2004, www.europarl.europa.eu).  
 
       The MEP above chose to express dissent by voting to abstain which is a less costly form of 
dissent when compared to voting no. The decision to vote abstain reflects decision-making at the 
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individual level but also party group attitudes toward abstain. For some groups, a vote to abstain 
is a product of compromise in which an MEP or delegation dissents but does not directly 
challenge the group line by voting yes or no.  
“It‟s better than a vote against. If you have got a group line that will usually be part of the appeal 
that look that if you can‟t vote for then at least abstain and don‟t vote against. That quite often 
works. Of course, if we are in a procedure where we need an absolute majority, an abstention can 
hurt. In that instance, the strong urging would be to vote for rather than to vote abstain”. 
(October 18, 2011)  
 
       The group vice-president above raises the importance of stages in the legislative process and 
their relationship toward what group leaders and staff view as preferable forms of dissent. When 
a vote to abstain does not jeopardize passage and the group line is in favor of passage, a vote to 
abstain, while not the preference of leadership is a form of dissent that doesn‟t present a threat to 
the group line. However, when an absolute majority is required for passage and the group line is 
in favor of passage, leaders will have to adapt dissent management strategies to dissuading 
members from voting abstain. For other respondents, a vote to abstain is not viewed as an 
acceptable form of dissent as a group secretary-general below indicates.       
“Anything that is not according to the group line is not in favor. If you vote abstain, you are not 
following the group line. In general terms, we don‟t like abstentions because either you are in 
favor or against something. We try to avoid abstentions. For me, group cohesion, is strictly 
following the voting list”. (May 30, 2012)  
 
       Table 3.6 below offers a glimpse into the impact of voting abstain as indicated from roll-call 
votes occurring in the two phases of field research both in terms of its prevalence as a form of 
dissent and in its use by group leadership in some circumstances as the adopted group line on 
amendments or entire reports. I anticipated that abstain as a proportion of dissent would be 
higher in the more cohesive groups as it is a less costly form of dissent and that abstain 
proportions would be higher on amendments that on whole reports though the proportions should 
be higher on group-sponsored amendments. 
100 
 
TABLE 3.6: ABSTAIN AS A PROPORTION OF DISSENT WITHIN PARTY GROUPS 
Legislation Type ALDE ECR EFD EPP GREENS GUE S & D 
All Votes-Phase 1 .48 .26 .27 .18 .29 .55 .23 
All Votes-Phase 2 .24 .14 .46 .27 .37 .38 .38 
Sponsored Amends .36 .10 NA .08 .57 .59 .42 
Sponsored-Phase 2 .08 0 NA 0 .36 .21 .34 
All Amends-Phase 1 .33 .18 .26 .13 .21 .43 .22 
All Amends-Phase 2 .19 .07 .45 .22 .39 .30 .41 
Reports-Phase 1 .57 .44 .28 .27 .41 .75 .25 
All Reports-Phase 2 .36 .38 .48 .40 .32 .63 .29 
Note: Calculated by dividing the number of MEPS within a group who voted abstain by the number of 
MEPs within the group who dissented. Data Source: www.votewatch.eu   
  
       Rows one and two depict abstain as a proportion of dissent within the groups on all roll-call 
votes during the two stages of field research. Rows three and four indicate abstain as a 
proportion of dissent on group-sponsored amendments while the subsequent rows consider 
abstain as a proportion of dissent on amendments and on whole reports in each field research 
stage. To properly account for abstain as a proportion of dissent I excluded roll-call votes where 
the group position was to abstain which in these circumstances would not indicate dissent. Apart 
from the EPP, all party groups adopted abstain as a group line in each field research stage. 
       Although the Greens conformed to expectations regarding the more cohesive groups, the 
EPP had a much lower than expected percentage for abstain as a proportion of dissent, as did the 
S & D in specific research phases, while contrary to expectations the GUE had consistently high 
percentages for abstain as a proportion of dissent. My expectations though were met when 
comparing abstain as a proportion of dissent on whole reports to amendments. Every party group 
saw an increase in the predicted direction which was based on the assumption that groups would 
place a higher priority on securing votes to abstain on reports than on amendments because of 
higher legislative stakes. One exception would be when the amendment is sponsored by the 
group and in turn with the exception of the ECR and EPP, abstain as a proportion of dissent was 
lower on sponsored amendments.  
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TABLE 3.6: DISSENT EXPRESSION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN PLENARY 
Legislation Type ALDE ECR EFD EPP Greens GUE S & D 
Sponsored Amends-Phase 1 .91 .87 NA .99 .98 .79 .97 
Sponsored-Phase Two .92 1.0 NA .99 .98 .99 .96 
All Amends-Phase One .81 .84 .51 .96 .93 .80 .89 
All Amends-Phase Two .85 .98 .46 .96 .95 .85 .89 
Reports-Phase One .92 .66 .41 .96 .91 .79 .90 
Reports-Phase Two .93 .92 .47 .97 .94 .72 .91 
Note: Table depicts group cohesion rates on amendments and reports for both phases of field research. 
Data Source: www.votewatch.eu  
 
       Table 3.6 above depicts dissent patterns when portions of reports or whole reports are 
considered. Rows one and two depicts party group cohesion on amendments sponsored or co-
sponsored by the group and is divided into roll-call votes occurring during each of the two 
phases of field research. Rows three and four indicate party group cohesion rates on all 
amendments, whereas the last two rows depict dissent within each party group on the report as a 
whole when modified following votes on amendments and on whole resolutions not 
accompanied by amendments. 
       When examining roll-call votes in the first half of the previous parliament  Hix et al. (2007) 
found that party groups were less cohesive on whole reports than on amendments (Hix et al. 
2007, 126). I expected that dissent should be lower for the more cohesive groups in the current 
parliament on whole reports and that dissent should also be lower on amendments sponsored/co-
sponsored by the group when compared to votes on all amendments. I held these expectations 
because groups have had more time since the 2007 study to assimilate MEPs from new member-
states and to develop dissent management strategies in light of expanded legislative influence.  
       Expectations were met regarding group cohesion rates on sponsored or co-sponsored 
amendments. In each phase, all groups secured higher cohesion (lower dissent levels) or the 





 As Table 3.6 further depicts, three of the four most cohesive groups (EPP, S & D, 
and ALDE) did obtain higher cohesion rates in both research phases on whole reports than on 
votes for select amendments. The exception is the Greens/EFA who had slightly less cohesion on 
whole reports than on amendments in both field research phases.  
       My observations of group meetings suggest that this discrepancy in part reflects the 
emphasis placed on discussing particular amendments within the group. At times, these 
discussions translated into a Greens/EFA group line opposing a whole report if particular 
amendments failed. However, it also at times resulted in a free vote on whole reports upon the 
failure of particular amendments thereby producing an ad hoc group line (a majority happened to 
vote one way) rather than one orchestrated by group leadership or indicative of a majority 
identified earlier through votes in the group meeting. 
       In turn, ECR group cohesion declined on whole reports when compared to amendments in 
both phases though the gap was significantly closed during the second phase. Similarly, ECR 
MEPs dissented in much higher numbers on sponsored or co-sponsored amendments during the 
first phase, whereas there was unanimity on ECR-sponsored amendments during the second 
phase. These patterns in part may be the result of budget votes in the first phase which typically 
divide British MEPs from their new member-state colleagues. Surprisingly, the GUE secured 
higher cohesion rates on whole reports than on amendments though the difference was small 
while dissent was much lower on GUE-sponsored amendments in the second phase than in the 
first phase of field research. I believe this is in part the result of leadership effects in terms of a 
change in group president (See Chapter Six).   
MANAGING DISSENT 
                                                          
6
 Sponsored or co-sponsored amendments in phase one: ALDE 6, ECR 7, EPP 15, Greens/EFA 7, GUE/NGL 9, and 
S & D 6. Phase Two: ALDE 7, ECR 3, EPP 1, Greens 17, GUE 14 and S & D 15. 
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       With multiple options for dissent available to MEPs in terms of levels of expression and 
timing within the legislative process, party group leaders are provided with impetus for creating 
proactive and multi-faceted dissent management strategies to minimize the extent and form of 
dissent. In this sense, party group leaders are presumed to behave as legislative entrepreneurs 
who rely upon a variety of tools ranging from discipline to communicating the group line 
through a whip structure supported by socialization processes in order to manage dissent in all of 
its forms and at every legislative stage.  
       Cox and McCubbins (2007) define legislative entrepreneurs according to three essential 
features: (1) they bear the direct costs of monitoring; (2) they possess selective incentives with 
which to reward those whom they find cooperating or punish those whom they find defecting, 
and (3) they benefit in various ways from ensuring favorable legislative outcomes (Cox and 
McCubbins, 2007, 84). Party group leaders are motivated to act as legislative entrepreneurs in 
large part because since 1999 more is at stake as the European Parliament has gained nearly co-
equal legislative authority and as the ongoing financial crisis has demonstrated, pressing issues 
confront the parliament.  
       Bailer et al. (2009) contend that party group cohesion is not only the result of ideological 
homogeneity, but also a result of party group discipline imposed by leaders (Bailer et al. 2009, 
356). In part, this is due to a personal interest of group presidents that seek a positive institutional 
reputation in order to gain legislative influence and perhaps attain the presidency of the 
parliament or a Commission position (Bailer et al. 2009, 356). Whether motivated by personal or 
group interests, leaders cannot leave voting outcomes to chance as legislative priorities and 
potentially party group (or even institutional) reputation may be in jeopardy. 
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        For example, the vote on the Services Directive (2006) witnessed higher than normal rates 
of dissent within party groups in which the additional dissent of only a handful of MEPs would 
have resulted in its defeat (See Hix et al. 2007). Similarly, during my field research, EPP group 
cohesion rates were higher than average on the “two-pack” and “six-pack” votes following 
extensive lobbying and appeals by group leadership as I describe in Chapter Six 
(www.votewatch.eu). Prominent reports as these illustrate that despite high cohesion rates on 
most votes, a need exists within party groups for a proactive and structured dissent management 
system in order to minimize dissent levels particularly on prominent reports. 
       Party groups have created various leadership positions with specific responsibilities tied to 
particular stages in the legislative process. Leadership positions may be considered as solutions 
to collective action problems in that they serve as agents charged by the party members with the 
facilitation of lawmaking in order to give certain members incentives to carry out tasks that 
otherwise might not be performed (Sinclair, 1995, 9). When managing dissent, leaders are not 
only punishing opposition and rewarding loyalty, they are also acting to prevent or at least 
minimize the levels of dissent at all legislative stages. 
       Dissent management consists of a relationship between leaders and rank-and-file in which 
decision-making by each influences the probable actions by the other often within the context of 
a group culture. In this sense, when legislators consider the form of dissent or to express dissent 
at all, they take into account the extent to which leaders can impact their re-election, secure 
offices (legislative and party) or influence the legislative agenda (particularly the impact of 
agenda control by leadership upon the legislator‟s policy and political goals) and voting 
outcomes on respective reports or amendments. In this regard, legislators are rational actors 
making choices in which they weigh the pros and cons of supporting or opposing the party line. 
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However, they are also influenced by group norms governing when and how to dissent. Whether 
due to rationality, the influence of socialization processes, or both, MEPs are incentivized to 
follow the party group line and should they dissent to do so at less costly levels. 
       A traditional approach to dissent management is to impose disciplinary measures. Though 
party groups possess far more limited disciplinary tools than their counterparts in other 
legislatures, they do have some options. Party groups control who is elected European 
Parliament President, who will become a committee chair, which MEP writes which legislative 
report, who can speak in plenary debates and for how long (Hix et al. 2007, 22). The most 
extreme disciplinary tool is expulsion. In 2005, EPP President Hans-Gert Pottering, successfully 
had Roger Helmer of the UK voted out of the group for supporting a motion to censure 
Commission President Barroso (Bailer et al. 20090, 355). Legislative party leaders can also 
avoid or mitigate dissent through candidate selection, agenda control, speaking time in floor 
debates, and control over the distribution of legislative and party leadership offices (Cox and 
McCubbins, 2007, 115).  
       For example, the selection of rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs is often made by 
coordinators who are the group leaders in committees. While all MEPs on a committee may 
ultimately shadow a report if not carry a report, the frequency of these assignments and perhaps 
more importantly the extent to which they are assigned prominent reports is often left to the 
group coordinator to decide. Coordinators are given wide discretion in most groups when 
assigning reports but maintain communication with the rest of leadership and on occasion take 
voting behavior into consideration (Lindberg, 2008, 1190). 
       In addition, party groups control speaking time in plenary debates. Speaking time in plenary 
is very limited in a legislature consisting of seven hundred fifty-six MEPs are allocated 
106 
 
according to party group size. Interviews reveal that assigning plenary speaking time is more 
about trying to meet requests for speaking time rather than serving as a party discipline tool. 
Furthermore, MEPs can circumvent leaders by offering written or oral explanations of vote or 
through „catch-the-eye‟ segments in plenary. 
       In such circumstances where party leaders have limited disciplinary tools, agenda control 
provides perhaps the most effective means for leaders to manage dissent (Cox and McCubbins, 
2007, 135). For example, leaders may control or heavily influence what legislation will be 
considered, what committee it will be assigned to, and the degree of support within the party 
caucus. In this sense, agenda control acts as a preemptive tool for managing dissent in that 
leaders can identify the policy preferences of legislators in order to confront dissent at and in 
advance of every legislative stage (Kam, 2002, 27).  
       As discussed in chapter one, while legislative initiative rests formally with the Commission, 
the parliament does influence or at times even direct what legislation it considers and upon its 
review has the potential to shape it through amendments, or reject a report altogether. Agenda 
control has the potential to act as the most effective disciplinary tool available to party group 
leaders in that all amendments in plenary must be sponsored by groups unless they are 
accompanied by the signatures of forty MEPs. 
       As “carrot and stick” approaches have limited impact upon party group dissent rates, group 
leaders often also rely upon re-enforcing behavioral norms and party group identities through 
socialization to ensure voting unity or to minimize dissent. Socialization implies that logic of 
consequences has been replaced by logic of appropriateness learned through mimicking the 
behavior and adhering to the appeals of colleagues (Checkel, 2005, 804). In this sense, MEPs do 
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not dissent or express dissent at lower levels because they are socialized into doing so as it is the 
appropriate response given the prevalent norms practiced within the group.  
       Established norms of behavior within groups provide a framework of reference enabling 
socialization to be effective as a means of ensuring the attainment of group goals and 
preferences. As Brown (2000) remarks, “Norms specify… rules for how group members should 
behave and thus are the basis for mutual expectations among the group members” (Brown, 2000, 
56). In turn, norms of behavior within groups may change over time as circumstances 
confronting groups change (Brown, 2000, 62).  
      In turn, as Hermann et al. (2004) noted, for a socializing effect to contribute toward ensuring 
party group unity, MEPs must develop a connection to the party group (and to some extent the 
parliament) on both a personal and professional level. “Individuals come to identify with an 
institution and the group that it represents to the extent that the institution is salient in their 
personal lives” (Hermann et al. 2004, 14). For example, in the British and Canadian House of 
Commons, the differences in cohesion levels was according to Garner and Letki (2005) partially 
explained by the degree to which MPs were socialized into norms and developed certain attitudes 
toward group unity. Party organizations in this sense provided the MP with a sense of efficacy 
through “opportunity channels” (caucus meetings, committees, etc.) which enabled the MP to 
feel that they had an effective voice (Garner and Letki, 2005, 466-468).  
       Similarly, an MEP is part of an organizational culture expressed at the institutional level as a 
member of the parliament, but also at the party group level where norms of behavior associated 
with socialization may enhance or maintain group identity and in turn influence voting behavior 
(Brown, 2000, 60). Socialization may be directed by party group leaders but it also re-enforced 
through daily interaction with colleagues and staff within the party group. Party groups in this 
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sense provide a context in which MEPs make decisions in part upon the basis of norms or 
expectations governing behavior.  
       When sufficiently fostered, such norms impose a sense of duty upon MEPs to support the 
group position which are re-enforced over time through experience with the legislative process 
and mimicking the behavior of group colleagues (Kam, 2002, 194 and 205). Socialization 
provides leaders with a less costly means of managing dissent in comparison to strictly 
disciplinary tactics. For example, with turnover common, and some MEPs reaching the limits of 
institutional promotion, socialization can ensure adherence to the group position just as it can for 
those in national legislatures (Kam, 2002, 194 and 205).  
       The impact of socialization is exemplified by the role of rapporteurs and coordinators in 
ensuring party group cohesion in voting at the committee level and to some degree in later 
legislative stages. While MEPs are presumed to possess policy preferences, they are nonetheless 
confronted by two informational constraints: they may not know the preferences of some of their 
colleagues and they may not possess a preference on every issue or on particular amendments 
due to lack of or even the overload of information. Facing these obstacles, MEPs may turn to 
rapporteurs and coordinators for cues on policy preferences which is re-enforced as a practice 
through socialization (See Ringe, 2010). 
       Field research and the Farrell et al. (2011) survey (See Chapter Eight) indicate that those 
party groups with well-developed norms governing dissent and a well-defined group identity 
conducive to unity are more likely to have lower levels of dissent whereas those groups who lack 
such norms and a well-defined group identity are more likely to experience higher dissent levels. 
However, field research also indicates that just as a whip structure is insufficient for managing 
dissent without the re-enforcement provided by socialization, socialization is only as effective in 
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the extent to which a proactive whip structure is in place for party group leaders to disseminate 
group norms and define a group identity.  
       Group leaders utilize each legislative stage to either act in concert (group presidents and 
whips during group meetings) or according to specialized roles (coordinators in the committees) 
to identify and manage dissent. If dissent is identified and addressed in the working group or at 
the group meeting stage, dissent may not be expressed or dissent may be expressed at a less 
costly level in plenary votes. On the other hand, if initial efforts are unsuccessful, dissent may be 
quite extensive in plenary votes resulting in the defeat of the group line on particular 
amendments or perhaps on the report as a whole.  
       Whether utilizing disciplinary tools or socialization process (or both), dissent management 
requires a whip structure in order to ensure communication which in the European Parliament 
occurs within party group leadership, between leadership and national delegations, and between 
leaders and rank-and-file MEPs. As the European Parliament expands in terms of both 
membership and legislative powers, party groups have re-evaluated existing leadership positions 
and dissent management strategies and in some instances created new offices and party bodies 
(horizontal working groups) to reflect changes within the group and in the parliament as a whole. 
       In this sense, a whip structure consists of a group president who presides over group 
meetings and in some cases serves as the focal point for building and securing the group line. A 
whip structure also consists of group vice-presidents, coordinators, and in five of the seven 
groups a whip/parliamentary secretary. National delegation leaders and rapporteurs (for each 
report) also play key roles within the whip structure, as does the group secretariat. The final 
component of a whip structure are the group meetings and in the four largest groups, horizontal 
working groups. A successful whip structure is one that achieves minimal dissent through 
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proactive leaders who communicate with one another and together with others within the group 
identify obstacles to group cohesion and resolve them through lobbying or through compromise 
to deter those who might otherwise dissent. 
       Field research reveals that each group president has his or her unique approach to dissent 
management and that no particular style is more effective than another. However, what all 
successful group presidents have in common are the ability to identify and achieve consensus 
and an understanding of the group‟s organization and culture. In other words, the more effective 
group presidents are those that understand what unites the group, what divides it, and how 
consensus can be formed in group forums, or if necessary in direct negotiations.  
       In turn, those groups with the highest cohesion rates are those who include the group vice-
presidents in dissent management rather than relegating them to administrative roles or with no 
responsibilities at all. For some groups, this may mean chairing a working group and for others, 
it may be serving as the focal point for dissent management. Similarly, coordinators are the eyes 
and ears of group leadership at the committee level where they are responsible for managing 
dissent, while in some groups they continue their involvement in in other group forums. 
       Perhaps no position better exemplifies the development of a whip structure than the 
assignment of a group vice-president as the whip or as it is often referred to as, a parliamentary 
secretary. Five of the seven party groups have a vice-president (or in the case of the Greens the 
secretary-general) designated as a whip. In most legislatures, the whip system performs two 
primary functions: it serves as the central conduit for information between leaders and members, 
and it plays a key role in the vote mobilization process (Sinclair, 1995, 117).  
       Until more recent parliaments, the group whip consisted merely of a set of voting 
recommendations in the form of a list distributed to MEPs (Raunio, 1999, 193). Over time, 
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whips monitored how each MEP voted in roll-call votes and informed the party group leadership 
of major breeches in voting instructions and attendance issues (See Hix et al. 2007). The whip 
now consists of a person designated with the task of communicating and advocating for the 
group line. Where the whip office is absent (GUE and EFD) dissent levels are higher.  
       Variation in dissent levels is not solely due to the absence of the whip office but rather 
indicative that particular groups lack the components of a complete whip structure. A complete 
whip structure not only consists of particular offices and degrees of involvement by particular 
leaders or staff, but also the utilization of group forums to identify and address dissent. In this 
sense, the whip structure is a communications network, an alert system for group leadership to 
the extent and sources of dissent. As these components of a whip structure are in place and 
utilized to their fullest potential, group dissent levels decline and as field research attests, the 
variation in dissent levels among the party groups can be in part explained by the absence of or 
the poor utilization of particular offices and forums.  
SUMMARY 
       In this chapter, I examined the properties of dissent consisting of: explanations for dissent by 
MEPs and legislative aides, levels of dissent expression, and dissent management strategies by 
party group leaders. To understand the true nature of dissent in the European Parliament or in 
any legislative body, it is necessary to understand the relationship between deciding whether or 
not to dissent, and when and how to dissent with the efforts by leadership and key staff to 
achieve consensus or to ensure that the number of those dissenting are kept to a minimum and 
that dissent is expressed in outlets (not-voting or abstain) and in legislative stages (amendments) 
which are less costly for the group both in terms of its legislative goals and in the perception of 
the party group as a potential policymaker and coalition partner. Having considered dissent in all 
of its properties, chapter four will initiate hypotheses testing and will address the question 
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presented to MEPs and staff of: what explains why most members of your group vote the same 
way in plenary most of the time.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: EXPLAINING PARTY GROUP UNITY 
 
INTRODUCTION    
       How do most party groups in the European Parliament achieve such high cohesion rates and 
what explains the variation in dissent rates among the party groups? Previous chapters have 
presented the case for pursuing this research topic, described the research design, and considered 
the properties of dissent. This chapter is the first of five to examine the research question through 
interviews of MEPs and staff conducted over two phases of field research as well as observations 
of party group and horizontal working group meetings normally closed to the public.  
       In the course of field research, I have identified a relationship between particular dissent 
management strategies and dissent variation patterns among party groups. Accordingly, I 
contend that the (largely) high party group cohesion rates are obtained at the individual level 
through an MEP‟s proximity to the group ideological mean in conjunction with processes at the 
group level consisting of the leaders and forums constituting the group‟s communication network 
or „whip structure‟, and socialization processes contributing to a shared conceptualization of the 
group identity. In turn, I argue that the less cohesive groups are those who do not: assign clear 
dissent management roles to leaders, fail to fully utilize group forums to build consensus, and 
who lack informal processes governing dissent and other MEP behavior.  
       While ideology at the MEP level contributes to high cohesion rates for most party groups 
(See Hix et. al 2007), ideology alone cannot account for why most MEPs as members of groups 
in a supranational institution so regularly support the group line in plenary votes. In turn, with 
expanded co-decision authority since the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) and with decision-making 
increasingly shifting from the nation-state to the EU level, understanding how party groups 
achieve such high cohesion rates and why some groups are more cohesive than others has 
become imperative. As Hix and Hoyland (2011) assert, “more at stake means more incentives to 
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strengthen the division of labor inside the political groups, to try and win votes and shift 
outcomes in a particular policy direction” (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, 143).  
       In addition, we know very little about how particular party group leaders (Ex: Presidents and 
the Vice-Presidents), or forums such as party group meetings contribute to group cohesion in 
plenary voting, and what tools group leaders utilize when shared ideology and lobbying on the 
political and policy merits of legislation are insufficient to secure maximum support for the 
group line and minimal levels of dissent expression.  
       While past research has provided valuable insight into explanations for party group cohesion 
rates (See Hix et al. 2007), such studies also reflect the limitations associated with roll-call vote 
data in that roll-call votes constitute a small and to a degree an unrepresentative sample of all 
plenary session votes (Carrubba et al. 2006). While roll-call votes remain a useful tool, they 
nonetheless fail to capture either the full extent of dissent or the forms of dissent expressions 
prior to the plenary session. As Carrubba et al. (2006) note, “The party groups are systematically 
hiding exactly the voting behavior we are interested in studying” (Carrubba et al. 2006, 699).  
       As an initial step to explaining variation in dissent levels, it is important to first assess how 
the party groups are able to achieve their respective cohesion rates. To accomplish this, I first 
consider explanations for group unity offered by roll-call vote analysis (Hix et al. 2007, Hix and 
Noury 2009) and contributions offered by MEP decision-making models (Ringe 2010) and by 
social identity theory (Tajfel 1978, Brown 2000). Finally, the bulk of the chapter will consider 
explanations for party group unity obtained from interviews collected in this study.  
LESSONS FROM ROLL-CALL VOTE STUDIES 
       Since the first direct elections in 1979 and as the European Parliament has acquired co-
decision-making authority in nearly every policy area, party groups have become more cohesive 
in plenary voting with average party group cohesion scores rising from .82 in the first 
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parliament, 1979-1984 to .91 in the fifth parliament which sat from 1999-2004 (Hix et al. 2007, 
93). Further examination of roll-votes from the fifth parliament also reveals that MEPs are likely 
to support the group line unless there is a conflict with the position of their national party. MEPs 
voted against their national parties less than five percent of the time and against their party group 
in nine percent of roll-call votes. In turn, MEPs voted with their national party and against their 
party group six percent of the time and against their national party but in support of the group 
line in less than two percent of roll-call votes in the fifth parliament (Hix et al. 2007, 138). 
       Another explanation for rising party group cohesion rates may be the increased legislative 
role for the parliament following the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999). With the extension of co-
decision authority and an increasing shift in decision-making from the member-state to the EU 
level, group cohesion rates rose by eleven percent (Hix et al. 2007, 102). Party group size also 
influences the likelihood of higher cohesion rates with a five percent increase in a group‟s seat 
share corresponding to a 0.19 percent increase in group cohesion (Hix et al. 2007, 101). The 
authors speculate that larger groups have a greater incentive to specialize and divide tasks due to 
membership numbers and higher plenary stakes than smaller party groups (Hix et al. 2007, 101).  
       What role does ideology play in influencing party group cohesion rates? Putnam (1971) 
clarifies the role of ideology in a legislator‟s decision-making in that “a political actor may be 
perceived to be ideological when he or she conducts politics from the standpoint of a coherent, 
comprehensive set of beliefs” (Putnam, 1971, 655). The impact of an MEP‟s set of beliefs upon 
party group cohesion rates may be assessed on a Left-Right spectrum or in terms of support for 
existing or further EU integration. When an MEP clearly identifies a set of beliefs along either 
spectrum, he or she may compare the group line to their system of beliefs and determine whether 
support or dissent is the proper course of action.  
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       Consequently, an MEP‟s decision of how and when to express dissent from the group line is 
related to their ideological proximity to the group mean, but also by the extent of ideological 
cohesion within the group. In other words, the likelihood and form of dissent expression is 
related to the extent to which an MEP shares the ideological views of the group and in turn the 
extent to which the group as a whole identifies a unifying ideology binding members to a 
common line and a shared identity. 
       Hix et al. (2007) concluded that the group‟s ideological position on the left-right spectrum or 
its proximity to the ideological mean of all party groups is not related to its cohesion level (Hix 
et al. 2007, 101). However, the authors did find that ideology at the individual (MEP) level helps 
to explain defection rates with thirty percent of the total variance in MEP defection from the 
group line explained by Left-Right politics. “The greater the distance between personal 
ideological position on the left-right dimension and the average left-right location of the party 
group, the more likely the MEP will vote against the party group, independent of the position of 
the national party” (Hix et al. 2007, 181). Similarly, when ideology is considered in terms of 
views on EU integration, the authors conclude that as the distance between an MEP‟s views and 
those of the group on the EU dimension decrease, the likelihood of defection from the party 
group line on related legislation decreases (Hix et al. 2007, 181).  
       Has EU enlargement impacted party group cohesion rates? Following the addition of ten 
new member-states Hix and Noury (2009) examined roll-call votes from the first half of the sixth 
parliament (2004-2006) and found that the gap between voting along national and party group 
lines increased, while overall group cohesion declined, but not significantly (Hix and Noury, 
2009, 162). Despite the increase in membership and the inclusion of MEPs from mostly Central-
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Eastern European member-states, party groups in the European Parliament remain highly 
cohesive and defection rates did not increase at a significant rate (Hix and Noury, 2009, 165).  
MEP DECISION-MAKING AND PARTY GROUP UNITY 
       While roll-call vote studies provide a valuable tool for examining party group cohesion, they 
are limited in two key facets: only thirty-five percent of plenary votes are roll-called and reports 
from some committees are never or rarely roll-called thereby calling into question the 
representativeness of the sample (See Carrubba et al. 2006). One additional tool for examining 
variation in party group cohesion rates is to analyze the decision-making processes of individual 
MEPs. Assuming rationality at the individual level, party group unity may be a product of MEPs 
deferring to policy experts within the group unless a separate national party line arises.  
       As members of party groups, the likelihood of MEPs securing their preferences is tied to the 
extent to which other group members share their preferences and whether the official group line 
approximates their own. However, when preferences are not evident or information aiding in 
preference assessment is lacking (or is overwhelming), MEPs may look to party group leaders or 
policy experts in the group when making voting decisions.   
       Ringe (2010) characterized this relationship in terms of rapporteurs, coordinators and other 
policy experts setting the group line with rank-and-file MEPs following the lead of these experts 
in most votes due largely to information constraints. “EP decision-making is founded on a 
division of labor and an exchange of information between expert and non-expert legislators 
based on perceived preference coherence. Legislators are often quite uninformed about the 
policies they exact because of very real external constraints on their ability to collect 
information” (Ringe, 2010, 209).  
       Each year, MEPs are confronted with the task of voting on numerous reports and resolutions 
with each often accompanied by hundreds of amendments. Knowing each amendment or report 
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inside out is a vaunting challenge at the committee level let alone at the plenary level. When 
lacking expertise on a given report or confronted with information overload, MEPs will 
according to the perceived preference model conclude that the most optimal course of action to 
secure their policymaking preferences is to defer to policy experts who possess a particular 
expertise and have invested their resources into more fully understanding the issue at hand 
(Ringe, 2010, 33). In turn, the challenge for party groups is to ensure that MEPs defer solely to 
experts within the group and follow the group line. 
       In addition to understanding the policy consequences, group experts will also be in a more 
informed position to communicate the political consequences of a report or amendment (Ringe, 
2010, 33). In such circumstances, the group rapporteur, president, or secretary-general may be in 
a unique position to provide insight on the fate of the report in the Council, the Commission‟s 
preferences, and how other party groups view the report. Consequently, party group cohesion 
rates are high when MEPs defer to policy experts on most votes, and where party groups have 
created leadership structures through which to communicate the group line formed from the 
expertise of select MEPs. In contrast, cohesion rates are lower in party groups where MEPs are 
less likely to identify a link between their preferences and those of group leadership and/or 
where leadership structures are not as effective in communicating the group line. 
       While perceived preferences and informational constraints help to explain party group unity, 
MEP decision-making may also be influenced by group membership. According to social 
identity theory (See Tajfel 1981, Tajfel and Turner, 1979), self-conceptualization based upon 
personal identity (individual characteristics and experiences), as well as social identity (group 
affiliations) frames decision-making. As Russell (2012) notes, “social identity is defined by the 
groups to which we belong and we maintain it by inter-group comparison in order to distinguish 
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ourselves from others” (Russell, 2012, 6). Furthermore, Brown (2000) contends that “Our sense 
of who we are and what we are worth is intimately bound up with our group memberships” 
(Brown, 2000, 28). For example, party group members may define their individual success or 
failure in terms of the success or failure of the group and accordingly make decisions based upon 
the likelihood their actions will contribute toward the group‟s success in achieving its goals.  
       In turn, group leaders will encourage behavior that contributes to the group‟s success while 
discouraging behavior that may place the group‟s goals in jeopardy. These efforts consist of 
communicating acceptable norms of behavior and developing socialization processes promoting 
preferred behavior such as through the use of cues from group leaders and other influential 
members (Russell, 2012, 6). According to Brown, “Once a group develops a clearly defined goal 
inevitably norms encouraging goal-facilitative actions and discouraging inhibitory behaviors will 
emerge” (Brown, 2000, 60). Brown further clarifies the impact of norms at the group level in that 
“they specify certain rules for how members should behave and are the basis for mutual 
expectations among group members” (Brown, 2000, 56). In this sense, norms re-enforce a shared 
conceptualization of the group identity which facilitates group cohesion. 
       The development of a shared identity and the degree to which socialization process are 
successful requires that logic of appropriateness accompanies if not replaces logic of 
consequences at the individual level. In other words, MEPs follow norms governing dissent and 
other behavior because they believe it to be the appropriate action, rather than solely on the basis 
of presumed consequences derived from strategic assessment. Socialization may be defined as 
the process of exposure or learning through which legislators acquire certain norms (Kam, 2002, 
194). Norms impose a sense of duty to support the leadership position and are re-enforced over 
time through exposure to group level decision-making processes and by mimicking the behavior 
121 
 
of colleagues. For example, an MEP‟s decision to dissent from or support the group line is 
framed in part by his or her group membership in that social interactions influence individual 
perceptions of group leadership roles and aid in the identification of appropriate norms of 
behavior including those governing dissent from the group line.  
       In turn, if party groups develop norms such as those promoting consensus, those governing 
when and how to dissent from the group line, and others encouraging deferral to group experts, 
then a party group‟s dissent rate should be lower when compared to groups who have not 
(successfully) fostered the development of such norms. For example, if an MEP belongs to a 
party group whose leaders effectively communicate the necessity for group unity, and the MEP 
observes other members deferring to group leaders, the MEP is likely to adopt a positive view of 
the party group and copy the observed behavior.  
      When the impact of decision-making processes upon party group unity is broadly assessed, 
both rational choice and social identity theory help to explain why some party groups are more 
cohesive than others. In this sense, respondents are assumed in this study to behave as rational 
actors pursuing individual preferences within information constraints yet who are also influenced 
by conceptions of group identity and socialization processes. In turn, the definition of group 
cohesion utilized in this study encompasses a collection of members with similar preferences 
(See Carey 2007) and the extent to which members share similar attitudes about and perceptions 
toward group unity (See Brown 2000). 
PREDICTORS OF PARTY GROUP COHESION/DEFECTION RATES 
       Why are cohesion rates on the whole so high among party groups in the European 
Parliament and why do some groups have higher dissent rates than others? In order to explain 
largely high cohesion rates and variation in party group dissent levels (See Table 4.1 below), I 
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contend that the leadership roles, group decision-making forums, and tactics associated with 
dissent management must be more closely examined.  
TABLE 4.1: PARTY GROUP COHESION/DISSENT RATES   
PARTY GROUP   COHESION RATE DISSENT RATE 
GREENS/EFA .947   0.053 
EPP   .931   0.069 
S & D   .928   0.072 
ALDE   .898   0.102 
ECR   .868   0.132 
GUE   .816   0.184 
EFD   .498   0.502 
Note: Party group cohesion/dissent rates are listed in descending order and reflect plenary roll-call votes 
during the current parliament (July 2009-March 2013) prior to the accession of Croatia into the EU. Data 
Source: www.votewatch.eu 
 
       Accordingly, I contend that lower party group dissent rates are a product of the extent to 
which individual MEPs are ideologically aligned with mean position of their party groups in 
conjunction with the degree to which party group leaders successfully utilize dissent 
management networks (whip structures) and socialize members into conforming to expected 
behavior and closely identifying with the group.  
MEP IDEOLOGY +  WHIP STRUCTURES + SOCIALIZATION = LOW DISSENT LEVELS 
  
       With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) granting even greater co-decision 
authority to the European Parliament and the accelerated process of integration (as evidenced by 
the response to the financial crisis), the legislative stakes are higher than ever for the party 
groups. With higher legislative stakes, party groups are incentivized to develop both formal and 
informal processes to facilitate the adoption of a common line as well as to identify and manage 
dissent on respective reports. Formal processes consist of assigned roles to party group leaders as 
well as decision-making forums such as party group meetings, while informal processes include 
the adoption of norms governing dissent and a shared conceptualization of the group identity.   
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       As described in chapter three, successful dissent management networks or whip structures 
are defined not only by the presence of respective positions (Ex: presidents, and vice-presidents) 
but more importantly by the roles assigned to each position. The efforts of party group leaders 
within this whip structure are directed toward producing consensus and when necessary ensuring 
that members dissent at less costly levels such as by abstaining or opposing the group line on an 
amendment but not the entire report. In turn, party group leaders are expected to utilize a 
combination of lobbying (on the basis of the report‟s merits and the political consequences for 
defection) and socialization to achieve their goal ensuring widespread group cohesion.  
       In order to gauge the extent to which whip structures and socialization processes are evident 
within the party groups and the extent to which each contribute to high cohesion and low dissent 
rates, I began each interview with a broad and open-ended question concerning group unity. I 
asked eighty-four MEPs and staff: what explains why most (or in the case of the EFD a majority) 
of MEPs in your party group vote the same way in most plenary votes? The question was 
purposefully left open-ended in order to capture the full range of respondent perceptions 
regarding party group unity and in the hopes of acquiring a more complete understanding of 
group culture, leadership roles, and decision-making processes. 
        In turn, I anticipated that responses could be arranged according to five categories: shared 
beliefs, communication, plenary coalitions, deferral to group experts, and with some respondents 
saying that group unity was unimportant. Each response category was expected to capture the 
effects (or the absence) of both a whip structure and of socialization processes. I expected that 
shared beliefs would be the most common response („We are unified because we think alike and 
because we value group membership‟) in that it entails not only the common ideology shared by 
most group members but also the extent to which respondents value group unity and perceive 
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that their colleagues share this assumption. The response of communication („We are unified 
because we constantly communicate our goals and concerns to one another) should be the second 
most common response and encompass the contributions of group leaders and forums in 
constructing and building support for the group line but also the extent to which a respondent felt 
connected to that decision-making process. In this sense, group cohesion is in part a product of 
the efforts by group leaders to communicate with one another and with the rank-and-file but also 
the extent to which rank-and-file members participate in and value the processes and forums 
associated with group decision-making processes (See Garner and Letki 2005). 
       Responses stating that party group unity were a result of plenary coalitions (We are unified 
because members know that the group‟s legislative priorities and its legislative reputation require 
a unified group in plenary votes‟) should reflect consideration of not only the perceived 
legislative or political consequences of dissent but also the impact of dissent upon the group‟s 
plenary reputation. In this sense, the response citing coalitions encompasses the political 
consequences assessed by respondents as well as the extent to which respondents are socialized 
into adopting a shared sense of importance placed upon preserving the group‟s reputation 
derived from delivering a unified group as part of plenary coalitions.  
        Meanwhile, responses citing deferral to experts („We are unified as a group because 
members don‟t have time to read all reports and/or because it is customary to defer to the experts 
within our group‟) were expected to capture the conclusions reached by Ringe (2010) and/or 
those assumed by social identity theory that deferral may be a product of either information 
constraints or a sense of closeness to the group and to its leaders in particular. Finally, responses 
maintaining that group unity is unimportant should capture the absence of socialization processes 
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as well as the limited or nonexistent contributions of group leaders and decision-making forums 
towards group cohesion.  
       In turn, I assume that the presence of certain party group characteristics should increase the 
likelihood of offering particular responses. Specifically, I assume that party group size (number 
of members) and the level of party group plenary influence (the percentage of times the group is 
in the plenary majority) should increase the likelihood of offering particular responses. 
TABLE 4.2: PARTY GROUP MEMBERSHIP  
Group Name                 Number/% of MEPs  
EPP (European Peoples Party)             271/35.9% 
S & D (Socialist and Democrats)         189/25.0% 
ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats)  85/11.2% 
Greens/EFA       58/7.7% 
ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) 56/7.4% 
GUE (Union of European Left)    34/4.5% 
EFD (Europeans for a Free Democracy)  34/4.5& 
Total       756/100% 
Note: Group Membership depicted in descending order from largest to smallest and reflecting totals prior 
to accession of Croatia. The 27 unaffiliated MEPs are not included. Data Source: www.votewatch.eu 
 
H1: Respondents from larger party groups will be more likely to reference shared identity 
derived from group membership in their response that shared beliefs explain party group unity.  
 
       Respondents from larger party groups should be more likely to refer to how group 
membership fosters a shared identity promoting group unity. Leaders in the larger groups have 
greater incentive to foster a sense of shared identity as they are unable to directly lobby every 
MEP. If members closely identify with the group and adopt norms setting expectations for 
behavior, socialization may help to overcome the logistical challenges associated with managing 
dissent in a large group. In contrast, leaders in smaller groups will have less incentive to develop 
socialization processes as they can more easily lobby individual members. In turn, respondents 
from smaller groups will be less likely to closely identify with the group and more likely to not 
reference shared identity in their discussion of shared beliefs. 
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H2: Respondents from larger party groups will be more likely to cite communication as an 
explanation for party group unity.  
 
      As membership size decreases, party groups will have less incentive to develop 
communication networks to form the group line and manage dissent. Large membership should 
encourage the development of specific leadership positions, assigned leadership roles, and 
decision-making forums. For example, the two largest party groups (EPP and S & D) have 
created horizontal working groups as an intermediary stage between committees and party group 
meetings, whereas the two smallest (GUE and EFD) have not. In turn, respondents from larger 
groups should refer to the group decision-making process as a whole as well as specific leaders 
and group forums in their explanations of group unity.  
H3: Respondents from party groups with greater plenary influence will be more likely to cite 
plenary coalitions and deferral to group experts as explanations for party group unity. 
 
       Respondents from the more influential party groups will be more likely to believe that party 
group unity is due to the legislative and political consequences as well as the perceived impact 
upon the group identity associated with the failure to provide sufficient votes to support a 
plenary coalition. For example, ALDE respondents should be among the most likely to cite the 
importance of plenary coalitions as an explanation for party group unity in part reflecting the 
shared goal of securing the ALDE line but also shared concerns of jeopardizing the group‟s 
identity built in part upon its plenary reputation as a reliable coalition partner.  
       Respondents from the more influential party groups should also be more likely to explain 
party group unity as a result or in part due to members deferring to group experts. All MEPs 
regardless of group size face the same informational constraints in regards to individual expertise 
and the volume of legislation. However, respondents from more influential party groups will be 
more likely to consider the higher legislative stakes in their assessment of whether or not to defer 
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to experts. In addition, respondents from more influential party groups should have greater 
exposure to norms encouraging deferral to experts.  
 
Note: Graph depicts the percentage of times each party group has been in the plenary majority in the 
current parliament as of March 2013. Data Source: www.votewatch.eu 
 
H4: Respondents from the least influential party groups will be the most likely to maintain that 
party group unity is unimportant. 
 
       Though smaller party groups may not influence the outcome of most votes, if they are 
unified, they may influence the outcome of votes on prominent reports which may incur more 
profound divisions among groups within parliament. However, the low level of plenary influence 
exhibited by the three smallest party groups indicates that a majority if not most members of 
these groups do not view unity important enough to justify consistent support for the group line 
or perhaps even advocate for the adoption of an official group line. In this sense, defection and 
plenary influence are inter-related in that the lack of plenary influence encourages dissent while a 
non-cohesive group measured along ideological lines or in shared views on unity (See Brown) 

























H5: Respondents who are coordinators, rapporteurs or staff will be more likely to state that 
communication explains party group unity than those holding other party group positions.  
 
      The effects of party group position should be most evident in offering the response that 
communication explains party group unity. In particular, coordinators and rapporteurs among 
group leaders should be the most likely to cite communication as these positions are the most 
responsible for forming the group line and managing dissent. Compared to other leaders, 
coordinators and rapporteurs communicate more with members from the committee to the party 
group meeting and at times prior to plenary. Staff should also be more likely to cite 
communication than rank-and-file MEPs or respondents who are group presidents and vice-
presidents because as the secretary-general, group policy advisors, or aides to MEPs, they will be 
in constant communication with members while contributing to consensus-building.  
H6: As the years of service in the European Parliament increases, the likelihood of stating that 
communication or deferral to group experts explains party group unity increases.  
 
       As respondents acquire greater acquaintance with the group level decision-making 
processes, they should be more likely to recognize that communication contributes to the unity of 
their party group. MEPs and staff to various degrees share common beliefs with their colleagues 
when first joining the party group, but it is only over time that they identify particular leadership 
roles and adopt particular norms. For example, members with more service in the parliament 
should more closely identify with the party group and (where applicable) working group 
meetings in terms of viewing them as vital decision-making forums where they can express their 
views and contribute to the development of the group line.    
       Similarly, information constraints confront all MEPs upon entry into the European 
Parliament, but socialization requires exposure over time to take full effect. In turn, I expect 
MEPs with more years of service to be more likely to explain party group unity in terms of 
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deferral to group experts because they will have had more exposure to socialization processes. I 
also expect that as staff becomes more acquainted with the procedures and the cultures of the 
group they should be more likely to cite deferral to experts in their explanation. 
TABLE 4.3: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF EU MEMBERSHIP BY MEMBER-STATE 
MEMBER-STATE  GOOD     BAD     NEITHER   DON‟T KNOW 
AUSTRIA                                .37          .25          .36             .02 
BELGIUM                               .65          .11          .23             .01 
BULGARIA                            .48          .10          .38              .04 
CYPRUS                                 .37          .25          .36              .02 
CZECH REPUBLIC               .31          .19          .48              .02 
DENMARK                            .55          .16          .28              .01     
ESTONIA                               .49          .09          .40              .01 
FINLAND                               .47          .19          .33              .01 
FRANCE                                 .46          .19          .33              .02 
GERMANY                            .54          .16          .26              .04 
GREECE                                 .38          .33          .28              .01 
HUNGARY                            .32          .22           .44             .02 
IRELAND                               .63         .12           .18              .07 
ITALY                                    .41          .17           .36             .06 
LATVIA                                 .25          .21           .51             .03 
LITHUANIA                          .49          .16           .31             .04 
LUXEMBOURG                    .72          .13           .13             .02 
MALTA                                  .42          .13           .37             .03 
NETHERLANDS                   .68          .12           .19             .01            
POLAND                                .53          .10           .33             .04  
PORTUGAL                         .39          .26           .30             .05 
SLOVAKIA                           .52          .10            .37             .01        
SLOVENIA                           .39           .21           .39              .01 
SPAIN                                    .55          .17           .22              .06 
SWEDEN                              .56           .17           .25              .20   
UNITED KINGDOM            .26           .32           .37              .05 
Note: Table depicts proportions of respondents providing each answer to the question of in what terms 
they viewed their country‟s EU membership. Data Source: EU Barometer (May 2011) 
 
H7: Respondents from member-states with a negative public perception of EU membership will 
be less likely to cite shared beliefs and more likely to contend that group unity is unimportant. 
 
       Given that MEPs with a stronger European identity (See Farrell et al. 2011) and who place 
themselves closer to the federalist position on the EU integration spectrum (See Hix et al. 2007) 
are more likely to value party group unity and take group positions into account when voting in 
plenary, I expect respondents from member-states with strong negative public perceptions of EU 
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membership to not closely identify with their group and in turn not value group unity. To 
measure public perception, I rely on the most recent EU Barometer survey (May 2011) depicted 
above in Table 4.3. Among a series of questions, respondents were asked if in general they 
thought their country‟s EU membership was: a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good nor a 
bad thing. In part, I hope to capture expected differences between respondents from new and EU 
15 member-states, but also those from individual member-states (particularly the UK and 
Greece) where the EU enjoys less support.  
       When public perceptions of EU membership are more negative, respondents from these 
member-states should be more likely to prioritize national interests over European or party group 
interests. For example, respondents from member-states with higher positive perceptions of EU 
membership will be more likely to reference the “community project” when they cite shared 
beliefs in that they believe that the group‟s „European‟ identity is at stake in plenary outcomes. 
In contrast, respondents from countries with more negative attitudes toward EU membership will 
be less likely to cite shared beliefs in part because they have less incentive to adopt a European 
component of the group‟s identity and in turn will be more likely to view group unity as 
unimportant as national priorities will outweigh the group‟s priorities.  
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES 
       When asked to explain the level of unity within their party group, respondents often offered 
two or more explanations which is why the number of cases (117) depicted in Figure 4.2 below 
exceeds the number of respondents (84) interviewed. As expected, the most common explanation 
for why the party group was mostly unified on most votes in plenary was shared beliefs. Thirty-
nine percent of responses maintained that the extent of party group unity could be best or in part 
explained by the extent to which group members share common beliefs on policy and to various 




Note: Figure depicts the frequency for which each response was offered. Number of Cases: 117. Multiple 
responses were permitted 
 
       Thirty-one percent of responses stated that the level of group unity in plenary voting was a 
product of or was in part due to constant communication whether between members of a 
committee or working group, or between leaders and rank-and-file. Many of these respondents 
also positively viewed group forums as vital forums for identifying and securing support for the 
group line. Sixteen percent of responses noted that party group unity was due to plenary 
coalitions in that members perceived that the group had to be unified in order to influence 
plenary outcomes and secure its plenary reputation. Thirteen percent of responses maintained 
that party group unity was high (in part) because members mostly defer to group experts, while 
six percent of responses stated that party group unity was not important. 
       Table 4.4 below depicts measures of significance for each of the respondent characteristics 
hypothesized to influence the likelihood of offering each response category. Gender and a 
respondent‟s previous profession have been added as extraneous variables. As the data are 











Beliefs and Values Communication Coalitions Look to Experts Unimportant




substantively significant relationship between responses and predictors. Values of 0 to 0.19 
denote weak associations between variables, .20 to .49 indicate modest associations, while values 
of .50 and above signify strong associations between variables.  
       While all of the respondent characteristics apart from gender have a moderate or strong 
association with nearly every response category, a statistically significant relationship occurs 
only between party group membership and the response categories of plenary coalitions and 
party group unity is unimportant. However, significant relationships between variables do not 
indicate causality. For example, belonging to one party group or another did not cause a 
respondent to offer a particular response but the likelihood of offering a particular response and 
belonging to a specific party group is high. 
TABLE 4.4: PREDICTORS OF EXPLANATION FOR PARTY GROUP UNITY  
Variable            Shared Beliefs   Communication     Coalitions       Experts       Unimportant 
Party Group       0.2930              0.3046             0.4712**         0.3075         0.4906** 
Group Position      0.2192              0.0736                0.2188             0.2578         0.2448 
Member-State       0.5574              0.3734                  0.4496             0.4328         0.5680                            
Gender                 -0.1736              0.1132                  0.0565             0.0032         0.0680 
Years of Service   0.3972              0.3699                  0.3977             0.3740         0.3642 
Profession       0.2968              0.3061                  0.2802             0.3515         0.3409 
(Number of Cases)   (46)                   (36)                    (16)                 (13)                (6)                           
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores measuring strength of association. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance on the .05, .01 and .001 levels. The number of cases associated with each response appears in 
parentheses on the last line of the table.  N of Cases: 117. Multiple responses were permitted  
             
       While association measures describe the substantive strength of the relationship between two 
variables, statistical significance indicates the likelihood that the same results would occur in the 
general population. In turn, whether a relationship between two variables is likely a product of 
chance may be ascertained from the p-value. The null hypothesis (no relationship occurs) may be 
rejected when p-values of below .05 occur.  For example, a p-value of .049 indicates that there is 
a statistically significant relationship between two variables and a less than one in twenty 
probability that the assumed relationship between the two variables occurred due to chance. 
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Therefore, while for example Cramér's V values indicate a moderate or high substantive 
association between a respondent‟s member-state origins and each of the response categories, the 
accompanying p-values indicate the absence of a statistically significant relationship and the high 
probability that the relationship between a respondent‟s member-state and given responses were 
a product of chance.  
       In particular, there is no pattern of respondents from member-states with negative public 
perceptions of EU membership being more or less likely to cite shared beliefs as I had 
hypothesized. In turn, throughout this study, a respondent‟s member-state often has a moderate 
or high association with responses to various questions but the relationship is never statistically 
significant. In part, I believe this is a product in part of an unrepresentative sample in that 
French, Italian, and Eastern European MEPs are somewhat underrepresented in this study. 
Overall, when the entire MEP population is considered, the same associations between a 
respondent‟s member-state and given responses would likely not occur.  
       I also contend that party group membership may negate some of the assumed effects of 
member-state origins. For example, because of high plenary stakes and large membership size, S 
& D group leaders are incentivized to socialize members from countries with higher negative 
perceptions of EU membership into supporting the group line. Consensus-building efforts are 
aided by a shared history of the socialist movement which may help to overcome national 
divisions within the group. In this sense, member-state effects are not statistically significant 
because respondents‟ perceptions are shaped by experiences linked to membership in a specific 
group rather than shared origins from a particular member-state.         
        In turn, it is important to note the pattern of moderate/high substantive associations and 
statistical significance between party group membership and responses to most questions (though 
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years of service and previous profession also are often statistically significant predictors of 
responses) throughout the study. I believe that given that each question is party group specific 
(explain why X happens in your party group or how X contributes to unity in your group), 
respondents are framing their responses according to their experiences as members of their party 
group. In turn, respondent perceptions are shaped by the size, plenary influence, and culture (in 
terms of shared attitudes and norms) of their respective party groups.  
       When responses to the question considered in this chapter are organized according to party 
group membership, those maintaining that plenary coalitions contribute to group unity were 
more frequently offered by ALDE respondents whereas those contending that party group unity 
was unimportant were more frequently provided by EFD respondents. However, I contend that 
valuable insight into particular dissent management roles and processes within each group is 
gained from organizing all five response categories according to group membership and by more 
closely examining their content.  
PARTY GROUP MEMBERSHIP EFFECTS 
       The degree of cohesion obtained in plenary voting suggests that party groups to various 
extents have created or utilized existing leadership positions, decision-making forums, and 
socialization processes to ensure maximum support for the group line and minimal levels of 
dissent. For example, Hix et al. (2007) found that “high cohesion rates demonstrated an 
impressive ability by party group leaders to coordinate the legislative activity of members across 
national party lines indicating extensive compromise between group and national party 
delegation leaders” (Hix et al. 2007, 145). They similarly concluded that “We find in part that 
ideological closeness alone cannot explain cohesiveness, but that effectiveness of transnational 
party groups is a key determinant of their voting cohesion” (Hix et al. 2007, 210). When 
responses are arranged according to party group membership, a pattern emerges of respondents 
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from the more cohesive groups emphasizing the importance of communication and those from 
the less cohesive groups placing little or no emphasis on communication.  
TABLE 4.5: GROUP UNITY RESPONSES BY PARTY GROUP AFFILIATION 
Response          ALDE   ECR    EFD    EPP    Greens   GUE   S&D       
Shared Beliefs               .39      .55    .80       .44       .55         .50      .76 
Communication              .50      .33       0       .50       .64         .25      .41  
Plenary Coalitions              .44         0       0       .13          0            0      .35  
Defer to Experts                      .17      .11        0      .31        .27           0      .06 
Group Unity is Unimportant    0      .22     .20          0          0         .38         0 
(N of Cases)               (18)     (9)     (5)      (16)      (11)        (8)    (17)    
Note: Entries are percentage of respondents within each party group who offered each response with the 
last line depicting respondents per party group. N of Cases: 117. Multiple explanations were permitted.  
 
       This pattern further underscores that while party group size and plenary influence help to 
explain variation in group dissent levels, group organizational and cultural processes also 
contribute to explanations. The response pattern to this initial question when framed according to 
group membership further suggests that higher cohesion rates are in part the product of the 
efforts of group leaders to build support for the group line, but also the extent to which members 
are invested in the forums and adhere to the norms of behavior associated with the group‟s 
communication network.  
       The S & D to a degree depart from this trend with respondents placing much greater 
emphasis on shared beliefs though they do more frequently mention communication than those 
from the three least cohesive groups. Nonetheless, this raises a second trend which may be 
derived from the table above but also from the content of the responses in that the definition of 
shared beliefs varies between respondents from the more and less cohesive party groups. 
       Whereas respondents from the more cohesive groups were more likely to define shared 
beliefs in terms of a shared group identity as well as a common ideology, those from the less 
cohesive groups defined shared beliefs almost exclusively along ideological lines. In other 
words, any degree of unity according to respondents from the three least cohesive groups is the 
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product of a common ideology that led national parties to form the group and not a reflection of a 
shared conceptualization of the group identity or the product of efforts by group leaders.           
       The table also provides a reference for exploring the basis for ALDE group cohesion in that 
ALDE respondents were the primary source of those who cited plenary coalitions as an 
explanation for group unity which reflects the group‟s extensive plenary influence. Finally, EPP 
and Greens/EFA respondents were the most likely to cite deferral to group experts as an 
explanation for group unity which highlights the importance of working groups in the EPP and 
of constant dialogue between leaders/staff and members in the Greens/EFA.  
BELIEFS 
       When respondents from the four largest groups cited shared beliefs, they defined cohesion 
not only in terms of unity in plenary votes but also in regards to the extent to which members 
perceived that their colleagues shared similar values or backgrounds and the degree to which 
membership shared the group‟s goals. In contrast, when respondents from the three smallest 
party groups cited shared beliefs, they were referring not only to the extent to which members at 
times shared policy positions, but also to the shared perception that group membership did not 
require consensus and that frequent dissent was acceptable. A shared identity may be derived 
from shared backgrounds or histories among party group members.  
“We are a small group to begin with and we basically only come from the Northwest, so we have 
hardly any Eastern Europeans…and hardly any southern members. So, there‟s not much regional 
diversity in our group and that helps. We are a small group and homogenous, but there are 
certain issues that we will vote differently on. Those are specific national sensitivities like the 
Dutch and the Swedes will never vote the same on prostitution and there are a couple of those 
things that you already know beforehand”. (June 14, 2012)  
 
       When Greens/EFA group leaders pursue consensus on a given report, they can draw not only 
upon members‟ shared perceptions of what it means to belong to the Green movement, but also 
from the shared geographic origins of most members. Whereas the EPP, S & D, and particularly 
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the ECR must contend with East-West divisions among members on various reports, the Greens 
largely approach an issue from a North-Western European perspective. In this sense, a shared 
identity along with constant communication helps to bridge gaps among the Greens.  
“I think the main reason we are more united than other groups is the main Green conviction, 
what Greens all over Europe share in their political thinking of how to restructure the economy 
towards sustainability and how to behave ecologically and how to fight climate change. So, we 
are very close on all of these Green issues….But I think these things where as Greens we come 
together to go for the Green message, that is the point why I think we are more united than other 
groups here in the house because we have a very clear Green narrative”. (June 5, 2012)  
 
       The Greens/EFA is the most cohesive group even though they do not have as much at stake 
in plenary outcomes as other groups. One explanation for the high level of cohesion is that 
members strongly identify with the group‟s goals as explained above. Though the group as a 
whole pursues the same objectives, differences do emerge at times when debating the most 
optimal solutions. In turn, though party group meetings can become quite contentious, members 
strongly identify with the need for a common line once the discussions are concluded in order to 
as many respondents noted “make the report Greener”.  
        Perhaps no party group though has deeper historical roots than the S & D with its origins in 
the Pan-European Socialist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
“I think the reason is historical, the socialists and social democrats have been cooperating at the 
international and European level since the nineteenth century. We have a history of making 
political programs together…So we have coordinated our strategies and our policies for over a 
century. I think that is the basic thing, we feel more than the others as one movement, as one 
political tendency. So, we have a history of sticking together, trying to find compromises, 
because historically we have been in an underdog situation fighting for working class people, etc. 
I think those historical and ideological explanations are the most important. (June 13, 2012)  
 
       S & D group leaders draw upon this shared tradition when urging members to support the 
group line which in turn helps to overcome East-West and other divides among members. The 
response also makes the assumption that the S & D are united in most votes because unlike the 
Liberals and other groups, its members share common beliefs and values. Group members come 
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to view their group in positive terms as they more closely identify with it which often leads 
members to adopt negative views of other groups and in turn defining their group in contrastive 
terms with how they perceive other groups (See Tajfel, 1981). In contrast, many ALDE 
respondents while identifying a cohesive identity in relation to plenary reputation associated with 
coalitions did not extend the same presumption in regards to ideological cohesiveness.  
“We have political groups, but within the political groups, we have members of political parties 
back home. They are all not necessarily identical, not even close to being identical. I mean, when 
I think of my colleagues in the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, there are some who are what 
I would call a Liberal, Liberal in the sense of an open market, little government involvement, fair 
competition, human rights, and things like this, but there are others who are far more left or far 
more right. So, it is not as homogeneous a group as you might think”. (June 20, 2012) 
 
       While differences do occur for example among the UK Liberal Democrats and the German 
FDP, most ALDE group members share attitudes on matters concerning individual liberty and 
free trade policies as evidenced by the high cohesion rates in plenary votes on each (91.60 and 
90.97 respectfully, www.votewatch.eu) which are higher than the group‟s average cohesion rate in 
roll-call votes. In contrast, the group is more divided on reports concerning the environment 
(85.84) and gender equality (85.08). While the ALDE have ideological divisions on some issues, 
the group as a whole pursues a common line on most reports which I would argue is the product 
of a shared identity derived in part from its plenary reputation, and „European‟ outlook in 
conjunction with consensus-building efforts by particular leaders (Verhofstadt). 
“We are definitely a pro-European party and I think that we are a party that is very 
united…Some of the other groups are perhaps more ideological and I think the EPP is perhaps 
more pragmatic. We have many parties who are in national government, and this gives them a 
different perspective”. (October 13, 2012)  
 
       While ideological homogeneity helps to explain party group unity, cohesion is also a product 
in part of the extent to which an individual identifies with the group‟s success or reputation to the 
point of placing group objectives before their own. Cohesion defined in these terms may be 
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facilitated through appeals by leaders to the European aspect of the group identity. For example, 
interview responses and speeches by EPP members often stressed the need to find a “community 
solution” to problems. This was especially evident during the six-pack and two-pack discussions 
in the EPP group meetings I observed. President Daul and other group leaders repeatedly 
appealed to the group‟s identity as a European party rather than a collection of national parties 
while noting that the reputation of not only the group but the entire EU project was on the line.        
       In contrast, members of the three least cohesive groups are less likely to define themselves 
according to their group membership. For example, respondents from the three smallest groups 
were far less likely to identify „ECR or GUE interests‟ but rather describe how national interests 
within the group at times coalesced into a line adopted by a majority of members. 
“We can‟t get agreement for instance on finance, because some of the components, the Polish are 
a good example, obviously have a different view to European budgets and they need to be in 
receipt of monies like the common agricultural policy funding. They don‟t like the idea that we 
might, the British, view that we need to reform that radically and to try and reduce the overall 
budget of the European Union. So, there are some clear differences there”. (October 26, 2011)  
 
       The ECR are highly cohesive on reports concerning constitutional affairs (93.98) and trade 
(94.96) but are divided mostly along East-West lines on the EU budget (80.9) and agriculture 
(81.34) as the response above accentuates (www.votewatch.eu). In turn, the ECR line is often a 
product of negotiations between national delegations which may nonetheless incur separate 
national lines. In this sense, while the ECR at times influence plenary outcomes, group leaders 
cannot appeal to a shared identity in part because the group is new but also in some ways 
paradoxically in that ECR group membership is initially appealing to delegations because no one 
is bound to support a common line. Given that norms are adopted from observing the behavior of 
colleagues and by following the cues of leaders, the readiness to accept separate national lines 
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while in the short-run ensures the group‟s survival in the long-run inhibits the development of a 
shared (ECR) identity which may facilitate cohesive voting behavior and shared attitudes.  
       Similarly, while the GUE at times agree to support a common line, the group identity is 
defined largely on the basis that membership guarantees the right to dissent rather than on one 
facilitating consensus. Members emphasize consensus but in their responses they do not 
associate consensus with maximum support for the group line. Instead, consensus is associated 
with a dialogue that may or may not result in a common line and where a majority does not 
impose its will or what they refer to as the “confederal” nature of the group. This 
conceptualization of the group identity along confederal terms contributes to the absence of a 
group line on many reports and the perception that individual members may vote freely in 
plenary or that delegations may adopt a separate national line. 
“Though we are a confederal group, which means we have discussions on the issues and 
everyone has the right to say his or her opinion freely, at the end a confederal group means that 
the given parties have a right to do whatever they want to do, but still we are all leftists. That 
means we have a common ground on the ideas, on what we have in front of us, the foundation 
which is more or less the same. So, that is why a majority vote the same way”. (June 27, 2012)  
 
       Even in the least cohesive group, EFD members as the respondent below notes do perceive 
similarities with their colleagues in the group in that they share mistrust of the EU project and 
believe that national sovereignty is undermined through EU membership which they want to 
eliminate for their respective countries.  
“I think you can see the EFD group as the opposition in the European Parliament. In any 
parliament, there has to be an opposition to control the government and to be posing the tough 
questions, the right questions. In this parliament, we are the opposition”. (October 13, 2011)  
 
       If EFD members (with the direction of group leaders) translated shared objections to the EU 
into a unified effort or common line then the group might obtain higher cohesion levels. Instead, 
EFD MEPs split on nearly every report and when they vote differently, they do not view it as 
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dissent. In this sense, EFD members have failed to frame objectives within a group agenda, but 
rather pursue national objectives while coincidently belonging to the same group. 
“In principal, we don‟t have group discipline. Most of the time, we can vote how we want. That 
has been the principal of the group since the formation of the group and I think that‟s what keeps 
the group together, because we have different views on so many issues”. (October 20, 2011)  
 
COMMUNICATION AND GROUP LEADERS 
       Communication is critical in order to ensure the realization of the party group‟s legislative 
objectives and consists of dissent management as well as consensus-building efforts. 
Communication links occur between leadership and rank-and-file, between MEPs and staff, 
among group leaders, and among the group secretariat, for the purpose of exchanging ideas and 
negotiation culminating in support for the group line. ALDE and Greens/EFA members often 
stressed how their group ensured high cohesion through mass participation in group meetings 
and other forums which produced strong links between members and the final group line.  
“I think two factors are important. One is size, so this means we have a small group. We have the 
time to discuss and get to a common position. Second is that we have a tradition for consensus. 
So, it‟s not a very hierarchical group, it‟s a group that loves to debate, to try and find the 
consensus, the balance. So, I think it is basically in the culture of the group that we are always 
looking towards some cohesion”. (June 4, 2012)  
 
      Though participation rates in group meeting discussions will be comparatively smaller in the 
larger groups, members in these groups can also positively view the role of group meetings and 
developed a shared concept of the group identity if leaders and other colleagues successfully 
socialize members into identifying with the group‟s goals and its decision-making forums. In this 
sense, the task is the same in larger groups, it is only the logistical scale and perhaps the tactics 
associated with accomplishing it that differs. In turn, group size may help to explain why 
members in larger groups more often cited communication as their explanation for group unity in 
that logistics associated with dissent management in larger groups necessitates an emphasis upon 
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communication. In other words, large groups will be motivated by membership size to construct 
additional decision-making forums and assign more specific leadership roles. 
“Membership in (my) group in the European Parliament implies from the outset, membership of 
the values and principles. Each new member agrees on these principles. In addition, our group is 
organized in such a way, whether in parliamentary committees, within the thematic working 
groups, or group meetings, to find compromises, consensus, on the largest numbers of subjects 
possible”. (June 2, 2012)  
 
       Sharing common beliefs may at times be insufficient in ensuring maximum support for the 
group line. In turn, party groups form networks containing specific leadership roles and decision-
making forums to communicate policy preferences, secure compromises, and if necessary, to 
manage dissent. For example, MEPs in the S & D group may share the belief that the EU has an 
obligation to promote economic and social equality. However, differences may arise on how best 
to achieve this goal in the content of a report or in regards to a particular amendment.  
       In turn, the S & D and the other larger party groups have developed working groups to 
formulate policy and party group meetings to secure support for the consensus achieved in the 
working group or at times to resolve deadlock in the working group. The larger groups also 
assign specific consensus-building roles for the group rapporteur, coordinators and vice-
presidents. The group line is in this sense a final product of shared beliefs and a communication 
network with consensus achieved through persuasion and information-sharing, rather than 
through disciplinary measures (Ringe, 2010, 62). 
“Then you have spokesmen from these different subjects, those who become rapporteurs on a 
certain issue or report. Now, these people become influential. First of all, the rapporteur or the 
shadow knows the subject up or down. Then, the coordinator plus the person like me who is 
presiding over this working group. These are the members who influence the positions...They are 
influential, we listen to them”. (November 9, 2011)  
 
       Both group size and plenary influence shape efforts by leaders to construct communication 
networks and develop socialization process to aid in consensus-building and dissent 
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management. However, plenary influence in particular provides incentive to ensure that the 
networks are utilized to their fullest potential and in turn that members closely identify with the 
processes culminating in the group line. Here again, shared beliefs and communication overlap 
as explanations for variations in party group unity. Leaders appeal for support of the group line 
or secure compromises on the basis of shared beliefs but are also aided by a communication 
network that produces a group line encompassing the contributions of select rank-and-file 
members while ensuring the attainment of leadership objectives. 
       When an influential party group has large membership, it is motivated to construct 
horizontal working groups to allow leaders to more easily direct the adoption of particular policy 
goals while ensuring the participation of select members. However, working groups at times fail 
to produce a group line or their proposal is perceived to be controversial by those outside the 
working group. In either circumstance, EPP and S & D party group meetings provide a forum 
similar to the ALDE or Greens/EFA in that they facilitate consensus but without the extensive 
participation of group members.  
“We have a big group with two hundred and sixty-five members. We have a number of forums 
and places where we try to merge a consensus. We have members within committees who meet 
regularly, and they have a consensus on the issues in their committee. Then, we have working 
groups that unites people in various committees like the economy working group, the budget 
working group, the foreign affairs working group, and that‟s where members from different 
countries try to find a common solution. When there is a problem that has not found a solution in 
this context, then we go to the group meeting, and we have a discussion. We try to discuss for a 
long time when it is necessary because we usually find a compromise” (October 15, 2011)  
 
       As the largest party group, the EPP has more at stake than any other group in plenary 
outcomes whether securing the passage or defeat of reports. At 271 members, the EPP is 
confronted by logistical challenges reflective not only of its size, but also of a membership from 
twenty-six countries often with two or more parties from a single member-state. With such 
diversity and depth, communication is viewed by members as a key component of group unity. 
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       However, unless the report addresses a contentious issue or if, the EPP group meeting 
normally serves as a forum for promotion of the group line and not as a forum for constructing 
the group line. However, when the communication lines break down prior to the group meeting-
when dissent is not fully addressed or policy questions are raised in or following the working 
groups- the full group may decide to adopt some form of compromise or settle for a free vote.  
       Like the EPP, the S & D have built a hierarchical communication network which includes 
six horizontal working groups. Working groups play a similarly crucial role in developing policy 
and of identifying and often resolving disputes before the report is considered by the entire group 
at its meeting. However, the more frequent assertion that shared beliefs and not communication 
explains party group unity along with a more frequent reference to plenary coalitions suggests 
that members draw unity from a shared identity defined in part as the opposition to the EPP.  
       Nonetheless, S & D group leaders have constructed communication networks to on one hand 
ensure than the group line prevails in plenary when the group may be in the majority but also 
with future votes in mind in that group leaders will be in a stronger position to appeal to the 
group unity if the roles of leaders and members are clearly defined and if working groups and 
other forums are viewed positively by members. For example, when communication fails to 
ensure the support of all national delegations such as when the Dutch delegation dissented from 
the S & D line on the six-pack or fiscal union initiatives, socialization processes ensured that the 
delegation communicated its intent to dissent prior to plenary and to express dissent at a less 
costly level by abstaining (www.euractiv.com, September 26, 2011).  
       While the ECR has created a communication network with some assigned roles (group 
whip), subsequent chapters will demonstrate that most leadership roles remain undefined or 
underutilized while socialization processes promoting consensus and facilitating a shared group 
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identity also remain largely absent. In this sense, ECR members hear appeals from the whip in 
the group meeting at times to support a common line but they are more likely than members in 
the more influential groups to adopt a separate line from that advocated by the whip. 
Accordingly, while ECR members may defer to group experts on a majority of reports, they are 
more likely than their counterparts in the more influential groups to ignore the experts‟ positions.  
“You have seen the breadth of work the parliament does, it is physically impossible for anyone 
to know everything. It is difficult to know even three committees, there is such a volume of 
work, especially on (my) committee where it‟s such a vast amount of work. So, you have to trust 
to a certain extent the judgement of your colleagues who have looked into it and have done the 
work. Are you going to read everything yourself? It‟s physically impossible to do that even for 
one committee”. (June 26, 2012)  
 
      The sheer volume of reports and accompanying amendments may lead members (especially 
newer MEPs) to defer to group experts on most votes. However, in the absence of socialization 
processes, more influential party groups may not wish to take consensus for granted, particularly 
on prominent reports where the likelihood of deferral to experts should decrease for most group 
members. In turn, party group leaders and those invested in policy-making will not only seek to 
persuade members to support the group line on the basis of policy content or perceived political 
consequences, but also on the basis of a shared identity. Consequently, members will be more 
likely to defer to experts and adopt the line produced from the communication network if they 
strongly identify with their group‟s goals and with its plenary influence/reputation.  
COALITIONS 
      The response of plenary coalitions ties together the contributions of group leaders and 
socialization processes toward group unity and in turn low dissent levels. If the group‟s influence 
on plenary outcomes is at stake, leaders will raise the potential effects of dissenting from the 
group line. Leaders may also make appeals on the basis of the group‟s reputation as the 
governing party (EPP), dealmaker (ALDE) or at times opposition (S & D) in plenary. These 
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results verified the expectation that respondents from the most influential party groups would be 
more likely to cite coalitions as an explanation for group unity, and in particular, ALDE 
respondents provided the bulk of all responses citing coalitions as an explanation for group unity.  
       In turn, not a single Greens/EFA respondent nor any from the three least influential party 
groups cited coalitions as an explanation. Perhaps more interestingly is the low response rate of 
EPP members on coalitions as only nine percent of EPP respondents cited coalitions. I suspect 
that this may derive from the position of the EPP as in many ways the governing party of the EU 
in that both the President of the Commission and the EU Council are from parties within the EPP 
group and the EPP are by far the largest group in the parliament. While they must secure plenary 
coalitions with other groups to pass or defeat reports, EPP members may take their group‟s status 
for granted whereas the ALDE and S & D leaders know that their group may not be on the 
winning side. In other words, EPP respondents know that other groups have to work with them 
and this contributes to shared beliefs and/or communication as their explanations for group unity. 
       Respondents citing the importance of plenary coalitions as explanations for party group 
unity often stressed the importance of upholding the group‟s plenary reputation. Party group 
leaders may secure support for the group line through appeals on the basis of the group‟s goals 
and its plenary reputation in the sense that if maximum support for the group line cannot be 
obtained, the group‟s plenary agenda and reputation may be placed in jeopardy. For example, the 
ALDE are the pivotal group as its legislative position often determines plenary outcomes in the 
absence of an EPP/S & D grand coalition which has been increasingly in decline (See Hix et al. 
2007, Hix and Noury 2009). In turn, despite policy reservations or political concerns over a 
particular report or amendment, an ALDE MEP out of a sense of loyalty may support the group 
line or choose to abstain so as not to jeopardize the group‟s plenary reputation. 
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“We know that if the EPP and the Socialists agree, it doesn‟t make any difference what the rest 
of the parliament thinks. But if they don‟t agree, and one is on the left, one is on the right, and 
the next big group is us. If we and one of the bigger groups agree we are pretty likely to win. If 
we as Liberals are divided, we throw away our effectiveness…It is just a theme of that we want 
to be effective and broadly we are most effective when we are united. We get a better result in 
the votes”. (October 26, 2011)  
 
       Perhaps the link between the group‟s plenary role and group cohesion is best exhibited by 
the defection of the Irish delegation from the group line when they abstained on a resolution 
criticizing the lack of press freedom in Berlusconi‟s Italy was met with such a robust response by 
group members? Not only did the delegation‟s defection ensure the defeat of a group legislative 
objective (the resolution failed by three votes) but it also put the group‟s plenary reputation at 
risk (www.euractive.com, October 23, 2009).  
       In this sense, group cohesion is a product in part not only of members closely identifying 
with the group‟s goals but also the extent to which members adopt norms promoting particular 
behavior, in this case how and when to dissent. In turn, when a group like the ALDE is 
influential, members have an added rational incentive as well as an added social impetus to 
support the group‟s agenda or at the least to dissent in a manner which is less harmful to the 
group‟s agenda and/or reputation. 
        To ensure preferred plenary outcomes, leaders in the more influential groups must deliver a 
cohesive group with minimal levels of dissent both in terms of numbers of members dissenting 
and in the forms of dissent expression, which may be ensured in part through appeals on the 
basis of the group‟s plenary reputation. As the respondent below notes, if the S & D cannot 
deliver the whole group, the Liberals may pursue a deal with the EPP and the Greens may choose 
to abstain rather than join a coalition with the S & D at the lead. 
“It‟s quite clear that if the Socialists and Social Democrats can play a role in the European 
Parliament, we have to stick together. We are not the biggest group, we are not certainly a part of 
any majority, and if we should ever be able to have an influence on decision-making we must 
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stick together in order to make deals…But if we should be able to challenge the EPP and find 
other solutions, we have to be able to deliver the whole Social Democratic group; we have to be 
able to say to the Liberals and the Greens, yes, we can deliver the votes of the whole Social 
Democratic group, not just a majority”. (June 13, 2012)  
 
       In this sense, leaders in the more influential groups understand that their group cannot act 
alone and that if dissent exceeds a particular level, the group line will fail. For example, the S & 
D may tolerate dissent from a single national delegation when it announces that the group line 
faces strong opposition among constituents, particularly if they know that the delegation will 
consistently support the group line in the future. However, if dissent levels rise to the point the 
plenary success of the group line is jeopardized, leaders may make appeals to delegations on the 
basis of plenary coalitions and perhaps secure their dissent on a less costly level such as through 
abstaining. In turn, S & D members are encouraged to adopt a shared group identity through 
socialization which leads to support for the group line or to abstain despite strong objections.  
      In my observations of party group meetings, I heard appeals from GUE, Greens/EFA and 
ECR presidents to members to support the group line or majority position on the basis that 
plenary coalitions were at-stake. Leaders of less influential party groups make such appeals 
because in part their group can on occasion influence plenary outcomes but also because any 
effort to build group unity in the present may contribute to group unity in the future. Overall, I 
contend that the lack of any Greens/EFA respondents citing coalitions as an explanation for 
group unity suggests that its members value group unity for reasons deriving more from shared 
perceptions of group membership while its omission in the case of respondents from the three 
least cohesive (and influential) groups underscores the absence of dissent management.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
       What explains the high cohesion rates among party groups? Why do some party groups have 
lower dissent levels than others? One explanation can be found in roll-call vote studies which 
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identified that thirty percent of the variance in MEP defection levels from the group line can be 
explained by the closeness of MEPs to the group‟s ideological mean. However, decision-making 
models and interview responses suggest that socialization processes associated with a shared 
conceptualization with the group identity in conjunction with a communication network 
consisting of group leaders and decision-making forums contribute to lower dissent levels.  
       When I asked the open-ended question of what explains the level of unity in plenary voting 
within their party group, respondents provided answers that can be placed within five response 
categories which when arranged according to frequency are: shared beliefs, communication, 
coalitions, deferring to experts, and with a few maintaining that party group unity was not 
important. Of all the predictors, only the relationship between party group membership and the 
likelihood of offering any of the response categories was statistically significant. In particular, 
significance associated with group membership occurred only for the responses of plenary 
coalitions or that group unity was unimportant. However, when responses are framed according 
to party group membership, party group effects (size, influence, and culture) help to explain why 
some groups have lower dissent levels than others. 
       When considering decision-making models, MEPs may defer to group leaders and other 
experts due to lack of policy expertise and information overload. So long as group preferences at 
the least approximate MEP preferences and no competing national party line emerges, members 
will support the group line because they cannot assess all of the information and in turn defer to 
those invested in the report. Social identity theory also helps to interpret responses in that 
respondents often attributed party group unity to the extent to which members identify with their 
party group. For example, communication involves not only the dissemination of information 
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and the securing of compromise but also according to this perspective the belief by group 
members that group meetings and other forums contribute to the development of the group line.        
       In turn, field research reveals that cohesion should be measured in attitudes toward unity as 
well as in terms of plenary voting patterns. Members develop a sense of loyalty but also a sense 
of investment in the group line through their participation in the decision-making process as well 
as by leaders‟ appeals to shared perceptions of group identity. The impact of shared identity upon 
MEP decision-making may be further assessed when responses are framed according to party 
group affiliation. For example, ALDE respondents were more likely to cite the importance of 
plenary coalitions as an explanation for party group unity, while S & D respondents and those 
from the least cohesive party groups were more likely to contend that shared beliefs best 
explained party group unity when it occurred.  
       However, key differences arose in the interpretation of shared beliefs offered by respondents 
from the four most cohesive groups compared to those from the three least cohesive groups. 
When respondents from the four most cohesive groups offered the explanation of shared beliefs, 
they referenced not only the extent to which members shared policy priorities but also the extent 
to which members identified with their colleagues and with the group as a whole. Cohesion in 
this sense was defined not only by plenary voting but also the extent to which members 
perceived that their colleagues shared the group‟s goals and values. This suggests the influence 
of socialization processes positively contributing to a shared conceptualization of the group 
identity and the mass adoption of norms governing behavior, particularly dissent. 
       In contrast, members from the three least cohesive groups defined shared beliefs in terms 
that are not conducive to group unity. For example, while ECR group leaders may pursue 
consensus, these efforts are not accompanied by the expectation that all national delegations will 
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(in most cases) work to ensure adoption of a common line. In turn, the perceived rationale for the 
group‟s creation is to ensure award of particular privileges and not to promote a group agenda. 
When members do not strongly identify with the group, they are less likely to support the 
adoption of a common line or meet expectations governing acceptable behavior. For some 
groups, like the EFD, these socialization processes are absent altogether. 
       The effects of party group membership may in turn be assessed according to group size and 
extent of plenary influence. The larger party groups are more likely to develop communication 
networks and promote a shared identity to help overcome the logistics associated with dissent 
management. In turn, the more influential party groups will make appeals to members on the 
basis of plenary coalitions in order to ensure successful adoption of the group‟s agenda but also 
to secure its plenary reputation. For example, when shared beliefs are insufficient to ensure 
maximum support for a common line, the larger and more influential groups employ 
communication networks to convey the group line and manage dissent at all legislative stages in 
part through appeals to a shared conceptualization of the group identity. In this sense, group size 
and plenary influence help to explain why the EPP and S & D are among the most cohesive 
groups and the three least influential and smallest groups are the least cohesive. 
       However, the examples of the ALDE and the Greens/EFA in many ways defy expectations 
raised in this chapter. The ALDE are the second most influential party group yet have the fourth 
highest dissent levels among the seven party groups. In part, lower cohesion derives from ALDE 
members not being as closely ideologically aligned compared to those from the three more 
cohesive groups. In addition, the ALDE communication network may not be as full developed in 
terms of leadership roles and decision-making forums as those in the more cohesive groups 
which will be addressed in chapters six and seven. 
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       Perhaps as equally perplexing is the fact that the Greens/EFA has the lowest dissent rate but 
is also the fourth largest group and the fourth most influential group. One explanation may be the 
emphasis by its respondents on the importance of party group meetings. Cohesion may be 
pursued because members want to ensure that the official line is a product of contributions from 
discussions in the party group meeting. This sense of investment in the common line then 
translates into unity in plenary voting because members want to demonstrate to the outside world 
as well as to each other that they strongly identify with the group‟s agenda. These assumptions 
will be tested in chapter seven where respondents evaluate party and working group meetings. 
       In turn, when the chapter‟s findings are considered on the whole, the attainment of lower 
dissent levels may be identified as the product of ideological proximity of members to the group 
mean in conjunction with dissent management processes encompassing specific leadership roles 
and promotion of a shared identity conducive to group unity. Nonetheless, many questions 
remain concerning the roles and tactics of specific group leaders and the explanations for why 
some norms of behavior are adopted more prevalently within particular party groups.  
       In this sense, the task of the remaining chapters, with the aid of responses to more specific 
questions and observation notes, is to explore in greater detail how party group leaders utilize 
shared beliefs, communication networks, and appeals to support plenary coalitions as facets of 
dissent management strategies. Chapter five will lead off this discussion by considering the 
impact of disciplinary tools available to party group leaders through responses to questions 
discussing the allocation of plenary speaking time, rapporteur assignment, and individually-
sponsored plenary amendments that are contrary to the group line.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCIPLINE AS A DISSENT MANAGEMENT TOOL 
 
INTRODUCTION 
       In the previous chapter, I considered explanations for why party group cohesion rates in the 
European Parliament (on the whole) are high and why some party groups are more cohesive than 
others. Analysis of roll-call votes finds that ideology at the MEP level explains thirty percent of 
the variance in dissent levels among party groups. “The greater the distance between personal 
ideological position on the left-right dimension and the average left-right location of the party 
group, the more likely the MEP will vote against the party group” (Hix et al. 2007, 181). 
Legislator decision-making models also provide insight into party group dissent rates. When 
confronted with information overload or a lack of information MEPs defer to leaders and policy 
experts, so long as their preferences approximately align with the group line (See Ringe 2010).  
       Social identity theory also contributes to the understanding of MEP voting behavior. As 
members come to more closely identify with their party group, they tie their personal level of 
success to the success of the group. “Our sense of who we are and what we are worth is 
intimately bound up with our group memberships (Brown, 2000, 28). The development of a 
shared group identity is in turn aided by the extent to which members adopt particular norms of 
behavior (such as those governing dissent) and follow the appeals and cues of group leaders (See 
Russell 2012 and Brown 2000). In this sense, group cohesion is a product of a shared 
conceptualization of the group identity fostering norms of behavior conducive to group unity. 
       Given that the European Parliament now has co-decision authority in most policy areas and 
that decision-making has increasingly shifted from the member-state to the EU level, I contend 
that party group leaders are incentivized to secure high levels of support for the group line and 
ensure that when dissent is expressed it is done so at less costly levels (for example voting to 
abstain). Accordingly, I conclude that high cohesion and variation in dissent levels among party 
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groups is a product of: ideology at the MEP level, a whip or communication structure consisting 
of party group leaders and decision-making forums, as well as socialization processes 
accompanying a shared group identity.  
       When asked what explains party group unity, the most common explanation offered by 
respondents was shared beliefs. Shared beliefs referred not only to ideology, but also the extent 
to which members identified with the party group. The second most frequent response was 
communication which encompassed not only the role of decision-making forums and leaders in 
disseminating information and building consensus, but also the perception that participation in 
group forums re-enforced a sense of loyalty to the group (See Garner and Letki 2005). 
       In this chapter, I contend that the extent to which group leaders successfully utilize available 
disciplinary tools to ensure low dissent levels are dependent upon: (1) the extent to which 
members are socialized into adopting shared attitudes toward unity and dissent and (2) the extent 
to which the group whip structure identifies and manages dissent. For example, members who 
place a greater value on group unity will elect to express dissent through explanations of vote 
rather than in plenary debates. Similarly, leaders will utilize the whip structure to communicate 
and secure group goals when assigning rapporteurs, particularly on prominent reports. 
       In turn, this chapter considers responses to three questions concerning the effectiveness of 
disciplinary tools available to group leaders: the allocation of plenary speaking time, the 
assignment of rapporteur or shadow rapporteur positions (those responsible for carrying or 
shadowing a report) and the role of group leaders as amendment gate-keepers in plenary. When 
asking these questions, I assumed that disciplinary tools available to group leaders would have 
limited impact (if any) upon group cohesion rates in part because members have other outlets to 
express dissent (explanations of vote, etc.) and because past studies have found that expertise is 
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the primary attribute influencing the assignment of rapporteurs (See Yashinaka et al. 2010). 
However, the perceptions of MEPs and staff may reveal that more consideration is given to 
voting behavior at least in particular instances such as allocating speaking time and rapporteurs 
on prominent repots and I also hoped to learn more about the roles of specific group leaders and 
in particular how the leaders of more cohesive party groups utilize disciplinary tools. 
SPEAKING TIME IN PLENARY DEBATES 
       Speaking time in plenary debates is allocated to party groups on the basis of membership 
size. For example, the EPP as the largest party group is allotted roughly thirty-six percent of 
plenary debate speaking time while the smallest party group, the GUE, is allocated about four 
percent of speaking time. Each group then distributes the allotted minutes to members. This 
responsibility is held in four groups by the secretary-general (ALDE, EFD, Greens/EFA, and 
GUE) though group leaders may become involved if conflicts over speaking time allocation 
arise. In the ECR, assigning speaking time is the responsibility of the group whip while EPP and 
S & D speaking lists are approved in the horizontal working groups which are reviewed and 
possibly revised by the group vice-president holding the position of parliamentary secretary.  
       Plenary debates typically begin with either the group presidents or the rapporteur from each 
group speaking for up to five minutes followed by the members of the applicable committee and 
others who are given less time. From this point, speakers proceed according to group size with a 
member of the EPP speaking first followed by a speaker from the S & D and so on. This order 
continues until each group has used all of its allotted speaking time.  
       Those responsible for constructing the lists are confronted with the challenge of allocating 
finite time, while striving to ensure that the bulk of plenary speakers reflect the group line when 
one is present. They also face the further challenge of dealing with members who request time 
and then do not show up in plenary. This not only causes potential embarrassment to the group, 
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but it is also unfair to those who were denied the opportunity to participate in plenary debates 
and are committed to following the rules as the response from a group whip below stresses. 
“We had a situation where some members were accepting speaking time and they were not using 
it. So, a change that I brought in was to say that if members missed speaking time, I would not 
allocate any more speaking time for a certain period. If you can‟t speak, then you need to hand 
the speaking time back to me and I can re-allocate it to somebody else, rather than it just being 
wasted”. (November 9, 2011) 
 
       I asked the open-ended question of whether plenary speaking time is denied to members 
who dissent from the group line. When taking the challenges and rules associated with the 
allocation of plenary speaking time into account, I anticipated five potential responses: speaking 
time is never denied on the basis of opposition to the group line, only a few dissenting MEPs are 
given speaking time and always at the end of the debate, only dissenting members from the 
applicable committee or working group are allocated time, only members of a dissenting 
delegation are given time, and plenary speaking time is always denied to dissenting members.  
H1: Respondents from the more influential party groups will be more likely to contend that 
plenary speaking time is always denied to dissenting members or that dissenting members are 
assigned the last speaking slot(s). 
 
       Greater plenary influence incentivizes party group leaders to deny plenary speaking time to 
dissenting members in that the group line may be jeopardized by dissenting speeches from group 
members and possibly encourage future dissent. In these groups, dissenting members should be 
encouraged to express dissent through explanations of vote rather than through finite time for 
articulating the group line. Influential groups may also permit a limited number of dissenting 
speeches on a given report in order to secure future support for the group line (See Kam 2002) 
but limit the number and assign these members to the last remaining slot(s) in order to not 
influence the debate. In contrast, respondents from less influential groups should maintain that 
plenary speaking time is never denied on the basis of dissent because unity is less important. 
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H2: Respondents who hold elite positions in group leadership and the secretariat will be more 
likely to maintain that dissenting members are always denied plenary speaking time or are 
assigned the last few slot(s). .  
 
       Respondents who are in group leadership or who are secretary-generals should be more 
likely to maintain that dissenting group members are always denied speaking time because they 
are primarily responsible for allocating speaking time and ensuring group unity. In contrast, 
rank-and-file MEPs and staff should be more likely to maintain that plenary speaking time is 
never denied to dissenting members as they likely presume that work ethic plays a more 
influential role in determining who speaks because they lack experience in allocating time.  
H3: Respondents with more years of service in the parliament will be more likely to state that 
dissenting members are always denied plenary speaking time or speak last. 
 
       As the years of service increase, respondents will have had more time to gain greater 
awareness of the group‟s decision-making processes, but also become more socialized into the 
party group culture (See Hix et al, 2007, Norris 1999). For example, not only will members have 
had more experience (or in the case of staff greater familiarity) in requesting and being denied 
speaking time, but they may also acquire leadership positions responsible for speaking time 
allocation. In addition, respondents with more years of service will have had greater exposure to 
group norms governing when and how to dissent which may influence perceptions on speaking 
time allocation in that dissent should for example be expressed through explanations of vote.  
H4: Respondents from larger delegations will be more likely to state that only members from 
dissenting delegations are permitted to participate in plenary debates. 
  
       With greater influence, respondents from the larger delegations should be more likely to cite 
the role of delegation membership when addressing whether dissenting members are denied 
plenary speaking time. In turn, group leaders will be more likely to accommodate dissent from 
the larger delegations by allocating plenary speaking time especially if the ultimate form of  
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dissent expression is abstaining or relegated to a vote on a particular amendment and because 
they will need the support of the delegation on future reports.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentages of respondents who offered each response. N of Cases: 77. 
 
       Seven of the eighty-four respondents did not answer the question and no multiple responses 
were offered. As depicted in Figure 5.1 above, an overwhelming number of respondents (nearly 
eighty-six percent) believed that members who dissent from the group line are either not 
excluded from plenary debates or are given time to speak (if possible) toward the end of the 
particular debate. In turn, only two respondents maintained that dissenting members are always 
denied plenary speaking time while few respondents identified any link between delegation and 
committee/working group membership and speaking time allocation.  
       To what extent do respondent characteristics influence the likelihood of offering one of the 
five response categories? Table 5.1 below illustrates that party group position, previous 
professional experience, and years of service in the parliament influence perceptions toward a 





















Figure 5.1: Plenary Speaking Responses 
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TABLE 5.1: PREDICTORS OF PLENARY SPEAKING TIME RESPONSES          
Party Group                0.3165   
Group Position             0.3281** 
Member-State                       0.4170 
Gender                                  0.2810 
Years of Service                   0.5001** 
Previous Profession              0.4496*            
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores denoting substantive significance. *, ** and ***, denote statistical 
significance on the .05, .01 and .001 levels respectfully. N of Cases: 77 
 
       Contrary to my expectations, a statistically significant relationship did not occur between a 
respondent‟s party group affiliation and the likelihood of offering a particular response. Though 
there is a moderate substantive association between group membership and plenary speaking 
time responses, within the general population of MEPs and staff the relationship between party 
group membership and each of the response categories is unlikely to occur. In contrast, as MEPs 
and staff acquire greater familiarity with decision-making associated with plenary speaking time 
allocation as a result of previous and/or current leadership experience, they are more likely to 
assert that plenary speaking time is allocated sparingly to dissenting members. In other words, a 
respondent‟s attitude toward the relationship between plenary speaking time allocation and 
dissent is influenced more by individual experiences than by party group membership.  
       Table 5.2 below depicts the percentage of responses according to a respondent‟s previous 
profession. The category of leadership contains respondents who previously served as a 
president, prime minister, minister, mayor, or as national party leaders. Elected office includes 
respondents who served in national or regional parliaments or on local councils. Staff includes 
respondents who previously served as national parliament or party staff, Euro Party or party 
group staff, Commission staff, or MEP aides. Those respondents who previously held leadership 
positions or elected office are more likely to maintain that if sufficient time remains, dissenting 
members are given the last speaking slot(s), while those who previously served as staff are more 
likely to state that dissenting members are never denied plenary speaking time.  
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TABLE 5.2 PLENARY SPEAKING RESPONSES AND PREVIOUS PROFESSION 
Professions        Never Denied   Speak Last  Comms/WG   Delgs. Only  Always Denied   N   
Leadership   0.36            0.56            0                   0.04               0.04  22 
Elected Office             0.32            0.59            0                   0.09               0   22 
Staff    0.52            0.26            0.05              0.11               0.05                   19 
Private Sector              0.50            0.50            0                   0                    0                          4 
Education/Student      0.20            0.40            0.40              0                    0                          5 
Unknown                    0.40            0.40            0.20              0                    0                          5 
(N of Cases)             (30)              (36)              (4)              (5)                (2)                       77 
Note: Entries are percentages of respondents who offered each response category according to their 
profession prior to service in the parliament. N of Cases: 77. Cramér's V Score: 0.4496* 
 
       Fifty-six percent of respondents who previously held leadership positions and fifty-nine 
percent of respondents who previously held elected office said that dissenting members are 
allotted time but speak last. In contrast, fifty-three percent of respondents who previously served 
as staff maintained that dissenting members were always given speaking time. This may in part 
reflect increased familiarity with party caucus communication networks where decisions are 
taken on the allocation of speaking time as well as more exposure to group socialization 
processes that lead respondents to link plenary speaking time allocation with group discipline 
whereas respondents with a staff or other backgrounds lack such experiences and thereby do not 
perceive that voting behavior and speaking time allocation are linked.  
       Figure 5.2 below on the whole confirms the hypothesized relationship in that respondents 
with more years of service are more likely to state that dissenting members will be relegated to 
the last slot(s), while those with fewer years of service maintain that dissenting members are 
never denied speaking time. In addition, the few respondents who maintained that dissenting 
members are always denied plenary speaking time are mostly those with more years of service. 
In turn, as years of service in the European Parliament increase, the likelihood of maintaining 
that only dissenting members who serve on the applicable committee or working group or are 




Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents according to years of service who offered each response. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate respondents by years of service. N of Cases: 77, Cramér's V: 0.5001** 
 
       Increased years of service provide more opportunities to request plenary speaking time, and 
to observe how speaking time is allocated across party groups. In this sense, as a respondent‟s 
years of service increases, they are more likely to observe that loyalty to the group line (when 
one is in place) along with individual expertise influences both the probability of being assigned 
plenary speaking time as well as the placement on the speakers‟ list. Similarly, increased years of 
service provides more opportunities to be exposed to socialization processes at the group level 
that encourage unity and in turn lead members to not request speaking time if they dissent or to 
express dissent in less costly forums such as explanations of vote.  
       The hypothesized relationship between party group position and offering each of the 
response categories is verified in Table 5.3 below to the extent that rank-and-file MEPs and staff 
are more likely to maintain that dissenting memebrs are never denied speaking time but the 


















Figure 5.2: Responses by Years of Service 
Never Denied Speak Last Committee Members Delegations Always Denied
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claimed that dissenting members are always denied speaking time. However, elites were more 
likely than rank-and-file group or staff to state that dissenting members always speak last.       
TABLE 5.3: PLENARY SPEAKING RESPONSES BY PARTY GROUP POSITION 
Response            President   VP   Coordinator   MEP   SG      Staff       N      
Never Denied       0.20           0.34 0.27      0.53     0.33   0.38       30    
Dissenting MEPs Speak Last     0.60           0.58 0.46      0.37     0.67   0.38      36 
Committees/Working Groups     0           0.04 0               0.05     0    0.16        4 
Speak if Delegation Dissents     0           0.04 0.27      0.05     0    0        5 
Always Denied      0.20           0 0      0          0    0.08         2 
(N of Cases)       (5)             (26)        (11)         (19)       (3)     (13)       77        
Note: Table depicts percentages of respondents according to party group position who offered each 
response.  N of Cases: 77, Cramér's V: 0.3281**  
 
       Elite respondents including the group vice-president below often noted that a finite amount 
of time and a potentially large number of members requesting speaking time may lead 
occasionally to the opportunity for only one or two dissenting members at the end of the list. The 
nearly fifty percent who gave this response believed this to both be fair and necessary in that 
while dissenting MEPs should not be denied speaking time, every request cannot be met and 
those who support the group line should be given first priority.  
“If there is a strong dissenting view, there will usually be an attempt to accommodate that and at 
least one person would get to express that view. Speaking time is so tight now that the person 
who‟s got the counterview would be lucky to get a minute or a minute and a half to express this 
counterview. That‟s not because of an attempt to suppress that point of view but simply a lack of 
speaking time”. (October 18, 2011) 
 
       Group vice-presidents in the larger groups have enormous influence in the assignment of 
speaking time as working group chairs, parliamentary secretaries, and on the more prominent 
reports often as the group rapporteur or shadow. Accordingly, group vice-presidents should be 
among the most informed respondents as they work with coordinators and those invested in the 
report. In turn, many vice-presidents believe that the first speakers should be those in the best 
position to articulate the group line and the immediate successive speakers should re-enforce that 
line. Then, if time permits, dissenting delegations and members may be assigned time. 
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”Our policy is major speaking time is given to the people who represent the group position and 
then of course a small amount is given towards the end of the debate to others, but of course 
formally only the first speaker is speaking for the group. It is important for the public to know 
the group line, so I think we are stricter on having a majority of the speakers to support the group 
line and then a minority of the speakers to represent the minority line”. (November 9, 2011) 
 
        As another vice-president below explains, dissenting members in the larger groups may be 
denied speaking time if they do not attend the working groups unless the parliamentary secretary 
later adds them to the list.  
“First of all, you have to be present in the working group to ask to speak, if you are not present, 
you cannot get speaking time. Second, you should have worked that report. You are the 
rapporteur, shadow rapporteur, you have a lot of amendments (to propose in the working group), 
or you work in that committee on it. You have to have a connection with that report. Of course, 
then if you have a member who stated that he will vote against, he can speak and there will be no 
problem”. (November 9, 2011) 
 
       Following proper procedures as the coordinator below not only refers to written rules, but 
also widely practiced norms such as those governing when and how to dissent. According to 
social identity theory, members observe how colleagues approach dissent and copy the observed 
behavior (See Brown 2000). For example, most groups insist that when a delegation or member 
intends to dissent from the group line it is expressed in group meetings and/or that leaders are 
privately notified in advance. If a member in most party groups does not provide advance notice 
and expresses dissent in plenary speeches, they may not be allotted time for their next request.  
“We make sure that the person is speaking on behalf of the group which is the first two speakers. 
If we have time, and usually as a big group we have time, then we will have no objection to 
somebody saying I don‟t agree. It‟s ok, we accept that, but what we don‟t accept is that the 
person should accept a slot and then not said they would oppose the group position. So, it should 
be known before and if we know before and we have time we will give the floor to someone who 
has an opinion that is contrary to the one the group supports”. (October 13, 2011) 
 
       On rare occasions, some group presidents field complaints from delegations or members 
who have not been included in speaking lists, especially in the smaller groups where there is not 
a parliamentary secretary. In this sense, the perceptions of group presidents on this question may 
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be shaped by their communications with others in leadership and senior staff. Most group 
presidents can also draw upon years of experience in the European Parliament and/or at the 
national level when assessing speaking time allocation. 
“We are a small group and that means we do not have much speaking time…We have to look 
and say ok in the afternoon we have eight minutes and we have three issues on the agenda. On 
the three issues, we have nine persons who want to speak. We have eight minutes, nine people, 
and this is not possible that all people can speak. So, we ask who was the rapporteur or the 
shadow. Who was included in the discussions, and who has a special development in their own 
country? Then, we decide and often I get one to two and half minutes to speak”. (June 19, 2012) 
        
       The response above from a group president describes the challenges confronting the smaller 
groups when allocating speaking time. If the group only has nine slots, then priority has to be 
given to those who worked on the report on the rare occasion the group is assigned the 
responsibility for carrying it. Otherwise, on most reports, the group president and the rapporteur 
are given priority with the limited remainder of the group‟s time divided among those interested 
in speaking on the report regardless of their voting intentions.  
       Secretary-generals in four of the seven party groups hold or share the primary responsibility 
of allocating speaking time. In particular, the decisions of secretary-generals in the ALDE or 
Greens/EFA face even higher levels of scrutiny compared to their GUE and EFD counterparts 
not only because of a larger number of speaking requests than allotted slots, but because they 
believe they must also ensure that the speaking list reflects the group line when one is present. 
“It depends in part on how much time we have. In general terms, the first speaker of the group 
according to the general rules of the parliament speaks on behalf of the group. In my view, the 
second speaker should never contradict the first speaker. So, if there is a minority position in the 
group, and we have time for more than three speakers, then they can get time to express their 
views. However, if we only have time for three speakers, there is not such time and then you 
have the possibility of an explanation of vote”. (May 30, 2012) 
 
       The first response category encompasses the perception among thirty-nine percent of 
respondents that no MEP is denied speaking time in plenary debates because they oppose the 
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group position. These largely rank-and-file respondents believe that anyone who wants to 
participate in plenary debates can request time and the group always balances the allocation of 
plenary speaking time between those supporting the group line or reflecting the majority in a free 
vote and those members who oppose the group line or are in the minority on a free vote.  
“Normally, we discuss the important issues in the plenary of our group before the plenary of the 
parliament. So, we know who is in favor and who is against and if it is controversial inside of the 
group, it is wise to give speaking time for both positions in order to avoid a confrontation inside 
of the group”.  (June 19, 2012)  
 
       Following discussion in the party group meeting, clear divides may arise on reports, 
particularly those associated with social issues and at times foreign policy. In these situations, a 
free vote is often called by leadership and the allocation of plenary speaking time reflects the 
overall divide within the group. In contrast, the MEP above notes that when a group line 
accompanies a report, a much greater share of speaking time is reserved for those supporting the 
group position yet the group ensures that dissenting voices are proportionately included.  
“Yeah, it‟s a fundamental position that it‟s the members right to speak. It covers itself to some 
degree, because if you look at the minutes, the first speaker always speaks for the group, usually 
the shadow rapporteur or the coordinator, and then you go down to the other members. We, in 
this office, would never say well that member takes a different view, that‟s not our job”. 
(October 5, 2011) 
 
       The response above is from an aide to a parliamentary secretary responsible for allocating 
speaking time. In his experience, once members associated with the report have been allocated 
minutes then any remaining time is not distributed on the basis of who supports the group line. 
Instead, he contends that a dissenting member may be given speaking time if any is available and 
he does not interpret his role (or that of the group vice-president) to single out dissenting 
members by denying them speaking time. 
       The third response category reflects both the potential influence of national delegations in 
influencing speaking time allocation but also potential hurdles for dissenting members wishing to 
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participate in plenary debates. According to these respondents, dissenting MEPs will only be 
allocated time if they are part of a national delegation opposing the group line. In other words, 
individual members dissenting from the group line are not allocated time; rather only those who 
are part of delegations who have notified the group in advance of their objections to the group 
line and who have reached an accommodation to receive plenary speaking time.  
“Let‟s say it was an agricultural debate …The coordinator on agriculture happens to be British so 
he would speak first and then we would probably ensure that the second speaker was Polish. We 
do try and alternate like that and although we don‟t have a rule on allocating times according to 
size of national delegations, we keep an eye on that. So, that if the British who make up just over 
forty percent of the group is massively more or massively less than forty percent of the time, then 
we would adjust that”. (November 9, 2011) 
 
      The example above is from an ECR staff person whose group often accommodates separate 
national lines and who often make decisions such as plenary speaking time allocation at least in 
part on the basis of national party membership. In turn, the practice by the group whip is to 
allocate speaking time proportionally among the three largest delegations (British, Polish, and 
Czech) while ensuring that members invested in the report are also assigned time.  
“We had that issue yesterday because we made the speakers‟ list for today‟s debate on the 
European Council for the end of June including negotiations on the financial network...I think we 
had thirty-eight applications for a total of seventeen minutes speaking time, so we had to tell a lot 
of colleagues sorry you cannot get in, but of course one member of the British Labour Party 
delegation got speaking time even though we know that they would vote against or possible 
abstain on the resolution because this includes difficult issues for them like the financial 
transactions tax and also the level of the budget, but they still get speaking time. So, if it is an 
established position, and we know that they (delegations) have another perspective, they still get 
time to speak, so long as they follow the rules”.  (July 5, 2012) 
 
      As the response above from an S & D coordinator describes, allocating speaking time largely 
on the basis of national delegations does not solely reflect a delegation‟s size but at times also 
domestic politics. Group leaders may in turn ensure that at least one member from a delegation 
encountering domestic opposition to a report is included on the speakers‟ list. In this sense, the 
group balances short-term goals of securing maximum support for the group line on a given 
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report with long-term goals of aiding a national party in winning seats in the next elections while 
knowing that they can rely in the future on support from the delegation. 
       A mere four percent of respondents stated that only those MEPs who were on the committee 
responsible for the report and who had opposed the group line in committee were allocated time 
in plenary. For example, the MEP below maintained that members who opposed the group line 
and served on the applicable working group were typically allocated plenary speaking time, 
whereas those members not serving on the applicable committee or working group were either 
excluded from the speakers‟ list (and expected to express dissent in explanations of vote) or were 
only given the last slots on the list.  
“The group gives both pro and con the floor, but debate speaking time in plenary is reserved 
largely for members of the committee responsible for the dossier, so MEPs opposed to the group 
who are not part of the applicable committee have the right to explain their vote outside of the 
group allotted time”. (October 11, 2011) 
 
       Finally, very few respondents indicated that members who opposed the group line were 
never allocated speaking time in plenary debates. The response below from a staff person 
maintains that participation in plenary debates entails the responsibility of representing the group 
position and not an opportunity for individual expression. Doing otherwise undermines the group 
position and signals disunity not only to members but also to other party groups. The response 
also underscores that dissenting members have other options for expressing their position and 
that speaking time in plenary debates should be reserved for those supporting the group line. 
“Yes, if someone has a dissenting point of view, I don‟t think in your right mind you would want 
to grant speaking time to that person to make it clear to the outside world that there are divisions 
inside your group. You do want to show uniformity and strength. These MEPs, they can make 
use of the catch the eye part of the debate before the rapporteurs, Council, and Commission 
round out the debate or they can use the explanation of vote”. (October 13, 2011) 
 
       Those offering this response do raise a vital point in that members have a variety of outlets 
for presenting their views. First and foremost, MEPs can provide an oral explanation of vote 
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following the conclusion of voting on all reports. In addition, MEPs have the opportunity to 
speak on the floor during “catch the eye” segments at the conclusion of plenary business. In this 
sense, the denial of speaking time in plenary debate is a limited tool for group leaders to ensure 
group unity as other outlets of plenary speaking are available to MEPs. 
       The consensus among most respondents is that group leaders and staff do not use the 
allocation of plenary speaking time as a means to punish dissenting members. A major 
contributing factor to perceptions of plenary speaking time allocation is whether or not a group 
line accompanies a report. If a free vote is called for, then the allocation of minutes is likely to 
reflect the extent of divisions within the group. If however a group line is present, the more 
influential groups appear to be more reluctant to provide speaking time for dissenting members 
and in turn place dissenting speakers (if at all) at the end of the list.  
AWARDING RAPPORTEUR AND SHADOW RAPPORTEUR POSITIONS 
       When compared to the allocation of plenary speaking time, the awarding of rapporteur and 
shadow rapporteur positions may offer more opportunities and more incentive for party group 
leaders to manage dissent. As with speaking time, reports are allocated on the basis of party 
group size. “Rapporteurships are assigned through an auction system, where each political group 
gets a quota of points in proportion to its number of MEPs. The coordinators decide how many 
points a dossier is worth and then make bids on behalf of the groups” (Hix et al. 2007, 113).  
       The rapporteur is the MEP responsible for carrying the report through committee and 
plenary and is also the lead negotiator with the Commission and Council. The shadow rapporteur 
represents his or her party group in negotiations on the report at all levels. The EPP and the S & 
D as the largest groups outbid the others on a majority of reports as well as on the more 
prominent reports. Recent studies have concluded that the assignment of rapporteurs is positively 
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tied to both expertise associated with the policy area of the respective committee and to the 
ideological distance of the MEP from the party group median (See Yashinaka et al. 2010).  
       Bailer (2011) similarly concluded that rapporteurs were assigned with loyalty to the group 
line and policy expertise in mind. “EP party group leaders use the additional rewarding 
instrument of distributing rapporteurships for loyal members. Receiving a rapport means that 
reliable group members are responsible for presenting and taking care of a special legislation 
dossier which gives them attractive opportunities to appear in public and to show their 
professional qualities as MEPs. But again, loyalty is not the only factor determining whether 
MEPs receive a dossier; national quota, expertise, and experience are additional factors 
contributing to receiving an important rapport” (Bailer, 2011, 15). In other words, most party 
group leaders want the rapporteur to be both knowledgeable about the subject matter and reflect 
the mainstream opinion within the group on the subject. 
       Higher stakes are associated with assigning rapporteurs compared to the allocation of 
plenary speaking time. Those carrying or shadowing the report represent the group throughout 
every stage of the legislative process whereas only the first few rounds of speakers in plenary 
debates are regarded typically as conveying the official group line. In addition, the actions and 
comments of the group rapporteur are more likely to impact levels of support for the group line 
and the group‟s plenary success than a single or even a series of plenary speeches. For example, 
rapporteurs present the group line and answer questions in party group meetings thereby serving 
as a leading expert on the report for members to defer to on voting (See Ringe 2010).          
       To determine whether or not party group members and staff believe that rapporteurs and 
shadows are assigned on the basis of party group loyalty, I asked an open-ended question: Do 
party group leaders consider voting history when assigning rapporteurs or shadow rapporteurs? 
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Based on the literature, I anticipated five response categories: the question is not applicable to 
my party group because we are small, rapporteurs are assigned according to an MEP‟s expertise 
and work in committee, rapporteurs are assigned on the basis of national delegation membership, 
only prominent reports are denied to members who frequently dissent from the group line, and 
all reports are denied to frequently dissenting members.  
H1: Respondents from the more influential party groups will be more likely to maintain that 
frequently dissenting members will always be denied reports or will be denied prominent reports. 
 
       More influential party groups will have more opportunities as larger groups to carry 
prominent reports and thereby more opportunities to consider dissent when assigning 
rapporteurs. Higher plenary stakes will provide added incentive for influential groups to deny 
prominent reports to frequently dissenting members as they will want loyal members to represent 
the group in negotiations and in appeals to members to support the group line. In turn, 
respondents from less influential party groups should be more likely to contend that rapporteur 
assignments are made on the basis of a member‟s policy expertise and work ethic in committee. 
H2: Respondents from the medium and smaller party groups will be more likely to maintain that 
the question is not applicable because they often only have one to three committee members. 
 
       Respondents from the EFD and the GUE should be the most likely to provide this response 
as they only have one to three members on each committee. Greens/EFA and ECR respondents 
should be the next most common to offer this response as they often have only two to five 
members on each committee. Otherwise, I expect respondents from these groups to contend that 
expertise and work and not voting record impact rapporteur assignment. 
H3: Respondents who are in leadership or who are the secretary-general should be more likely to 
maintain that all reports or prominent repots are denied to frequently dissenting members. 
 
       Those with decision-making authority should be more likely to state that all or prominent 
reports are denied to frequently dissenting members. Group coordinators are primarily 
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responsible for rapporteur assignment though secretary-generals and vice-presidents who preside 
over working groups or serve as the parliamentary secretary/whip also influence rapporteur 
assignment. The group president bears the ultimate responsibility for ensuring group unity but is 
rarely involved in rapporteur assignment. Rank-and-file MEPs and staff meanwhile should be 
more likely to state that expertise and not voting behavior influence rapporteur selection. 
H4: Respondents with more years of service in the European Parliament will be more likely to 
maintain that all or prominent reports are denied to frequently dissenting members. 
 
       With more years of service in the European Parliament, respondents should acquire a greater 
understanding of the rapporteur selection process. More years of service will be accompanied by 
a greater appreciation for unity given the greater prominence for the parliament as well as more 
opportunities to observe that frequently dissenting members are denied all rapporteur positions or 
more likely that the most prominent reports are awarded to those with seniority and who are 
loyal to the group line. Those with fewer years of service should be more likely to assume that 
expertise and work ethic are the primary attributes influencing rapporteur selection. 
H5: Respondents from the smaller member-states will be more likely to maintain that rapporteur 
assignments are made largely or solely on the basis of national delegation influence. 
 
       Most groups have one-member delegations as well as members from countries with small 
delegations. Whether due to envy or their observation of the selection process, these members 
should be more likely to state that rapporteurs are selected largely or even solely on the basis of 
national delegation membership in that they believe that the larger and more influential 
delegations have first choice of all reports and are awarded the most prominent reports.  
         All but six respondents answered the question and no multiple responses were offered. As 
depicted below in Figure 5.3, nearly half of respondents maintained that expertise and committee 
work are the leading factors for assigning rapporteurs and that past opposition to the group line is 
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either not considered or is secondary to policy expertise and committee work. Respondents 
defined committee work in terms of attendance, participation, as well as work ethic. About a fifth 
of respondents noted that the question was not applicable because their group had so few 
members on committees while a similar number contended that prominent reports were denied to 
frequently dissenting members. Meanwhile, less than ten percent of respondents believed that 
delegation membership was the primary determinant of rapporteur assignment.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentages of respondents who offered each response. N of Cases: 78. 
 
       The most unexpected result was that not a single respondent said that a member who 
frequently dissented from the group line would be denied all opportunities to carry or shadow a 
report. Instead, respondents maintained that although a frequently dissenting member may not be 
assigned many reports and possibly no prominent reports, they would nonetheless be assigned 
some reports either as a result of the group‟s size, the individual‟s expertise in a particular policy 
























Figure 5.3: Rapporteur Responses 
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       As depicted below in Table 5.4, party group membership was found to have the strongest 
statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of offering a particular response to the 
question of whether party group leaders consider a member‟s voting history when assigning 
rapporteurs. Statistically significant relationships also occurred for a respondent‟s years of 
service in the European Parliament and a respondent‟s previous profession.  
TABLE 5.4: PREDICTORS OF RAPPORTEUR ASSIGNMENT RESPONSES          
Party Group                0.4665***             
Group Position             0.2978 
Member-State                       0.4024 
Gender                                  0.2785 
Years of Service                   0.4806* 
Previous Profession              0.4577*   
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores providing measures of strength of association.  *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance on the .05, .01 and .001 levels respectfully. N of Cases: 78 
 
        When considering the data presented below in Table 5.5, while expertise and work were the 
most common responses across professional categories, those respondents having served in 
elected or party leadership positions or who had held elected office prior to parliamentary service 
are more likely to have stated that prominent reports are denied to frequently dissenting members 
than those who previously were employed as staff or from other professions who instead 
maintained in greater proportions that expertise and work ethic influence rapporteur selection.  
TABLE 5.5 RAPPORTEUR ALLOCATION RESPONSES AND PREVIOUS PROFESSION 
Professions          Not Applicable   Expertise/Work   Dissenting Delgs.  Prominent Reports    N 
Leadership  0.23        0.41                       0.04                        0.32                         22 
Elected Office             0.32            0.45                       0.09                        0.14                         22 
Staff   0.16            0.63                       0                             0.21                         19 
Private Sector             0.25            0.50                       0                              0.25                          4 
Education/Student      0                 0.67                       0.20                         0.20                          6 
Unknown                    0.20            0.20                       0.20                         0.40                          5 
(N of Cases)             (17)            (38)                         (6)                            (17)                      78 
Note: Entries are percentages of respondents according to previous profession prior to parliament service 
who offered each response. N of Cases: 78, Cramér's V: 0.4577* 
 
        This in part reflects greater experience with decision-making associated with prominent 
reports. For example, past leadership experience at the national government level provides the 
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respondent with the knowledge that the assignment of prominent reports requires closer scrutiny 
of past voting behaviour. Similarly, past experience in elected office provides greater familiarity 
with group level socialization processes and in turn a greater likelihood that the respondent will 
presume that similar norms governing the assignment of prominent reports are in place and are 
valued within the party group. In contrast, previous staff and other professions will have less or 
no familiarity with group norms and processes governing the assignment of prominent reports 
and otherwise assume that expertise or national delegation membership dictates assignment.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents according to years of service who offered each response. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate respondents by years of service. N of Cases: 78, Cramér's V = 0.5001** 
 
       Figure 5.4 above indicates that as years of service in the European Parliament increases, the 
likelihood of contending that prominent reports are denied to dissenting members increases, 
particularly for those with eleven or more years of service. Similarly, the likelihood of 
maintaining that expertise and work ethic are the main determinants for rapporteur assignment 

















Figure 5.4: Responses by Years of Service 
Not Applicable Expertise Delegations Prominent Reports
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said that the question wasn‟t applicable due to party group size is higher for those who served 
three years or less in the European Parliament. 
       I believe in part this reflects that service in a full parliament (five years) is necessary before 
fully understanding and being able to accurately interpret group and parliamentary decision-
making processes. For example, respondents with more years of service are more likely to have 
carried or shadowed more reports, especially prominent reports. As members are assigned more 
responsibility, they should in turn recognize the higher legislative stakes leading them to 
presume that prominent reports are denied to dissenting members. In contrast, members with 
fewer years of service are unlikely to have carried prominent reports. 
TABLE 5.6: RAPPORTEUR RESPONSES ACCORDING TO PARTY GROUP AFFILIATION 
Response          ALDE   ECR    EFD    EPP    Greens   GUE   S&D       N   
NA-My Group is Small 0 0.33   0.80 0          0.40 0.86 0           17 
Expertise & Work  0.76 0.22   0.20 0.57     0.40 0.14 0.56  38 
Awarded by Delegation 0 0.45   0 0.14     0 0 0    6  
Prominent Reports Denied     0.24 0        0 0.29     0.20 0 0.44  17 
(N of Cases)                             (17)    (9)     (5)           (14)     (10)    (7)         (16)     78 
Note: Entries are percentages of respondents according to party group membership who offered each 
response. N of Cases: 78. Cramér's V: 0.4665*** 
        
       As depicted above in Table 5.6, respondents from the smaller party groups as expected 
tended to state that the question of whether voting history was considered in the assignment of 
rapporteurs was not applicable to their group because the single or few group members on a given 
committee hold the responsibility of shadowing all reports assigned to committees and carrying those few 
reports allocated to the group through the bidding system.  
       Most of the respondents who said that delegation membership influences rapporteur 
selection were predictably from the ECR. Surprisingly, a majority of respondents in the more 
influential party groups noted that expertise and work ethic were the primary determinants for 
assigning rapporteurs. However, most of the responses contending that prominent reports were 
denied to frequently dissenting members were from the three most influential party groups. This 
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suggests that when the stakes are high, such as budget votes, leaders in influential groups may 
consider voting history when allocating these reports whereas reports are normally allocated at 
the committee level based upon expertise and work. In this sense, group leaders do have a tool to 
a certain extent in managing dissent, at least in the larger and more influential groups.  
       In turn, respondents often commented that any ideological discrepancies between members 
and leaders should be addressed through committee assignments. For example, assuming that 
unity is important to a group, a member who disagrees with the group line on trade will be 
assigned to another committee in order to avoid rapporteur selection controversies unless the 
dispute is in an area (social policy) where the group does not adopt a common line or the 
member‟s delegation insists that they be assigned to that committee in which case they are 
unlikely to be assigned prominent reports.  
“Yes, if somebody‟s voting record and their position on key areas of our work was outside the 
norm of the group, I would be reluctant to give them a major report, because you need somebody 
who can hold the group together and if you have a rapporteur who has got a particular view 
which is not the mainstream then it is very difficult to hold group unity”. (June 6, 2012)  
 
       Because the rapporteur not only represents the group position but is expected to build 
support for the group position, party group leaders (especially in the influential groups) may be 
reluctant to assign a prominent report to a member who frequently dissents from the group line. 
For example, while the working group is likely to follow the lead of the coordinator from the 
committee responsible for the report, objections may arise from members outside the committee, 
including the presiding group vice-president. According to most respondents in the influential 
groups, every member is assured of being assigned as the group rapporteur at some point, but 
those members who display the strongest work ethic, highest policy expertise, and consistently 
support the group line are most often the lead rapporteur or shadow on prominent reports. 
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“I have to take many things into account. Just as I would not assign a Greek to be the rapporteur 
on Macedonian membership to the European Union, I would not hand a report on something as 
vital as the six-pack to someone who frequently votes against the group. In either instance, the 
member would still be given the responsibility to shadow or perhaps even carry a report, but not 
one in which they could frustrate the group‟s interests or raise questions about its leaders‟ 
judgment”. (November 14, 2012)  
 
      The response above expands on the differences surrounding the assignment of prominent or 
even controversial reports compared to most other reports. The EPP as the largest group not only 
carry more reports but they also successfully bid on a larger number of prominent reports. In 
turn, even shadow rapporteurs from the EPP have to in some ways be even more mindful of the 
group position as the group‟s support usually ensures the success or failure of the report.  
“If you know that somebody is not going to be exemplary for the group and has a very specific 
national interest in doing a file or wants to make a point, you will strive to make sure that they 
can make their point in some way but not as the rapporteur, because as the rapporteur you are not 
only expected to represent the group in writing the report, but even in the whole of parliament 
…For shadows, it depends greatly on the file. Sometimes, if it is a high profile dossier then we 
will keep account of that, but if you think there is a point to be made for a specific country and 
nobody else really cares, then we will definitely give it to them”. (June 14, 2012)  
 
       There are occasions as highlighted in the response above where the group will call for a free 
vote or does not intend to pursue a common line at all. On these occasions, readiness to assume 
the rapporteur responsibility is equally weighed with expertise and competence. However, if the 
group does intend to pursue a common line, then as the respondent notes, loyalty to the group 
line will be considered along with expertise. 
“There is a point system for which group gets the report and then it is distributed mostly 
according to participation in the work of the committee. People don‟t normally look at the voting 
behavior, but of course if it is known that someone is always voting differently from the group 
line, they will not get important reports, they will get less important reports. I think then that 
basically it‟s voting behavior, activity and leadership at the lower level”. (November 9, 2011)  
 
       Similar arguments are made by respondents in other influential groups. The response above 
notes that while committee votes are not roll-called, coordinators can observe voting behavior in 
voice votes and recall remarks made by the member in committee working groups as well as 
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committee debates. This information may also be shared through communication networks to 
other leaders and to other staff such as policy advisors and the secretary-general and together 
with an assessment of the member‟s overall voting behavior may lead to the denial of prominent 
reports. Nonetheless, the bulk of reports appear to be assigned in the influential groups on the 
basis of expertise and work ethic.  
“Usually at first when I have something on the table, I let my staff write an email to all of the 
members asking who is interested in what. If it is of a certain importance…I decide to do it 
myself or I ask somebody in my group who I think is the best one to do this very important 
subject, because it‟s not only a question of good will and interests, but of political importance in 
some ways.…So, I always have to think about what kind of experience does this person have, 
how important is this dossier…So, I try to be as fair as possible”. (June 25, 2012)  
 
       As a coordinator comes to know committee members, they acquire a better understanding of 
how to approach rapporteur assignments. If the report is determined by leadership to be a key 
component of the group‟s plenary agenda, then the role of rapporteur may be assumed by the 
vice-president or assigned on the basis of expertise on the subject. However, on most reports, the 
coordinator is likely according to this response, to consider not only the policy expertise of each 
colleague but also the national interests and personal background of each colleague.  
“The only conditions we take into account are that the member of the committee who is going to 
be rapporteur or shadow rapporteur is always in the committee meetings and is involved in the 
work of the working group. If there is an important report, we do not give it to a member who 
goes from time to time to the committee and very seldom goes to the working group and so on. 
But honestly….no one will accept being a rapporteur if they know that the position of the group 
is contrary to their position, because that is like a torture for the rapporteur to have your group 
against you”. (June 19, 2012)  
       
       The respondent above not only believes that voting behavior either in the committee or in 
plenary is not considered when assigning rapporteurs but also that a member would not accept or 
pursue a prominent report if their views conflict with the group. The response suggests that 
socialization processes in the committee as well as at the group level may lead a member to place 
the group line above personal preferences when pursuing rapporteur assignments. However, the 
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member may also be acting rationally in that they know they will damage their chances of being 
assigned future prominent reports if they do not indicate their conflicting views in advance.  
“The choice of rapporteurs, that‟s done at the committee level…So, this is the coordinator in 
each committee who decides who is given the rapporteurship of a certain report. Most of the 
time, they will ask if there is somebody who is interested, but it‟s their final decision on who will 
be the rapporteur. Also, on the shadow rapporteur, what usually happens is that someone 
becomes the shadow, not necessarily related to their voting behavior, because as I told you we 
really don‟t have that problem, so basically the allocation of reports is related mainly with 
attendance and work at the committee level”. (May 30, 2012)  
 
       Since the EFD and GUE (and often the ECR and Greens/EFA) only have one to three 
committee members, either the single member will shadow all of the reports or all the group 
members would rotate as shadows. The response below sheds further light on how rapporteur 
assignments are perceived to be handled by these party groups. 
“On the Budget Committee, we are normally only two colleagues working there…I am the 
coordinator, so when there is the coordinators‟ meeting to distribute the reports, I am the 
responsible person and I always try and have a very fair division of reports among the colleagues 
and it‟s not that about whether they were on the right line because I think all of the people on the 
budget committee really work hard and they indicate their interests. If there is a conflict, we try 
to figure out how we can solve it, but normally it‟s not so tricky to find the possibility and to 
share the points with the people who want to have it. It‟s more complicated for example in 
Foreign Affairs or in other committees when you have more colleagues”. (June 5, 2012) 
 
       On the whole, respondents from the Greens/EFA group were split between those from 
committees with smaller membership contending that the question was not applicable to their 
group, while those from committees with larger membership more often stated that expertise and 
committee work and not voting history determined whether a member was assigned as the group 
rapporteur. This is interesting given that the group is the most cohesive in parliament in that the 
responses suggest that voting behaviour is not considered even on prominent reports.  
“I don‟t know of any case where that has affected whether they get that or not. It depends on 
your own committee to be honest. Within (my) committee, there is always a very high demand 
for shadow rapporteurships and what we often find is that there are two of us following one 
report. We don‟t get that many reports through the group. For instance, three years ago, I was 
offered quite a major report…They said to me, you are always there, you always come to 
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committee and you always vote, and it‟s obvious you know what you are doing, so I was offered 
the report. If it‟s somebody who has worked a lot in committee, then obviously they offer reports 
to them but not on voting records in my experience”. (June 9, 2012)  
 
       The size of the Greens/EFA committee contingents reflects the group‟s policy priorities. 
While they may have more than three members on the environment committee, they have fewer 
members on the agricultural committee. When committee membership is small, Greens/EFA 
members often share shadow responsibilities. However, when the group successfully bids on a 
report, leadership and staff according to the response pay close attention to who receives the 
rapporteur assignment. In these circumstances, closeness to the group‟s ideological mainstream 
is equally considered with the member‟s policy expertise and committee work.  
       The response below underlines the political realities associated with the allocation of reports 
in that as the Greens/EFA can successfully bid only on a few reports, group leaders and staff will 
work to ensure that the selection of the rapporteur or the responsibility of shadowing reports 
identified by leadership as key to the group‟s plenary agenda will reflect the group‟s core beliefs. 
In contrast, the assignment of most rapporteurs is normally a challenge of convincing members 
already shadowing multiple reports to take on additional responsibilities. 
“In general, the Greens are so far back in the hierarchy of the parliament that by the time our 
group bids on reports, there is not much disagreement left to be had, so everyone knows where 
they want to be…For the shadow rapporteurships, I don‟t see a problem with this because 
normally as a small group it is more of a problem finding someone who is willing to take the 
shadow rapporteurship at all”. (June 25, 2012) 
 
       An overwhelming number of respondents who stated that the question of considering dissent 
when distributing rapporteurs was not applicable to their group were from the two smallest 
groups, the EFD and the GUE. The response below underscores this sentiment in that as the only 
group member or one of two to three on the committee, GUE members will have to serve as 
shadow rapporteurs on all or multiple reports in a given parliament.  
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“In the GUE/NGL, we never fight about reports, because we are a small group, so it‟s more like, 
do I really have to be a shadow on this? So, that‟s not the problem for us, it‟s more like we now 
have three reports amongst ourselves, who will take what? I have only recognized a couple of 
times that I see that in the group there are two people wanting the same report. So, even if you 
don‟t get a rapporteurship, you can be a shadow rapporteur”. (June 22, 2012)  
 
       While GUE shadow rapporteurs may propose that the group adopt a particular stance on a 
report, there is not a group line on a majority of reports and individual members or delegations 
frequently adopt a separate line. In contrast, when the group successfully bids on rapporteur 
assignments for carrying a report, a competition between the members on a committee may arise 
for the responsibility of carrying the report which in this circumstance is likely be accompanied 
by a group line or at least the pursuit of a group line.  
       Finally, only eight percent responded that rapporteurs are allocated largely on the basis of 
national delegation membership. These respondents believed that members of large national 
delegations were awarded the more prominent and largest number of reports irrespective of their 
policy expertise or voting history. This contrasts with the largest block of respondents who 
acknowledged the role of national delegation membership but believe that expertise and 
committee work are more important determinants for the assignment of reports.  
       While acknowledging the importance of work at the committee level, the respondent below 
believes that reports are assigned first on the basis of national delegation membership and then 
according to work ethic and policy expertise. This may depend on the distribution of delegations 
within a party group. For example, the ECR may assign reports to members from the UK, Polish, 
and then Czech delegations with the rest assigned to the multiple one-member delegations.  
“Delegations are the underlying factor in this group when you consider any award, whether it be 
leadership positions or rapporteurships. If you are from the British delegation you have a leg up 
so to speak on everyone and then the Brits compromise with the Poles and Czechs to hand out 
the other positions or reports. Of course if you are one of two (ECR members) on a given 
committee you will be a shadow on nearly every report but the responsibility of being a 
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rapporteur will be decided on the basis of which delegation you belong to as the group will spend 
its points on rapporteurships accordingly.” (November 1, 2011)  
 
PLENARY AMENDMENTS AND PARTY GROUP DISCIPLINE 
       Dissent from the group line either does not impact the allocation of plenary speaking time or 
results only in the placement of dissenting speakers at the end of lists. MEPs may otherwise 
utilize explanations of votes and other opportunities to voice dissent in plenary. Voting history is 
not the sole determinative factor in the assignment of rapporteurs though on occasion leaders in 
the more influential party groups may deny prominent reports to members who frequently 
dissent from the group line or do not agree with the line on the particular report. This leaves the 
remaining potential disciplinary tool of party groups as amendment gatekeepers to block or 
lobby against plenary amendments tabled by individual MEPs that are contrary to the group line.  
       At the committee level, individual MEPs may table amendments without party group 
sponsorship. However, in plenary, all amendments must be sponsored by a party group unless an 
individual MEP can attain at least forty signatures. The twenty-seven non-attached MEPs must 
rely on this tool to propose amendments in plenary. When an individual MEP from a party group 
tables an amendment, it rarely passes in plenary. From my observations and the interviews, it 
appears that when group leaders in the more cohesive groups identify contrary amendments they 
normally resolve the dispute in one of the group decision-making forums prior to plenary.  
      Otherwise, the group does not take a position on the amendment or simply notes on the 
voting list to members that the particular amendment is not group-sponsored. Accordingly, I 
asked respondents if group leaders actively lobby members to vote against amendments offered 
by individuals in the group that contradict the group line and I anticipated a response set similar 
to the question on rapporteurs: the question isn‟t applicable to our group because individual-
sponsored amendments are rare, leaders take no position, leaders note their opposition on the 
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voting list but do not lobby members to changer their intended vote, leaders will lobby members 
to change their voting intent unless the amendment has delegation backing, or leaders lobby 
against all plenary amendments from group members that oppose  the group line.  
H1: Respondents from influential party groups will be more likely to maintain that leaders 
actively lobby against contradictory individually-sponsored amendments. 
 
       Higher plenary stakes should provide incentive for leaders in more influential party groups 
to lobby against amendments from individual members in their group that contradict the group 
line or at the least to note their opposition in voting lists provided to members. Otherwise, the 
group‟s plenary agenda and reputation may be put at risk and in the absence of opposition by 
group leaders members may become more likely to pursue other forms of dissent expression.  
H2: Respondents from less influential party groups will be more likely to maintain that 
individually-sponsored amendments are rare or that leaders take no position on them. 
 
       Less influential party groups are more likely to either not pursue a common line or to ignore 
amendments that contradict the group line because they do not manage dissent or lack the 
necessary tools (see chapter four) to manage dissent. If there is no group line, the group should 
agree to sponsor all amendments or in the event that an ad hoc majority within the group opposes 
an amendment offered by a member, leadership should not take a position against it because they 
lack the incentive and thereby the communication network and socialization to address it. 
H3: Respondents who are leaders or secretary-generals will be more likely to maintain that 
leaders actively lobby against contradictory individually-sponsored amendments  
 
       While I do not anticipate a high number of responses maintaining that group leaders actively 
lobby against individually-sponsored amendments from members, I would expect that any such 
argument would be made by respondents who are in senior leadership positions or are the 
secretary-general as these positions are associated with dissent management responsibilities 
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whereas rank-and-file members and staff should be more likely to maintain that leaders do not 
lobby at all against such amendments.  
H4: Respondents from large delegations will be more likely to maintain that leaders do not lobby 
against contradictory amendments if they are supported by national delegations within the group.  
 
       Leaders may choose not to lobby against individually-sponsored amendments that contradict 
the group line particularly if the delegation is a considerable portion of the group. My 
observations and interviews suggest that group leaders will try to reach a compromise with the 
delegation in such circumstances (such as to abstain) but otherwise will simply not the absence 
of group sponsorship on the voting list or take no action at all because the group will need the 
delegation‟s support on future and may understand the national political rationale for the 
delegation sponsoring the particular amendment. 
H5: Respondents with more years of service will be more likely to maintain that group leaders do 
not take any position or that individually-sponsored amendments are rare.  
 
       With more years of exposure to the decision-making processes within the group and to the 
parliamentary procedures and patterns, respondents with more years of service should conclude 
that individually-sponsored amendments (outside the non-attached members) are so rare that the 
question is not applicable or they will conclude that because such amendments normally fail in 
plenary, group leaders will not take any position on them at all. 
       Thirteen of the eight-four respondents were either not asked the question or did not respond 
and no multiple explanations were offered. As indicated below in Figure 5.5, a little over forty 
percent of respondents stated that party group leadership never took a position on such 
amendments at least in the plenary stage. The group coordinator might lobby against the 
amendment in committee, but group leaders would not reference it in the party group meeting 
because plenary amendments without group sponsorship are expected to fail. A slightly smaller 
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percentage of respondents noted that the question was not applicable because such amendments 
were so rarely authored by their colleagues in the party group.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents offering each response. N of Cases: 71 
      
       Fourteen percent noted that group leaders might state their opposition to the amendments in 
working groups and party group meetings and perhaps even notate it on the voting lists handed to 
members just prior to plenary, but not lobby members to oppose the amendment because it was 
assured to fail. Opposition was noted for the sake of maintaining communication with members 
and to ensure that further expressions of dissent were not encouraged. Only three respondents 
cited any lobbying by party group leaders on individually-sponsored amendments contrary to the 
group line. One MEP stated that if the amendment was endorsed by a delegation, no lobbying 
would occur, but if an MEP acted alone, leaders would work to ensure its defeat. 
       While the response pattern is as I expected, I am surprised that the last two categories 
received such low response rates. This suggests that the communication network in the more 


























Figure 5.5: Amendment Responses 
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most circumstances are not concerned with such amendments. Group coordinators and the 
rapporteur will often try to reach compromises or lobby against contrary amendments. These 
efforts by coordinators might not only deny contrary amendments from moving beyond the 
committee stage, they may also deter other MEPs from tabling contrary amendments at the 
working group or group meeting as the account by an EPP aide to a coordinator below explains. 
“First we try and have the rapporteur deal with it, and by deal with it I mean that the amendments 
are not submitted or that that the rapporteur or shadow rapporteur addresses this issue in a 
compromise amendment that would not prejudice the position of the group. Now, obviously, 
some amendments might be totally contrary to the group line and there is a certain amount of 
flexibility you can have to find compromises. In that case, we might speak to the person offering 
the amendment or to their delegation, and tell them there might not be a majority on this and why 
don‟t you withdraw it and pursue it through other means”. (June 27, 2012) 
 
       The account from the coordinator‟s aide helps to clarify why so many respondents either did 
not believe the question was applicable to their group or that group leaders did not take positions 
on plenary amendments contrary to the group line. Above all, they are rare and when they do 
occur, they are addressed at the committee or working group stage through lobbying by leaders 
or by compromise obtained through the re-wording of a sponsored amendment or by splitting an 
amendment in two and having a split vote in plenary. This is further evidence of dissent 
management at every legislative stage in the more influential groups. 
       In my observations of EPP working groups, the presiding vice-president averted contrary 
amendments through such compromises. With the matter resolved in the working group or at 
times in the group meeting, an individually-tabled amendment from MEPs at the plenary stage is 
either not necessary or is ensured to fail due to the lack of group support. Similarly, other 
influential groups like the ALDE will utilize the group meeting to resolve the differences over 
amendment or group leaders will ignore the amendment altogether. 
       As depicted below in Table 5.8, a respondent‟s party group membership and the likelihood of 
offering a particular response was found to be statistically significant as was the relationship with a 
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respondent‟s gender. In contrast, the association between a respondent‟s member-state or previous 
profession and the likelihood of providing any of the responses was likely the product of chance. 
TABLE 5.8: PREDICTORS OF INDIVDUAL AMENDMENT RESPONSES          
Party Group                0.3476**             
Group Position             0.2187 
Member-State                       0.4752 
Gender                                  0.3782* 
Years of Service                   0.3847 
Previous Profession              0.4170            
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores measuring strength of association. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance on the .05, .01, and .001 levels respectfully. N of Cases: 71. 
 
       As Figure 5.6 below indicates, female respondents are more likely to state that group leaders 
do not take a position on individually-tabled contrary plenary amendments or that leaders would 
note opposition on a voting list but not lobby or appeal to members to adhere to the group line, 
while male respondents are more likely to maintain that the question was not applicable since 
such amendments are so rare and were also the sole source of those contending that contrary 
plenary amendments supported by national delegations within the group were acceptable.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentages of amendment responses by respondent‟s gender. Number in 






























        As depicted in Table 5.9 below, the trend of offering one of the first two response categories 
cuts across all party groups though respondents from the two least influential and smallest party 
groups (EFD and GUE) were unanimous in offering the second response category.  
TABLE 5.9: RESPONSES ACCORDING TO PARTY GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
Response   ALDE     ECR    EFD    EPP     Greens     GUE     S&D    N          
NA-Amendments are Rare  0.60         0.44      0      0.50     0.30       0            0.40     27    
Leadership Has No Position  0.36         0.44      1.0      0.30     0.40       1.0         0.13     30  
Oppose but No Lobbying  0              0.14      0      0.20     0.20       0            0.39     10               
No Lobbying if Delegation     0              0           0      0          0.10       0            0            1       
Lobby against All              0.04         0           0      0          0            0            0.09       4 
(N of Cases)               (15)         (9)        (5)       (10)     (10)        (7)          (15)    71 
Note: Table depicts percentages of respondents according to party group membership who offered each 
response with last row depicting number of respondents. N of Cases: 71, Cramér's V: 0.3476* 
 
       In addition, S & D respondents were the most likely to maintain that leaders will oppose but 
not lobby against individually-sponsored amendments from group members that contradict the 
group line and are the source of two of the three responses contending that group leaders lobby 
against all such amendments. While more respondents maintained that the group largely ignored 
contrary plenary amendments, some such as the S & D coordinator below noted that while 
leaders wouldn‟t lobby members they would state their opposition in the group meeting and 
notate the amendment in the voting list as one not sponsored by the group. Though this response 
indicates that there is not an active effort to defeat the amendment, the group position is clearly 
stated as the amendment might attain sizable support or encourage other forms of dissent.  
“Plenary amendments are tabled by the political groups, meaning that they correspond to the 
group line (validated by the coordinator and the VP in charge); otherwise, you need at least 40 
members to table an amendment. This usually happens regarding cross-party issues. If such an 
amendment does not correspond to the group line our voting list in plenary will have a negative 
vote indication. In particularly sensitive issues, the group might give a free vote” (June 6, 2012). 
 
       Broad support within the group is necessary to ensure passage as it not only provides a block 
of votes but also attracts cross-party group support as an amendment sponsored by a cohesive 
group is more likely to pass. In turn, respondents perceive that if their party group is to be 
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influential in plenary, individually-sponsored amendments are not effective. This view is 
expressed by an ALDE MEP below.  
“It doesn‟t happen that often, it‟s odd really. Generally, if you have got a good cause and a case 
that is argued well, the group will support the tabling of the amendment, and especially in order 
to get anything through in co-decision procedures we need cross-party agreement, you can‟t get 
anything through if you only have one group, then the effort to build up that cross-party 
consensus is quite serious. It‟s only by going outside the group that you can achieve things and I 
suspect that is the position of the EPP group also”. (June 25, 2012)  
 
       The split among ECR respondents might reflect the tendency to accommodate national 
delegations within the group as the response below indicates. The group for the sake of unity 
may decide to sponsor an amendment which incurs majority or significant opposition among 
members. In such circumstances, individually-sponsored amendments are either not necessary as 
the group liberally sponsors amendments or leadership does not comment on such amendments 
as they often have a base of support within the group from one of the larger delegations. 
“At times, perhaps you have for the sake of argument the Czech delegation which feels strongly 
different from the group, from the position taken by the coordinator or the rapporteur and for the 
sake of unity, the amendments of the delegation will be offered in plenary though most of the 
group will vote against them”. (October 5, 2011)  
 
       In the EFD, respondents commented that individually-tabled amendments were not only 
common, but also did not encounter opposition from leaders. This stems from the fact that there 
is rarely any formal group line but rather ad hoc voting majorities. In addition, the group is not 
viewed by some members as a necessary legislative vehicle, as the response below underscores. 
“There are some dossiers on which I might go to the group and ask for their support on an 
amendment. On other occasions, my colleagues in the ECR or among the non-inscrits or perhaps 
even among my fellow countrymen might support my amendment and I won‟t bother to formally 
take it up with the group. In either case, the group leadership may not take a position in support 
but they certainly wouldn‟t oppose the amendment since it is the right of each individual MEP to 
table the amendment….assuming they can get the necessary signatures”. (October 28, 2011) 
  
       The response below by a member of the EPP secretariat maintains that while amendments 
opposing the group line are rarely pursued by members, they do not incur opposition from 
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leaders because they are likely to fail in plenary. On other occasions, such as on social issues, an 
amendment may be contrary to the majority position, but because the issue is so divisive, leaders 
withhold sponsorship and do not lobby against it or they may not adopt a group line at all.  
“Any member can put forward an amendment or co-sign an amendment. That‟s the right of any 
member and we cannot and would not do anything about that, it‟s their right to express their 
opinion. We would not accept though that any member would sign on to any amendment on 
behalf of the group. So, if it happens that on certain issues we can‟t agree, we can‟t find a 
compromise, there is no group line and there is a free vote”. (October 15, 2011)  
 
       Respondents from the Greens/EFA group were again divided on the use of a disciplinary 
tool in dissent management. For some, the question wasn‟t applicable because they believed that 
such amendments were rare because members knew that group support was crucial for plenary 
passage and that party group meetings provided the vehicle for ensuring unity by arranging 
compromises on amendments or discussion leading to the amendment‟s withdrawal. However, 
other respondents such as the group vice-president below noted that when an individual MEP 
from the group proposed an amendment in plenary contrary to the group line it normally had the 
backing of a national delegation or from EFA members. 
“Yes, it happens. Sometimes, we also have the regionalists, EFA, and they have some things 
very specific on language and minority rights though sometimes it‟s something the group can 
support anyway, but it‟s not something we want to raise as a topic, but they will raise it as EFA 
members and collect forty signatures. So, sometimes it is not a group priority, but it doesn‟t 
conflict, and then it is not mentioned as the group line”. (June 4, 2012) 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
       When asked to assess the extent to which an MEP‟s voting history impacted the allocation of 
plenary speaking time or assignment of rapporteurs, most respondents believed that neither was 
awarded solely according to voting history, but rather on primarily on the basis of policy 
expertise along with work and attendance at the committee or (where applicable) working group 
level. Similarly, most respondents maintained that party group leaders tended to ignore rather 
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than lobby against individually-sponsored plenary amendments that were contrary to the group 
line, because they were so rare and almost certain to fail.  
       However, the responses also confirm that leaders in the more influential groups often weigh 
support for the group line when assigning rapporteurs/shadows for prominent reports or 
allocating plenary speaking time on reports accompanied by a group line. Years of service in the 
European Parliament also appears to have some influence in that respondents with more years of 
service were more likely to state that dissenting members spoke last and that prominent reports 
were withheld from frequently dissenting members. As MEPs and staff become more acquainted 
with legislative and party group decision-making processes, they should be more likely to link 
voting behavior with speaking time allocation or rapporteur assignment.  
       In addition, previous professional experience also appears to have influenced responses in 
that those with previous leadership experience or who served in elected office were more likely 
to contend that dissenting members speak last and that prominent reports are denied to dissenting 
members. In this sense, previous experience with group level decision-making and socialization 
processes provides a reference point for respondents to assess the distribution of speaking time 
allocation or rapporteur assignment.  
       The responses considered in this chapter demonstrate that the more influential groups link 
assignment of prominent speaking slots and reports to support of the group line. Nonetheless, 
respondents overwhelmingly emphasized alternate outlets for addressing the plenary and the 
practice of most coordinators assessing policy expertise and committee work rather than voting 
behavior when assigning rapporteurs. These sentiments are shared by respondents from the least 
as well as the most cohesive groups. This suggests that disciplinary tactics while employed to an 
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extent by the more influential groups do not significantly (if at all) contribute to high cohesion 
levels or explain dissent variation among the groups. 
       If not through disciplinary tools, how then do group leaders and staff ensure maximum 
support for the group line? Chapter six will consider the role of members of the leadership team: 
group presidents, vice-presidents, coordinators, rapporteurs, as well as the secretariat. The 
chapter will consider how each party group has come to define specific leadership roles and the 
degree to which particular dissent management strategies employed by party group leaders are 
successful in minimizing dissent levels.   
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CHAPTER SIX: LEADERS AND DISSENT MANAGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
       In the previous chapter, I examined the relationship between dissent and discipline when 
allocating plenary speaking, assigning rapporteurs, or when members tabled plenary amendments 
contrary to the group line. Most respondents maintained that policy expertise and work ethic 
rather than voting behavior were key determinants for awarding rapporteurs or plenary speaking 
time. However, responses also indicate that dissent is considered in some instances.  
       For example, respondents with more years of service in the parliament and those holding 
party group leadership positions were likely to maintain that dissenting members will either 
speak last or are not assigned time at all unless they are members of the relevant committee. In 
contrast, respondents who were rank-and-file MEPs or staff and who had fewer years of service 
were more likely to contend that dissenting members are never denied plenary speaking time. 
       In addition, respondents from the smaller party groups often noted that as the group had only 
one to three members on any given committee, the extent to which an MEP dissented from the 
group line did not influence the assignment of rapporteurs.  In contrast, respondents with more 
years of service and those from the more influential party groups were more likely to contend 
that leaders would not assign prominent reports to frequently dissenting members but that 
dissenting members would still have opportunities to serve as the rapporteur on other reports. 
       Finally, an overwhelming majority of respondents noted that party group leaders rarely 
lobbied against amendments tabled by individual MEPs in plenary that opposed the group line. 
In the absence of group sponsorship, these amendments nearly always fail. Knowing this likely 
outcome, respondents maintained that group leaders ignore the amendment or merely note the 
absence of group sponsorship in voting lists passed out to members prior to plenary. 
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      These findings suggest that the more influential party groups consider dissent in regards to 
allocating plenary speaking time and rapporteur responsibilities when the plenary stakes are 
high. However, dissenting MEPs have alternate outlets to address the parliament and will be 
assigned reports throughout the parliament. In turn, limited disciplinary tools should encourage 
the more influential party groups to rely on communication networks and socialization processes 
to ensure maximum support for the group line and minimal levels of dissent expression.  
       How do leaders contribute to party group unity and what dissent management roles are 
assigned to specific leadership positions? Party groups are hypothesized to have lower levels of 
dissent if they fully utilize group leadership positions as part of a whip structure. A fully-utilized 
whip structure assigns clear dissent management roles to group leaders (president, vice-
presidents, coordinators and rapporteurs) while functioning as a communication network in 
which group leaders share information and collaborate to ensure maximum support for the group 
line and attain minimal levels of dissent expression (voting to abstain, etc.).  
       In this chapter, I consider how party group leaders contribute to lower dissent levels while 
also identifying the specific contributions of party group presidents and vice-presidents whose 
roles are left largely undefined in the literature. To examine the role of the group president, I 
asked MEPs and staff what attribute makes group presidents effective leaders and at what point 
does the group president become involved in building unity. Next, the chapter considers how 
group vice-presidents contribute to group unity and then assesses the role of vice-presidents (or 
secretary-general) serving as the group whip or parliamentary secretary where applicable.  
LEGISLATIVE PARTY LEADERS AND DISSENT MANAGEMENT 
       How do dissent management challenges confronted by party group leaders differ from 
leaders in other legislatures? Above all, the „competing principals‟ dilemma (See Carey 2007) 
confronting legislators in federal democracies is much more present as nomination and election 
196 
 
resources are controlled by the parties at the national level. Unlike their counterparts in national 
parliaments, party group leaders also do not operate under a government-opposition structure, 
but rather must build cross-party group coalitions on respective reports. However, like their 
national counterparts, party group leaders encounter dissent in various forms. Above all, party 
group leaders solve collective action problems such as by identifying the voting intentions of 
colleagues and in some instances lobbying to ensure that the number of those disagreeing with 
the majority line (as formed or as endorsed by leaders) is kept to a minimum.  
       Party group leaders in the seventh parliament (elected in 2009) face higher legislative stakes 
and have more influence upon the path of European integration than any previous parliament. 
With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (2007), the European Parliament has co-decision 
authority in nearly every policy area at a time when decision-making is increasingly shifting 
from the nation-state to the EU level. The six-pack (October 2011) and two-pack (June 2012) 
votes on economic governance, and the 2006 Services Directive (See Hix et al. 2007), highlight 
the necessity for group leaders to identify and manage dissent on prominent reports. 
       As Brown (2000) notes, the assignment of specific roles (leader or member) brings order to 
a group‟s existence and implies expectations about behavior. In this sense, role assignment helps 
an individual to define a sense of who they are and how they may contribute to group unity 
(Brown, 2000, 72). In turn, the best leader may be someone who can organize the group‟s 
activities while remaining responsive to the views and feelings of its members (Brown, 2000, 
96). However, while MEPs may often defer to leaders and other policy experts, there is no 
guarantee that in the absence of constant communication by group leaders that a sufficient 
majority will support the group line on every report. Even in the most cohesive group, the 
slightest number of dissenting MEPs can contribute to the defeat of the group‟s plenary agenda 
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and possibly jeopardize its plenary reputation. In this sense, the difference between eighty-five 
and ninety percent cohesion may determine the fate of the group line and impact the group‟s 
plenary reputation. Accordingly, party group leadership positions should be assigned specific 
responsibilities and develop a wide array of dissent management tactics. 
       For example, group coordinators and rapporteurs in most groups build support for the group 
line at every legislative stage and group members often look to these leadership positions for 
voting guidance particularly when a report originates from a committee outside of their purview. 
As Ringe (2010) noted, “the official party line of a given proposal is the end result of this 
information distribution process, acting as a series of information filters” and “the two 
(coordinators and rapporteurs) tend to work in tandem and jointly lead their party groups through 
the decision-making process” (Ringe, 2010, 58-59).  
       The response below from a coordinator further underscores the variety of dissent 
management tactics employed but also emphasizes the collaborative aspect of leadership in that 
if support for the group line is to be secured, the coordinator must not only appeal to members 
but also work with the rapporteur and other leaders to resolve disputes before advancing the 
group line to the next stage in the decision-making process. This is particularly evident in the 
larger groups at the working group level where the vice-president becomes involved. 
“Of course, I try to convince them to follow the group line…In some cases, when there are really 
possibilities that maybe a shadow rapporteur has a certain view and the others don‟t follow this 
view, then I ask for votes (among our group members on the committees) and if the shadow 
rapporteur is over-ruled I say that the majority line should be another view…In some cases, I 
even allow free votes, but I try to keep free votes very low because free votes mean you don‟t 
know how everyone is going to vote”. (June 25, 2012) 
 
ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE GROUP PRESIDENT 
        The contributions by coordinators and rapporteurs to group unity are well-documented in 
the literature (See Ringe 2010, Yashinaka et al. 2010). In contrast, we know very little about the 
198 
 
roles of group presidents and vice-presidents. However, we do have insight into their general 
responsibilities. Party group presidents represent the group in key plenary debates, media 
availability, and preside over party group meetings. In addition, the Conference of Presidents 
serves as an important weekly forum for group presidents to air concerns, bridge differences, and 
for some, to plan how best to protect the institutional integrity of the European Parliament
7
.  
       Whether in the Conference of Presidents, in plenary, or press availability, group presidents 
wear many hats: from group spokesperson to defender of institutional interests, from partisan 
advocate to consensus-builder. To better understand the role of the group president, MEPs and 
staff were asked the open-ended question of what made their group president(s) an effective 
leader. Presidents (or Co-Presidents) were identified by name in order to ascertain perceptions 
about individual presidents and to determine whether the perceived attributes of an effective 
president could be identified across groups. I also identified presidents by name because three 
groups (ECR, GUE and S & D) changed presidents between the two phases of research.  
       Give the literature and my interpretation of what constitutes effective dissent management 
skills (See Chapter Four), I anticipated that respondents would cite four qualities when 
evaluating their president‟s effectiveness: previous experience in the European Parliament, 
previous national leadership experience, ability to convey and re-enforce shared group beliefs, 
skill in forging consensus or otherwise state that their president was not an effective leader.  
H1: ALDE respondents will be more likely to refer to the group president‟s experience at the 
national government/political level than those from other party groups. 
 
       Before observing ALDE group meetings or conducting interviews, I assumed that ALDE 
respondents would reference Guy Verhofstadt‟s experience as a former Belgian Prime Minister 
                                                          
7 Formally, the Conference of Presidents consists of the seven group presidents and the President of the European 
Parliament and is responsible for drafting the parliamentary agenda and submitting proposals to the parliamentary 




which I believed contributed to his election as group president upon his first day of service in the 
parliament in August 2009. However, I also hoped that interview responses and observations 
would identify specific attributes of this service in other group presidents thereby indicating how 
national governmental experience contributed to the effectiveness of all group presidents.  
H2: Respondents from more influential party groups will be more likely to reference the previous 
European Parliament experience of group presidents in their assessment of effectiveness. 
 
       High plenary influence should encourage group members to elect presidents whom they 
believe are the best prepared to maintain that level of influence. In turn, previous experience as a 
group vice-president or as a coordinator/rapporteur should be viewed as a positive and necessary 
attribute of an effective group president. Influential party groups will have incentive to ensure 
that their leader can not only help to attain low dissent levels (vice-president or coordinator) but 
also have the experience of building cross-party group coalitions (rapporteur).  
H3: Respondents from more influential groups will be more likely to cite consensus-building 
skills when assessing the effectiveness of a group president. 
 
       A highly cohesive group is necessary to secure the group‟s goals in plenary and in turn 
respondents from influential party groups should also equate consensus-building skills with an 
effective group president. For example, if the working group or party group meeting is unable to 
identify a common line, then the group president may need to offer mediation or act as an arbiter. 
Presidents may differ in their approaches, but presidents in influential party groups should be 
skilled in finding common ground or ensuring minimal levels of dissent expression. 
H4: Respondents from less influential party groups will be more likely to contend that their 
group president is not an effective leader. 
 
       With lower plenary stakes, group presidents will have less incentive to become involved in 
building consensus or in managing dissent. The lack of presidential engagement in consensus-
building does not necessarily equate with higher dissent levels, but members from less influential 
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groups should be more likely to view their group presidents as ineffective as they assess both the 
group‟s plenary influence and their perception of little importance for group unity.  
H5: Respondents from larger and more influential party groups will be more likely to identify an 
ability to convey shared beliefs as an attribute of an effective group president. 
 
       Leaders of larger and influential party groups have more incentive to encourage the adoption 
of shared beliefs through socialization in order to help alleviate the logistical challenges 
associated with ensuring maximum support for the group line (See Kam 2002). Presidents of 
influential groups will similarly refer to shared beliefs and in particular the shared group identity 
in group forums and plenary debates in order to re-enforce a sense among members that 
everyone has a stake in developing the group line and in the group‟s plenary success.  
H6: Respondents who hold elite positions will be more likely than respondents from other group 
positions to cite a president‟s consensus-building skills.  
 
       The combination of greater responsibility and familiarity with consensus-building should be 
reflected in the responses of those who are elites among group leadership and staff. In turn, those 
who hold responsibility for pursuing consensus on reports should be more likely to cite 
consensus-building as an attribute of an effective group president. In contrast respondents not 
responsible for negotiations with national delegations or with dissenting members should be less 
likely to view consensus-building as an important attribute of an effective group president. 
H7: Respondents from countries with higher positive perceptions of EU membership will be 
more likely to cite shared beliefs as an attribute of an effective group president. 
 
       If respondents represent countries with higher public positive perceptions of EU membership 
they should be more likely to view party group membership as a vehicle for accomplishing 
shared goals and in turn will be more likely to elect a group president who will be effective in 
articulating shared group beliefs and in turn a shared group identity. In contrast, those 
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respondents from countries with higher negative perceptions of EU membership will be less 
likely to cite shared beliefs as they will have less incentive to identify with the group. 
H8: Respondents with more years of service in the European Parliament will be more likely to 
cite shared beliefs and consensus-building as attributes of an effective group president. 
 
       With more years of service in the European Parliament, respondents will have had more 
exposure to group level socialization processes and acquired greater familiarity with the group‟s 
decision-making process. In turn, they will be more likely to closely identify with the group and 
draw from greater experience when evaluating the effectiveness of the group president. In 
contrast, respondents with fewer years of service in the parliament will be less likely to closely 
identify with the group and will have less familiarity with the role of the group president. 
  
Note: Figure depicts the frequency for which each response was offered. Number of Cases: 120. Multiple 
Responses were permitted.  
       All eighty-four respondents answered the question with some offering multiple explanations 
for why their group president was an effective leader. As depicted above in Figure 6.1, forty-five 
percent of responses cited the president‟s ability to convey and re-enforce shared group beliefs. 
























Figure 6.1: What Makes the Party Group 
President An Effective Leader 
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articulates the group‟s shared vision in group meetings. Nearly thirty percent of responses noted 
the ability to forge consensus within the group made the president an effective leader. 
Consensus-building efforts consist of the group president identifying a common line when one is 
lacking but more often building support for the existing group line. Less than twenty percent of 
responses cited national political experience as the explanation for why the group president was 
effective while fewer than ten percent cited previous European Parliament experience.  
       According to Bailer et al. (2009), national and European leadership experience instills skills 
such as identifying and securing compromises or influencing colleagues‟ voting behavior (Bailer 
et al. 2009, 359). Most ALDE respondents cited such skills when referencing Verhofstadt‟s 
experience as Prime Minister of Belgium. Nonetheless, most responses appear to suggest that 
members expect that the group president will understand and have experience with the legislative 
process and in turn identify other attributes of an effective group president.  
       Finally, fewer than five percent of respondents did not believe their party group president 
was an effective leader. The elite-heavy nature of the field study may partly explain the rarity of 
this response and the small number of responses is insufficient to indicate what contributes to the 
perception of ineffectiveness. Moreover, many of these responses reflect strong personal 
misgivings about individual leaders and accordingly are not cited otherwise respondent 
anonymity may be placed in jeopardy despite the lack of attribution. 
       Table 6.1 below depicts Cramér's V scores as a measure of strength of association between 
respondent characteristics and the likelihood of offering each response. Statistical significant 
relationships occurred at the .001 and .05 levels respectfully between a respondent‟s party group 
membership and the likelihood of offering a response that national political experience or the 
ability to achieve consensus within the group defines the effectiveness of a group president.  
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TABLE 6.1: PREDICTORS OF EFFECTIVE PARTY GROUP PRESIDENT RESPONSES 
Variable     Group Beliefs  National Experience   EP Experience  Build Consensus  Not Effective 
Party Group      0.3404        0.6844***             0.2953                0.4214*               0.2720 
Group Position     0.2450        0.3584          0.2195          0.2794                 0.1342 
Member-State      0.4543        0.5848                   0.3823                0.5468                 0.3727 
Gender                -0.0804        0.1132                   0.0795               -0.1291                 0.0548 
Years in EP          0.3860        0.3949                   0.4882                0.3311                 0.3875 
Profession      0.4077        0.4398                   0.3438                0.4460                 0.4867 
(N of Cases)      (54)              (21)                     (8)                       (33)                     (4)      
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores measuring strength of association. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance on the .05, .01, and .001 levels respectfully. Number of cases associated with each response 
appears in parentheses on the last line of the table. N of Cases: 120. Multiple explanations were permitted.  
 
       I believe conveying shared beliefs is the most common response yet does not incur a 
statistically significant relationship with any respondent characteristic because the response 
category is broadly defined. For example, conveying shared beliefs encompasses the efforts of 
presidents in the more cohesive groups to urge all members to support the group line yet also the 
practice of reminding members in less cohesive groups of shared views yet within an 
understanding that frequent dissent is acceptable. When responses are framed according to party 
group membership in Table 6.2 below, contrary to expectations, conveying shared beliefs was 
the most frequently cited trait of an effective group president by respondents from the three 
smallest party groups though this response was also offered by a majority of respondents in the 
three of the four largest party groups.   
TABLE 6.2: RESPONSES ACCORDING TO PARTY GROUP AFFILIATION 
RESPONSES  ALDE      ECR      EFD    EPP    GREENS  GUE    S & D  
Group Beliefs  .44             .89        1.0       .69       .64           .75          .53     
National Experience   .67             .11           0       .06       .64              0             0 
EP Experience     0       .11           0       .13       .09              0          .24 
Build Consensus         .44             .11           0       .38       .18           .63          .65 
Not Effective              .11                0           0       .13          0              0             0 
(N of Cases)  (18)             (9)        (5)     (16)       (11)           (8)       (17) 
Note: Entries are percentage of respondents within each party group who offered each response. Last row 
depicts number of respondents per party group. N of Cases: 120. Multiple responses were permitted. 
 
       Previous national political experience was most commonly offered by ALDE respondents 
noting Verhofstadt‟s previous service as Belgian prime minister and by Greens/EFA respondents 
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who frequently noted Cohn-Bendit‟s leadership of the student movement in France in 1968 or 
Harms‟ experience in regional government in Germany. In turn, a closer inspection of responses 
reveals that respondents from the more cohesive party groups tend to broadly define shared 
beliefs to include a shared group identity, whereas those from less cohesive groups tend to more 
strictly define the response in terms of the degree to which members share policy preferences.  
       These contrasting approaches in turn underscore differently perceived roles for group 
presidents. Whereas respondents from the more cohesive groups tend to expect their presidents 
to emphasize the individual‟s connection with group membership in their appeals for support of 
the group line, those from less cohesive groups tend to expect their presidents to reiterate the 
agreement reached by a majority of members while emphasizing that the group line need not be 
adopted by all in the group. This suggests that group cohesion should be more broadly defined to 
encompass a cohesive group identity as well as cohesive voting patterns (See Brown 2000). 
“I think he is strong in the way he explains the reasons why we should be united….that doesn‟t 
make him the leader that everybody loves, because if you have to be strong and tough, members 
feel they don‟t have the freedom to vote as they want, according to national positions, but of 
course that‟s precisely the idea. You work in a European group and not in a national party, so 
you have to forget about your national party line and have a group line and that what he always 
tries to do. So, I think in this respect he is an effective leader”. (October 5, 2011)  
 
       Presidents from the more cohesive groups are more likely to call upon members to support 
the group line in that the group‟s success is more important than any policy objection they may 
hold. In turn, the perceived responsibility of the president in these groups is to remind members 
that the shared values and goals that bind members to one another are at-stake in plenary votes. 
The president in most groups may normally leave direct lobbying to other leaders, but helps to 
secure support for the common line by appealing to the group as a whole on the basis of shared 
beliefs or to appeal to a sense of loyalty to the group by requesting that they dissent at a less 
costly level. In other words, while the group president may not be perceived to bear the primary 
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responsibility for building group unity, most respondents recognize the opportunity afforded to 
group presidents to appeal for widespread support of the group line in their role as chair of group 
meetings and as primary public spokespersons for the group.  
       The ability to convey shared beliefs was also cited by all EFD respondents as the defining 
attribute of an effective group president though the responses and my observations indicate that 
while the co-presidents divide responsibilities neither appears to be engaged in any form of 
dissent management. In this sense, conveying shared beliefs refers to the reiteration of shared 
attitudes on integration and other policy areas but not in urging members to pursue any particular 
voting behavior in plenary. In turn, while a shared EFD group identity exists to some degree it is 
not cultivated by group leaders including the co-presidents.   
“Well, it works in a way that is very pragmatic I would say. If one has to be away, the other can 
chair the group meetings. Anything having to do with public communication, it is mostly Nigel 
Farage who is representing the group. When it comes to more internal affairs, that is the Council 
of Presidents and how to set the agenda for the plenary and things like that it is mostly Speroni 
who goes. They have at least a week-to-week discussion on who does what and I think it has 
worked quite reasonably”. (October 13, 2011) 
 
       Meanwhile, the frequency of respondents from influential party groups offering the response 
of consensus-building did not occur to the anticipated extent in that while S & D respondents 
frequently cited consensus-building, they were joined in this assessment by a similar percentage 
of GUE respondents but not by a majority of respondents in the other influential groups. 
However, if the ALDE national leadership responses are included, the gap between expectations 
and actual results is closed considerably in that responses citing Verhofstadt‟s previous 
experience as prime minister stressed his consensus-building skills. In contrast, GUE 
respondents tended to underscore the responsibility of the group president to ensure equal 
participation in group forum discussions and to respect the divisions that occur within the group 
when citing consensus-building as an attribute of effective presidents.  
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“The role of the president is important in the group. He must provide the collegium and the unity 
at the same time, which is very difficult when you have two hundred sixty-five members, 
twenty-six counties, and more than fifty parties. The organization of the group is very clear, there 
are different levels of responsibility which help to manage the group, but even if there are 
coordinators and leaders in the working groups, sometimes you cannot find a compromise at 
these levels and then it is necessary that somebody will take the decision. This is the role of Daul 
in the organization of the group. He also has other responsibilities like representing the opinions 
and positions of the group which are very important”. (November 9, 2011)  
 
       As the response above emphasizes, leading a large group requires a president to preside over 
an extensive communication network. Normally, the EPP or S & D leadership structure identifies 
and secures consensus prior to the party group meeting, which in turn on the whole acts as a 
forum to affirm the group line rather than one for defining consensus. However, when a working 
group is deadlocked or when dissent arises outside of the working group, the group president 
may be called upon to lead negotiations and to take a more assertive role in the group meeting.  
“Well, this is my personal opinion, but an effective group leader would be an effective big 
coordinator. An effective leader can bring all of the differences between the different delegations 
under one position which can be acceptable to everyone. A good group leader takes into 
consideration the positions of small countries but also considers the clout of big countries. A 
good group leader can convince different delegations and MEPs that we are here to compromise 
and that Europe is about give and take”. (June 27, 2012) 
 
       In the three most cohesive groups (EPP, Greens/EFA and S & D), an effective group 
president is assessed in part according to the skill of communicating with other leaders, policy 
experts, and national delegations in securing minimal dissent or as the response above described 
the role as a “big coordinator” When the group is deadlocked or when a consensus has not been 
identified prior to a group meeting, the group president is uniquely positioned as the person 
chairing the meeting to identify and communicate a potential consensus. This requires the skill to 
not only listen but also to identify the key elements of a potential compromise.  
“He is a very talented and skilled and most of all an experienced leader being a former Prime 
Minister of Belgium in that the whole country is a compromise in a sense. He‟s got good routines 
when it comes to finding a common position even though the initial positions can be quite far 
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from one another. He is very good at seeing where we have the very smallest common 
denominator and being able to find a compromise.” (October 26, 2011)  
 
         ALDE respondents were more likely to assign primary consensus-building responsibility to 
the president. In my observations of group meetings, Verhofstadt often identified consensus 
where none seemed to be apparent or successfully advocated for the group line despite initial 
intense objections within the group. Consensus-building meanwhile is interpreted differently by 
respondents in the less cohesive groups. In the GUE, when a delegation or a member deviates 
from the rapporteur‟s position or the view of the majority, there is little or no effort to convince 
them to support the majority position or to express dissent at a less costly level. GUE group 
presidents are in turn viewed as effective when they are able to convince a majority within the 
group to support a given position but yet are expected to accept frequent dissent.  
“We have a different nature from the other European parliamentary groups. We are a confederal 
group, so the role of the President, and I think he does it very well, is to balance the different 
positions in the group and try to keep the union on all the common positions, which are the 
majority, but we don‟t have a discipline of vote, as all the delegations have the freedom to vote 
one way or the other depending on their positions…so I think he tries to keep that balance 
between keeping us united and also to respect the differences”. (October 27, 2011)  
 
       The confederal organization of the group influences the shared group identity in the sense 
that maintaining the unity of the group is measured by keeping national parties in the group and 
not by ensuring that a maximum number of members support a common line. In my observations 
of group meetings, President Zimmer would often advocate a common line (at times to abstain as 
a group) while always noting that no member or delegation was bound to support any line. In this 
sense, her efforts are restricted by both the confederal organization of the group and the group 
culture that does not positively view efforts to secure voting discipline.  
DETERMINING WHEN TO INTERVENE 
       When should the group president defer to others to build consensus and when should they 
intervene to ensure that the maximum number of members support the group line or that dissent 
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is expressed at less costly levels? I asked the question of when the group president(s) become 
involved in ensuring that the group is unified. In turn, I anticipated four responses: the group 
president is never involved in building group unity, the president is involved only when 
prominent reports are at-stake, the president is involved when the party group meeting or 
working group is deadlocked, and the president is always involved in building unity.  
H1: Respondents from more influential party groups will be more likely to contend that the 
group president is involved in building unity only when party group meetings are deadlocked. 
 
       With higher legislative stakes in terms of plenary outcomes and reputation, presidents of 
influential party groups will have more incentive to address dissent or to break the deadlock that 
may occur in party group meetings. Whereas presidents of less influential party groups will be 
more willing to let dissent raised in group meetings go unanswered or to accept that no group 
line can be formed, presidents of more influential groups will in most circumstances address 
dissent in group meetings or ensure that the meeting produces a group line. 
H2: Respondents from less influential party groups will be more likely to maintain that the group 
president is never involved in building party group unity. 
 
       With little or no influence upon plenary outcomes, group presidents have little incentive to 
ensure that the group is unified in plenary voting. Accordingly, they will not take on any dissent 
management responsibilities and assume more of a ceremonial role. In contrast, presidents from 
more influential groups should be involved in ensuring group unity to some degree. 
H3: Respondents from more influential party groups will be more likely to maintain that 
presidents are active in dissent management only on prominent reports or always involved. 
 
       Plenary influence should provide incentive to group presidents to ensure that an optimal 
number of members support the group line on prominent reports. While plenary losses or higher 
than expected dissent levels on most reports should not be welcomed, much higher costs are 
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associated with dissent on prominent reports. In turn, presidents of influential party groups 
should always be engaged when prominent reports are at-stake. 
H4: Respondents who are coordinators, rank-and-file group members, or staff will be more likely 
than other respondents to cite the president‟s efforts to build group unity in party group meetings. 
 
       Whereas, respondents who are group vice-presidents or secretary-generals are more likely to 
work with or observe the president‟s efforts to build group unity in a variety of forums, 
respondents who are lower in the membership or staff hierarchy will be more likely to only 
observe the president‟s contributions (if any) to group unity during party group meetings. In turn, 
rank-and-file members and staff will be more likely to associate the president‟s role of presiding 
over group meetings with any efforts to build unity within the group.  
H5: Respondents with more years of service in the European Parliament will be more likely to 
identify the party group president‟s contributions to building unity on prominent reports. 
 
       Increased exposure to group organizational and socialization processes should lead 
respondents to contend that the group president is only involved in building unity when 
prominent reports are at-stake, whereas those with less exposure will be more likely to assume 
that the group president is always involved in building group unity due to the assumed 
responsibilities associated with representing the entire group.  
H6: Respondents from member-states with a strong or moderate positive public view of the EU 
will be more likely to cite the president‟s role in building unity in party group meetings.  
 
       Respondents from member-states with a positive public view of the EU will have more 
incentive to strongly identify with the party group. In turn, respondents should view the party 
group meetings as valuable forums that provide opportunities to contribute to the development 
and produce consensus on the group line. As these meetings are chaired by group presidents, 
respondents from these member-states should be more likely to positively view the contributions 
of presidents than those from member-states with a more negative public view of the EU. 
210 
 
       As depicted below in Figure 6.2, all but five respondents answered the question and unlike 
the previous question, respondents did not offer multiple explanations but instead were specific 
as to the point to when the group president became involved in building unity. An unanticipated 
fifth response maintaining that the group president was only involved when the group 
bureau/presidency is deadlocked was offered by five percent of respondents.
8
 Forty-five percent 
of respondents indicated that presidents were only involved in building group unity when 
prominent reports were at-stake. In these instances, presidents are expected to make appeals in 
group meetings, leadership forums, and if necessary in meetings with individual MEPs and 
national delegations. In contrast, when prominent reports are not at-stake, the group president is 
expected to rely on other leaders and act more as a cheerleader rather than as an arbiter. 
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents offering each response. N of Cases: 79  
       However, twenty percent of respondents maintained that their group president was involved 
in building unity on all reports. For these respondents, group unity is more readily attained if the 
                                                          
8 The bureau normally consists of the group president, vice-presidents, the secretary-general, coordinators and 
national delegation leaders. The ALDE and S& D have a separate forum known as the presidency which excludes 































group president takes the lead on securing support from dissenting or undecided members. 
Eighteen percent of respondents noted that the group president was involved in building group 
unity only when party group meetings are deadlocked. In turn, the group president is expected to: 
identify consensus derived from deliberations, secure support for the pre-existing group line, or 
to propose a group line when one is not apparent. Eleven percent of respondents did not perceive 
the group president as having any role in building group unity. According to this perception, the 
president‟s primary role is not to manage dissent or build consensus but rather to (1) preside over 
group meetings in order to ensure equal opportunity for all members to contribute to discussions 
and (2) represent the group in plenary debates, Conference of Presidents and other forums.  
TABLE 6.3: PREDICTORS OF GROUP PRESIDENT INVOLVEMENT           
Party Group     0.4460***             
Group Position    0.2670            
Member-State     0.4341            
Gender                0.2478              
Years of Service 0.4634            
Profession     0.4907***               
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores measuring strength of association. . *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance on the .05, .01, and .001 levels respectfully. N of Cases: 79 
 
         When considering the relationship between respondent characteristics and the likelihood of 
offering each of the five responses, party group membership and the previous profession of 
respondents achieved both high statistical and substantive significance. As Table 6.4 below 
indicates, respondents who had previous leadership experience or had served in elected or party 
office were more likely to maintain that group presidents are involved in building group unity 
only on prominent reports. This suggests that previous leadership responsibility and acquaintance 
with the legislative process may lead respondents to associate the party leader‟s involvement in 
building unity only on high profile reports and otherwise defer to other leaders to manage 
dissent. In contrast, respondents with previous staff backgrounds in national parliaments or 
parties or at the EU level were nearly evenly split among response categories.  
212 
 
TABLE 6.4: GROUP PRESIDENT INVOLVEMENT AND PREVIOUS PROFESSION 
Professions                   Never   Prominent Reports   Group Meeting   Bureau   All Reports    N    
Leadership              0.05     0.55              0.18    0.04       0.18              22 
Elected/Office              0.09     0.41              0.27    0       0.23              22 
Staff               0.25        0.30                         0.20                   0              0.25              20 
Private Sector              0.75        0.25                         0                        0              0                      4 
Education/Student       0.33        0.17                         0.33                   0.17         0                      6 
Unknown                     0.20        0.40                         0                        0.20         0.20                 5 
(N of Cases)    (9)         (35)                          (14)                     (5)         (16)               79 
Note: Entries are percentages of responses according to respondent‟s previous profession of when the 
group president becomes involved in building group unity. N of Cases: 79. Cramér's V (0.4907) *** 
 
       As depicted in Table 6.5 below, expectations regarding the hypothesized relationship 
between party group membership and the likelihood of offering particular responses to the 
question of when the group president becomes involved in building unity were largely met. 
However, the high frequency of responses referencing prominent reports across most party 
groups was unexpected. This indicates that aside from the least cohesive group (EFD) and the 
ALDE (whose leader is more visibly engaged on all reports) most group presidents relegate their 
consensus-building roles to prominent reports in order to maximize their influence and limit their 
involvement for situations when the plenary stakes are at their highest.  
TABLE 6.5: GROUP PRESIDENT INVOLVEMENT AND PARTY GROUP AFFILIATION 
Responses  ALDE    ECR      EFD    EPP    GREENS    GUE    S & D    N 
Never      0           .11        1.0        .07          .20             0           0          9 
Prominent Reports   .18           .78           0        .60          .30          1.0        .37        35 
Group Meetings .23     .11           0        .27          .20             0        .19        14 
Bureau Deadlocked    .06              0           0        .06             0             0        .19          5 
All Reports              .53              0           0           0          .30    0        .25        16 
(N of Cases)   (17)          (9)         (5)       (15)        (10)           (7)      (16)     79 
Note: Entries are percentages of responses according to party group affiliation. Number of respondents 
per party group appears on the last line of the table. N of Cases: 79.  Cramér's V (0.446) *** 
 
       In addition, respondents from the more influential party groups were more likely to maintain 
that presidents become involved in building group unity when party group meetings are 
deadlocked. These responses also at times revealed the impact of party group size in that 
respondents from the two largest groups often referenced the role of horizontal working group 
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meetings in building support for the group line. In turn, when working group meetings are 
deadlocked or when there is dissent in the party group meeting, the group president is more 
likely to become involved in consensus-building whereas they are likely to otherwise defer to 
vice-presidents and the rapporteur to argue for the group line. 
       While every EFD respondent maintained that the group co-presidents were never involved in 
building group unity, ECR and GUE respondents defied expectations by contending in large 
numbers that the group president was involved in building group unity on prominent reports 
which indicates a higher priority on plenary unity compared to the EFD at least when the plenary 
stakes are at their greatest. However, unlike respondents from the more cohesive groups, ECR 
and GUE respondents do not associate an importance of group unity with the president‟s 
advocacy for a group line on prominent reports to any significant degree.  
       ALDE respondents were more likely than those from any other party group to identify the 
group president as the primary leader responsible for building group unity. Most ALDE 
respondents noted the skill at which Verhofstadt identified consensus when it was not evident in 
group meetings or in proposing a common line in group meetings when none existed.       
“In general, what makes him a good leader is that he has the ability to listen. For example, in the 
beginning of my career in the European Parliament, we had a big discussion on something and 
there were opposing opinions in the group and we discussed for three hours, and he listened and 
let everybody tell what they want to have as this group line and he made a decision that 
everybody thought was perfect, because his proposal was kind of a compromise proposal. It 
wasn‟t the right or the left side of our group, but something everybody could feel comfortable 
with and besides he let us discuss for such a long time…” (June 21, 2012)  
 
       I witnessed similar efforts by Verhofstadt in group meetings who after a lengthy debate 
when no consensus seemed evident made a proposal supported by most or all members. On other 
occasions, Verhofstadt suggested a free vote by members was in order thereby underling the 
importance for a group president to know when to propose or urge support for a group line.  
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“Maybe about a year ago, we had a debate about criticizing Berlusconi‟s hold of the media. So, 
we discussed it in our group meeting and we all agreed to vote the critical Berlusconi line. We 
then had the vote in parliament and it lost by one vote and we were all mystified because we had 
done the calculations and we thought we would win it. We found that our three Irish members 
had switched sides after our meeting. They didn‟t think it would matter, but it made all the 
difference. So in the following evening‟s group meeting, Verhofstadt made sure the Irish 
members were there and said we had an agreement in our meeting and you three voted against it. 
Would you like to explain in front of the whole group why you did that? In the end, Verhofstadt 
said we have done this, so let‟s go on to the next item, but it was a masterful performance. I said 
to him after afterwards that I was very impressed by that trick. He said unfortunately you can‟t 
do it often, because if you do it too often, it loses its effectiveness”. (October 26, 2011)  
 
       Knowing when to become involved in building group unity is a key skill for any leader. The 
response above highlights the skills honed by Verhofstadt as a former Belgian prime minister in 
not only building coalitions but in maintaining discipline within the coalition or in this case the 
party group. If a group president were to call members out on their dissenting votes in every 
party group meeting, the tactic would lose its effectiveness and a backlash might occur. 
However, if done sparingly, it may help to secure unity on future votes and re-enforce group 
norms governing dissent (alerting the group ahead of time).  
       Apart from ALDE respondents, Greens/EFA members were the most likely to reference the 
role of their co-presidents in building group unity. Having co-presidents enables one to chair 
meetings while the other lobbies members off to the side during the meeting as I witnessed on 
occasion. The Greens/EFA further differentiate themselves from other groups in that a majority 
of members and even staff take part in group meeting discussions. In turn, some respondents 
may believe that co-presidents are involved in building unity on all reports, because they 
regularly participate in group discussions. Similarly, other respondents may identify the role of 
co-presidents in building unity with only prominent reports, because it is on these occasions that 
the co-presidents act more as advocates in the group meetings rather than as individual 
participants or as facilitators of consensus. 
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“They are extremely different people. I would say that it is partly a national thing and partly a 
personal thing. Danny just does it by sheer charisma and clout within the parliament and within 
Europe as a whole saying this is the line for me and I need your vote and he will do that only 
very sparingly. He will only do it if the foundations of the Union are coming into play, with the 
compact, or a proposal for a new treaty change. Rebecca basically keeps to the things she knows 
a lot about: energy policy, environmental policy, some human rights cases”. (June 14, 2012)  
 
       In contrast, group presidents from the least influential party groups take the lead consensus-
building role in far fewer instances. Consequently, the group president is expected to be involved 
in building group unity only when there is a perceived opportunity to impact plenary outcomes 
(which is less common for these groups) or in terms of core group beliefs being at stake. 
Nonetheless, even in such situations, the group president is expected to honor norms governing 
dissent in that consensus is not pursued at the cost of separate lines by national delegations.  
”Well, she has a very difficult job. We have a confederal character in our group which means she 
has to try to see the consensus coming. She can‟t do that in a way that she is depriving the people 
of their opinion, but she gives the floor to the parties and her job is to see if the majority…we 
don‟t use that word majority…the consensus is there. If there isn‟t any consensus, then she says 
that‟s ok, we know we have that confederal character and everyone can do what they want to do. 
Of course, even if there is a consensus, someone can vote differently”. (June 27, 2012)  
 
       Though the group culture is more conducive to building support for a common line, the 
presidents of the larger and more influential party groups are similarly perceived to relegate their 
consensus-building roles to prominent reports. The key difference with the GUE being that 
dissent is managed by other leaders on nearly all reports. In turn, EPP and S & D group 
presidents may in part be perceived as being involved in building group unity only when 
prominent reports are at stake because they are expected to work with other group leaders in a 
whip structure assigning particular roles and cues for involvement (vice-presidents in working 
groups, etc.). Otherwise, the group president is expected to utilize opportunities as chair of the 
group meeting to re-enforce the group identity and the appeals of other leaders. 
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       As the leader of the largest and most influential party group, the EPP president has 
enormous responsibility to ensure the group‟s legislative objectives are reflected in plenary 
outcomes. This requires a unified group and constant communication within a hierarchical 
structure managing consensus among twenty-six national delegations (many of which are 
national governing parties) and over two hundred-seventy members.  
“I remember one important example. One cornerstone of this six-pack economic package was to 
give the right to the Commission to enter automatically into punitive measures if a member-state 
does not conform with what is contained within the package, keeping the rate of inflation down, 
keep the deficit below three percent, and a number of issues. In our group, the French delegation 
was going to vote differently and this was going to be lost. Having the entire package to be lost 
would have tremendous consequences…there were behind the scenes efforts, not only with the 
members of the French delegation but also with Sarkozy directly. The French government agreed 
and the French members were liberated to vote along with the group. Mr. Daul played a key role, 
he made telephone calls, went to the Elyse Palace, and to the Germans”. (November 9, 2011) 
  
       The six-pack exemplifies when the EPP president should take the lead in building group 
unity. If the six-pack had not passed, its failure would have called into question the ability of the 
EPP to lead coalitions and deliver votes for prominent reports. This led Daul to negotiate with 
national leaders from his European party while assuming a more assertive role in building party 
group unity. This was reflected in appeals in group meetings, through negotiations with national 
delegations and at times in appeals to individual MEPs which culminated in ninety-eight percent 
cohesion or unanimity on each of the six-pack votes (www.votewatch.eu). Otherwise, most EPP 
respondents believed that the president should respect the group decision-making process. 
“He tries not to be involved in all of the issues because he respects the competence of the 
members…His philosophy is to rely very much on colleagues who are dealing with an issue, he 
believes they are the persons that should convince colleagues of the group to behave in a 
responsible way, to attend the meetings, to vote when they should vote, so he very much relies 
on that. When he sees that there could be a problem, then he uses his authority as chairman to 
make sure we avoid that”. (October 15, 2011)  
  
       Similarly, the S & D group president is expected to work with and rely upon a leadership 
structure to identify and ensure support for a common line. If a report is not regarded as crucial 
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because it concerns a social issue or a divisive foreign policy question, the group president may 
call for a free vote. However, if the report is perceived to be vital to group interests, the president 
may intervene in the bureau or in the group meeting.  
“So, Swoboda is chairing the group meeting, but he is not really interfering into business except 
when there are very crucial reports, and in this case he might call for a meeting of the respective 
coordinators and vice presidents in his office to coordinate a common position before the dossier 
is discussed in the group meeting. Like what we had with ACTA for instance”. (June 17, 2012)     
 
GROUP VICE-PRESIDENTS 
       To better understand the impact of group vice-presidents in dissent management, I asked 
respondents how vice-presidents in your group contribute to group unity. Group vice-presidents 
are often assigned as rapporteurs on prominent reports and may stand in for the group president 
in party group meetings, the Conference of Presidents, and in other forums. They are also often 
group spokespersons and in the three largest party groups, some are assigned as chairs of 
horizontal working groups. However, the dissent management role of group vice-presidents is 
undocumented. As effective dissent management requires a bridge in regards to communication 
between and coordination among between rapporteurs/coordinators and the group president, I 
expect vice-presidents in the more cohesive groups to take lead dissent management roles. In 
turn, I anticipated five potential responses: group vice-presidents are not assigned any 
responsibilities, vice-presidents are purely administrators, vice-presidents contribute to group 
unity by chairing working groups, vice-presidents coordinate consensus-building in group 
bureau/presidency meetings, and vice-presidents are active lobbyists on behalf of the group line 
throughout every stage of the legislative process.  
H1: Respondents from less influential party groups will be more likely to maintain that group 
vice-presidents have no responsibilities or are purely administrators.  
 
       Greater plenary influence should incentivize party groups to assign consensus-building and 
dissent management responsibilities to every member of the group leadership team including 
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vice-presidents. In contrast, party groups with little or no plenary influence will either treat vice-
president positions as awards for particular members or delegations with only ceremonial duties 
such as sitting in for the group president at certain events or meetings, or relegate responsibilities 
to administrative functions such as policy research and development. 
H2: Respondents from the more influential party groups will be more likely to maintain that 
group vice-presidents are active participants in dissent management efforts.  
 
       As a party group‟s level of plenary influence increases, the dissent management role of 
group vice-presidents should become more widespread. This will translate into active lobbying 
roles for group vice-presidents at every legislative stage whether in committees, group forums, or 
on an individual basis especially when prominent reports are at-stake. Vice-presidents in these 
groups will work with other leaders to identify and manage dissent in order to build consensus or 
ensure dissent is expressed at minimal levels. According to social identity theory, vice-presidents 
in these groups should also be agents of socialization as well as advocates for the group line.  
H3: Respondents from larger party groups will be more likely to maintain that group vice-
presidents manage dissent as chairs of working groups or in the group bureau/presidency. 
 
       Larger party groups have created horizontal working groups as forums where group 
members from committees with related policy portfolios can prepare the group line and assign 
responsibilities including rapporteurs and plenary speaking time. Vice-presidents in these groups 
chair horizontal working groups whereas the role is not applicable in the small and most of the 
medium-sized groups. In turn, larger party groups are more likely to rely in part on group vice-
presidents to build consensus in group bureau/presidency meetings. 
H4: Respondents who hold non-elite group positions will be more likely to maintain that group 
vice-presidents have no responsibilities or are merely administrators.  
 
       Rank-and-file members and staff are likely unaware of the full responsibilities of group vice-
presidents as most will only have contact with coordinators or rapporteurs unless they are 
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members of influential delegations or have expressed dissent on prominent reports. Otherwise, 
non-elite respondents are likely to not associate any dissent management responsibilities with 
group vice-presidents or only view them as administrators whereas elites will be more 
acquainted with these roles where applicable. 
H5: Respondents with more years of parliamentary service will be more likely to maintain that 
group vice-presidents are active in dissent management or reference their role in working groups.  
 
       With greater exposure to party group decision-making and socialization processes, 
respondents with more years of service in the European Parliament will be more likely to 
understand the responsibilities of group vice-presidents and associate a dissent management role 
with this position either in all instances or in specific forums as working groups where 
applicable. In contrast, fewer years of service will lead to less awareness and to less socialization 
in that members with fewer years of service will not closely identify with the group. 
H6: Respondents from member-states with strong pro-EU attitudes will be more likely to 
maintain that group vice-presidents are active participants in dissent management efforts.  
 
       More successful socialization efforts should lead to a shared conceptualization of the group 
identity facilitating support for the group line but also promotion of specific behavior including 
deferral to group leaders such as vice-presidents and associating these positions with the 
promotion of group unity. In this instance, representing or originating from a member-state with 
high levels of support for the EU should incentivize respondents to identify with the group, 
particularly the more cohesive groups which have strong pro-European integration identities.   
       Every respondent answered the question with ten offering multiple examples of how vice-
presidents contribute to group unity. As depicted below in Figure 6.3, nearly a third of responses 
stated that group vice-presidents solely or primarily contribute to group unity by chairing 
horizontal working groups. The three largest party groups (EPP, S & D, and ALDE) have 
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horizontal working groups chaired by group vice-presidents, whereas the Greens/EFA working 
groups are normally chaired by other members. Working groups provide a forum to resolve 
differences between group members across committees. When presiding over working groups, 
vice-presidents act as mediators and as „coordinators-in-chief‟ preparing the group line or 
advancing it to the group meeting where they join with other leaders in pursuing consensus. 
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents offering each response. Number of Cases: 94. Multiple 
Responses were permitted. 
 
       The second most commonly cited contribution of group vice-presidents was their role in 
pursuing consensus in the bureau or presidency. In these forums, group vice-presidents may 
advance a particular line or to secure a compromise before they and others advocate for the line 
in the group meeting. In contrast, fifteen percent of responses described vice-presidents primarily 
as administrators. Administrative responsibilities consist of: overseeing the secretariat, managing 
group finances, developing policy positions, as well as standing in for the president in group 
meetings or in the Conference of Presidents. Respondents citing administrative duties or no 


















Figure 6.3: Role of Group Vice-Presidents 
221 
 
       In turn, nineteen percent of respondents maintained that group vice-presidents have neither 
administrative nor dissent management responsibilities and are solely awards to specific 
members or national delegations. However, twelve percent of responses went a step further by 
maintaining that group vice-presidents actively lobby members to support the group line or 
express their dissent at less costly levels. For some respondents, this is a reference to the vice-
president serving as a group whip or parliamentary secretary. For others, it is indicative of a 
more active dissent management role: on prominent reports or at times on other reports whether 
by taking members aside during group meetings or meeting with them afterwards.  
       As depicted in Table 6.6 below, respondent‟s party group affiliation was the only 
characteristic to have both a substantive and statistically significant relationship with responses 
to the question of what role do group vice-presidents play in building party group unity, and only 
in regards to the first and third response options.  
TABLE 6.6: PREDICTORS OF GROUP VICE PRESIDENT ROLE RESPONSES          
Predictor             None          Administrative   Working Groups    Bureau      Actively Lobby     
Party Group      0.5637***     0.4998*             0.6804***           0.1857       0.2622 
Group Position   0.1515           0.1973               0.1902                 0.2139       0.2708                  
Member-State             0.3632           0.3763               0.5000                 0.3824       0.4456        
Gender                        0.0005          -0.0219              -0.0731                0.1698        0.2042 
Years of Service         0.3500           0.2866               0.3352                 0.5000        0.4533 
Previous Profession    0.4393           0.4473               0.3412                 0.3891        0.3721 
(N of Cases)                   (18)               (14)                   (30)                      (21)              (11) 
Note: Entries are Cramér's V measuring strength of association. *, ** and ***, denote statistical 
significance on the .05, .01 and .001 levels respectfully. The number of cases associated with each 
response appears in parentheses on the last line of the table. N of Cases: 94. Multiple responses permitted. 
 
       Members of less influential party groups as expected were more likely to maintain that vice-
presidents had no or only administrative responsibilities while members of the two largest party 
groups most frequently cited the vice-president‟s role of chairing working groups as the primary 
contribution to party group unity. Respondents who maintained that group vice-presidents are 
active lobbyists on behalf of the group line largely originated from the three most cohesive 
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groups (Greens/EFA, EPP, and S & D) with much of the rest coming from ECR respondents. 
Finally, responses citing the vice-presidents‟ contributions to group unity group bureau or 
presidency meetings largely came from S & D or Greens/EFA respondents.  
TABLE 6.7: VICE PRESIDENT RESPONSES AND PARTY GROUP AFFILIATION 
Response          ALDE      ECR    EFD     EPP    Greens    GUE    S&D    
No Responsibilities          0.11         0.55     0.60      0.06      0.18       0.72     0           
Administrative          0.50         0          0.20      0           0.18       0.14     0.06              
Chair Working Groups        0.17         0.11     0           0.75      0.09       0          0.77           
Group Bureau/Presidency   0.22          0.22    0.20      0.19      0.36       0.14     0.35           
Actively Lobby Members   0.06          0.22    0           0.13      0.27       0          0.18    
(N of Cases)            (18)          (9)     (5)          (16)       (11)     (8)        (17)          
Note: Entries are percentage of respondents within each party group who offered each response with the 
last line depicting respondents per party group.  N of Cases: 94. Multiple responses were permitted. 
 
       When ECR respondents discussed the contributions of group vice-presidents they largely 
were referring to the role of Ashley Fox as group whip and to a degree that of Timothy Kirkhope 
as (former) deputy chair and chair of the policy development group. The group does not have 
working groups and in turn, ECR vice-presidents (apart from Fox) do not have dissent 
management responsibilities. 
“I think it has to do with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of having a Whip. The person worrying this 
week about the votes for next week would be Ashley Fox on the leadership team. If you looking 
slightly further down the road it would be the Deputy Chairman, Timothy Kirkhope, who has 
responsibility for the Policy Development Group, which brings together the coordinators and the 
committee chairs and national delegation leaders and that tends to focus on particular areas 
where interest has been expressed or a need has been identified”. (September 23, 2011)  
 
      The ECR have established a leadership structure acting as an alert system identifying a 
common line in the long-term through the Policy Committee and addressing divisions in the 
short-term through the whip office. The final product is at times a common line advocating a 
position on reports or amendments or an agreement to abstain as a group though distinct national 
lines are possible, especially on the EU budget. With no working groups, finding consensus on 
the report at-hand begins at the committee level and ends at the group meeting which is the 
primary decision-making forum.  
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       In turn, this places an enormous burden on ECR rapporteurs and coordinators (who are often 
one of only two or three group members on a committee) and the whip to achieve consensus in 
the group meeting without the assistance of group vice-presidents. As chapter four outlined, 
these efforts are further undermined frequently by separate national lines on prominent reports 
and the norm of accepting national divisions unless consensus through a group line of abstain 
can be attained by the whip and others. However, as the parliament has progressed, group 
cohesion has increased which suggests that as this new group establishes a coherent identity and 
a more extensive whip structure buttressed by a stable presidency, cohesion may continue to rise. 
        Above all, I am surprised by the ALDE results in that contrary to expectations respondents 
from the second most influential party group on the whole maintained that their group vice-
presidents had only administrative or no responsibilities. On the other hand, this helps to explain 
the emphasis placed on the group president‟s consensus-building role by ALDE respondents and 
the gap between expected and actual cohesion.  
“Up till now, maybe besides Guy Verhofstadt, the most important one was Alexander Graf 
Lambsdorff. Only because he is the leader of our German delegation and he is quite experienced 
in working with policy…and so on, and so he is quite a broad-based politician so to say. That 
doesn‟t mean that the others are not, but he is very experienced”. (June 25, 2012)  
 
       Respondent perceptions of ALDE group vice-presidents in part reflect the poor regard 
members have toward horizontal working groups. If working groups are not viewed as useful 
instruments for ensuring group unity, then the dissent management role of vice-presidents in the 
larger groups will in turn likely be accorded less importance and members may not be as easily 
socialized into following norms of behavior (See Garner and Letki 2005). In turn, while ALDE 
party group meetings are viewed as vital forums for consensus-building and identifying the 
group line, ALDE vice-presidents (unless they are rapporteur) are not perceived to play 
important roles in these meetings.  
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       Another explanation for the high frequency of administrative responses is that particular 
group vice-presidents are afforded higher status by ALDE respondents. At the time of field 
research, Mr. Lambsdorff served as the deputy chair (the position was being phased out) along 
with his responsibilities as vice-president and as leader of one of the two largest delegations in 
the group (FDP from Germany). Many respondents considered him, the UK delegation chair 
(Fiona Hall) and the secretary-general to be the most influential in setting the group line with the 
greatest emphasis placed on the group president.  
“Verhofstadt has made the real decision-making the vice-presidency. So, he, and Lambsdorff, 
and Alexander Beels who is our secretary-general, and the rest tend to decide. They do inform 
the bureau and they inform the group, but actually the impetus seems to come from the vice-
presidency, the small group, whereas under Graham Watson the previous leader, he was much 
more consensual, he didn‟t want to take decisions on his own and left it to a bigger body, the 
bureau”. (October 26, 2011)  
 
       Respondents from the two largest party groups were more likely to reference the 
contributions of group vice-presidents as chairs of working groups or as the parliamentary 
secretary (whip) but were also more likely to perceive vice-presidents as active lobbyists for the 
group line. For example, as chairs of working groups, EPP vice-presidents manage dissent prior 
to the party group meeting where they are among the primary spokespersons for the group line.  
“Yes, we are persuading in the working groups, but sometimes if there is a difficult situation and 
we need a majority and there are some members that need to be convinced, I discuss this with 
them also in private meetings outside the working group. I explain why I think this should be the 
position, they explain their position, and then we reach a compromise, a common position at the 
end”. (November 5, 2011)  
 
       Vice-presidents in either of the two largest groups may call for a free vote in the working 
group and/or the group meeting when a report pertains to an issue where the group accepts 
divisions (social issues, nuclear energy, etc.). However, in most instances, the EPP or S & D 
pursue a common line which is formed at the committee level, molded at the working group 
level, and then adopted at the group meeting. At every stage of the legislative process, vice-
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presidents in the two largest groups try to resolve disputes by proposing amendments or reaching 
an agreement with members to dissent at a lower level such as by abstaining.  
        On the whole, responses from the most cohesive party group (Greens/EFA) mirror those of 
their counterparts in the two largest groups yet also reflect the group‟s size and culture. Vice-
presidents do not normally chair working groups which focus on specific policy areas rather than 
committees with related portfolios. This may lead some members to conclude that vice-
presidents serve a purely administrative function. However, Greens/EFA vice-presidents are 
viewed by a majority of respondents as active participants in securing support for a common line. 
“We have discussions about the group line and at times I ask to be recognized to address the 
point and urge members to support the group position. That includes me taking members aside 
during the meeting, where I listen to their concerns and try to reach an accommodation or make a 
final appeal on behalf of the group, but I have done that in group meetings very often. Usually, 
we solve it in the group meetings, or bilateral in the group meetings.” (June 4, 2012)  
 
       More than any other group, Greens/EFA members are actively engaged in discussions in the 
group meeting, both formally as well as informally in private conversations in the aisle or in the 
hallway as the response above mentions. Greens/EFA vice-presidents advocate for support of the 
group line yet also often participate in give-and-take with colleagues to re-shape the group line 
through additional amendments, or to produce consensus by agreements to abstain as a group.  
       In the least influential party groups, respondents maintained that group vice-presidents had 
no responsibilities or were mere administrators though some did reference their decision-making 
role in the group bureau. For example, EFD respondents reiterated that group unity is not 
important and that vice-presidents and other group leaders have no role to play in building group 
unity. The absence of administrative replies also reflects in part the EFD group having co-
presidents. This removes one role of vice-presidents: to fill in for the president as one co-
president can cover for the other in group meetings.  
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“I participate in the bureau meetings. We have a bureau that consists of the two presidents and 
the vice-presidents, and we take decisions on the staff of the group, we take decisions on the 
more long-term strategic interests, for instance on enlargements and applications and things like 
that which might be considered confidential and that‟s the primary role. There is also a public 
role to it in every time I speak on behalf of the group”. (October 13, 2011)  
 
       EFD vice-presidents do represent the group when they meet with the press and participate in 
plenary debates. Some vice-presidents also utilize their position as group coordinators to 
advocate policy goals as they are often the only group member on committees. In circumstances 
such as these, individual members can appeal to group colleagues to support their position on 
reports and a majority might be obtained. However, a group line is never presented at meetings 
thereby leaving vice-presidents to advocate for policy positions largely as individuals. 
       GUE respondents mirrored their EFD counterparts in mostly asserting that group vice-
presidents had no real responsibilities in building group unity. However, the responses differed 
in that they reflected an evolving view among some in the group that not only should vice-
presidents have greater responsibilities, but that the group should more actively pursue a 
common line even if it is to abstain as a group in plenary.  
“The vice presidents in our group have not played a very great role. It‟s not good. Rebecca is 
working on changing this. That‟s why she has meetings once a month after the group meeting 
where she informally invites the vice presidents to discuss different things, but it‟s not possible 
to take positions, because some people of the group think that this will be a new hierarchy…This 
is a problem in our group…It is very important that we retain some elements of our confederal 
character, but there must be ways of finding some common solutions, common positions, some 
common line”. (June 19, 2012) 
 
       As the response accentuates, GUE vice-presidents may meet to discuss reports, but they are 
not permitted under group rules to propose a common line at that meeting. Instead, they must 
individually either lobby delegations or advocate for a common line in the group meeting with 
the understanding that members and delegations are under no obligation to adopt a common line. 
Whether or not the current group president, Rebecca Zimmer, is successful in assigning greater 
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responsibilities to group vice-presidents will likely depend on whether the group culture evolves 
to embrace a group identity in which unity is valued over individual or delegation independence. 
GROUP VICE-PRESIDENTS AS WHIPS 
       We know very little about the role of party group whips. According to Bailer (2009) party 
group leaders issue voting instructions to their members via voting lists which are often referred 
to as the group whip (Bailer, 2009, 195). In turn, I propose that a group whip is necessary in the 
larger and medium-sized groups in order to overcome logistical challenges. Their responsibilities 
should consist of: coordinating dissent management efforts by other leaders, mediate disputes 
between delegations or members prior to the group meeting, advise the group president on 
dissent management, address dissent during group forums, or lobby members and delegations to 
support the group line in private discussions. 
       During initial interviews, respondents often contended that their group did not have a whip. 
However, when pressed to identify responsibility for coordinating the group line and 
constructing the voting list, respondents often identified the parliamentary secretary. This led me 
to ask how the group parliamentary secretary helps to build group unity. In turn, I anticipated 
five possible responses: the group does not have this position, the group whip is only responsible 
for constructing the voting lists, the group whip coordinates consensus-building efforts but does 
not lobby dissenting members, the whip lobbies members only on prominent reports, and the 
group whip lobbies members on all reports.  
H1: Large party groups will employ a group vice-president as a whip/parliamentary secretary in 
order to coordinate consensus-building and dissent management efforts. 
 
       The three largest party groups should require someone to coordinate consensus-building as 
well as dissent management efforts due to the sheer size of the group and number of reports. In 
this sense, they act both as an early alert system warning the group president and others of 
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potential dissent and as a facilitator of compromise among competing committees, working 
groups, and/or delegations. The smaller party groups meanwhile should not have a parliamentary 
secretary or whip as coordination is a simpler task with such small membership. 
H2: Respondents from influential party groups will be more likely to maintain that the 
parliamentary secretary helps to manage dissent only on prominent or on all reports. 
 
     With higher plenary stakes, party groups should not only employ a member of leadership to 
coordinate the development of the group  line an alert the group president and others of potential 
dissent but to assume greater responsibility by lobbying dissenting members or delegations on 
prominent reports or potentially all reports. In particular, given the stakes of prominent reports 
for influential party groups, there will be incentive to have someone address dissent in the 
working groups or in private meetings before involving the group president. 
H3: Respondents from medium-sized party groups will be more likely to maintain that the group 
whip is responsible only for constructing the voting lists and other administrative tasks. 
 
       Respondents from the ECR and Greens and possibly the ALDE should maintain that a group 
vice-president has been designated to be responsible for constructing the group lists that are 
passed out to members in plenary informing them of the group line or the occurrence of a free 
vote on each report or amendment. In turn, this position may also be utilized to either approve or 
coordinate the assignment of plenary speaking time. Otherwise, the position should not be 
responsible for coordinating consensus-building and dissent management efforts.  
H4: Respondents who do not hold elite or leadership positions within party groups will be more 
likely to maintain that the group does not have a whip or that it has only administrative tasks. 
 
      Respondents who are rank-and-file MEPs or staff should have less contact with group vice-
presidents and in particular those who serve as the group whip or parliamentary secretary. 
Instead, these members or staff should work more closely with delegation leaders, coordinators 
and the rapporteur when building the group line or in discussing voting intentions. In turn, these 
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respondents will either assume the group does not have such a position or that this person is only 
responsible for distributing the voting lists or possible allocating plenary speaking time.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents offering each response. Number of Cases: 77 
       All but seven respondents answered the question and no multiple explanations were offered. 
As indicated above in Figure 6.4, forty-one percent of respondents maintained even after probing 
questions that the group did not have a parliamentary secretary or whip, which in most cases was 
correct. In other words, there were a few cases where the respondent insisted that the group did 
not have a parliamentary secretary even though the position did in fact exist. Twenty-three 
percent perceived the role of the parliamentary secretary as one involving primarily 
administrative duties, while the same percentage of respondents identified the role of the 
parliamentary secretary as one of coordinating consensus-building and dissent management 
efforts among group leaders. Twelve percent maintained that parliamentary secretaries/whips 
were among the primary leaders addressing dissent by members or delegations on prominent 






















Figure 6.4: Role of the Group Whip 
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       A statistically significant relationship at the .001 level occurred between a respondent‟s 
party group membership and the likelihood of offering one of the responses to the question of 
what was the role of the group whip or parliamentary secretary. In addition, a statistically 
significant relationship at the .05 level occurred between a respondent‟s gender as well as 
previous profession and the responses.  
TABLE 6.8: PREDICTORS OF WHIP ROLE RESPONSES          
Party Group                0.4597***             
Group Position             0.2665 
Member-State                       0.4350 
Gender                                  0.3910* 
Years of Service                   0.4052 
Previous Profession              0.4451*             
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores measuring strength of association. *, ** and ***, denote statistical 
significance on the .05, .01 and .001 levels respectfully. N of Cases: 77 
 
       As depicted below in Table 6.9, those with previous leadership experience in national/local 
elected or party office were more likely to assign an administrative role for the group whip, yet 
also were more likely to identify a coordination role for the group whip in comparison to those 
from other previous professional backgrounds. Those who had previously served as legislators in 
various levels of government were more likely to have identified a key dissent management role 
for the group whip when prominent reports were at-stake though a plurality maintained that the 
group had no whip which was a sentiment shared by most of those who had previously served as 
staff or worked in the private sector.  
TABLE 6.9: GROUP WHIP RESPONSES AND PREVIOUS PROFESSION 
Professions                   No Whip   Administrative   Coordinate     Prominent    All         N       
Leadership     0.33          0.33            0.29          0.05               0           21 
Elected Office                0.40         0.14            0.23               0.23        0           22 
Staff      0.47          0.21            0.26          0.06        0           19 
Private Sector                0.75          0.25                    0                    0                     0            4 
Education/Student         0.33          0.17                    0.33               0.17                0            6 
Unknown                       0.20          0.40                    0                    0.20                0.20       5 
(N of Cases)                    (31)         (18)                   (18)                    (9)              (1)        77 
Note: Entries are percentages of responses according to respondent‟s previous profession prior to service 
in the European Parliament.  N of Cases: 77, Cramér's V: 0.4451*   
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       As depicted below in Figure 6.5, female respondents were far more likely to maintain that 
their party group did not have a whip, while male respondents were more likely to contend that 
group whips contributed to unity by coordinating dissent management or by playing a key role 
on prominent reports. I am not sure why a respondent‟s gender influenced these response trends. 
Perhaps the differences would be less pronounced with a larger sample of female respondents 
particularly given that most respondents not answering the question were women. The response 
that group whips build consensus on all reports was provided by a sole and female respondent.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentages of responses by respondent‟s gender. Number in parentheses depicts 
number of respondents by gender. N of Cases: 77. Cramér's V: 0.3910 
 
       When party group membership effects are considered in Table 6.10 below, respondents from 
the two largest groups as expected were more likely to assign a dissent management coordination 
role to the parliamentary secretary, while a third of ECR respondents also provided this response. 
As expected, all EFD and GUE respondents maintained that their group did not have this 
leadership position but I was surprised to hear the same response from all Greens/EFA 


























interviews and observations, I concluded that Greens/EFA respondents offered this response 
because their secretary-general uniquely functioned as a whip, while ALDE responses reflect in 
part that parliamentary secretary responsibilities are split among three persons. Meanwhile, 
respondents from two of the three most influential party groups as expected were more likely to 
maintain that the group whip lobbied dissenting members or delegations when prominent reports 
were at-stake. ECR respondents were also likely to provide this response. 
TABLE 6.10: GROUP WHIP RESPONSES AND PARTY GROUP AFFILIATION 
Response          ALDE      ECR    EFD    EPP    Greens   GUE   S&D         N  
No Group Whip         0.59         0           1.0      0           1.0        1.0        0            31 
Administrative         0.35         0.11      0         0.43      0           0           0.31       18   
Coordination          0.06         0.33      0         0.36      0           0           0.56       18 
Prominent Reports         0              0.56      0         0.14      0           0           0.13         9 
All Reports                         0              0           0          0.07     0           0           0               1 
(N of Cases)          (17)         (9)        (5)        (14)     (9)        (7)        (16)         77 
Note: Entries are percentages of responses according to party group affiliation with the last line depicting 
respondents per party group. N of Cases: 77, Cramér's V: 0.4597***   
 
       The EPP parliamentary secretary operates as part of a support system for building consensus 
and managing dissent. The sheer size of the group prevents individual leaders from meeting with 
every group member to address potential dissent. To resolve this collective action problem, the 
EPP have designed a hierarchical whip structure to identify and address dissent.  
“If everyone had to take all of their problems and their differences to the Szajer level, then the 
load at that level would be unmanageable. Usually, it is not Szajer that we update usually it is the 
chair of the working group. If we have a delegation that has problems, we raise it during our 
working group meetings. So that is where we would take problems one step up.” (June 27, 212)  
 
       Coordinators are expected to resolve dissent in the committee level and the vice-presidents 
chairing the working group is responsible at their level. If the working group cannot resolve 
conflict, they appeal to the parliamentary secretary, Mr. Szajer, who if necessary will bring 
disputes as I observed at times to the attention of the group meeting. In this sense, while each 
group leader within the EPP whip structure is responsible for addressing dissent at their level, 
they can appeal to the person at the next stage for assistance.  
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“All working groups are chaired by vice presidents, so the vice presidents have the responsibility 
of keeping the members in line as we go into the votes, etc. So, these are the first people, and 
then Mr. Szajer is coordinating the logistics and if there is a problem the chair of the working 
group will tell him, so he is the first instance of appeal and Daul would be the last instance. 
Again, Daul will try to ask the vice presidents who are chairing the working groups to try and 
find solutions, if they don‟t find a solution  they will try to go to Szajer and find a solution and if 
it is not really possible, then they will go to the Chairman”. (October 15, 2011)  
 
        The response below from one of the two persons who served as S & D  parliamentary 
secretary during the period of field research and outlines how he utilizes leadership or group 
meetings to propose compromises and ensure that the largest possible number of group members 
support the adopted line. Just as in the EPP, lobbying individual members is not feasible except 
through discussions in the group meeting or when necessary in private if the individual is 
someone who can influence the votes of others.  
“At the group meeting, if we see there are strict opposing different views on certain elements 
then my job is to find an amendment which is bridging the different positions in the group unless 
it is a very clear minority and majority for the positions, and then we just vote…My job is not so 
much to go for individual members unless it is in the group discussion where we will see the 
differences, because it is impossible with many individual members unless it were my only job, 
then I could do it. I think it is important to get a very high number of people on board and of 
course if you see that there is one individual who has a different opinion with some influence 
with a certain sector of the group, then you speak with them”. (November 9, 2011)  
 
       The S & D parliamentary secretary is similar in many ways to his EPP counterpart. Both are 
leaders in large groups that must rely on a communication network from the committees to 
working groups and ultimately the group meeting to identify dissent. The role of the 
parliamentary secretary is to pursue compromise when leaders at lower levels in the whip 
structure cannot foster consensus and to appeal to the group president or to the group as a whole 
to secure a resolution through adoption of the group line or through a compromise.  
“As Vice-President in charge of parliamentary affairs, he is definitely involved…We go to the 
vice presidents in charge of the given portfolio area, but Mr. Swoboda also plays a vital role in 
making decisions. What we usually have before each bureau meeting is a separate meeting with 
(President) Martin Schulz and Mr. Swoboda and a number of senior staff in the secretariat where 
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we highlight the issues, the potential problems, and the potential solutions. They determine how 
to proceed and we go into the bureau meeting and they discuss it”. (October 13, 2011)  
 
       The role of the S & D parliamentary secretary though differs from the EPP in the use of the 
group bureau. The S & D group bureau provides an intervening forum for resolving disputes and 
forming the group line in between the working groups and the group meeting. Here, the 
parliamentary secretary can build consensus among leadership and invite dissenting delegations 
to discuss a compromise with the applicable committee coordinators and working group chairs. 
If this setting does not produce a common line, the parliamentary secretary can appeal to the 
group meeting to determine the line or to secure support for the preferred leadership position. In 
this sense, the S & D parliamentary secretary is more of a coordinator than a lobbyist.  
“I wouldn‟t consider that position as a whip position. Our British Labour delegation has the 
Westminster tradition of having a whip, and a similar kind of thing occurs in the German 
delegation, but we don‟t have it in the group. Guerrero‟s position is coordinating coordinators 
which are more about things like setting the parliamentary agenda for sessions, dealing with 
horizontal issues”. (June 13, 2012)  
 
       A majority of ALDE respondents maintained that no such position existed. In part, I believe 
this perception is due to the division of parliamentary secretary responsibilities between the vice-
presidents Adina Valean and Alexander Lambsdorff, as well as the secretary-general, Alexander 
Beels (allocating plenary speaking time). Based upon most of the responses and my observations 
of group meetings, the role of Ms. Valean is to indicate the group line on the voting lists handed 
to members prior to plenary. In my observations of ALDE group meetings, I never heard Ms. 
Valean advocate for the group line, but rather only provide verification of it, whereas her ECR, 
EPP and S & D counterparts pursued consensus in the group meetings on prominent reports.  
“She is our whip, but we don‟t have a whipping system like in the House of Commons, but we 
do need someone to show the vote, because if you vote on amendments at lunchtime, then a 
certain amount of people get distracted, they say that oh this is a procedural point and you need 
someone to indicate the group line. So, the whip‟s first role is to guide the members in the 
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established votes in plenary and the second role is to explain afterwards to the members if there 
were successes or failures in the votes”. (May 30, 2012)  
 
       None of the responses cited Valean or Lambsdorff as someone who would approach 
members to support the line or dissent at less costly levels (unless they were from the same 
delegation). Lambsdorff did at times chair group meetings or stood in for the president at the 
Conference of Presidents. In addition, he also chaired weekly meetings of the group coordinators 
which in the absence of influential working groups provide a forum to identify problems which 
may be brought to the attention of the bureau or presidency. However, Lambsdorff does not 
bring disputes to the attention of the group meeting. In turn, the president and the rapporteur take 
the lead on consensus-building in the group meeting and in subsequent negotiations. 
“Alexander chairs the coordinators‟ meetings, but I don‟t see a role of coming up with a common 
position or joint platform from different points of view and that‟s also the case with the whip. 
The whip has to indicate the votes in plenary, but I don‟t see any role in the group or in the 
working groups, I don‟t see any specific work in trying to merge the position, but this in our 
group is more the role of the Chair…and it is really up to the Chair to formulate a compromise 
view in order to gather all of the group and to have a single position recommended by the 
working group to the entire group, and it is really up to the president to shape a common 
platform and a compromise”. (June 12, 2012)  
 
       Meanwhile, the ALDE secretary-general, Alexander Beels, holds greater responsibility than 
his EPP and S & D counterparts in that he allocates plenary speaking time and is considered by 
some in the group to be among the key decision-makers in the group presidency and act as a 
close confidante to the group president. However, unlike his Greens/EFA counterpart, he does 
not take part in group meeting discussions and does not directly lobby members. 
“I think he is very much involved. He has a huge job in preparing the meetings, in coordinating 
the positions, in understanding where we have differences in signalling to the president in 
preparing internal compromise. So, he doesn‟t take the floor in group meetings, but he does take 
the floor a lot before and after group meetings”. (June 12, 2012)  
 
       This raises the question of why the Greens/EFA is the most cohesive group yet lacks a 
parliamentary secretary. The answer in part I found lies in the unique role of the group secretary-
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general Vula Tsetsi. On the whole, group secretary-generals are perceived to play a more 
administrative or behind-the-scenes advisory role as the response below describes. 
“In formal terms, the politics is done by the politicians. That is their role and they do that. I think 
the strength of a secretary-general is not being very visible, but by doing a behind the scenes job. 
If you have a complicated dossier, what would be bad is that only during the group meeting do 
we discover that this is a complicated issue-the right person is not aware of this on the agenda, 
the leader is not aware of this complication, and then it is the role of the secretary-general to 
make sure that all information is provided in time, that people are forewarned and have the 
information necessary to make a decision”. (May 30, 2012)  
 
       After observing my first Greens/EFA group meeting, I noted that the secretary-general not 
only openly participates in group meeting discussions, but also lobbies members and delegations 
to support the group line. In turn, Vula Tsetsi acts as a group whip not only through the 
allocation of plenary speaking time but also through her efforts to coordinate dissent 
management and if necessary to lobby members.  
 “She is indeed active and she tries to be tough towards the other secretaries-general to express 
our Green interests. We are the fourth biggest group, so we don‟t have the biggest influence, but 
she really tries to defend the Green interests and to make us heard within the other groups, and to 
show towards our group that is really eager to go for what we want to see as far as debates in the 
plenary and what issues should be tackled. I think this engagement and in being tough in these 
negotiations with the others, that is her way of keeping the group together”. (June 5, 2012)  
 
       On many occasions, Vula appealed to members in the group meeting to adhere to the group 
line to ensure plenary coalition success or the attainment of party group policy goals. When she 
thought a particular amendment or strategy (to vote no or abstain as a group) was insufficient or 
even detrimental to these goals, she succinctly articulated her position, even when it differed 
from one or both of the co-presidents. In turn, though the co-presidents and other leaders take the 
lead in forming a common line in the group meeting, the opinion of the secretary-general aids 
and at times shapes consensus-building efforts.  
       Turning to the less cohesive groups, a majority of ECR respondents maintained that the 
group whip contributes to unity mainly on prominent reports. Though united in their desire to 
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reform the EU, the ECR group is divided on particular policy areas (such as the budget) mainly 
along UK and new member-state lines. The office of group whip provides a vehicle to try and 
overcome these obstacles to group unity though it is often frustrated by the confederal 
organization of the group and its evolving group identity. 
“The way it works with us that coming up to a group meeting, Fox will circulate a note to the 
shadows letting him know if they want him to discuss something, so this way you find out what 
might be controversial within the group prior to the meeting and the chief whip asks the group in 
the meeting to discuss its position, but there‟s never an instruction to anyone to vote in a 
particular way…In this case, the chief whip has to make the judgment based on what has 
happened. Members will have in their plenary notes to look to the chief whip”. (October 5, 2011)  
 
      As the response above notes, Mr. Fox may independently learn of potential divisions over 
reports, but on the whole, he relies upon the group rapporteurs or coordinators to identify 
individual members or delegations who have developed a line contrary to that pursued by 
leadership or by a majority in the group when a common line can be identified prior to the group 
meeting. He will then present these divisions in the group meeting and following debate will 
often suggest a way in which to achieve consensus.  
       For example, I observed an exchange between four delegations in an ECR group meeting 
who sought to abstain on a report and one delegation that intended to vote no. Mr. Fox suggested 
that the group as a whole adopt a line to abstain on the report as it would demonstrate unity while 
securing each delegation‟s preferences. This position was subsequently adopted. In turn, 
delegations are expected to inform the group whip either in the meeting or in private that they 
intend to dissent from the majority line. The group meeting might produce a shared line or a 
majority line with one or more delegations voting separately. Each scenario is reflected in the 
member‟s voting list as an indication of which line to support and how to vote (yes, no, abstain).  
       In this sense, while the ECR whip is a consensus-builder, he is far less likely than his 
counterparts to pursue the adoption of a common line among all members. Therefore, while the 
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presence of a group whip in the ECR defies my expectations in regards to medium-sized and less 
influential groups, once the UK parliamentary tradition is accounted for, the creation of this 
position makes sense as does the limitations of the office given the group‟s evolving identity. 
       Group unity is not important for the EFD, so there is no need to assign responsibility for 
noting the group line or to assist in promoting a line in the group meeting. The organizational 
structure and size of the GUE similarly leaves no need for a parliamentary secretary as issues are 
resolved (if at all) primarily in discussions between the group president and the rapporteur on 
one hand and delegation chairs on the other or on a broader basis within the group meeting.        
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
       In order to ensure the maximum number of MEPs supports the group line and that dissent is 
expressed at a minimal level, party group leaders in the more cohesive groups divide dissent 
management responsibilities. Group leaders identify and address dissent at every legislative stage 
and if consensus or a compromise cannot be achieved at one level then the dispute is referred to 
another where additional group leaders may become involved. 
       ALDE respondents were more likely to identify an active role for the group president on all 
reports. In contrast, respondents from most other groups were more likely to assign a consensus-
building role for the group president only on prominent reports in part because other leaders are 
perceived to hold a greater consensus-building responsibility. In addition, party group culture 
shaped responses in that it influences perceptions of when consensus is desirable, when and how 
dissent is expressed, and when the group president should (if at all) become involved.  
       For example, the ECR and GUE have developed norms encouraging dissent which 
complicates efforts to build consensus and restricts the role of the group president. In contrast, 
the EPP or S & D have developed norms encouraging the adoption of consensus and have 
promoted a dissent management role for the group president, particularly on prominent reports. 
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Across the more cohesive groups, presidents are viewed as the unifying figure who gives voice 
to the group‟s values as well as to its legislative priorities. The president helps to communicate a 
sense of what defines being a member of a particular party group and in turn guides the 
socialization process through which members closely identify with the group (See Brown 2000). 
In turn, presidents in the more cohesive groups help to set expectations of how to behave and 
how to contribute to group unity. Accordingly, most respondents do not prioritize a president‟s 
previous leadership experience as much as they emphasize a president‟s communication skills.  
       Though other leaders in most groups assume a more active dissent management role, party 
groups with lower dissent rates share in common a president who is perceived to contribute to 
group unity and to be engaged in dissent management on reports where the plenary stakes are 
high, whereas party groups with higher dissent levels are led by presidents who are perceived to 
either not be engaged in dissent management or are restrained in their efforts by a group culture 
that does not re-enforce consensus-building efforts. However, given the variation in party group 
characteristics and the noted contributions of other leaders, the activity of the group president 
alone cannot explain dissent variation among party groups.  
       Aside from the GUE and EFD, group vice-presidents contribute to various extents to low 
group dissent rates as part of a whip structure responsible for identifying and managing dissent 
supported by socialization processes contributing toward a shared conceptualization of the group 
identity. In turn, I find that those party groups with the highest cohesion rates (Greens/EFA, EPP, 
S & D) are those whose vice-presidents or secretary-generals are assigned a prominent dissent 
management role. In contrast, cohesion rates are lower in party groups who assign and perceive 
an administrative or no role at all for vice-presidents (ALDE, GUE, and EFD) or in the case of 
the ECR who assign a clearly-defined role only to the group whip. 
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       EPP and S & D respondents maintained that vice-presidents contribute to group unity largely 
by chairing working groups where they resolve disputes and build consensus prior to serving as a 
lead advocate for the group line in the bureau and the group meeting. Though Greens/EFA vice-
presidents do not normally chair working groups, they perform many of the same roles as their 
EPP and S & D counterparts, and together with the group co-presidents and the secretary-general 
play vital roles in building party group unity in the group meeting and elsewhere. 
       Similarly, the three party groups with the highest cohesion rates have a vice-president who 
serves as a parliamentary-secretary or have assigned such responsibilities to the secretary-
general. This person is responsible for coordinating the group line, acting as an early alert 
system, and when necessary serving as a key advocate for the group line. The ECR whip (in 
addition to allocating plenary speaking time) brings divisions to the attention of the group 
meeting in the hopes of identifying a common line or minimizing dissent but his influence is 
restricted by the emphasis within the group on national rather than group membership.  
       When viewed separately, the absence of dissent management roles for group vice-presidents 
or of a parliamentary secretary does not explain variation in group dissent rates. Rather, it is the 
absence or minimal utilization of all leadership positions in combination that facilitates higher 
dissent rates. For example, one explanation for the ALDE having the fourth highest cohesion rate 
despite their influential plenary position is the administrative role assigned to group vice-
presidents and the division of the parliamentary secretary‟s administrative responsibilities among 
three persons with no assignment of dissent management responsibilities. Though the group 
president and others normally build consensus in party group meetings and achieve relatively 
high cohesion rates, the maximum potential for ALDE cohesion is not reached in part because a 
gap exists between the efforts of the president and other leaders in group meetings and plenary 
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voting. Specifically, there are not vice-presidents or a whip to ensure that members adhere to the 
agreed upon consensus or to address dissent left over from the meeting. 
       However, a fully-utilized whip structure is insufficient if not accompanied by socialization 
processes promoting consensus. Successful socialization leads to the adoption of norms 
conducive to group unity such as those governing dissent. In turn, socialization fosters a shared 
identity in which members and leaders each are assigned specific roles which help to govern 
relationships and expected behavior. For example, if ALDE members do not positively view 
horizontal working groups and defer to these forums and its presiding leaders, dissent rates may 
rise (See Garner and Letki 2010). Furthermore, relatively high ECR dissent rates despite the 
coordination efforts of a group whip demonstrate that while a whip structure with clearly 
assigned dissent management roles is essential for building group unity, members must also view 
themselves as part of a party group rather than a collection of national delegations. In turn, 
neither the EFD nor the GUE place importance on group unity and often lack a group line. 
Though smaller groups do not need a whip to ensure unity, they do require group norms 
promoting unity and leaders who are empowered and determined to pursue unity. 
       To this point, I have considered one component (leaders) of the equation explaining low 
dissent rates. In chapter seven, I will begin a more detailed examination of the impact of the next 
component of the equation (socialization processes) upon dissent levels by considering the role 
of working group and party group meetings in terms of their place in the group‟s decision-
making structure, but also the extent to which they are regarded by respondents as contributing to 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: PARTY GROUP FORUMS AND DISSENT MANAGEMENT        
INTRODUCTION 
       Party group leaders in the European Parliament contribute to group unity and thereby the 
level and form of dissent expression to various extents often reflecting their group‟s 
organizational structure and culture. In the previous chapter, I reviewed responses to a series of 
questions concerning the role of party group leaders and their impact upon group dissent levels 
as part of a whip structure. A whip structure consists of an organized effort by party group 
leaders to distribute and execute dissent management responsibilities as well as group forums.  
       The primary task of those within the whip structure is to identify and address dissent at 
every stage of the legislative process: committees, horizontal working groups (where applicable), 
party group meetings, and plenary. The desired outcome is minimal levels of dissent both in 
terms of the number of those opposing the group line and in the form of dissent expression (such 
as voting to abstain). The components of a whip structure in terms of assigned responsibilities or 
in regards to dissent management tactics vary in many ways among the party groups but some 
overlapping characteristics are evident across groups. 
       Respondents overwhelmingly identified that coordinators and rapporteurs bear the brunt of 
dissent management in that they help to shape the group position on each report and work to 
ensure maximum support for the common line at every legislative stage. In addition, I found that 
in two of the three most influential party groups, presidents will become directly involved in 
managing dissent only when prominent reports are at-stake. In contrast, the ALDE group 
president is primarily responsible for building group unity in most cases, while the Greens/EFA 
co-presidents work as part of a leadership team in securing support for the group line on all 
reports. Meanwhile, group presidents in the least influential groups either are not interested in 
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building group unity (EFD) or in the case of the ECR and GUE are hindered in their efforts by 
the group‟s confederal structure and a culture that encourages separate lines and dissent. 
       In turn, respondents from the three most cohesive groups (Greens/EFA, EPP and S & D) 
identified a dissent management role for group vice-presidents. In the two largest groups (EPP 
and S & D), vice-presidents chair horizontal working groups which bring together group 
members from associated committees and provide a forum to build consensus and advocate for 
the group line. Similarly, Green/EFA vice-presidents serve as advocates for the group line in the 
party group meeting and often lobby members at multiple legislative stages to support the group 
line or express dissent at a less costly level even though they often do not chair working groups. 
        Both the EPP and S & D also designate a vice-president as a parliamentary secretary who 
monitors the progress of each report, identifies potential dissent, and works with the leadership 
team to minimize dissent both prior to and during group meetings. The most cohesive group, the 
Greens/EFA, lack an official parliamentary secretary, but group respondents and observations 
confirmed that the secretary-general takes on a much more influential and visible dissent 
management role than her counterparts in other groups by acting as a parliamentary secretary 
through her advocacy for the group line and allocation of plenary speaking time.     
       In contrast, ALDE respondents perceived the group president as having the biggest impact 
on group unity, whereas group vice-presidents were viewed as having largely administrative 
roles or no responsibilities whatsoever. Similarly, ALDE respondents stated that the group 
lacked a parliamentary secretary which interviews and observations confirmed in fact was split 
among three persons but only in terms of administrative and not dissent management 
responsibilities. While these perceptions of leadership roles and the group‟s leadership structure 
do not singularly explain its comparatively higher dissent levels, the contrasts with other groups 
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do suggest that when party groups lack a fully developed whip structure to communicate with or 
lobby members at various legislative stages, dissent levels are likely to increase. However, a 
group‟s whip structure will only successfully manage dissent if it is accompanied by 
socialization processes and a shared group identity that promote unity.       
       This chapter acts as a bridge in that it will on one-hand complete the consideration of the 
dissent management role of party group leaders while initiating the discussion of the contribution 
of socialization processes toward group unity through a comparison of how party groups utilize 
party group and (where applicable) horizontal working group meetings. In particular, it examines 
how group leaders utilize such forums to foster particular norms and a shared conceptualization 
of the group identify in conjunction with lobbying on the political and legislative merits to 
ensure maximum support for the group line and minimal levels of dissent expression.  
       Following a literature review, the chapter will consider responses to the questions of how 
working group and party group meetings contribute to group unity which are compared to 
findings obtained through my observations of meetings. In turn, the chapter will (1) identify how 
party group and working group meetings are utilized in consensus and dissent management 
efforts by group leaders and (2) indicate the extent to members view group meetings as vital 
forums for contributing to the development of the group line as well as the extent to which 
members believe it is important to adhere to the decisions taken by the group as a whole within 
such meetings. In addition, the chapter will explore how group meetings facilitate the 
development of a shared conceptualization of the group identity and socialize members into 
adopting shared expectations on dissent. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
       Much of what we know about legislative party caucus meetings comes from either U.S. 
congressional studies or those examining Westminster systems such as the UK and Canada. One 
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important contribution of legislative party caucus meetings is to disseminate information. As 
Forgette (2004) notes,” Information asymmetry exists between leadership and rank-and-file 
regarding legislative strategy, policy priorities, and electoral marketing of party agenda” 
(Forgette, 2004, 410). In turn, the aim of caucus meetings is in part to provide information to 
members who are not part of the committee responsible for a given piece of legislation and 
thereby to afford leaders with the opportunity to build cohesion through information transmission 
(Forgette, 2004, 410). Information transmission in this sense acts as a two-way conduit by which 
members are aided in decision-making efforts and through which leaders identify dissent and the 
potential means by which to mitigate or eliminate dissent (Forgette, 2004, 410). 
       In addition, Forgette identified an correlation in the U.S. Congress between legislative party 
caucus meeting attendance and the extent of voting discipline in that “a member‟s attendance at a 
strategically timed conference meeting results in an 11% increase in the odds of voting the 
party‟s position” (Forgette, 2004, 425). “Strategically timed” refers to caucus meetings 
scheduled before floor sessions in the House or Senate. Legislative party caucus meetings are in 
turn opportunities to not only build support for the group line in floor voting but also to build a 
cohesive group identity with these forums diffusing norms encouraging deference to decisions 
taken in group meetings and those governing when and how to express dissent.  
       Garner and Letki (2005) found in their interviews of UK Labour and Canadian Liberal MPs 
that party caucus meetings and other forums act as “party opportunity channels” through which 
members may develop a group identity conducive to unity aided by the perception that they have 
a voice in party affairs which facilitates efforts by leaders to instill a sense of loyalty (Garner and 
Letki, 2005, 468). The authors tested this assumption through a survey which contained four 
specific questions constituting an “Isolation Scale” which ascertained the extent to which MPs 
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identified with the party caucus meetings and the extent to which they perceived they as 
backbenchers contributed to the formation of the party line (Garner and Letki, 2005, 471).  
       The authors found that MPs in the two parties were more likely to dissent from the party line 
if they scored lower on the Isolation Scale. “They must view communication channels between 
leaders and backbenchers as accessible or otherwise they feel isolated from leaders and the party 
in the legislature as a whole” (Garner and Letki, 2005, 472). More specifically, an increase of 
one point on the Isolation Scale (1-5) resulted in an increase in the level of dissent by 6.4% 
(Garner and Letki, 2005, 474). In turn, I assume that given the increasing legislative stakes, party 
group leaders will utilize group forums to identify and manage dissent in order to ensure greater 
cohesion in regards to plenary voting and in terms of a shared identity (See Brown 2000).  
       We know very little about the role of party group or working group meetings in building 
group cohesion. Raunio (1999) briefly mentions party group meetings by noting that especially 
in the larger groups, it is expected that MEPs will announce their intentions to dissent before the 
entire group (Raunio, 1999, 193). He also noted that these meetings are “important forums for 
consensus-building with extensive negotiations often taking place in search of mutually 
acceptable compromises” (Raunio 1999, 193). My observations confirm that since Lisbon 
(2007), nearly every party group has developed formal and informal processes governing the 
announcement to dissent and that the more cohesive groups regardless of size have developed a 
whip structure which utilizes the group meetings to identify and manage dissent. 
       A more detailed assessment of the dissent management role of party group forums is 
provided by Ringe (2010) in his assertions that group forums are part of a communication 
network “designed to reduce the workload of a party group and to solidify a common position” 
(Ringe, 2010, 60). Ringe further noted that the role of these meetings was in part to act as an 
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“alarm system” in which dissent was announced and subsequently addressed by coordinators and 
rapporteurs often through compromise (Ringe, 2010, 63). However, Ringe maintained that the 
primary function of group forums was to relieve the information asymmetry confronting 
members both in terms of the lack of information but also often in terms of dealing with an 
information overload leading to frequent deferral by MEPs to group experts (Ringe, 2010, 65). 
       Every report cannot be discussed in detail in the party group meetings which is addressed in 
part by the formation of working groups in the larger groups, but also in most groups, by 
discussing only controversial or prominent reports in any detail in the party group meeting 
(Ringe, 2010, 63). Given the supranational organization of party groups and the absence of re-
nomination control, party group leaders are under greater pressure compared to their national 
counterparts to fully utilize meetings as dissent management and socialization tools. Otherwise, 
divisions along delegation lines may become more pronounced whereas fully utilized party 
group meetings aid in producing cohesive plenary voting and a shared group identity. 
       In turn, I find that the more cohesive groups are those with well-attended working group and 
party group meetings overseen by engaged leadership. More specifically, party group forums 
contribute to high cohesion levels when utilized by leaders to identify and manage dissent and 
when respondents are invested in the processes and outcomes associated with group forums. 
Group forums in this sense provide specific contributions to group unity in that they: disseminate 
norms governing behavior, re-enforce a shared conceptualization of the group identity, resolve 
disputes between members and/or delegations, identify and address dissent and afford leaders 
with the opportunity to articulate or formulate the group line.  
HORIZONTAL WORKING GROUPS AND PARTY GROUP UNITY 
       Before examining the dissent management role of party group meetings, I first asked 
respondents how working group meetings contributed to party group unity. In turn, I anticipated 
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five potential responses: our party group does not have working groups, working group meetings 
are not well-attended or very important, working group meetings are important only for those 
invested in the report, working groups are important only for resolving disputes on prominent 
reports, and working groups are forums for building consensus on all reports.  
H1: Respondents from large party groups will be more likely to contend that horizontal working 
groups contribute to group unity on all reports. 
 
       Larger party groups will encounter a greater logistical challenge in constructing and in 
building support for the group line. In turn, EPP and S & D respondents will be more likely to 
contend that working groups build unity on all reports because information asymmetry will be 
the greatest in these groups which may be solved in part by encouraging members to defer to 
working groups (See Ringe 2010). In turn, leaders in the larger groups focus their dissent 
management efforts in the party group meetings on prominent reports.  
H2: Respondents from the more influential party groups will be more likely to contend that 
horizontal working groups contribute to party group unity on prominent reports.  
 
      Respondents from the more influential groups should be more likely to view working groups 
as important forums for building group unity on prominent reports because with higher stakes 
every forum will be utilized for dissent management. In contrast, a decline in plenary influence 
should lead respondents to conclude that working groups do not contribute to group unity or are 
important only for those invested in the report as efforts at each stage to secure support for the 
group line are unimportant given the limited (if any) impact the group will have in plenary. 
H3: Respondents who hold elite positions within party groups will be more likely to contend that 
horizontal working groups are important for building group unity on all reports.  
 
       Those respondents who are more invested in developing a group line and in building high 
levels of support for the group line will be more likely to contend that working groups build 
group unity on all reports. Elites include group presidents, vice-presidents, and secretary-
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generals. These elites have more at-stake and in turn will have greater dissent management and 
consensus-building responsibility. In turn, rank-and-file members and staff will be more likely to 
provide other responses as they have less at-stake and have less responsibility. 
H4: Respondents with more years of service in the European Parliament will be more likely to 
contend that horizontal working groups contribute to group unity on all or on prominent reports. 
 
       More years of service in the parliament as MEPs and/or as staff will be accompanied by a 
greater likelihood to positively view the contributions of working groups in building party  group 
unity. This stems from greater exposure to the processes associated with decision-making in 
working groups, but also a greater reliance on experts in these forums to set the group line due to 
information asymmetry and overload. More years of service in turn facilitates efforts by group 
leaders to socialize members into deferring to and in highly regarding the work of these forums. 
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents offering each response category. N of Cases: 79 
 
       All but three respondents answered the question. As depicted above in Figure 7.1, thirty-
eight percent of respondents stated that working groups help to build unity on all reports, while 


















Figure 7.1: Working Groups and Unity 
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prominent reports. Meanwhile, twenty percent of respondents maintained that the question was 
not applicable as their party group did not have working groups, while fifteen percent of 
respondents contended that working groups mattered only to those invested in the report. Finally, 
only four percent stated that working groups did not contribute at all to party group unity. In all, 
the response trend indicates that where present, working groups are positively viewed perceived 
to contribute to party group unity. 
TABLE 7.1: PREDICTORS OF WORKING GROUP RESPONSES          
Party Group  0.5189*** 
Group Position 0.2333 
Member-State  0.4858 
Years   0.4417 
Gender  0.2180 
Profession  0.4208 
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores measuring strength of association. *, ** and ***, denote statistical 
significance on the .05, .01 and .001 levels respectfully. N of Cases: 79 
 
       As Table 7.1 above depicts, while substantive relationships between years of service, 
previous profession, and member-state origin are associated with working group responses, only 
party group membership provided a statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of 
offering particular responses. For example, while a respondent may acquire particular attitudes 
over time in the parliament toward the role of working groups, these perceptions are in turn 
shaped by experiences as a member of a particular party group. This suggests that party group 
size, plenary influence, and group culture are the most important contributors to forming a 
respondent‟s perceptions of the role of working groups in building party group unity. 
       When responses are framed by group membership, all GUE and EFD respondents correctly 
noted that their party groups did not have working groups. However, ECR respondents were 
divided on the question in that while the ECR does not have horizontal working groups it has 
formed the Policy Development Group, which some respondents counted as a working group. In 
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turn, respondents from the two largest party groups (EPP and S & D) as hypothesized were more 
likely to contend that working groups contribute to party group unity on all reports.  
TABLE 7.2: WORKING GROUP RESPONSES AND PARTY GROUP AFFILIATION 
Response          ALDE      ECR      EFD     EPP      Greens     GUE      S&D      N 
Not Applicable                 0               0.33       1.0        0           0               1.0        0          16 
Not Important          0.29          0            0           0           0.11          0           0.06       7 
Only if Invested         0.34          0.44       0           0           0.22          0           0          12 
Prominent Reports         0.29          0.23       0           0.29      0.56          0           0.31     18  
Most/All Reports         0.08          0            0           0.81      0.11          0           0.63     26 
(N of Cases)                        (17)          (9)         (5)         (14)       (10)        (8)         (16)      79 
Note: Entries are percentages of responses according to party group affiliation with the last line depicting 
respondents per party group. N of Cases: 79, Cramér's V: 0.5189***   
 
       In contrast, ALDE respondents representing the second most influential group were more 
likely to maintain that working groups did not contribute to group unity or that working groups 
mattered only to those invested in the reports. Meanwhile, despite their status as the fourth most 
influential party group, a majority of Greens/EFA respondents perceived that working groups 
contributed to group unity on prominent reports. In turn, even though Greens/EFA working 
groups are organized according to policy priorities rather than associated committees, members 
value their contributions toward group decision-making whereas ALDE respondents are more 
likely to solely value the party group meeting as an important forum for building unity.  
       Horizontal working groups are viewed as important forums by respondents in the two largest 
party groups (EPP and S & D) because they resolve collection action problems and contribute 
toward a shared group identity. The sheer size of membership and the legislative volume require 
these two groups to provide forums for members prior to the party group meeting to set and 
resolve conflict over the group line as well as to allocate plenary speaking time. Working groups 
also provide opportunities for leaders to re-enforce the group identity and its values to 
participating members who in turn convey and build support for the group line in the party group 
meeting which in turn facilitates the norm of deferral to the working groups. 
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“Yes, we are persuading in the working groups, but sometimes if there is a difficult situation and 
we need a majority and there are some members that need to be convinced, I discuss these issues 
also with members in private meetings outside the working group. I explain why I think this 
should be the position, they explain their position, and then we reach a compromise, a common 
position at the end”. (November 9, 2011) 
 
      As one of the EPP vice-presidents chairing working groups above explains, working groups 
provide a forum for leaders to hear differing views from members of related committee and then 
produce consensus. However, dissent management does not end for the vice-president (and for 
other leaders) in the working group. Some of its members may not be on board with the group 
line and require additional lobbying afterwards. Others may still not support the group line but 
may be convinced to dissent at a less costly level. I found these efforts also extend into the group 
meeting especially on prominent reports or reports addressing divisive issues. In this sense, the 
presiding vice-president, other leaders, and often many of the working group rank-and-file, act as 
spokespersons and advocates for the group line in party group meeting discussions.  
“They are very important, because you have to see that there are more than just the committees 
you are a member of and you have to hear the discussion of what is going on in other 
committees. Committees often work together and then for others you can hear their discussion in 
the horizontal working groups”. (June 19, 2012) 
 
     The response above from a new MEP in the EPP group identifies the perception among most 
members that working groups provide a necessary and vital forum to share ideas and build the 
group line on reports. This not only reduces the information gap or overload confronting MEPs 
but also contributes to the development of group norms. For example, members on the whole 
positively view the efforts of working groups and defer to them on most votes as its members are 
presumed to be experts as well as colleagues who share the group‟s values and interests. In turn, 
when a prominent or divisive report produces opposition or questions in the party group meeting, 
working group members take the lead in addressing these concerns. 
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       I observed two EPP working groups: Foreign Affairs and the Economy and Environment. 
While the personalities and leadership styles of the presiding vice-presidents and of members 
differed, there were many similarities. The vice-presidents (with the assistance of staff) of both 
working groups allocated plenary speaking time at the conclusion of discussion on a given 
report. Both working groups met in large rooms accommodating the dozens of members, MEP 
aides, group staff, other MEPs, and observers from the Commission and other EU institutions. 
Both working groups were also led by vice-presidents who together with the rapporteur oversaw 
discussion often resulting in consensus but at times determining that further meetings were 
necessary or that the working group‟s division should be reported out to the full party group.  
       For example, in the Foreign Policy working group, a member raised an objection about a 
particular paragraph in a report. Members discussed his concerns and he ultimately agreed to 
withdraw his objections. On another report, multiple members raised objections and the vice-
president determined that the group line should be to demand a split vote on the paragraph where 
the plenary would vote separately on the two halves of the paragraphs with the group line to be 
support for one half and for the group to not take a line on the more divisive half. This position 
was later adopted in the subsequent party group meeting I observed without much discussion.  
       In the Economy and Environment working group, the presiding vice-president announced 
that division over a particular report had been resolved in committee and the working group 
voted to adopt this position as the group line. When a member raised objections on a different 
report, the vice-president said she would meet with the member and the shadow rapporteur to 
resolve the issue. Later, in the party group meeting, the report was reported to receive unanimous 
support from the working group. The working group is also a forum to announce cross-group 
agreements which are later noted in voting lists. 
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“These working groups are very informal…and everything is openly discussed and we try and 
find a common position. If we don‟t, if we see that there is a division within the Socialist 
working group, we bring it on the agenda of the S & D political group meeting with all of the S 
& D members where it can be discussed in a greater forum and then if the position is still not 
clear, then we take positions to a vote in the group meeting and then we decide if we vote in 
favor or against a certain amendment or a certain report as a whole”. (June 18, 2012) 
 
       As with the EPP, I observed that S & D working groups incurred high attendance, full 
participation, and served as forums for allocating plenary speaking time and reporting the group 
line to the full party group meeting. As a member of the group secretariat above notes, an S & D 
working group is an informal setting in which to debate, report on inter-group and inter-
institutional relations, and construct the group line with (as in the EPP) the decisions of the 
working group adopted in most instances by the group. However, as the response trends 
highlights, there is also an assumption by many S & D respondents that working groups are 
important for building unity only for prominent reports with a few even asserting that the 
working groups have little impact on the group decision-making process.   
“They should be important but sometimes are not so important because the members of the 
horizontal working groups do not always go to the meetings and so many times it is not clear 
what the decisions of the working groups are before the discussion of the group meeting. 
However, if there is a good debate inside of the working group and if there is a huge majority 
supporting the decision within these working groups, then that is quite relevant for the position 
of the group”. (June 19, 2012) 
 
       The response above places working groups within the framework of the S & D decision-
making process which includes a more prominent role for the group bureau as a forum to resolve 
disputes on prominent reports which as discussed in chapter three often consists of negotiations 
between group and national delegation leaders whereas working groups are primarily forums for 
resolving disputes between group members of associated committees.  
       I also observed more frequent unity appeals by S & D leaders in comparison to the EPP such 
as when the presiding vice-president of the Civil Liberties and Justice working group reiterated 
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during debate on one report of what “a strong and united group” would mean for the parliament 
and for the people of Europe. Such appeals were also very common in S & D party group 
meetings, where leaders reminded members of the need for the group to appear united and tied 
being „socialist‟ to voting in a particular way. I believe this in part reflects the acknowledgement 
by S & D leaders that they often attain less cohesion on prominent reports compared to the EPP. 
In other words, higher dissent on prominent reports produces more appeals by leaders. 
       In the same working group, another report was tabled to the next meeting as members were 
divided while on another report, the presiding vice-president clearly stated “I need your support”, 
a sentiment I never heard expressed in such stark terms in the EPP working group meetings. 
Such appeals were also commonly expressed by the presiding vice-president and the respective 
rapporteurs in the Health, Environment, and Safety working group. Discussion on one report 
produced a group amendment to be introduced in plenary, while extensive debate accompanied 
another report which achieved unanimous support while concerns on another were referred to the 
shadows‟ meeting where rapporteurs from all seven groups meet to discuss progress on reports. 
     The sheer size and legislative responsibility of the EPP and S & D necessitate the creation of 
horizontal working groups in order to resolve collective action problems and build support for 
the group line. As the third largest group, and particularly as the second most influential party 
group, ALDE leaders are incentivized to develop horizontal working groups for the same reasons 
though their smaller size is more conducive to highly participatory party group meetings. 
“Working groups are a forum for disagreements to be resolved but sometimes these may go to 
the entire group to decide, otherwise policy is determined at this level with the bureau providing 
the political support within the group”. (October 11, 2011) 
 
       The sentiments expressed above by a member of the ALDE secretariat differ from those of 
most ALDE respondents. A plurality believed that working groups matter only for participating 
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members, with the remainder split between those who thought that working groups did not 
contribute to group unity or did so only on prominent reports. The ALDE formed working 
groups A, B, and C and recently have consolidated A/B into a single working group covering all 
committees not related to international issues addressed by C. While the ALDE may not require 
as many working groups as the two largest party groups, consolidation in my view reflects the 
poor attendance and the largely negative views of ALDE respondents toward working groups. 
“They are not so important. That actually is something that I would say is a problem, the 
attendance is quite low and most of the important things are handled in the full group, because 
our group is still small enough that we can still handle these things in our full group. But 
sometimes it is frustrating because you know that for example the working group on Israel-
Palestine discusses this for one hour and then an hour later the same debate among the same 
people will continue into the full group”. (October 26, 2011).  
 
      Interview responses repeatedly convey the theme expressed above by an ALDE vice-
president that the working groups matter only for the respective members and not the group as a 
whole. When combined by the frequent perception that attendance in these meetings is not 
necessary, ALDE working groups fail to instill norms of deference and group unity that are 
prevalent not only in the two largest groups but also in the Greens/EFA.  
“I think they are important, but I am not sure they contribute to group unity. I think they are 
important because that‟s how you find out what‟s going on elsewhere. I don‟t always go to them; 
I only go to them where there is something I am interested in. They are not that well-attended in 
general. It is usually only the people who are interested in the topic, either supporting it or not, 
but as far as building group unity, you do have the opportunity and it‟s a great opportunity for 
anyone who wants to use it, especially if you don‟t support something, to go and be heard and try 
to get people to agree with you there. So, in the sense that it is part of a process that allows you 
input into final outcomes in the group, then yes, it helps group unity. (June 17, 2012)  
 
       The introspective response by an ALDE coordinator above in many ways underlines the 
ALDE group decision-making process. Working groups can provide valuable outlets for those in 
attendance to express opinions and exchange ideas with colleagues from related committees. Yet, 
the party group meeting is regarded as the primary forum for setting and affirming the group 
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line. In turn, the ALDE president and others must often utilize the full group meeting to manage 
dissent and build consensus on most reports, whereas EPP and S & D leaders utilize full group 
meetings to manage dissent only on prominent or divisive reports.  
       The failure to fully utilize working groups in conjunction with the absence of dissent 
management responsibilities for vice-presidents helps to explain why the ALDE are the fourth 
most cohesive group. For example, poor attendance in and negative attitudes toward working 
groups hinder the development of a shared group identity in that the group meeting becomes the 
exclusive forum to disseminate norms and make appeals for unity. On the whole, the ALDE 
overcome these logistical and socialization challenges in the group meeting to produce relatively 
high cohesion. However, when comparing ALDE cohesion in terms of both roll-call votes and 
shared attitudes to the more cohesive groups, I believe the discrepancy is largely due to a 
breakdown in the ALDE whip structure and in socialization before and after the group meetings.  
       My observation of ALDE working group C refuted responses in that the meeting was well-
attended by members and staff. However, I believe this was the result of scheduling the working 
group in the same room as the party group meeting which followed immediately. The meeting 
provided recent World Bank data to members and reported on a cross-party group agreement on 
amendments. The presiding vice-president next oversaw debate on another report which the 
working group concluded through voting should be accompanied by a group line of calling for 
split votes on four particular amendments. Later in the party group meeting, this position was 
reported and after extensive debate was adopted as the group line. 
       My observation of ALDE working group A/B confirmed respondent perceptions in that only 
the presiding vice-president, three other MEPs and about a dozen staff were in attendance. The 
presiding vice-president proposed an amendment on one report while noting that the group 
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would not co-sign an amendment on a particular report with other groups. The shadow 
rapporteur wanted to split a paragraph three ways (in terms of plenary voting) with a group line 
of No on two of the paragraphs. The next week in the party group meeting, the A/B vice-
president presented these recommendations which were met by some opposition. However, 
Verhofstadt secured support for most of the recommendations.  
“We have working groups and from January on we have a kind of horizontal working groups. 
They will be around climate change, the Green New Deal, and about the international affairs, in 
order to make some debates as deep as possible and to prepare some group positions as better as 
possible, because not everything can be done at the plenary level. We have meetings with 
coordinators and we will have them on a very regular basis from January on, once per month, 
together with the co-chairs of the group, and the secretariat”. (November 9, 2011) 
 
       The Greens/EFA are slightly smaller than the ALDE and do not exert as much plenary 
influence when measured in terms of percentage of times the group is in the plenary majority. 
However, the group‟s influence is perceived internally and among the party groups to be exerted 
in its impact on policy development prior to plenary. In turn, the Greens/EFA have constructed 
three horizontal working groups along policy priority lines, rather than along membership of 
related committees as a member of the group secretariat above explained. These working groups 
are not chaired by vice-presidents in every instance and consist of only about a dozen members 
each in addition to staff. A variety of factors prevented me from attending these meetings. 
       My group meeting observations confirmed the prevalent respondent perception of 
Greens/EFA working groups as constructive forums to develop the group line on prominent 
reports though the group line on most reports is shaped in party group meetings. Nonetheless, 
working groups provide an outlet for Greens/EFA members outside committees to contribute to 
the development of the group line and to become invested in its adoption. On repeated occasions, 
I observed the co-presidents and the secretary-general referring to reports from the working 
groups and call for their implementation as a basis for the official group line. 
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       However, the Greens/EFA more closely resemble the ALDE in their greater emphasis on the 
party group meeting for dissent management and policy formulation which suggests that for 
medium-sized groups, working groups can be utilized to form consensus on controversial topics 
or prominent reports but are not as important forums as the party group meetings more easily 
accommodate debate. In this sense, working groups are not absolutely necessary components of 
the medium-sized group whip structure as party group meetings can fill this gap. However, when 
members overwhelmingly negatively view the role of working groups, the dissent management 
burden grows for leadership and cohesion in term of attitudes toward group membership and 
unity suffers, whereas a positive reception and constructive role of working groups contributes to 
high cohesion in plenary votes and in the attitudes of membership.  
       Similarly, while the formation of horizontal working groups may not be a necessary 
component of the ECR whip structure, leaders have identified the need for a forum where 
members can contribute to the formation of the group line on sensitive issues. In turn, as a UK 
ECR MEP below notes, the Policy Development Group was created to resolve some collective 
action problems and in the long-term contribute toward group unity.  
“I think the reason for that is the size of the group. We have 56 members, so there isn‟t a need in 
my view to have for example an agricultural working group meet and discuss that issue. What 
Mr. Kirkhope chairs is something called the Policy Development Group and that meets most 
months. It met this morning and was discussing a trade issue. The month before, it discussed 
Palestine, Israel, and foreign relations. We discussed agriculture previously and we found a form 
of words that we, the British, the Poles, and the rest of the group could live with. It‟s a working 
group on any particular topic the group feels needs discussion”. (November 9, 2011) 
 
       However, as noted in the discussion above, group cohesion can only be accomplished by a 
highly utilized and valued party group meeting. Given the ongoing development of the ECR 
group in terms of its identity and organization, the group may find a need in the future to develop 
working groups along similar lines as the Greens/EFA while its leaders may also find increasing 
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impetus through more frequent coalitions with the EPP for re-enforcing the dissent management 
role as well as positive attitudes by members toward the party group meeting. 
     Similarly, the smaller GUE and EFD do not require working groups though as a GUE vice-
president below notes, working groups of an informal sense often are formed by interested 
members on various topics. However, as with the ECR, the smallest groups must procure high 
cohesion through an engaged whip structure and through a cohesive group identity that promotes 
unity which the GUE and EFD at the present lack. 
“We don‟t have formal meetings because of the dimension of the group that I mentioned, but we 
have other meetings. For instance, as a coordinator of a committee, we often meet with the 
members who are from the group on that committee and with the staff who are following that 
committee. We also have other groups that are not associated with a committee. For example I 
work on climate change issues and we have members who are interested in this or if we are 
talking about refugees, there are members who are very interested in this. So, it is not a formal 
division of the group into inter-groups, but it works on the basis of subjects”. (October 21, 2011) 
 
PARTY GROUP MEETINGS AND COHESION 
      While working groups may provide valuable contributions, party group meetings are the 
most important forums for managing dissent and building consensus. It is in these forums that 
leaders can appeal to the entire group and ensure the widespread adoption of the group line. In 
turn, I expect respondents to offer one of five potential responses to the question of how party 
group meetings contribute to group unity: party group meetings serve no real purpose, group 
meetings are forums for discussing national politics, group meetings are primarily procedural 
forums for conveying the group line, group meetings are key forums for building unity on 
prominent reports, and party group meetings build unity on all reports. 
H1: Respondents from more influential party groups will be more likely to contend that party 
group meetings are important forums for building unity on prominent reports 
 
       When the legislative stakes are high, influential party groups will be incentivized to ensure 
that a maximum number of members support the group line or will dissent at less costly levels. 
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To accomplish this goal, leaders in these groups will utilize the party group meeting to identify 
and manage dissent particularly on prominent reports accompanied by appeals for unity and 
shared identity. In contrast, respondents in the least influential party groups will be more likely 
to contend that party group meetings serve no purpose or are forums to discuss national politics. 
H2: Respondents from the largest party groups will be more likely to contend that the primary 
function of party group meetings is for leaders to convey the group line. 
 
      Due to the sheer size of membership and the logistics associated with discussing every report 
in detail, respondents from the two largest party groups should presume that party group 
meetings primarily serve a logistical purpose in conveying the group line. Otherwise, 
respondents from medium and smaller groups should be more likely to contend that party group 
meetings build unity on prominent or all reports as party group size and the logistical challenges 
associated with multiple reports declines. 
H3: Respondents who are in party group leadership or are the secretary-general will be more 
likely to contend that party group meetings build support for the group line on prominent reports. 
 
       Respondents with greater dissent management and consensus-building responsibilities will 
be more likely to associate the role of party group meetings with building unity on prominent 
reports because the legislative stakes are highest on these reports which in turn require the full 
attention of leaders and other group elites. In contrast, rank-and-file MEPs and staff will be more 
likely to assume that group meetings are forums primarily for leaders to convey the group line as 
they have less at-stake in ensuring widespread support for the group line. 
H4: Respondents with more years of service in the European Parliament will be more likely to 
contend that party group meetings primarily build unity on prominent reports. 
 
       As respondents acquire greater familiarity with parliamentary and particularly party group 
decision-making processes, they will be more likely to assign an important role to forums such as 
party group meetings for resolving differences and building unity on prominent reports as these 
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reports incur the highest stakes. In turn, more years of service should be accompanied by greater 
exposure to and easier identification of socialization processes and appeals for group unity 
accompanying group-level discussions of prominent reports.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents who offered each response category. N of Cases: 81 
        
       All but three respondents answered the question. As depicted above in Figure 7.2, the 
overwhelming majority (two-thirds) of respondents identified a unity-building role for party 
group meetings primarily associated with prominent reports. This reflects the higher stakes 
associated with prominent reports but also the logistics of most groups not having the time to 
accommodate widespread discussion of all reports. In turn, only five percent of respondents 
identified a link between party group meetings and group cohesion on all reports whereas six 
percent regarded group meetings primarily as procedural forums for conveying the group line. In 
contrast, twenty percent viewed party group meetings primarily as a forum for discussing 
national politics and not for building group unity with one EFD respondent maintaining that the 























Figure 7.2: Party Group Meetings and  Unity 
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     As depicted below in Table 7.3, a respondent‟s length of service in the European Parliament, 
previous profession, and party group membership were statistically significant predictors of party 
group meeting responses. As respondents acquire greater familiarity and closer ties with their 
party group, aided by previous political and leadership experiences, they are more likely to 
identify a link between party group meetings and ensuring unity on prominent reports. 
TABLE 7.3: PREDICTORS OF PARTY GROUP MEETING RESPONSES          
Party Group  0.4067*** 
Group Position 0.2455 
Member-State  0.3905 
Years of Service 0.5577*** 
Gender  0.2985 
Profession  0.4869** 
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores measuring strength of association. *, ** and ***, denote statistical 
significance on the .05, .01 and .001 levels respectfully. N of Cases: 81 
 
       Figure 7.3 below illustrates that the probability of contending that party group meetings 
contribute to group unity primarily on prominent reports increases as years of service and 
exposure to party group organizational and socialization processes increases.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents who offered each response. Numbers in parentheses 




















Figure 7.3: Responses by Years of Service 
No Purpose National Politics Convey Group Line Prominent Reports All Reports
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       In contrast, those with fewer years of service were more likely to relegate party group 
meetings as forums for discussion of national politics or as procedural forums for conveying the 
group line although a majority of these respondents also offered the prominent reports response. 
This indicates that while respondents may view party group meetings as providing a variety of 
functions, the prevailing perception that the primary function of party group meetings is to build 
support for prominent reports grows over time.  
TABLE 7.4: PARTY GROUP MEETING RESPONSES AND PREVIOUS PROFFESSION 
Professions                   No Purpose   Nat. Pols    Communicate    Prominent    All Reports   N        
Leadership     0                  0.08        0.08          0.84              0                  22 
Elected Office                0            0.25        0                        0.75       0                  22 
Staff      0.04             0.23        0.09          0.50       0.14             22 
Private Sector                0                  0.25             0                        0.50              0.25               4 
Education/Student         0                  0.17             0                        0.83              0                    6 
Unknown                       0                  0.20             0.40                   0.40              0                    5 
(N of Cases)                  (1)                (17)              (5)                     (54)             (4)                81 
Note: Entries are percentages of responses according to respondent‟s previous profession prior to service 
in the European Parliament.  N of Cases: 81, Cramér's V: 0.4869**   
 
       As depicted above in Table 7.4, the single respondent who maintained that party group 
meetings serve no purpose had previously served as staff at the national or party level. While 
perceptions of party group meetings contributing to unity extended across respondent 
professional categories, responses referencing prominent reports were more likely offered by 
those with previous leadership or elected office experience with comparatively only half of 
respondents with previous staff or private sector experience citing prominent reports. However, 
the few respondents who maintained that party group meetings contribute to group unity on all 
reports had a previous staff or private sector background. These results indicate that greater 
familiarity with legislative processes and in particular previous experience with party caucus 
meetings contribute toward identification of party group meetings as key forums for building 
support for the group line primarily on prominent reports where the stakes are highest.  
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      As depicted below in Table 7.5, the response trend followed predicted patterns in regards to 
group membership in that respondents from the most influential party groups were more likely to 
contend that party group meetings primarily contributed to group unity on prominent reports. 
With higher legislative stakes, leaders in more influential groups will be incentivized to focus 
dissent management efforts on prominent reports. However, EPP respondents offered this 
response in lower numbers which suggests that group size also influences perceptions of party 
group meetings in that EPP respondents are more likely to view group meetings as procedural 
forums where the group line is articulated with members deferring to working groups. 
TABLE 7.5: PARTY GROUP MEETING RESPONSES AND PARTY GROUP AFFILIATION 
Response          ALDE      ECR        EFD     EPP      Greens     GUE      S&D      N  
No Purpose                 0               0             0.20       0           0              0            0            1 
National Politics         0.06          0.22        0.80       0.07      0              0.75       0.19      17   
Communicate Line         0               0             0            0.26      0.10         0            0             5 
Prominent Reports         0.83          0.78        0            0.60      0.80         0.25       0.81      54 
All Reports                  0.11          0             0            0.07      0.10         0            0             4 
(N of Cases)                        (18)          (9)           (5)         (15)       (10)        (8)         (16)       81 
Note: Entries are percentages of party group meeting responses according to party group affiliation with 
the last line depicting respondents per party group. N of Cases: 81, Cramér's V: 0.4067***   
  
       In turn, Greens/EFA and ALDE respondents were the most likely to contend that party 
group meetings contribute to group unity on all reports which underscores the widespread 
positive attitudes by respondents toward and the observed extensive participation by members of 
these groups. Meanwhile, ECR respondents also were more likely to offer the response citing the 
link between group meetings and prominent reports which indicates that as the ECR identity and 
whip structure evolve, group leaders can utilize meetings as forums to build group unity though, 
at least for now, these efforts are relegated to a handful of reports viewed as „prominent‟.  
       Finally, respondents from the two smallest and least influential party groups were more 
likely to perceive party group meetings merely as forums for discussing national politics with an 
EFD respondent providing the sole perception of no role whatsoever for party group meetings. 
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My observations corroborate these perceptions in regards to EFD meetings, but I also observed 
that GUE meetings often encompass spirited and informed debate as well as national updates. I 
believe this reflects GUE culture in that individual and national independence in voting is 
prioritized over group unity leading most respondents to conclude that the group meetings do not 
contribute to unity though participation in them is high. 
      Party group meetings in the two largest groups are focused on building consensus and 
addressing dissent on prominent reports. In part this reflects the logistical limitations confronting 
leaders as a member of the EPP secretariat below asserts. In addition, EPP and S & D working 
groups are very influential in developing a common line that is adopted with minimal discussion 
in the group meeting or in the case of prominent reports is the framework for dissent 
management efforts by leaders. In this sense, the working group vice-president, along with the 
rapporteur and coordinators together at times with the parliamentary secretary take the lead in 
party group meetings to ensure maximum support and minimal levels of dissent expression.  
“Our group like I think all groups tries to have as much discipline as possible. First we try to 
have debates in the group on the tricky issues. We have a big group with two hundred and sixty-
five members. We have a number of forums and places where we try to merge a 
consensus…When there is a problem that has not found a solution in this context, then we go to 
the group meeting, and we have a discussion. We try to discuss for a long time when it is 
necessary because we usually find a compromise”. (October 15, 2011) 
 
      In my observations of EPP party group meetings, working group positions were nearly 
always adopted as the official group line. When encountering opposition, leaders were successful 
in addressing dissent during the meeting or pledged to follow-up with individuals afterwards. In 
a few instances, particular individuals or delegations were successful in securing group 
sponsorship of plenary amendments or agreed to dissent by abstaining or voting against a 
particular amendment but not the entire report. I believe this reflects in part the group culture that 
emphasizes unity as well as deference to working groups. 
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      Based on my observations and interview responses, President Daul tends to take a more 
relaxed role when presiding over party group meetings. He normally defers to other leaders to 
secure support for the group line except on prominent reports. When reports address divisive 
issues such as social issues or some foreign policy questions, Daul will ensure that all sides 
participate in a discussion and then a free vote is called for with the group line in this instance 
reflecting a majority and not an official leadership stance. However, when prominent reports are 
at-stake, Daul assumes a more assertive role. 
       In my first observation, after other leaders argued for the group line on a particular report, 
Daul urged members to “close ranks” behind him and pledged not to “pull punches” when 
meeting with national government leaders. On another report, one member took issue with the 
group line and engaged in a debate with the working group vice-president. The vice-president 
pledged to meet with the member even though she was not a delegation chair and that member 
later vote the group line in plenary. In another observation, the parliamentary secretary, Szajers, 
took a visible dissent management role such as by noting what he regarded as „the unacceptable 
position” of the Council on a particular report while clarifying the group line.  
       Szajers assumed the role of moderator on another report when noting a division between the 
rapporteur and a coordinator on particular paragraphs. Following discussion, Szajers forged a 
compromise which was supported in a recorded vote by the group. In my subsequent 
observations, Daul also acted as mediator in referring one report back to a working group and in 
overseeing a compromise on an amendment for another report. Daul was also very demonstrative 
in a Strasbourg meting addressing a particular dispute with the Council by referring to its 
position as “unacceptable” and vowed to defend the parliament‟s interests which drew loud 
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applause. Later Daul concurred with the rapporteur on having split votes on various amendments 
which would be proposed by the EPP in plenary. 
“It‟s through persuasion, it‟s through dialogue and encouraging full discussion in the group and 
that requires some trust. People have got to feel that they can raise an objection in group without 
being shot down, that they will get a fair hearing, that there will be a sensible discussion around 
the issue. So, we have worked hard as a group I think to nurture that feeling”. (October 16, 2011) 
 
       The comments above from an S & D vice-president underline the importance of party group 
meetings not only in the scheme of a whip structure managing dissent but also in regards to 
attitudes toward group unity (See Garner and Letki 2005). If members do not view party group 
meetings as forums where competing views may be heard and where the group line reflects 
consensus, group cohesion in plenary and in attitudes toward unity will decline. If such 
disconnect exists, members will be less likely to follow the lead of colleagues in supporting the 
group line in adopting group norms governing dissent. However, logistics prevent the larger 
groups from discussing every report in detail and not every member can participate in 
discussions. Therefore, group unity reflects the efforts of leaders to accommodate discussion and 
of members adopting the norm of adhering to the line set or articulated in the meetings. 
“So, Swoboda is chairing the group meeting, but he is not really interfering into business except 
when there are very crucial reports, and in this case he might call for a meeting of the respective 
coordinators and vice presidents in his office to coordinate a common position before the dossier 
is discussed in the group meeting. Like what we had with ACTA for instance. Then, in the group 
meeting, we try to discuss in order to find an agreement or compromise, and we cannot do this, 
then we vote and the majority is the position of the Socialist group”. (June 21, 2012) 
 
      As I also noted above, S & D presidents and other leaders were more likely to reference the 
group (Socialist) identity and appeal for unity than their EPP counterparts. The S & D are also 
more likely to set the group line or produce compromises on prominent reports in the group 
bureau before the full meeting. Otherwise, S & D group meetings mirror those of the EPP in 
their attention to prominent reports and in their deference to the working group position as the 
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group line. In turn, any expression of dissent must be made prior to or during the group meeting 
with less costly forms of dissent expression often secured in the meeting. 
       The first S & D party group meeting I observed was chaired by President Schulz. His style 
differed from his successor Swoboda (parliamentary secretary during my first research phase) in 
that he was more demonstrative in his speaking and in that he adopted a more top-down 
approach to consensus. In part, this was reflected in more frequent votes in the meeting to 
identify a group line under Swoboda‟s leadership but also in that Schulz was quicker to address 
dissenting views, whereas Swoboda tended to let the debate play out before reverting to appeals 
for unity on the group line. As with Szajers, the S & D parliamentary secretaries noted the group 
line and at times acted as moderators/lobbyists.  
       In another meeting, Schulz noted that a vote on a particular report would be “a signal to the 
Council” underlying the defense of the European Parliament as an institution. Multiple members 
made appeals to Schulz to go further in his plenary address in criticizing the banks. Schulz then 
outlined three clear goals that must accompany any future S & D line on fiscal and financial 
integration. He then turned over the discussion to one of the WG vice-presidents who echoed 
many of Schulz‟s criticisms. In a meeting I observed during the second phase of research, 
President Swoboda was critical of the level of plenary cohesion for the group on a particular set 
of prominent reports while the new parliamentary secretary, Guerrero, reviewed the upcoming 
plenary agenda and group lines on reports and amendments.  
       Party group meetings in the medium-sized groups provide the same consensus-building and 
dissent management forum as in the larger groups yet also differ in key ways. With fewer 
members, ALDE, ECR, and Greens/EFA party group meetings provide more of an opportunity 
for members to participate in discussions and to contribute to the development of the group line. 
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In turn, party group meetings become the focal point for dissent management, socialization, and 
(apart from the ECR) instilling a common group identity. In this sense, the relatively high 
cohesion obtained by the ALDE and the Greens/EFA is in large part a product of the full 
utilization of party group meetings by leaders AND the investment of members in valuing the 
role and output of these forums.  
“For example, we had a big discussion on something and there were opposing opinions in the 
group and we discussed for three hours, and he listened and let everybody tell what they want to 
have as this group line and he made a decision that everybody thought was perfect what he 
proposed, and his proposal was kind of a compromise proposal. It wasn‟t the right or the left side 
of our group, but something everybody could feel comfortable with and besides he let us discuss 
for such a long time and of course there must be compromises” (June 29, 2012) 
 
       I often witnessed the scenario described above by an ALDE MEP in my observations of 
group meetings. The rapporteur would propose the group line which would be followed by 
extensive discussion which left me and members baffled as to what exactly was the common 
line. Then, Verhofstadt would propose a common line reflecting the bulk if not the majority of 
views of those who had participated in the discussion. At times, this was a modification of the 
rapporteur‟s position and in other instances was an entirely new approach to the group position. 
This clearly demonstrates the unusual role of Verhofstadt in that he acts as the principle 
consensus-builder in party group meetings.  
“We had a debate about criticizing Berlusconi‟s hold of the media. So, we discussed it in our 
group meeting and we all agreed to vote the critical Berlusconi line. We then had the vote in 
parliament and it lost by one vote and we were all mystified because we had done the 
calculations and we thought we would win it. We found that our three Irish members had 
switched sides after our meeting…So in the following evening‟s group meeting, Verhofstadt 
made sure the Irish members were there and said we had an agreement in our meeting and you 
three voted against it. Would you like to explain in front of the whole group why you did that? In 
the end, Verhofstadt said we have done this, so let‟s go on to the next item, but it was a masterful 
performance.” (October 26, 2011)  
 
      The example above offered by a member of the ALDE bureau highlights the norm of 
members giving advance notice to group leadership that they or their delegation will dissent from 
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the group line. This may be done in private, in the working group, or in the party group meeting. 
Norm adoption occurs when members copy the behavior of their colleagues and/or follow the 
appeals of group leaders. In this sense, widespread norm adoption of indicating dissent prior to 
or during group meetings as well as a strong sense of investment by members in the processes 
and outcomes associated with group meetings helps to explain relatively high ALDE cohesion.  
       However, an explanation for the ALDE‟s ranking as the fourth most cohesive party group 
may be found in the breakdown of the whip structure in that in contrast to the collaborative 
efforts by Greens/EFA leaders during and after group meetings, the ALDE group president and 
rapporteur bear the brunt of dissent management. In addition, poor attitudes toward working 
groups as described by most ALDE respondents in the previous section undermines or at the 
least complicates dissent management in that unlike their EPP or S & D counterparts ALDE 
leaders cannot rely on norms encouraging deferral to group experts.  
       My observations of ALDE group meetings affirmed that group presidents and other leaders 
in general must pick their battles in the sense that they cannot secure universal support for the 
group line in all matters and otherwise pursue lower levels of dissent expression. In my first 
observation, one delegation announced that they would oppose the group line on a report, which 
was met with a notation by Verhofstadt. Instead, the president focused his time addressing what 
he considered as the key points of the group‟s priorities concerning economic governance. The 
group then affirmed a common line on four other reports following extensive discussion. 
       In another observation, the parliamentary secretary asked the group to clarify its position on 
a particular report. From there, the rapporteur took the lead role in advocating for support of the 
group line as defined by the relevant committee members. After an extensive debate, Verhofstadt 
identified a consensus consisting of a proposal by the group in plenary to split a particular 
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paragraph, have a free vote on one amendment, and adhere to the original line on the bulk of the 
report and on its final passage. This exchange also highlights the far more reserved role of the 
ALDE whip in comparison to her EPP, S & D, and even ECR counterparts in that she asked for 
clarification for the group line but never advocated for a position and did not act as a mediator.  
       Later, Verhofstadt pledged to raise an issue of concern identified by many members to the 
Council of Presidents. In another meeting, Verhofstadt confirmed that the group would support a 
particular amendment on a report but asked the group to identify its views on another 
amendment. After debate clearly identified a pronounced division among the group, Verhofstadt 
announced that a free vote would accompany that particular amendment.  
“In the beginning, I had some difficulty with the way the group discusses things sometimes. It‟s 
difficult to follow and a bit messy and it depends a bit on the mood of the chair. Once you get to 
understand the dynamics and the method in a way, I think that usually I am more in line when I 
leave than when I arrived. We have all the written briefings and we have very good staff, and 
they write very elaborate briefings on all of the files, and if we have questions we can raise, but I 
think usually they solve a lot on the written text because they are so thorough”. (June 4, 2012) 
 
        The response above from a Greens/EFA vice-president to the question of whether party 
group meetings contribute to group unity reflects both the structure and the culture associated 
with party group meetings. Greens/EFA meetings are distinctive in their extensive participation 
(followed closely by the ALDE) but are also unique in that the group secretariat and MEP aides 
participate in debate exemplified by the „whip‟ role assumed by the secretary-general, Vula 
Tsetsi. Vula not only participates in debates but also pursues consensus for the group line while 
providing updates on developments in other groups and institutions. In turn, Greens/EFA 
meeting notes are the most detailed and easily understood produced by any group. 
“It depends. So, normally if it is in the group meeting that it is clear that the working group could 
not solve the conflict and there are very different notions, and sometimes the people indicated to 
the co-presidents and the secretary-general that there is a conflict, it‟s tackled in the group 
meeting and normally Rebecca Harms and Cohn-Bendit try to make their interests clear, Danny 
is especially strong in defending his interests, and then the procedure is that we try to figure out 
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by indicative voting in the group what is the majority and minority position, and then in these 
cases if we find that it is a conflict that we cannot solve, then we have indications in the voting 
list of where we have a free vote, what is the majority vote, and which people want to vote 
differently”. (June 5, 2012) 
 
       The response above provided by a Greens coordinator underscores the contributions of 
working groups on prominent reports but also highlights the crucial dissent management role 
played by a „team‟ of group leaders consisting of co-presidents, vice-presidents, the rapporteur, 
Vula, and others in securing near universal support for the group line. Even after fractious 
debate, either the Greens/EFA group line is re-affirmed or a compromise among the group 
occurs after the debate in the group meeting. Though separate national lines do occur (especially 
by the EFA parties), on most votes, the group is nearly unified despite the obvious reservations 
of some members expressed in in the group meeting. In this sense, Greens/EFA members 
strongly identify with the group in that they put their objections aside and support the line agreed 
upon in the group meeting which I believe is in part a product of a strong sense of investment in 
the meetings and of the efforts of leaders to identify and manage dissent prior to and during the 
meeting as illustrated by frequent lobbying in the aisle or hallway. 
       On most occasions in my observations, either Harms or Cohn-Bendit were in the chair for 
the entire proceedings while the other either talked to members at their seats or elsewhere, or left 
the room for periods of time. When discussing one report, the rapporteur noted that the group 
had made it „greener‟ through amendments at the committee level while also addressing group 
goals. However, as there were administrative costs in the report for a program the group very 
much oppose, she recommended that the group abstain as its official plenary line in the first 
reading and then vote no in the second reading following conciliation with the Council.  
       In one group meeting during the economic governance crisis, Vula took the lead role in 
articulating the outline of any future group position. The debate highlighted significant divisions 
275 
 
in an otherwise ideologically cohesive group in that some members prefer austerity measures, 
while others prefer stimulus spending. Later, the near unanimity on the six and two-pack (See 
www.votewatch.eu) is in turn evidence of successful lobbying and socialization associated with 
Greens/EFA party group meetings. In another meeting a particular report was met with 
substantial reservations. The appeals for unity by the rapporteur were reiterated by vice-
presidents, Vula, and Harms while Cohn-Bendit worked the aisles lobbying members. After 
agreeing to a compromise amendment, the group line on the entire report was affirmed.   
       My observations confirmed the views of a significant majority of ECR respondents who 
maintained that party group meetings contribute to group unity on prominent reports. In turn, 
many of the components of a successful whip structure are in place. The group whip utilizes the 
meeting to state the group line on all report, notes divisions within the group on particular 
amendments or reports, and at times proposes compromises to secure consensus or to minimize 
dissent at less costly levels as the response from an aide to an ECR vice-president contends. 
“The way it works with us that coming up to a group meeting, Fox (whip) will circulate a note to 
the shadows letting him know if they want him to discuss something, so this way you find out 
what might be controversial within the group prior to the meeting and the chief whip asks the 
group in the meeting to discuss its position”.  (October 5, 2011) 
        
       In turn, the ECR party group meeting acts an additional component of the whip structure in 
that it is utilized by the rapporteur, the whip, and other leaders to clarify and build support for the 
group line. However, what distinguish the ECR from the more cohesive groups are the 
prevalence and the acceptance of separate national lines. For instance, while Fox may pursue a 
common line, more than often, a group line either does not accompany a report or it entails a 
majority opinion rather than the official leadership view unaccompanied by lobbying.  
“I would say that nine of ten plenary notes come before the group and there is no comment. In 
other words, everyone is happy that the coordinators made the right decision. Of the remaining 
ten percent, any member could say I am not happy with that plenary note and I want a discussion 
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or occasionally the coordinator will say this is a genuinely difficult issue on which the members 
of the committee are divided and therefore we want the group to inform us on how they feel. 
Those are fairly rare, because I think for example on agriculture, we know that the British 
delegation will have a position x and the Polish will have a separate whip. So, there might be a 
thorny issue on agriculture but it doesn‟t need to be discussed in the group because we know 
what the result will be”. (November 9, 2011) 
 
       As an ECR vice-president above describes, the group meeting is often a venue for noting 
either the majority view or a series of national lines on various reports. However, if the 
coordinators, the rapporteur, and others approach the whip to pursue a compromise or if he and 
the group president believe that the ECR can influence a plenary outcome on a prominent report, 
then Fox will argue for a common line in the meeting. This may take the form of abstaining as in 
the vote on ACTA which as another ECR vice-president below notes was the result of lobbying 
by the group president, Martin Callanan (second field research phase). 
“A good example would be the recent discussion on ACTA that took place in the ECR group 
meeting. Whereas some ECR Members were inclined to support ACTA, others were strongly 
against. Mr. Callanan formed a consensus and the group abstained”. (ECR VP, June 19, 2012) 
 
       In this sense, while the ECR have a whip and more recently a group president who pursues a 
common line on prominent reports, the bulk of ECR party group meetings act as information 
forums rather than dissent management venues. As I have argued in previous chapters, the ECR 
have obtained relatively high cohesion in a short time since their founding in 2009 and have the 
potential to become even more influential in plenary. However, the acceptance of separate 
national lines on a majority of reports impedes the influence of party group meetings. In turn, a 
greater emphasis on securing a common line adhered to by most of the group on most reports 
would contribute toward greater plenary cohesion and a more cohesive group identity. 
      However, it is important to note that I never observed an ECR group meeting chaired by 
Callanan and observed only two group meetings chaired by Zahradil. However, these 
observations did confirm the perceived influence of the group whip and of the prevalence of 
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separate national lines on a majority of reports. In my first ECR meeting observation, the Czech 
prime minister addressed the group and fielded questions from members. Fox then briefed the 
group on the upcoming plenary and announced that an agreement among delegations and the 
rapporteur had been reached that the group would abstain as a whole on a particular report. 
       In another meeting observation, Fox summarized the conflicting positions among some 
within the group on a particular report. He gave way to the rapporteur who was from one of the 
delegations comprised of only one member. A debate among members entirely along delegation 
lines ensued with Fox noting in the end that the UK delegation would abstain and the other 
delegations would support the rapporteur‟s position. In this sense, the rapporteur‟s position while 
reflecting a majority of the group was not the official party group line with a significant portion 
of the group adopting a separate line. However, on another report, Fox secured an official group 
line of abstaining on a particular amendment but supporting final adoption in plenary.  
       Most GUE respondents view party group meeting primarily as forums for discussing 
national politics though a quarter believed meetings contributed to unity on prominent reports. 
My observations on the whole confirm these perceptions although I did notice a change in 
attitude by leadership toward the role of group meetings following the election of Rebecca 
Zimmer as group president prior to the second phase of field research. As one GUE leader below 
notes, leadership does pursue a common line on some reports including abstaining as a group. 
”Sometimes abstain is also a position. It depends on the issue and from the direction of the report 
if an abstention is more positive or negative. Normally, the chair wants to get a common position 
to support or to reject a report. Sometimes for abstention, but we need good feelings for it and 
sometimes she and other leaders may have the feeling that there is no common position and will 
say ok, if you don‟t want to come to a common position, then this is a free vote.” (June 19, 2012) 
 
       The GUE more than often do not have an official line on reports and any „group line‟ more 
often reflects a majority of members rather than a position pursued by leadership. In this sense, 
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the rapporteur‟s position is rarely adopted as the common line and the GUE according to 
responses and my observations are far less often than the ECR to utilize group meetings to 
pursue a common line. However, President Zimmer on occasion did argue for a common 
position and has called for a more substantive consensus-building role for GUE vice-presidents. 
If the GUE pursue and utilize group meetings to achieve consensus on more reports, then they 
may acquire greater plenary influence and more cohesion. In other words, the GUE would need 
to replace the norm of dissent with one emphasizing adherence to a common line and regard 
consensus as a unity-building exercise rather than as „subversion of democracy‟. 
       That is not to say that the GUE do not debate issues in group meetings. In some ways, my 
observations refute the response trend in that I heard far more substantive discussions on reports 
than in the EFD meetings which indicate an interest among many members in plenary outcomes. 
In my first observation, the group was notified by one member of a planned general strike in 
Portugal and of developments in Greek protests which both underlined the closer connections to 
social movements enjoyed by the GUE compared to the other groups except perhaps for the 
Greens. In my initial two observations, President Bisky moderated discussions but never 
advocated for a common line on any reports. Similarly, the rapporteur‟s appeals in most 
instances lacked the support of other leaders that I observed in other group meetings.  
       In my third observation, President Zimmer announced that an agreement had been reached 
between delegation leaders and the rapporteur to propose a common line of abstaining on a 
particular report. One MEP notified the group of a rally on repealing border controls which the 
president promised to attend and urged members to record video testimonials on this issue. This 
underscores how in many instances, the GUE are a protest movement criticizing liberalization 
and other policies yet in other instances a majority join with the S & D and Greens to pass or 
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defeat particular reports. On another report, the president tried to secure a group line of 
abstaining but many members persisted in calling for split votes. In the end, this side won in that 
the group would sponsor amendments splitting paragraphs but a majority pledged to abstain. 
       EFD party group meetings are almost exclusively forums for discussing national politics and 
opposition to the EU project with little discussion of the plenary agenda. However, some EFD 
members do participate in policymaking at the committee level and will urge colleagues to 
support their position in plenary. Vice-President Messerschmidt of Denmark and the Lega Nord 
delegation typify this approach of though being critical of integration utilize the tools at their 
disposal to safeguard particular interests whereas UKIP members reject the process as a whole. 
Nonetheless, EFD members do positively view party group meetings as one MEP below asserts. 
“We all find it useful to be in a Group and to attend group meetings, where we hear reports from 
other countries, often containing interesting details, which do not appear in the media; or meet 
personalities from around the world, who can shed new light on familiar matters.  Sometimes we 
undertake campaigns, as a Group - like our campaign in Ireland, against Fiscal Union - but, as in 
that case, not all delegations participate.  It's a live-and-let-live situation. Maximum freedom for 
all to do what they like”. (June 21, 2012)  
 
       At my first observation of an EFD group meeting, Nigel Farage was not in attendance and 
co-president Speroni chaired the meeting. The meeting consisted largely of a series of national 
political reports by delegations though the co-president did state the group‟s opposition to 
developments within a particular EU agency. One vice-president lobbied his colleagues to 
coordinate efforts to derail financial and fiscal union, though my sense was that each delegation 
viewed its efforts as sovereign and independent endeavors. In the absence of the UKIP, I believe 
the EFD could exert greater plenary influence and attain higher cohesion if its leaders pursued a 
common line which they rarely. In another observation, Farage was in the chair and he asked for 
one delegation to clarify their position on a particular issue. Following this discussion, Farage 
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offered insight on a particular report which revealed his knowledge of the financial sector. From 
here, Farage was ecstatic in reacting to recent public opinion polls and the meeting adjourned.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
       Party group and (where applicable) working group meetings contribute to party group unity 
by functioning as dissent management and consensus-building forums. Group meetings provide 
an opportunity for members to express their views and contribute to the development of the 
group line which in turn strengthen the cohesion of the group in that members who regard group 
meetings as productive and vital forums are more likely to support the group line in plenary and 
view themselves as group members rather than solely as individuals or as part of a national 
delegation. In this sense, group meetings provide an opportunity for leaders to socialize members 
into adopting the norm of adhering to the group line affirmed or identified in the group meeting 
and to announce the intent to dissent either before or during the group meeting. 
       In addition, party group meetings are also opportunities for leaders to identify and manage 
dissent. In turn, a whip structure consisting of clearly-assigned roles for leaders who work as a 
team is necessary in order for group meetings to be utilized to the fullest potential in terms of 
securing consensus and managing dissent. Observations confirmed the prevalent perception 
among respondents that party group meetings are primarily utilized by leaders in the more 
cohesive groups to build consensus and manage dissent on prominent reports whereas the least 
cohesive party groups (EFD and GUE) primarily utilize group meetings to discuss national 
politics and to articulate separate lines. This perception is also more evident among respondents 
with more years of service in the parliament and those with previous national governmental or 
party leadership experience. I also find that the ALDE president is far more active in consensus-
building and dissent management in party group meetings than his counterparts, while the 
Greens/EFA are unique in their practice of including the secretary-general and other staff in 
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meeting deliberations. Overall, in the four most cohesive groups, leaders make appeals and when 
necessary lobby members during or after the meeting.  
       Group forums as a whole reduce information asymmetry, facilitate dissent management, and 
instill the norm of deference to decisions taken in group forums. Interview responses similarly 
identified an important dissent management role for horizontal working groups and that negative 
views toward working groups contribute to low levels of group cohesion both in plenary and in 
terms of attitudes within the party group toward unity. Positive perceptions of the role of 
working groups were held by respondents in the two largest groups on all reports. In contrast, 
ALDE respondents on the whole negatively viewed working groups as either unimportant 
forums accompanied by low attendance or as forums important only for those invested in the 
report. While the ALDE have secured relatively high cohesion, negative views toward working 
groups helps to explain their comparatively higher dissent levels. 
       Meanwhile, though the Greens/EFA do not have working groups in the same organizational 
sense as the three larger groups their thematic working groups are positively viewed by members 
and are part of a whip structure that aggressively pursues unanimity at every stage. Similarly, the 
ECR have formed a policy development group which identifies long-term issues and positions 
for the group. When considered in conjunction with the coordination role played by the group 
whip, ECR cohesion is in part a product of members‟ views toward group forums and of the 
efforts of the group whip. However, ECR cohesion remains far lower in part because separate 
national lines displace or accompany the group line articulated in the meetings. 
       Finally, while the smallest party groups do not require working groups, their lower cohesion 
is a product of their inability (or in the case of the EFD unwillingness) to fully utilize party group 
meetings to build consensus and address dissent and of a group culture which undermines unity. 
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In this sense, group size and influence contribute to specific forums and leadership roles, but 
unity for any party group is attainable through the full utilization of party group meetings by 
leaders and of a widespread perception among members that meetings are forums where 
participation is encouraged and whose decisions embody the values and goals of the group. 
       In the next chapter, I will continue my consideration of the relationship between 
socialization and group cohesion by considering to two questions included in the Farrell et al. 
survey (2011) and responses to two questions I asked in interviews: when is it appropriate to 
dissent from the group line and what is done to help new MEPs understand the organization and 
values of the party group? Low dissent levels can only be achieved when a whip structure is 
accompanied by socialization processes that foster a shared group identity and instill particular 
norms. Socialization in this sense both assists and builds upon lobbying efforts by group leaders 
in that it reduces their workload by encouraging members to adopt the group line or dissent at 
less costly levels yet also is another tool utilized by leaders to ensure unity. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: SOCIALIZATION AND PARTY GROUP COHESION 
 
INTRODUCTION   
      In the previous chapter, I considered the contributions of horizontal working groups (where 
applicable) and party group meetings toward party group cohesion. I found that the more 
cohesive party groups utilized both forums to identify and address dissent, instill norms, re-
enforce shared conceptualizations of the group identity, and reduce information 
asymmetry/overload for MEPs. Group meetings provide an opportunity for members to 
contribute to the development of the group line which in turn strengthen the cohesion of the 
group in that members who regard group meetings as productive and vital forums are more likely 
to support the group line in plenary and view themselves as group members rather than solely as 
individuals or as part of a national delegation (See Brown 2000, Garner and Letki 2005). 
       Observations confirmed the perception among most respondents that party group meetings 
are primarily utilized by leaders in the more cohesive groups to build consensus and manage 
dissent on prominent reports whereas the least cohesive party groups (EFD and GUE) primarily 
utilize group meetings to discuss national politics and to articulate separate lines. This perception 
is also more evident among respondents with more years of service in the parliament and those 
with previous national governmental or party leadership experience. In addition I found, the 
ALDE president is far more active in consensus-building and dissent management in party group 
meetings than his counterparts, while the Greens/EFA are unique in their practice of including 
the secretary-general and other staff in meeting deliberations. 
       Interview responses similarly identified an important dissent management role for horizontal 
working groups with negative views toward working groups contributing to low levels of group 
cohesion. For example, whereas respondents in the three most cohesive party groups viewed 
working group leaders and members as experts who embody the values and priorities of the 
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group, ALDE respondents on the whole negatively viewed working groups as either unimportant 
forums with low attendance or as forums important only for those invested in a given report.  
       Meanwhile, though the Greens/EFA do not have working groups in the same organizational 
sense as the three larger groups their thematic working groups are positively viewed by members 
and are part of a whip structure that aggressively pursues cohesion at every stage. Similarly, 
while the ECR lack working groups, they have formed the policy development group which 
identifies long-term issues and positions for the group. Finally, while the smallest party groups 
do not require working groups to resolve collective action problems, lower cohesion reflects an 
unwillingness to fully utilize party group meetings and a group culture which undermines unity.  
       In this chapter, I will consider the relationship between socialization and party group unity in 
greater detail. The chapter will first review literature defining socialization, shared identity, and 
norms of behavior at the group level which I link to dissent management processes. From here, 
the chapter will consider evidence of socialization in party groups through responses to two 
questions asked as part of the extensive Farrell et al. (2011) MEP survey which identify the level 
of a shared group identity defined in “European” terms as well as the perceived importance of 
party group unity among membership. The bulk of the chapter will then consider further 
evidence of socialization through field research interview responses to two questions. The first 
question asked respondents to identify expectations for communicating dissent from the group 
line and the second enquired about efforts at the party group level to socialize new MEPs. In 
turn, the goal of the chapter is to indicate how party group leaders utilize socialization processes 
in conjunction with lobbying to secure high levels of group cohesion. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
       Kam (2002) defines socialization as “the process of exposure or learning through which MPs 
acquire certain norms” (Kam, 2002, 194). In turn, Brown (2000) notes that “our sense of who we 
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are and what we are worth is intimately bound-up with our group memberships” (Brown, 2000, 
28). In this sense, the combination of a shared conceptualization of the group identity and the 
diffusion of norms through socialization contribute to a cohesive group in regards to both voting 
behavior as well as the extent to which members strongly identify with the group and its 
aspirations (Brown, 2000, 64). Some party groups have shared histories dating back to the 
foundation of the European Parliament or in some cases much deeper foundations as part of a 
European political party family whereas the ECR have only been in existence since the 2009 
elections. In turn, a succession of treaties and ECJ rulings have provided added incentive to party 
groups to remind members of shared histories and traditions in order to secure high cohesion. 
       With higher legislative stakes, the more cohesive party groups have pursued a shared 
conceptualization of the group identity in order to instill a sense of unity by socializing members 
into considering themselves as part of the (x) party group and not solely as individuals or 
members of national party delegations. For example, party group leaders encourage members to 
view themselves as „Europeans‟. As Smith (2004) notes in his study of European foreign policy 
decision-making forums, this requires members to “reconstitute their behavior in favor of 
European norms rather than solely national norms” (Smith, 2004, 30). This does not require 
members to sacrifice national or individual identities in favor of group identities as “identity is 
not a zero-sum characteristic and does not require a transfer of loyalty” (Smith, 2004, 30). It does 
though require members to highly value group unity and to put group interests before their own. 
In turn, loyalty to the party group is obtained in part by the promotion of group membership as a 
vehicle for European cooperation and in appeals stressing „Community‟ or „European‟ solutions.  
       A shared identity is in part re-enforced through role assignment for leaders and rank-and-
file. As Brown (2000) notes, particular roles “bring order to the group‟s existence and imply 
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expectations about behavior (Brown, 2000, 72). Role assignments clarify dissent management 
responsibilities for leaders and consensus-building roles for group forums. For example, the EPP 
and S & D have assigned leadership roles to vice-presidents chairing horizontal working groups 
and instilled norms of deferring to the group line adopted on most reports by working groups. In 
contrast, the GUE have to-date refused to assign dissent management roles to group leaders and 
often promote national or individual interests at the expense of party group unity. 
       According to Brown (2000), “norms specify…certain rules for how group members should 
behave and thus are the basis for mutual expectations among the group members” and that 
“norms may serve to enhance or maintain the identity of the group” (Brown, 2000, 56 and 60). In 
this sense, group leaders are not only disciplinary figures and lobbyists but also role models or 
reference points for other members. As Crowe (1983) notes, “socialization aims to establish 
conformity with group norms, ensuring regularized patterns of behavior and interaction among 
members of the group” (Crowe, 1983, 923). Brown similarly contends that “once a group 
develops a clearly-defined goal inevitably norms encouraging goal-facilitative actions and 
discouraging inhibitory behaviors will emerge” (Brown, 2000, 60).  
       With high electoral turnover, retirement, and members leaving during a parliament, a 
cohesive group comprised of an overall fluid membership is obtainable in the long-term if there 
is a wide-spread adoption by membership of group goals and shared attitudes toward group-level 
decision-making processes which is in turn passed on to incoming members. As Crowe (1983) 
notes, “a well-established normative structure limits the de-stabilizing impact of new members 
by subjecting them to socialization” (Crowe, 1983, 909). In this sense, socialization encompasses 
an ongoing effort by group leaders across successive parliaments yet also draws from a shared 
group identity that is not bound to a given report or plenary session.  
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       Imbedded norms (those which are widespread and have been in practice for some time) as 
Crowe (1986) identifies impose obligations on members in the sense of a shared loyalty to the 
group. In turn, when a member indicates their intention to dissent or of their uncertainty, leaders 
can appeal to that sense of loyalty to the group in conjunction with lobbying efforts and in place 
of disciplinary efforts (Crowe, 1986, 163). Loyalty to the group in this sense becomes as Kam 
(2002) notes, “routine and consensual” in that leaders rarely have to lobby most individual 
members or otherwise the whip structure would become strained and the group‟s plenary 
influence as well as its identity would suffer. In turn, Kam contends that socialization ensures 
that party loyalty becomes “normatively desirable” with members internalizing the costs of not 
adhering to established norms at the group level thereby making dissent management efforts 
easier for group leaders to achieve and maintain (Kam, 2002, 31). 
FARELL, HIX, AND SCULLY 2011 MEP SURVEY AND SOCIALIZATION 
        One source of evidence for the extent of socialization in party groups may be found in MEP 
responses to a survey conducted early in the current parliament (Farrell et al. 2011). From this 
extensive survey, I have selected one question which considers the relationship between 
competing identities and one which examines the extent to which respondents not only value 
party group unity but also how they perceive colleagues view group unity. Responses to both 
questions reveal a correlation between shared identity and extensive socialization with high 
levels of party group cohesion. In turn, I consider responses only within the context of party 
group membership for the purposes of addressing the topics raised in this chapter.  
       While each party group may develop its own identity, one common link between a shared 
conceptualization of the group identity and a highly cohesive party group may be to socialize 
members into seeing themselves and the group as European. Question 6.8 of the survey asks 
MEPs (including non-attached) if they see themselves: in terms of their nationality only, 
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primarily in terms of their nationality but also as European, the same combination but with an 
emphasis on being European, solely in the sense of being European, or according to some other 
category (EPRG MEP Survey Dataset: 2011). This question differs from an earlier that asked 
MEPs to place themselves on an ideological scale measuring support for European integration.  
       As depicted in Table 8.1 below, when responses are organized according to party group 
membership, two patterns emerge. First, nearly three-fifths of respondents accentuated their 
national origins but included a European aspect to their identity. Secondly, respondents from the 
more cohesive party groups are more likely to define their identity in European terms. Members 
of the most cohesive party group, the Greens/EFA, were more likely to view themselves solely 
as European or to emphasize being European over their national origin. This perception was 
followed in intensity by ALDE, S & D, and EPP respondents. In contrast, ECR and EFD 
respondents were more likely to define their identity according to national origins while GUE 
members were more likely to select the other category which perhaps reflects economic class?  
TABLE 8.1: EUROPEAN/NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
Identity EPP S&D ALDE   Greens/EFA   ECR    GUE  EFD    NA       N  
Member-State 0.02 0 0   0       0.29     0  0.40    0      7  
MS/European 0.72 0.61 0.59   0.07       0.71     0.33  0.30    0.80  103 
European/MS 0.16 0.24 0.34   0.43       0 0  0    0.20    38  
European 0.02 0.02 0   0.14       0 0  0.10    0      5    
Other  0.08 0.12 0.07   0.36       0 0.67  0.20    0          23 
(N of Cases)   (60)     (49)     (27)       (14)             (7)         (4)       (10)       (5)       176      
Note: Table depicts percentage of respondents according to party group affiliation from largest to smallest 
party group with last line depicting umber of respondents per party group. N of Cases: 176, Cramér's V = 
0.3764***. Data Source: Farrell et al. EPRG MEP Survey Dataset: 2011 
 
       How do these responses impact party group cohesion? As Smith (2004) above noted, an 
emphasis on being European does not necessarily translate into an abandonment of a national 
identity but rather indicates in this case that membership in a particular party group is defined in 
part by the degree to which a member views themselves and in turn perceive their party group as 
European. In this sense, European refers to support for European rather than national solutions 
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which in turn translates into pursuing consensus (within and when possible across party groups) 
with party group unity viewed as an essential step in order to obtain the European solution. 
       For example, I found that the more cohesive party groups have much closer ties to their 
Europarty with members viewing both the party group and Europarty as part of a larger „family‟ 
or „movement‟. In contrast, respondents from the less cohesive party groups identified far 
weaker ties with their Europarties or noted that a Europarty was still in the process of formation. 
This stronger European bond was further evident in the language employed by leaders from the 
more cohesive party groups. For example, group presidents often made appeals to members to 
support the group line on prominent reports because European or Community solutions were 
necessary or because the “European experiment” was at-stake along with the group‟s reputation.   
       As an EPP vice-president below emphasizes, members of the more cohesive groups derive a 
sense of unity from sharing a European approach to issues. In turn, I contend that the absence of 
a European identity in the less cohesive party groups contributes to higher dissent levels in that 
party group membership is viewed by members as a necessity rather than as a vehicle for 
obtaining a shared vision for Europe. For example, when an MEP‟s goals are defined in part by 
their definitions of group membership, leaders may draw from a shared emphasis on finding 
European solutions as group affiliation is partially defined in European terms. On the other hand, 
a shared identity in any form is insufficient for securing high cohesion if unaccompanied by 
other socialization processes and a fully functional whip structure.  
“Our group has a common line which is in favor of more European integration. I think that is the 
main strength of our group. Then, we might have different views which are center-left or center 
right, more progressive or more moderate policy on how to implement a European approach, but 
I would say that main European approach is the main goal of our activities”. (June 12, 2012) 
 
      Party group unity is in this sense also a product of an engaged leadership (whip structure), 
and of a membership that places an emphasis on unity. In turn, high cohesion is in part the 
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culmination of efforts by leaders to socialize members into framing their goals according to 
group membership. Accordingly, members perceive that their goals and those of the group are 
one in the same and that shared goals are only attainable through a unified party group. For 
example, whereas EFD members do not value group unity and instead direct their attention to an 
external audience, Greens/EFA members value group unity to the point of setting aside 
differences in order to secure a compromise culminating in a common line.  
       Unity in this sense is rational yet also reflects group cultural influences in that while 
members may pursue group unity because it facilitates the fulfillment of their preferences, group 
unity is also a product of members adhering to the appeals and copying the behavior of leaders 
and colleagues who emphasize the importance of group unity. In turn, if group leaders 
demonstrate the importance of unity through voting and in speeches while also pursuing unity 
through lobbying, members are more likely to copy this behavior and adopt similar attitudes. 
       In Question 5.4 of the Farrell et al. survey (2011), MEPs were asked if they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement: “For our European political group, it is very important to appear 
united” (EPRG MEP Survey Dataset: 2011). The response set was arranged according to a five-
point scale with 1 indicating complete agreement, 2 agreement, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 
disagreement and 5 indicating complete disagreement. The number of respondents for this 
question is one larger than those answering the previous question and Gamma rather than 
Cramér's V is utilized as a measure of strength of association as responses to the question are of 
an ordinal rather than a nominal nature. As depicted in Table 8.2 below, nearly three-fourths of 
respondents completely agreed or agreed with the statement that it was important for their party 
group to appear united. MEPs in the ECR group as well as members of the more cohesive party 
groups most often agreed with the statement with members of the two largest groups most likely 
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to completely agree. In contrast, those from less cohesive party groups were more likely to 
disagree or completely disagree that it was important for their group to appear united.  
TABLE 8.2: IMPORTANCE OF APPEARING UNITED AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
Group Unity EPP S&D ALDE   Greens/EFA    ECR      GUE      EFD      NA        N  
Completely 0.26 0.35 0.08   0.14               0      0        0.22      0.20      40 
Agree  0.52 0.53 0.65   0.64               0.87        0        0.11      0          92 
Neither 0.14 0.08 0.15   0.07               0.13        0        0.22      0.60      24  
4  0.02 0.02 0.12   0.14               0      0.50       0.44      0          13 
5  0.06 0.02 0   0               0      0.50       0         0.20        8 
(N of Cases)   (62)    (49)     (26)         (14)                (8)           (4)        (9)         (5)      177        
Note: Table depicts percentage of responses according to party group affiliation from largest to smallest 
party group with the last row depicting the number of respondents per party group. N of Cases: 177, 
Gamma = 0.2637**, Data Source: Farrell et al. EPRG MEP Survey Dataset: 2011 
 
       The ECR response trend defies expectations in that as among the least cohesive party 
groups, its members responding to this survey place a great emphasis on party group unity. In 
part, this may reflect the influence of the UK Conservative MEPs with their long history of party 
discipline and their primary role in forming the group and its organizational structure (whip 
office) which in turn leads colleagues from other member-states to conclude that the appearance 
of party group unity is important because their UK colleagues stress its importance. Regardless, 
the responses do provide further evidence that the ECR may achieve higher cohesion if it 
develops socialization processes to translate the perceived importance of party group unity into 
reality. In other words, non-UK members must take the next step from acknowledging the 
importance of appearing unified to adhering to a single line rather than separate national lines on 
a consistent basis if higher cohesion levels are to be attained.  
SOCIALIZATION AND EXPECTATIONS ON ANNOUNCING DISSENT 
       Norms governing dissent expression may be translated into informal practices re-enforced 
through appeals by leaders as well as through observing and copying the behavior of colleagues. 
However, informal practices may be codified over time into formal rules (See Smith 2004). Party 
group rules are normally not available to the public, but in the course of field research, some 
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respondents referenced rules governing dissent announcement. For example, one senior member 
of the ECR secretariat noted that it was required in the 2009 Prague Declaration (the group‟s 
constitution) for any member to inform the group whip of their intent to dissent either directly or 
through their delegation chair. In the absence of accessible rules governing dissent 
announcement in most groups, I asked the question of: when is it acceptable for an MEP to 
dissent from the official group line? I also asked the question in order to gauge the extent to 
which party group unity was valued by respondents and the extent to which they perceived unity 
was valued by colleagues. Dissent can be conveyed in private meetings, or may be announced in 
group forums in order to provide leaders with the opportunities to address or mitigate its effects.  
       For example, large party groups should utilize working groups as forums for announcing 
dissent prior to the full meeting with the bureau/presidency serving a similar function, whereas in 
the smaller party groups, the full group meeting provides the sole forum for dissent 
announcement outside of delegations. In turn, I anticipated five potential responses: there is no 
(formal or informal) requirement to announce dissent from the group line, members are expected 
to indicate dissent to their national delegation leaders, members are expected to privately inform 
group leaders (or the secretary-general), members are expected to announce dissent in group 
forums, and group rules require members to announce dissent in group forums.  
H1: Respondents from the smaller party groups will be more likely to contend that an MEP is 
(formally or informally) expected to indicate their intention to dissent in party group meetings. 
 
       With fewer members, leaders of smaller party groups will be more likely to encourage 
members to indicate their intent to dissent from the group line in group forums as it is more 
feasible to facilitate widespread participation in group forums. Smaller forums may also in turn 
encourage adherence to the group line through peer pressure and prompting from colleagues. In 
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contrast, leaders of the larger party groups will prefer for members to announce dissent privately 
or through delegation leaders as the full group forum does not facilitate widespread participation. 
H2: Respondents from the more influential party groups will be more likely to contend that it is a 
group rule that MEPs announce their intent to dissent in working groups and group meetings.  
 
       Plenary influence though may trump logistics in that with high plenary stakes, influential 
party groups should require members to announce their intent to dissent in group forums. Group 
forums provide leaders with opportunities to address dissent or ensure that it is expressed at a 
less costly level prior to plenary. Through discussion, lobbying and peer pressure, group forums 
provide opportunities for dissenting members to adhere to the group line or to compromise. In 
contrast, less influential party groups lack incentive to install rules for dissent announcement.  
H3: Respondents who are rank-and-file members/staff will be more likely to contend that 
members do not have to inform party group leaders about their intent to dissent.  
 
       While the extent and the forms of socialization effects should vary by party group, a 
respondent‟s position should also influence perceptions regarding expectations on announcing 
dissent. In turn, respondents who are rank-and-file members or staff in the absence of 
responsibility should be more likely to believe that there are no informal or formal rules 
governing dissent. In contrast, group leaders/secretary-general should maintain that members are 
expected or are required to indicate dissent as a result of greater responsibility and incentive.  
H4: Respondents with more years of service in the European Parliament will be more likely to 
contend that it is an expectation or the group rule to announce dissent in party group forums. 
 
       Respondents with more years of service will be more likely to contend than there is an 
expectation within the group or that the group has formal rules requiring members to indicate 
dissent in group forums. More years of service provides greater familiarity with party group 
procedures as well with more opportunities to dissent from the group line. In contrast, those with 
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fewer years of service will be more likely to assume that no such expectations or rules exist as 
they have less familiarity with the group and fewer opportunities to dissent from the group line. 
       Seventy-nine of eighty-four respondents answered the question. As depicted below in Figure 
8.1, a plurality of respondents (thirty-four percent) perceived that members were expected to 
indicate their dissent to group leaders. The leader to whom they report may vary according to the 
legislative stage (coordinator) or to party group whip structure (Greens/EFA secretary-general). 
The second most common response (offered by thirty percent of respondents) was that dissent 
should be conveyed to the national delegation chair. This practice should be prevalent in the least 
cohesive groups, but also in the S & D which tends to address dissent through delegations as 
noted in earlier chapters. 
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents offering each response category. Fifth response category 
not depicted due to zero responses. N of Cases: 79 
 
       Twenty-two percent of respondents went a step further than the plurality by contending that 
members are expected to announce their dissent in group forums rather than convey this intent in 


























socialization in that dissent is public and thereby incurs comments and behavior from colleagues 
encouraging group unity, but also affords leaders with the opportunity to address or mitigate 
dissent. Fourteen percent of respondents however maintained that there were no informal or 
formal rules governing dissent announcement from the group line indicating in turn that group 
unity is not valued or perceived to be valued by these respondents.  
       However, the most striking result is the absence of responses maintaining that party group 
rules specify a requirement for members to announce their dissent in group forums. A closer 
inspection of responses reveals that the fifth response category was not offered because most 
respondents perceive that the group requires advance notice of dissent but does not specify the 
manner in which it is conveyed. In other words, while most respondents believe that dissent must 
be indicated prior to plenary, respondents perceive that members may do so through their 
delegation chairs, in private to group leaders, and/or in group forums.  
TABLE 8.3: PREDICTORS OF DISSENT EXPECTATIONS RESPONSES          
Party Group  0.5428*** 
Group Position 0.2817 
Member-State  0.4623 
Years of Service 0.5029** 
Gender  0.3223 
Profession  0.4739** 
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores measuring strength of association. *, ** and ***, denote significance 
on the .05, .01 and .001 levels respectfully. N of Cases: 79 
 
       As indicated above in Table 8.3, party group membership is the most statistically significant 
respondent characteristic associated with the likelihood of offering particular perceptions 
governing dissent announcement. Party group leadership decision-making forums influence 
perceptions on dissent announcement as each afford members with particular outlets for 
expressing dissent that may not be available in other groups. In turn, socialization practices 
fostering a sense of loyalty to the group may vary in regards to extent and tactics across party 
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groups, In addition, years of service in the European Parliament and a respondent‟s previous 
profession were also found to be statistically significant predictors of responses at the .01 level.  
       As depicted below in Figure 8.2, responses in part conformed to expectations in that 
respondents with fewer years of service in the parliament were more likely to maintain that no 
informal or formal rules were in place within the party group in regards to announcing dissent 
from the group line. However, while the probability of contending that members were expected 
to inform group leaders of intentions to dissent in private or in the group meeting increased with 
more than three years of service in the parliament, the trend dropped off somewhat among 
respondents with more than ten years of service in the parliament. 
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents who offered each response. Numbers in parentheses 
indicate respondents by years of service. N of Cases: 79, Cramér‟s V = 0.5029** 
 
       In addition, respondents with more years of service were more likely to contend that intent 
to dissent must be conveyed to a member‟s national party delegation chair. While dissent may be 
conveyed to delegation leaders, it does potentially undermine the efforts of group leadership to 



















Figure 8.2: Responses by Years of Service 
None National Delegations Inform Group Leaders Announce in Group Meetings
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equal terms with national delegation membership. For example, GUE respondents may inform 
delegation leaders because group unity is unimportant, whereas the same response by S & D 
respondents reveals an internal process that does not necessarily undermine group unity. 
       Responses on dissent announcement are also influenced by a respondent‟s previous 
profession prior to service in the European Parliament. As depicted below in Table 8.4, 
respondents with a staff background at the governmental or party level along with those with a 
private sector background were more likely to contend that there were no informal requirements 
on group members to announce dissent. However, respondents with previous experience in 
leadership or elected office along with those previously from the private sector were more likely 
to contend that members were expected to indicate dissent to national delegation leaders.  
TABLE 8.4: DISSENT EXPECTATION RESPONSES AND PREVIOUS PROFFESSION 
Professions                   None       National Delegations    Inform Leaders    Announce in PG    N        
Leadership     0.14        0.27                    0.36             0.23                       22          
Elected Office                0.14       0.32                0.36                      0.18                   22 
Staff      0.20        0.20                    0.35             0.25                   20 
Private Sector                0.25        0.50                               0                           0.25                         4 
Education/Student         0             0.33                               0.33                      0.33                         5 
Unknown                       0             0.60                               0.40                      0                              6 
(N of Cases)                   (11)         (24)                               (27)                      (17)                       79                  
Note: Entries are percentages of responses according to respondent‟s previous profession prior to service 
in the European Parliament.  N of Cases: 79, Cramér's V: 0.4739**   
 
       In contrast, respondents with previous governmental or party leadership experience, as well 
as those with previous experience in elected office were more likely to maintain that members 
were expected to convey dissent in private with group leaders. In all, apart from the perception 
that the group did not have expectations regarding dissent announcement, a respondent‟s 
previous profession appears to have little impact on response trends. Meanwhile, as depicted 
below in Table 8.5, some clear patterns occur which separate the more cohesive from the least 
cohesive party groups. The effects of party group size are evident in that respondents from the 
EPP and S & D were more likely to contend that members are expected to inform group leaders 
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in private of their intent to dissent and that party group meetings were utilized to address dissent 
primarily on prominent reports, while members of the medium-sized groups (ALDE and 
Greens/EFA) were more likely to announce dissent on all reports in group meetings. The latter 
reflects the greater ease with which medium-sized groups may accommodate widespread 
participation in group meetings yet also indicative of greater concern for unity than the smaller 
groups who do not utilize group meetings in the same way.  
TABLE 8.5: DISSENT EXPECTATION RESPONSES AND PARTY GROUP AFFILIATION 
Response          ALDE      ECR      EFD     EPP      Greens     GUE      S&D      N  
No Rules/Norms         0               0.11       1.0       0           0              0.57      0.06         11       
National Delegations         0.23          0.89       0          0.20      0              0.43      0.38         24  
Inform PG Leaders             0.18          0            0          0.73      0.60         0           0.44         27 
Expected to Announce       0.59          0            0          0.07      0.40         0            0.12         17 
(N of Cases)                         (17)         (9)        (5)         (15)        (10)        (7)         (16)        79 
Note: Entries are percentages of responses according to respondent‟s party group affiliation with the last 
line depicting number of respondents per group. N of Cases: 79, Cramér's V: 0.5428***   
 
       In turn, fewer respondents than expected from the two largest groups may have maintained 
that dissent was expected to be announced in group meetings because they distinguished 
discussion of dissent in party group meetings from that in working groups or group bureau 
meetings. In contrast, with low regard for working groups, ALDE respondents expect dissent 
announcement to occur in party group meetings which are the primary forum for securing 
support for the group line, as well as for expressing dissent. Finally, respondents from the 
smallest and least cohesive party groups were more likely to contend that there were no formal or 
informal requirements to announce dissent while ECR, GUE and S & D respondents were more 
likely to maintain that dissent should be conveyed to delegation leaders.  
       In turn, responses citing national delegations have different connotations across party 
groups. Analysis of complete interviews suggest that when eighty-nine percent of ECR 
respondents and forty-three percent of GUE respondents maintained that dissent should be 
conveyed to national delegations, this underscored support for a separate national line pursued by 
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delegation leaders. In contrast, the same response when offered by thirty-eight percent of S & D 
respondents underlines that delegations contribute to group unity through their identification of 
dissent within the delegation in order to secure support for the group line or to facilitate 
subsequent efforts by delegation leaders to reach a compromise in the bureau or group meeting. 
       EPP respondents as the vice-president below often cited working groups as forums for 
expressing dissent when the report originated from an applicable committee. 
“Of course, sometimes there are members who are not so happy and in this case they have 
another chance to go into the working group and there we again discuss all of the positions and if 
we cannot reach a compromise we vote. If there is such a controversial position that we cannot 
find an agreement in the working group, we take the discussion to the group. Usually, it is very 
rare that we have a free vote, because we always try to have a position of the group. Then, we 
have the ability to vote as we want with the condition to announce before”. (November 9, 2011) 
 
       The response also stresses the importance of group unity in that a free vote is rarely called as 
the group line is set in the applicable committees and working groups, rather than through 
majority vote in the full group meeting unless the report addresses a social policy or foreign 
policy question for which leadership has decided not to pursue consensus. In this sense, members 
are expected to follow the group line set prior to the group meeting or to dissent at a less costly 
level with lobbying by leaders continuing through and after the meeting if the member is 
influential or if the vote is expected to be close. As an EPP senior advisor below notes, separate 
delegation lines may occur but on the whole violate the norm of group consensus.  
“We try to discuss for a long time when it is necessary because we usually find a compromise. 
We don‟t always manage to find a compromise, sometimes what we do is to ask the delegations 
if they know if they will not vote on the line of the group, we tell them to tell us before, but we 
try to avoid it…as much as possible so we have a line”. (October 15, 2011) 
 
       As another EPP vice-president below elaborates, it is not sufficient to announce dissent and 
the form in which it will be expressed though this expected. Norms within the EPP group also 
dictate that a member state a clear rationale, address counter-arguments, and above all pursue 
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compromise (such as in the form of a group-sponsored amendment or a group plenary motion for 
a split vote on a paragraph) to secure support for the group line or to express dissent in a less 
costly form that originally stated. In this sense, dissent is accepted in the EPP but it is expressed 
only after exhausting all other routes with the whip structure engaged at every legislative stage 
unless a group line identified by leadership is absent.  
“Up to some extent you have to do, but it‟s not enough to do just that, you have to really explain 
your position to the group. You need to engage in a debate …but you can reach your separation 
point only after you have shown your availability to find an agreement with a majority of the 
group. So, you really have to first explore all other possibilities and you have to really prove you 
did try to explore these”. (June 12, 2012) 
 
       Similarly, the S & D address dissent through multiple leaders in various forums. In turn, 
socialization serves as a less costly and at times more efficient means through which to secure 
group cohesion by establishing clear norms governing dissent announcement and those which 
encourage group unity. However, the S & D differ from the EPP in their use of the bureau to 
manage dissent and in the role of delegations in diffusing and enforcing norms governing 
dissent. As the response below from an S & D staff person stresses, group membership takes 
priority in that delegations are expected to adopt the group line in most circumstances. 
“Not too long ago there was one dossier on which two vice-presidents indicated that their 
delegations would vote differently from the group. The president said look of course the group 
respects your mandate and that your group cannot be forced to follow any paths. However, he 
also reminded these vice-presidents that the group is one unified body; this is not a collection of 
national delegations. While we respect them, we would like them to make an effort to come 
closer to the group position. Usually, when the group decides to vote either yes or no, then we 
ask those who have a different opinion to abstain or not to attack the group by voting with other 
groups. That way, this is also an indication that they have a different position, but they do not 
weaken the group that much”. (October 13, 2011) 
 
       As with the EPP, delegations as well as members are expected to pursue every possible 
outlet for compromise and then, if necessary, to dissent at a less costly level. This is evident in 
the appeals by the group president to adopt a singular voice through the group position rather 
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than pursue multiple and national lines. The president also makes the allusion to the shared 
identity of belonging to the S & D group measured in European as well as in ideological terms.  
“We encourage them to raise it in the whole group so the bureau and the group can have a 
chance to hear their problems. On the six-pack for example, our Swedish members found it 
extremely difficult to follow the group line. If you look at the roll-call vote on the Wortman-
Kool report, you will find that some of them abstained and some voted in favor. So, they voiced 
that in the bureau of the group and in the full group, they made it clear that they had this 
difficulty, and there was a high level of understanding from other members”. (October 18, 2011) 
 
       The response from an S & D vice-president above highlights circumstances in which the 
group acknowledges domestic political circumstances preventing delegations from adhering to 
the group line. However, leaders will pursue less costly expressions of dissent by the delegation. 
In all, the S & D utilize each group forum to identify and address dissent and to stress norms 
governing dissent announcement, compromise, and stressing group unity. As the response from 
an S & D MEP below stresses, these practices while informal are influential nonetheless.  
“It‟s not a written rule, but it‟s quite clear that the rule is that if you don‟t want to follow the 
group line, you should inform the group leadership or the responsible rapporteur in advance and 
you should preferably have your say in the group meeting and explain your position. That‟s been 
the policy of Johannes Swoboda, Martin Schulz and group leaders before them. They would 
always put pressure on you to make you follow the group line, but everybody understands on the 
other hand that there are situations when that is not possible for national reasons or whatever. So, 
it is accepted within the group that if it is important you can go your own way, but it is a kind of 
rule of honor that we do inform the group leadership in advance”. (June 13, 2012) 
    
       The ALDE group‟s relatively high cohesion is in part a product of norms governing dissent. 
There is great expectation that ALDE members announce their dissent in party group meetings as 
a bureau member below asserts. With the exception of the Greens/EFA, no other party group 
utilizes their full meeting more to identify and pursue consensus. In turn, ALDE party group 
meetings are primary outlets for dissent expression in part because working groups are 
negatively viewed. In addition, as the common line is often set or amended by the entire group, 
members are in turn expected to indicate dissent before the entire group in order for colleagues to 
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weigh in and for Verhofstadt and other leaders to pursue compromise or less costly dissent. The 
response below also notes the role of VoteWatch and other independent plenary monitors in 
putting pressure on members to adhere to the group line or indicate dissent advance. 
“We try to ensure that the group discussions allow all members to express their 
opinion…Therefore, members that cannot follow the group line need to indicate this in advance 
of the vote, to allow us to have an overview of our cohesion before the plenary vote…Finally, 
with roll call votes, and with independent monitors like VoteWatch, this has a disciplining effect 
on members, as all are aware that the strength of our group is our voting cohesion. By having a 
fully transparent way to see how members voted, there is an understanding that deviation from 
the group line must be limited to very special cases”. (July 11, 2012) 
 
       The response below from an ALDE vice-president elaborates on the relationship between 
socialization and lobbying by group leaders through the emphasis on the direct role played by the 
group president on most reports yet also notes the socialization effect of indicating dissent prior 
to plenary in order to permit the possibility of compromise or to secure less costly forms of 
dissent expression. In keeping with the prevalent ALDE response trend, the respondent perceives 
that dissent announcement and responses by leadership are to be conducted in the open in group 
meetings. Though some dissent is indicated in bureau or presidency meetings, as well as in 
private, most dissent is indicated in the full group meeting and rarely in working groups.  
 “You may very well hear a member in the group meeting tonight say I am sorry Guy but I am 
going to vote the other way tomorrow despite what we all just agreed and you would give your 
reason. If it has to do with some region or interests you represent, the rest of us would say ok I 
don‟t feel that but I recognize it is very strong for you. If we think though that this is very 
important and the vote is going to be very tight, then maybe Guy might say is this really 
important to you because on the bigger scale of things we need your vote to win this thing in 
parliament tomorrow, this is really important, can you change this?” (October 26, 2013) 
 
       The response also provides further evidence that ALDE members are under political and 
social pressure at the group level to not only indicate dissent in advance but also to change 
course and adhere to the group line when prominent votes are at-stake or when the ALDE‟s 
plenary reputation is at-stake. However, as I have noted in previous chapters, while most ALDE 
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members value group unity and adhere to norms governing dissent announcement, socialization 
can only procure high cohesion rates if accompanied by a complete whip structure. In turn, 
comparatively higher dissent rates are in part the product of a breakdown by the whip structure to 
secure support by more members prior to and after the party group meeting.  
       Greens/EFA respondents were nearly evenly divided in their assessment of dissent 
announcement practices with sixty percent stating that members are expected to inform group 
leaders when they intend to dissent from the official line, while forty percent maintained that 
dissent was expected to be announced in the full group meeting. Greens/EFA responses highlight 
three important themes for the parliament‟s most cohesive group: members are expected to 
indicate dissent, group leaders will almost always attempt to reverse or mitigate the intent to 
dissent, and group meetings are the focal point of decision-making as well as socialization.  
“It is almost always ok if you have a reason on content or if the debate seems really heated in 
your own country. With the pensions and the French, I am sure if left to their own devices, they 
might move a bit towards us, but considering it is such a heated debated there, they cannot let 
their left wing friends in France down, which is understood and you do need to flag it to the 
shadow rapporteur because it would be highly impolite to vote differently without flagging it. 
It‟s only a problem if the Greens are necessary for a majority, so if those two votes, three votes, 
ten votes can make the difference between a report being adopted or not, then there will be some 
sort of a whip”. (June 14, 2012) 
 
       The response above from a Greens/EFA vice-president stresses that domestic political 
concerns may necessitate dissent from the group line as well as those underscoring the norm of 
informing leadership (in this case the shadow rapporteur) prior to the group meeting. In addition, 
the response also notes that if the Greens/EFA can impact plenary outcomes, leaders may ask 
dissenting members to reconsider or express dissent at a lower level. 
“So, that happens, but we try to think together and there is always an acceptance that you could 
have good reasons for not doing so, but sometimes it is not important, but sometimes if it is very 
important, if the media is aware and everybody is watching you, then I would say it has 
consequences to vote against the group line. I mean, you have to at least explain why you are 
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doing this according to something back home mostly, or something involving integrity, you just 
can‟t do it or whatever, but it has consequences”. (June 4, 2012) 
 
       As the response above from another group vice-president notes, lobbying in some instances 
is not necessary because the norm of group unity is re-enforced in group meetings and through 
social interaction. In this sense, Greens/EFA leaders and staff focus their efforts upon certain 
individuals or delegations as the bulk of membership agrees with and/or has been socialized into 
adhering to the group line on a given report. Consequences are defined as the failure to secure 
the group‟s plenary agenda, denial of prominent rapporteur assignments, as well as social 
pressures in the sense that colleagues will lobby dissenting members to support the group line. 
      While EFA members dissent from the group line on issues such as fisheries, the same 
expectations regarding dissent announcement apply to them as well. As a group vice-president 
below notes, EFA members are on the whole treated in the same manner as Greens members. In 
turn, EFA members are likely to adhere to the group line and participate in group meetings as 
regular members rather than as a separate faction.  
“Normally, we don‟t give them particular consideration we just treat them as normal members of 
the group, so if they want to join the discussion they are welcome. If they don‟t join, then we 
don‟t go back and ask if they have a different point of view, we just accept that as a reality also. 
On some issues where we know that they have some particularly strong interests and particularly 
strong views, we make it a point to ask for their opinions, and we make it a point to include 
them, like on fisheries for example” (June 26, 2012) 
 
       ECR responses highlight the challenges confronting a new group which is undergoing a 
process of developing a shared identity as well as implementing a complete whip structure. 
Nonetheless, the ECR distinguish themselves from the two least cohesive party groups in that 
members have quickly been socialized into adopting the norm of announcing dissent prior to or 
during the group meeting through delegations. The comments below from a member of ECR 
leadership underscore the efforts to identify dissent when setting a group line. However, the 
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official line may reflect a majority vote on the group rapporteur‟s position or one developed in 
the group meeting with either accompanied by separate national lines. In contrast to the role of 
delegations in the S & D, separate delegation lines are prevalent in the ECR and in turn while the 
norm of indicating dissent is present, the norm emphasizing group unity remains absent to-date. 
“Now, having determined what that group position is, anyone of our own nine national 
delegations can have their own national whip, and under my group rules, their only duty is to 
advise leadership of their separate whip and having advised leadership, they are totally free to go 
their own separate way”. (November 9, 2011) 
 
       The response below from a senior member of the ECR secretariat accentuates the absence of 
a group identity. When a shared identity does not accompany a particular norm, socialization will 
not be an effective dissent management tool. In this case, while the group whip and other leaders 
are aided in their efforts to secure a common line through the norm of indicating dissent, they are 
limited in their ultimate objective in that the next step of adopting the group line or dissenting at 
a less costly level is much more difficult to achieve in the absence of a shared identity.  
“The basic building blocks of the group are not formally members, but are the national 
delegations…It is an important principal that they are supposed to inform the Chief Whip so 
there are no surprises. Often though, this will be seen coming way down the tracks because they 
will have often voted that way in committee. Other times though we will find out at the last 
minute if a particular delegation has a problem with us…Members are encouraged to vote the 
group whip, but national delegations have different whips and there is no punishment for not 
following the group line, so it‟s mainly a question of generating good will and trust rather than 
any kind of threat”. (September 19, 2011) 
 
       In the smaller and least cohesive party groups, norms governing dissent are absent altogether 
(EFD) or in the case of the GUE respondents that norms are either absent or members should 
inform their delegation leaders of dissent. The response below by an EFD vice-president stresses 
that group membership is a vehicle for individual or delegation pursuits and not a source of 
shared identity. In turn, though some EFD members do pursue plenary objectives at times, the 
absence of a group line and of a shared identity contributes to the absence of norms. 
306 
 
“Well, that easy, we don‟t have a group line. It goes like this, if we don‟t decide on it, we don‟t 
have a group line. It is up for every delegation for them to decide. I think it has happened three 
times since the election that there actually was a group line…The group gives this sort of 
flexibility to the members. We are here, the group is here that is to say to serve us as MEPs and 
not the other way around as it might be in the rest of the groups where if you are the leadership 
you have a large control of the group”. (October 13, 2011) 
 
      In contrast, socialization is evident to a degree within the GUE in that some respondents do 
perceive the presence of norms governing dissent announcement, primarily by alerting 
delegation leadership. However, my observations also suggest that the GUE secretariat is active 
in identifying dissent and passing this information to the rapporteur and the president who may 
choose to follow-up with debate in the group meeting. However, the norm (to the extent that it 
occurs) of alerting the delegation is not accompanied by one promoting group unity. In turn, a 
common line in the GUE is often absent or reflects a majority vote with no formal or informal 
requirement of adherence among members or of every member or delegation alerting leadership 
of their intent to dissent as the response below from a member of the GUE secretariat contends. 
“This group is different from the others, mainly from the big groups. Not only from the political 
point of view, but also in the function of the group, because our group is confederal. That means 
it is not obligational for a delegation to vote or behave in a certain way or in a way that a 
majority of the delegation decide to behave, so that means that each delegation has the possibility 
to vote in the way they think is best for their political position. We don‟t work in a way of 
majority and minority but to find a broader consensus between groups without putting one 
position to a vote to see what is the majority or minority but to find at least in the crucial issues 
for our group, to find the consensus between delegations”. (October 18, 2011) 
 
NEW MEP ORIENTATION 
       In my interviews, I asked about new MEP orientation in part to identify the process of 
assisting new MEPs with the often difficult transition to life in the European Parliament which 
the literature rarely discusses. I also asked the question because socialization efforts are in part 
exemplified by new membership outreach. The focal point of socialization on a given report will 
be those who are unsure or have announced that they intend to dissent from the group line. 
However, new members should be the primary target for ongoing socialization efforts as these 
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members will be the least familiar with party group decision-making and with the practice of 
particular norms. New members on the whole refer to those who join the European Parliament 
after an election or following the resignation of an elected member. New members also refer to 
those MEPs who leave one party group to join another, which is rare but occurred during the 
current parliament when two EFD members for example left to join the ECR.  
       In either circumstance, leaders in all party groups should reach out to new members, but 
these efforts should be more evident in the more cohesive party groups as they have greater 
impetus to ensure that the new member comes to value group membership in terms of adherence 
to the group line but also in regard to viewing group interests and their own as the same. 
Socialization in this sense occurs in every legislative stage as well as in informal encounters 
throughout a parliament. Socialization may be directed at the committee level by group 
coordinators or rapporteurs or may occur at the delegation level if delegations value group unity. 
Socialization may also be an effort executed primarily by group staff in terms of MEP aides, 
group policy advisors and others as they may be in more frequent contact with MEPs.  
       While elites were the primary target for interviews, I did contact new MEPs in each party 
group in order to provide for some balance in perceptions toward group decision-making and 
socialization processes. To identify how and the extent to which new MEPs are socialized into 
party groups, I first asked if the group had formal orientations or mentorship programs directed 
toward all new MEPs which I soon found were absent across party groups. Accordingly, I 
substituted the question of: after an election or throughout the parliament, what is done to help 
new MEPs understand how your party group is organized and to communicate its values or 
beliefs? In turn, I anticipated five potential responses: little if anything is done to help new 
MEPs, some help is provided by the group secretariat, most help for new MEPs is provided by 
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their national delegation, most help is provided by members and staff at the committee level, and 
new MEPs are provided extensive help at the group leaders and staff.  
H1: Respondents from the larger party groups will be more likely to contend that most help for 
new MEPs is provided by the members and staff at the committee level. 
 
       Larger groups should be more likely to focus socialization efforts for new MEPs at the 
committee level. In committees, new MEPs may interact with the group coordinator and 
rapporteur, as well as policy advisors who serve as daily tutors for policymaking and for 
explaining the group culture with new members having access to these actors throughout the 
legislative process. In contrast, new MEPs in smaller groups may be the only member or one of 
two on a committee which should encourage leaders or staff to assume a more responsive role. 
H2: Respondents from the least influential party groups will be more likely to contend that no 
help is provided for new MEPs or that some but not much help is provided at the group level. 
 
       With less incentive for ensuring favorable plenary outcomes, less influential party groups 
should be unlikely to pursue socialization of members, including new MEPs. In turn, new MEPs 
in less influential party groups will be more likely on their own to learn the legislative process 
and to participate in a disparate group culture in which unity is not stressed. As a group‟s plenary 
influence increases, added incentive will encourage party groups to offer some help to new 
MEPs through the group staff, with more focused help offered by the more influential groups. 
H3: Respondents who hold party group leadership positions will be more likely to contend that 
extensive help is provided for new MEPs by members and staff at the party group level.  
 
        Responses should in some ways reflect group hierarchy in the sense that those with more 
responsibility should contend that new MEPs are offered extensive help at the group level as 
leadership or senior secretariat positions are vested with greater responsibility for assisting rank-
and-file members. In contrast, norm adoption by rank-and-file members and staff should be 
accomplished through daily interaction at the committee and delegation levels or through 
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observation and copying of leadership behavior in group forums leading these respondents to 
conclude that group leaders and staff do not (extensively) directly assist new MEPs.  
H4: Respondents with fewer years of service in the European Parliament will be more likely to 
contend that little if any help is provided to new MEPs, “You learn by doing”.  
 
       New MEPs should feel overwhelmed and perceive (accurately or inaccurately) that they are 
not receiving adequate help from group leadership and staff. In turn, newer members should 
conclude that they receive little help or are mostly aided by delegations which provide a more 
familiar setting for newer members. In contrast, as service in the parliament increases, members 
and staff will assume that more help is provided for new MEPs as they will possess a greater 
(perceived) understanding of party group organizational and socialization processes.  
H5: Respondents from larger national party delegations will be more likely to contend that all or 
most assistance is provided for new MEPs at the delegation level. 
 
       As a national delegation within a party group increases in size, the likelihood of a 
respondent contending that most or all help for new MEPs is provided by national delegations 
should increase. Larger delegations (UK, Spanish, German, French, etc.) should have greater 
incentive for ensuring that members are quickly acquainted with the parliamentary and the group 
decision-making process as the delegation‟s ability to shape the group line and ensure its success 
in plenary is at-stake whereas one-member delegations and smaller delegations may have less 
incentive to socialize new members as they have less impact in regards to the group line. 
       While most respondents believed that not enough help was provided to new MEPs and that 
learning was accomplished largely through direct participation in parliamentary and party group 
activities, there was consensus among most respondents that some training and socialization was 
afforded in particular venues and by particular actors. All but two respondents answered the 
question. As depicted below in Figure 8.3, responses were divided across the five expected 
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categories with a plurality of twenty-six percent maintaining that nothing was done to help new 
MEPs. However, nearly as many respondents maintained that members and staff at the 
committee level are the primary source of help for new MEPs followed by twenty-one percent 
who stated that most help for new MEPs was provided through their delegation. Sixteen percent 
stated that extensive help for new MEPs was provided by members and staff at the group level, 
while thirteen percent conceded that some but little help was provided by members and staff.  
 
Note: Figure depicts percentage of respondents offering each response category. N of Cases: 82 
 
       The extent to which new MEPs are socialized into a group culture and in adopting particular 
norms is in part determined by the extent to which the party groups develop and fully utilize 
whip structures. My observations and assessment of responses finds that in the more cohesive 
party groups, new MEPs receive help from a variety of actors and in multiple venues though 
committees may afford more focused opportunities to acquaint new MEPs with parliamentary 
and group level processes. While formal orientation or mentorship programs are absent in the 

















Figure 8.3: Extent of Help for New MEPs 
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variety of strategies. However, socialization is also a product of imitating the behavior of group 
colleagues and of adhering to the appeals of group leaders or staff.  
TABLE 8.6: PREDICTORS OF NEW MEP RESPONSES          
Party Group  0.3575** 
Group Position 0.2915 
Member-State  0.4628 
Years of Service         0.4030 
Gender  0.1951 
Profession  0.3957 
Note: Entries are Cramér's V scores measuring strength of association. *, ** and ***, denote significance 
on the .05, .01 and .001 levels respectfully. N of Cases: 82 
 
       As depicted in Table 8.6 above, party group membership was the only respondent 
characteristic to serve as both a substantively and statistically significant predictor of responses 
to questions regarding help for new MEPs to understand party group processes and its values. In 
turn, length of service did not serve as a statistically significant predictor though the Cramér's V 
score suggests that there is some substantive impact. However, experiences associated with 
length of parliament service are framed in many ways by membership in a particular group. 
Member-state origin should be similarly assessed for effect in that while membership in larger 
delegations may influence perceptions of help for new MEPs this outlook is as well to an extent 
dependent upon party group membership with the ECR for example highlighting how delegation 
membership may frame how a new member views group unity. 
       As depicted in Table 8.7 below, expectations regarding the relationship between party group 
membership and responses were met to an extent. Members of the two largest party groups (EPP 
and S & D) were most likely to maintain that most help for new MEPs is provided by members 
and staff at the committee level. Committees not only provide more personalized opportunities to 
socialize new MEPs but also hands-on experience such as by serving as a rapporteur. The largest 
groups also utilize horizontal working groups to socialize members which are a continuation of 
experiences in the committee. In contrast, members of medium-sized or small party groups do 
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not place as much importance on committee experiences in regards to learning more about their 
party group as they are the only or one of a few group members on a given committee. 
TABLE 8.7: NEW MEP RESPONSES AND PARTY GROUP AFFILIATION 
Response          ALDE      ECR      EFD     EPP      Greens     GUE      S&D      N  
Nothing          0.44          0.22       0           0.33      0.20          0.25      0.12      21         
Some Staff Help         0.06          0.11       0           0.07      0.30          0.25      0.17      11    
National Delegations          0.11          0.67       0.20      0.27      0               0.13      0.18      17 
Help in Committees         0.28          0            0           0.33      0.20          0.11      0.41      20 
Extensive PG Help         0.11          0            0.80      0.00      0.30          0.25      0.12      13   
(N of Cases)                        (18)          (9)          (5)         (15)      (10)            (8)       (17)     82 
Note: Entries are percentages of responses according to party group affiliation with last row depicting 
number of respondents per party group. N of Cases: 82, Cramér's V: 0.3575**   
 
       In contrast, plenary influence appears to not significantly shape responses as evident with 
forty percent of ALDE and a third of EPP respondents maintaining that nothing is done to help 
new MEPs whereas EFD and GUE members take a more positive view of group efforts. 
However, interviews reveal that particular group cultures influence perceptions of new MEP 
socialization. For example, EPP respondents were the most likely to use the phrase “learn by 
doing” and to reference the socialization role of committees or working group meetings. 
Meanwhile, though EFD respondents may note the friendliness coinciding with group 
membership, they are just as quick to stress that group unity isn‟t important. In other words, 
though some EPP members are unable to identity organized socialization efforts for new MEPs, 
they come to value group unity through copying the behavior and adhering to the appeals of their 
colleagues, whereas the help afforded to new EFD members has more to do with collegiality than 
with instilling the importance of party group unity in new members. 
       In turn, the emphasis on the socialization role of delegations by ECR and EPP respondents 
frames views toward unity differently in that EPP delegations on the whole appear to emphasize 
unity at the group level which is mimicked by new MEPs. In turn, delegations in the ECR group 
are more assertive in pursuing separate agendas even at the expense of the group line which is 
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similarly mimicked by new MEPs. Finally, the division among Greens/EFA respondents 
suggests that though perceptions widely vary, the overall positive trend reflect observations and 
replies to other questions that underline the impact of socialization (particularly in group 
meetings). Similarly, the overall negative perceptions by ALDE respondents underscore the 
challenges confronting Verhofstadt and others in pursuing consensus and socializing members.  
     Help in the largest party groups may come from leadership and the staff at the group level as 
a senior member of the EPP secretariat below asserts.  
“There are many ways, for example, when a new member comes to the group they are 
immediately received by the chairman. He welcomes them and he wants to try and see if there is 
any problem. If the new member has a logistic or a political problem, then we in the staff are 
here to check-up with the members and solve the problem. They will receive documents 
explaining the rules of the group, how the group works, who is responsible for what in the 
secretariat and they are told which committees they will be members of”. (October 15, 2011).  
 
       The prevailing perception among EPP respondents is that new MEPs learn about the 
parliament and about the party group primarily or solely at the committee level a socialization 
role for working groups was also frequently mentioned. As the response below from an EPP aide 
to a coordinator asserts, socialization is a two-way street in which the group staff, MEP aides, 
and the coordinator on one-hand identify a new member‟s goals and assist them yet assistance 
also requires the new member to be engaged and receptive to advice. 
“First of all, this would depend on the member themselves. You get members who are 
enthusiastic to work on the committee, and you have other members who are interested in other 
issues…When my boss became coordinator, one of the first things we did was to offer a meeting 
with each and every member of the committee. We also send emails asking them what their 
priorities are, so we can plan accordingly: what own initiative reports they would like to do, 
which hearings they would like to see, which delegations they would like to go on, and so on and 
so forth. So, yes, we do reach out, but then it is up to the members themselves”. (June 27, 2012) 
 
       Similarly, as the new EPP MEP below notes, new members often rely on experienced office 
staff as well as their delegation for help in learning more about the group‟s cultural and decision-
making processes. However, a new member is incentivized and socialized into placing faith in 
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the group and its principles as well as in its experts as a new member is overwhelmed by 
information and more likely to copy the behavior of colleagues as they sort through collective 
action problems and become acquainted with social practices at the group level.  
“When you get to the parliament, it is not so easy to remember where everything is in Brussels 
and Strasbourg. Then, I went to the EPP group and (my) delegation, and they were very helpful, 
some of them I have known for many years and of course they told me if you have questions, 
come to us and we will help you. …So, in the beginning, on the thirteenth of March, I had to go 
to my first plenary when I first got here, and I had no idea on what we were voting on, and then I 
had to believe in my group of course. (June 19, 2012) 
 
       S & D respondents also stressed the socialization role of committees as well as working 
groups with the rapporteur and coordinator serving as the primary contact and role model in 
regards to learning about acceptable behavior and practices within the group. Leaders in 
committee aid new MEPs by offering advice, providing examples, but also by quickly 
integrating the new member into parliamentary and group level processes at times such as by 
assigning a report to them to shadow or carry. 
“Of course the basic integration is done by the working group because most of the important 
work is done at the committee level for a normal member. So the rapporteur or the coordinator 
brings in the new member and invites them and their colleagues to work together on some issue, 
but I think it is done relatively smoothly basically via the working group. (November 9, 2011) 
 
      The more negative views of ALDE respondents in regards to help for new MEPs underscore 
the comparatively lower group cohesion in terms of attitudes as well as plenary votes. As the 
ALDE coordinator below contends, members learn over time and in the view of those with more 
experience, a new member learns about the ALDE group through observation, interaction, and 
experience over time, and not through a concerted effort by leaders or staff. In other words, most 
ALDE respondents believe new members learn rather than are taught to value group unity.  
“You have to find your own way. If it is people from my country or my party, I try to help them 
and explain things as I go, but for every new MEP it‟s a question of trial and error…I have been 
an MEP for eighteen years and have a long institutional memory, so if they ask me questions in 
my committee or elsewhere I will help them”. (June 25, 2012) 
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       However, the relatively higher cohesion compared to the ECR, GUE, and EFD suggests that 
socialization does occur as my observations of ALDE party group meetings underscore. In this 
sense, the ALDE do pursue socialization in that they instil the importance of the group‟s role as a 
plenary dealmaker or the norm of adhering to the group line identified or adopted in the full 
group meeting. Yet, as the response below by an ALDE bureau member underscores, 
socialization is in many ways an individual pursuit guided at times by colleagues but lacking the 
informal or formal (working groups for example) structure of the more cohesive groups.   
“Nothing really. You always get the complaint from the new members, no one tells me anything. 
New members usually say after about six weeks I am going to write a book to help the new 
members next time how to get started and they never do. The parliament staff helps them. There 
is a team of civil servants within the parliament who welcome them and say this is the handbook 
and so on. It‟s like going to a new school really. You arrive at the new school, the teacher says 
sit down, and you have to learn as fast as you can”. (October 26, 2011) 
 
      In contrast, the Greens/EFA group adopts a much more concerted socialization effort which 
is evident in the near unanimity achieved on most votes following very often contentious party 
group meetings. As a senior member of the secretariat below asserts, socialization of new MEPs 
is crucial for group unity and requires the efforts of leaders and staff to ensure success in plenary 
as well in instilling a deep sense of identification with the group.  
“We also take this very seriously, obviously because you need a good introduction in the group, 
then we organize meetings between the co-chairs with them. We discuss the details of departure 
and arrival, we discuss their personal interests and how we can optimize their presence in the 
group. There, staff also plays a certain role of helping MEPs to adapt themselves as quick as 
possible”. (October 17, 2011) 
 
       For other Greens/EFA respondents such as the new MEP below, most help is provided at the 
committee level by the coordinator and the staff. However, Greens/EFA respondent perceptions 
of sources of help for new MEPs reflect the group‟s presence on a given committee in that it will 
direct the allocation of points by placing more members on targeted committees (environment) 
and place only two members on most committees.  
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“When I joined, we had briefings from the main kinds of secretariat people: how does it work to 
organize the plenary speaking time, etc. Then, in the first week of January, we had different 
working groups for the different committees. In the first committee working group meeting, I 
was given an introduction of how the work of the committee goes: how the parliament structure 
is organized, what role our group can play, how you can get a dossier, how do we organize the 
shadows. So, this was good and maintained by the coordinator”. (June 25, 2012) 
 
      As a new group, the ECR have limited experience with socializing new members in the 
historical sense and are in the early stages of developing decision-making, as well as 
socialization processes as a member of the ECR secretariat below asserts in a reference to the 
group‟s founding declaration and to the role of national delegations.  
“We have had two new MEPs: one Danish and one new British. In both those cases, a lot of 
preliminary discussions took place before they joined in order to sound them out to see if they 
were in sympathy with the group‟s aims. They don‟t have to agree with every line but they do 
have to agree with and sign the Prague Declaration. If you take the Danish individual member 
for example, there are key areas where she and the group will not agree…In the case of the 
British member, it was the delegation who led that process. In both of those cases, they are 
already sitting MEPs, so they already had reasonably good connections with members of the 
group. (September 23, 2011) 
 
      These assertions were echoed by a group vice-president in my second phase of field research 
following the arrival of new members to the UK delegation after some original members had left 
the parliament. The response also underlines the ongoing influence of national delegations and 
the evolving group identity that has yet to fully embrace group unity. 
“We had some new British Conservative members join. They all came in new but they are 
settling very well. The delegations are really the first place to help new MEPs, not in the group. 
My committee has a very friendly atmosphere, but you would have to talk to the other 
committees”. (June 25, 2012) 
 
     As noted above, the positive reception reported by new MEPs in the two smallest and least 
cohesive party groups indicates the closeness among members and staff in these groups yet is 
devoid of reference to group unity. In turn, though colleagues make efforts to become acquainted 
with and be available to new members, outreach is of a personal nature as group unity is 
unimportant (EFD) or not prioritized (GUE). 
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“Yesterday, we got a new colleague and yesterday we had coffee for two hours. MEPs will take 
him to coffee or to dinner and try to get to learn who is this person is. He probably has talks with 
the secretary-general. You have a huge role for the staff. …After the last election seventy-five 
percent of the MEPs were new, so it was a huge task of the staff to explain how things work and 
to make things work. (October 26, 2011) 
 
      Collegial sentiments devoid of references to group unity are expressed above by a member of 
the GUE secretariat and are echoed below by a new EFD MEP. The latter also underscores the 
contrastive role of the group‟s co-presidents compared to their Greens/EFA counterparts whose 
personal outreach reflects both collegial as well as dissent management motivations.  
“Actually, they were quite nice. First, in the group meeting, they introduced me on two separate 
occasions…There were no regular meetings with group leaders, but they are always available 
when needed. I met with Farage many times, mostly because we speak English…I am sure 
Speroni would be available too if we had any common interests to discuss. (October 13, 2011) 
 
       In other words, while Farage or Speroni may welcome new members, they do not build 
individual relationships to facilitate group unity. In turn, the influx of new GUE members 
complicates efforts by President Zimmer to form a group line or to instill a norm of group unity 
given the predisposition towards confederality by veteran members in that leadership offices lack 
formal authority and the group as a whole lacks an identity conducive to unity-building efforts.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
       How does socialization contribute to securing a cohesive party group and to what extent is 
socialization evident among party groups in the current parliament? Kam (2002) defines 
socialization as “the process of exposure or learning through which MPs acquire certain norms” 
(Kam, 2002, 194). In this sense, party group members are socialized into valuing group unity and 
following certain practices through observation and copying of colleagues‟ behavior as well as 
adhering to the appeals of leaders and other members. If other members value party group unity 
and if leaders stress group unity in their appeals, members are likely to adopt the view that group 
unity is important and in turn define their goals through the prism of group membership.       
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       Socialization in this sense culminates into not only adhering to the group line in most cases, 
but also to expressing dissent at a less costly level in order not to jeopardize the group‟s goals. In 
addition, once a member values group unity as defined above, they will adopt norms governing 
dissent and other behavior as logic of appropriateness influences their decision-making in that as 
choices related to voting behavior for example are considered, the preferred choice will be the 
one that is regarded as acceptable by group leaders and by a majority of their colleagues both of 
whose support for the decision to support the group line is sought after by the member.  
       According to Brown (2000), “norms specify…certain rules for how group members should 
behave and thus are the basis for mutual expectations among the group members” and that 
“norms may serve to enhance or maintain the identity of the group” (Brown, 2000, 56 and 60). In 
this sense, norms serve as informal rules governing behavior and link the member to the group. 
In turn, Brown (2000) notes that “our sense of who we are and what we are worth is intimately 
bound-up with our group memberships” (Brown, 2000, 28). Accordingly, party group leaders 
promote norm adoption in part because they (in the more cohesive groups) value group unity but 
also in a rational sense in that socialization supports lobbying efforts and is a less costly (and in 
the parliament a realistic) dissent management tactic compared to disciplinary measures.  
       As more members are socialized into valuing group unity and adopting particular norms, 
leaders may focus their attention on a select number of members as most will support the group 
line or will announce/express dissent according to established conventions without direct 
prompting. In turn, when leaders lobby a wavering or dissenting member, they may appeal to 
shared attitudes toward group membership and to particular norms in addition to the policy and 
political merits of supporting the group line. In this sense, socialization does not replace 
rationality but rather is one facet of an MEP‟s decision-making. 
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       Group membership influences an MEP‟s decision-making if they value membership, define 
their identity in part through group, and if they perceive that other members adopt similar 
attitudes toward the group and its practices. In turn, the more cohesive party groups are those that 
possess a shared conceptualization of the group identity (See Brown 2000) as well as those who 
secure widespread support for the group line in plenary as a consequence of socialization and 
lobbying overseen by leaders and staff as part of the whip structure.   
       For evidence of socialization, I first considered responses to two questions included in the 
extensive MEP survey by Farrell et al. (2011). The first question asked members how they saw 
themselves in terms of: exclusively along member-states lines, primarily member-state but also 
as European, primarily as European, and exclusively as European. When framed according to 
party group membership, respondents from the most cohesive party group, the Greens/EFA, are 
the most likely to self-identify strictly in European terms followed by ALDE respondents, and 
those from the two largest groups. In contrast, respondents from the least cohesive groups were 
more likely to view themselves according to their member-state or other origins. When combined 
with interview responses on relations with Europarties and other observations in my field 
research, the results suggest that group cohesion is more easily attained by leaders when a party 
group adopts a more European outlook and defines its identity in part in European terms. 
       A second survey question asked members if it is important for their party group to appear 
united with responses arranged on a 1-5 scale from completely agree to completely disagree. 
When responses on the first and second levels of the scale are considered, those from the most 
cohesive party groups are more likely to perceive that appearing unified is important for the 
group, while those from the less cohesive groups are more likely not to share this perception.        
However, given that an overwhelming number of ECR respondents replied according to the 
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higher levels of the scale, perceptions that group unity is valued must be accompanied by social 
practices promoting group unity. In other words, while for example ECR respondents from new 
member-states may perceive that group unity is valued in part because their UK colleagues stress 
the importance of group unity, perceptions must be accompanied by norms governing dissent 
announcement, the prevalence of a group line over national lines, and of a fully functional whip 
structure in order for high levels of group cohesion to occur.  
       As part of my field research, I asked two questions identifying the level of socialization 
within and across party groups. First, I asked when it was acceptable to dissent from the group 
line. An overwhelming majority maintained that there were norms in place governing dissent 
announcement though respondents differed on whether members were expected to announce in 
group meetings, consult delegation leaders, or report dissent privately to group leaders or staff. 
Those respondents with more years of service in the European Parliament were more likely to 
contend that dissent was expected to be announced in group meetings, while those with less 
years of service and those with previous staff or private sector experience were more likely to 
maintain that there were no expectations governing dissent announcement. 
       Party group organization and culture also influenced perceptions of dissent announcement in 
that ALDE and Greens/EFA respondents were more likely to contend that dissent should be 
announced in group meetings which are the focal point of decision-making and consensus-
building. Respondents from the largest party groups were more likely to contend that dissent 
should be expressed to group leaders and staff, while those from the least cohesive party groups 
either believed that dissent should be expressed to delegation leaders or that norms governing 
dissent were absent in their group. I also asked the question of what is done to help new MEPs 
adapt to the parliament and to be educated about the group‟s values and practices.  
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       New MEPs should be the focal point of education and socialization efforts as they are the 
least familiar with group beliefs and practices. While no formal orientation program are in place, 
informal socialization and education of individual new MEPs is evident in committees where 
coordinators assist and where new MEPs may take turns as group rapporteurs. New MEPs are 
also aided by group staff and colleagues at other levels and learn about the parliament and their 
party group through daily interaction and/or observation of colleagues‟ behavior.  
       Respondents from the two largest party groups were more likely to maintain that new MEPs 
are primarily offered help in committees, whereas Greens/EFA respondents while mostly 
contending that help is provided for new MEPs were split as to the precise or predominate venue 
or source of help. In turn, ALDE respondents were more likely to contend that no help to any 
real degree is provided for new MEPs, while ECR respondents were more likely to state that 
most help for new MEPs is provided by their delegations. Meanwhile, though GUE and EFD 
respondents were likely to contend that extensive help was provided by group members and staff 
responses reflect collegiality which is not accompanied by expectations for group unity or in turn 
the education of new members on group level organizational and socialization processes.  
       In the next and final chapter, I will present a summary of the conclusions reached through 
the completion of field research as reviewed in preceding chapters and by a consideration of the 
literature. I will begin with a review of the impetus for examining how party groups in the 
European Parliament manage dissent and the research design structuring field research. From 
here, I will define dissent and cohesion before reviewing explanations for group unity offered in 
chapter four. Chapter nine will then review the role of disciplinary measures, and the whip 
structures and socialization processes of respective groups in achieving (on the whole) relatively 
high party group cohesion and in turn account for variation in cohesion levels among party 
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groups. The chapter will conclude with a consideration of future research which I contend is 
necessary in order to fully assess the contributions of group leaders, meetings, and socialization 
processes toward group cohesion. These efforts should primarily consist of a survey targeting all 
MEPs and should occur after the next elections in June 2014.         
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CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
       In the previous eight chapters I have presented the case for determining why party groups 
are on the whole cohesive and for explaining the variation in dissent levels among party groups. 
With rising challenges and increasing integration decision-making in Europe has increasingly 
shifted from the national to the EU level. Accompanying this transition has been a growing 
decision-making role for the European Parliament which has acquired co-decision authority in 
nearly every policy area. Given these trends, it is more important than ever to uncover the dissent 
management processes contributing to party group cohesion. In turn, I interviewed eighty-four 
MEPs and staff and observed thirty-three party group or horizontal working group meetings over 
the course of two field research phases in 2011 and 2012 to attain first-hand accounts. 
       From these interviews and observations in conjunction with the findings of previous studies, 
I have concluded that cohesion levels and dissent variation may be explained at the individual 
level as an output of the ideological positioning of MEPs in relation to the ideological mean of 
their party group (Hix et al. 2007), and at the group level by the full utilization of leadership 
offices and forums associated with a communication  network or „whip structure‟ in addition to 
the extent that members are socialized into valuing group unity and adopting norms of behavior 
governing dissent announcement and expression. 
MEP IDEOLOGY + WHIP STRUCTURE + SOCIALIZATION = LOW DISSENT LEVELS 
       As an MEP is closer to agreement with the median ideological position of the party group, 
they are more likely to support the group line on a given report or amendment. However, 
ideology does not explain instances when an MEP ultimately supports the group line or dissents 
at less costly levels after initially expressing opposition to or reservations about the group line. In 
turn, party group leaders acting as legislative entrepreneurs (See Cox and McCubbins 2007) have 
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developed whip structures and socialization processes. A whip structure refers to the leadership 
offices and group forums associated with dissent management with emphasis upon the full 
utilization of each component as part of a communication network in which leaders exchange 
information and collaborate with one another. Socialization refers to the processes through which 
members come to share a conceptualization of the group identity, value group unity, and adopt 
norms of behavior such as those governing dissent announcement and expression.  
        In this chapter, I will review successful dissent management strategies identified in this 
study while also previewing future research projects. The chapter first reviews the impetus for 
exploring the research question and briefly recounts the research design. From here, I define 
dissent and how each level of dissent expression influences dissent management efforts of group 
leaders. Next, the chapter recounts the limited disciplinary tools available to group leaders before 
turning to the findings of chapter four which asked respondents to explain why their party group 
is so unified in plenary voting. Here, I will consider not only the responses stressing shared 
beliefs and communication processes but also more broadly the impact of party group size and 
plenary influence upon dissent level variation. Next, I will consider the contributions of party 
group leaders and socialization processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with ideas on future 
research; in particular plans for a mass survey of MEPs to be conducted after the June 2014 
elections utilizing original questions as well as those from Garner and Letki (2005). 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND DESIGN 
       What explains the variation of dissent levels among party groups in the European Parliament 
and why are party group cohesion levels on the whole so high? Given such patterns, how do 
party group leaders manage dissent and how does this impact the form of dissent expression by 
individual MEPs? As depicted in Table 9.1 below, most party groups achieve relatively high 
cohesion rates despite their supranational organization and lack of control over re-nomination. In 
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addition, the table depicts a variation in cohesion and dissent rates that cannot be explained 
solely as a product of party group size or plenary influence, otherwise the ALDE would be more 
cohesive and the Greens/EFA would not be the most cohesive party group.         
TABLE 9.1: PARTY GROUP COHESION/DISSENT RATES   
PARTY GROUP   COHESION RATE DISSENT RATE 
GREENS/EFA .947   0.053 
EPP   .931   0.069 
S & D   .928   0.072 
ALDE   .898   0.102 
ECR   .868   0.132 
GUE   .816   0.184 
EFD   .498   0.502 
Note: Party group cohesion/dissent rates are listed in descending order and reflect plenary roll-call votes 
during the current parliament (July 2009-March 2013) prior to the accession of Croatia into the EU.  
Data Source: www.votewatch.eu 
 
       Given the questions raised by dissent level variation among party groups and by the 
limitations associated with roll-call vote studies (See Carrubba et al. 2006), I chose to conduct 
onsite research because although past studies (See Hix et al. 2007 and others referenced in this 
dissertation) have made enormous contributions, we know very little about the internal processes 
contributing to party group cohesion levels. In particular, the roles of specific group leaders 
(presidents and vice-presidents) are not well-defined in the literature as are the contributions of 
party group meetings and other group forums. In turn, past studies have defined dissent mostly in 
terms of deviation from the group line in plenary with little consideration toward other forms of 
dissent or of how party group leaders secured lower levels of dissent (opposing the group line on 
an amendment or voting to abstain). Finally, past studies have also largely defined party group 
cohesion strictly in relation to plenary voting yet have ignored other definitions of cohesion 
encompassing shared attitudes toward group membership and the extent to which members 
perceive colleagues value group unity (See Brown 2000).  
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       In turn, identifying the processes associated with dissent management is necessary in order 
to fully explain decision-making within the European Parliament, particularly as decision-
making increasingly shifts from the national to the supranational level. With the implementation 
of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the European Parliament now holds co-decision authority on 
nearly all policy areas and even prior to Lisbon decision-making had shifted away from the 
national and toward the EU level (Benoit and McElroy, 2007, 4-5). Now more than ever, it is 
imperative for party group leaders to secure high cohesion and minimal dissent expression as the 
legislative stakes are much higher. As Hix and Hoyland (2011) note, “more at stake means more 
incentives to strengthen the division of labor inside the political groups to try and win votes to 
shift outcomes in a particular policy direction” (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, 143).  
        Higher legislative stakes have in turn incentivized party group leaders and staff to monitor 
roll-call votes and to identify and manage dissent prior to plenary votes. How is this achieved?     
As I note above, the gap in the literature is in part a product of institutional limitations in that at 
about thirty-five percent of all plenary votes, roll-call votes constitute a small and 
unrepresentative sample (Carrubba et al. 2006 and Kreppel 2002). Furthermore, votes in 
committees or party group meetings are never roll-called. In this sense, while roll-call vote 
studies display the extent of party group cohesion in plenary votes and indicate the impact of 
particular MEP characteristics (group membership, age, country of origin, etc.) upon voting 
behavior, roll-call votes do not reveal the dissent management processes prior to plenary voting 
and are in many instances not representative of all plenary votes.  
       For example, Carrubba et al. (2006) found that roll-call votes in plenary sessions are not 
representative of legislation from all committees. “A majority of roll-call votes originate in just a 
few committees. Three committees accounted for 63.88% of RCVS, but only 28.35% of all 
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votes” (Carrubba et al. 2006, 699). Accordingly, while roll-call votes remain a useful and 
available tool for party group studies, we know little in regards to how party groups manage 
dissent where roll-call votes are absent, as well as when plenary votes are roll-called. In other 
words, we lack an explanation for how party groups address dissent both prior to a roll-call vote, 
but also in the majority of instances where votes by individual MEPs are not recorded. As 
Carrubba et al. note “The party groups are systematically hiding exactly the voting behavior we 
are interested in studying” (Carrubba et al. 2006, 699).  
       In this sense, a field study is necessary in order to reveal the hidden processes associated 
with dissent management and dissent expression within party groups both prior to and during 
plenary sessions. While past studies have clarified the role of group rapporteurs and coordinators 
(See Ringe 2010, and Lindberg 2008), we know very little about the role of and the dissent 
management tactics employed by party group presidents and vice–presidents. When do party 
group presidents utilize their unique position as representative of the entire group and as 
presiding chair of party group meetings to ensure widespread adoption of the group line? Are 
party group vice-presidents merely administrators or legislative entrepreneurs who lobby 
members to adopt the group line or dissent at less costly levels throughout the legislative 
process? In particular, what are the responsibilities and the influence of the vice-president 
serving as the parliamentary secretary or group whip?  
       In order to uncover the dissent management roles of leadership offices and group forums, I 
interviewed eighty-four MEPs and staff and observed dozens of party group and working group 
meetings across all seven party groups. Interviews provide the opportunity to learn more about 
internal (party group) processes from those who either have responsibility for or are directly impacted by 
the dissent management. According to Rubin and Rubin (2005), “through qualitative interviews 
you can understand experiences and reconstruct events in which you did not participate” (Rubin 
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and Rubin, 2005, 3). In other words, in order to uncover particular dissent management processes 
across party groups and to assess their effectiveness, it is necessary to ask questions of those 
associated with dissent management in a setting which is more flexible and more likely to 
produce detailed answers compared to surveys.  
TABLE 9.2: INTERVIEWS BY RESEARCH PHASE AND SUBJECT CATEGORY 
RESEARCH STAGE   MEPS   STAFF    TOTAL 
ONE     21     17         38 
TWO     41      6         47 
TOTAL    61     23            84 
Note: Table depicts number of interviews by research phase and by subject category broadly defined here 
as MEPs or staff.  N of Cases (Interviews): 84 
 
       Interviews in this study targeted (See Table 9.2 above) party group leaders (presidents, vice-
presidents, and coordinators) and elites among the secretariat (secretary-generals and senior 
advisors). I contacted every MEP holding a leadership office in each of the seven party groups 
for an interview and apart from the absence of EPP coordinators I secured a representative 
sample of group leader interviews in regards to group membership and leadership positions. I 
also pursued interviews with rank-and-file MEPs as well as staff varying from policy advisors at 
the group level to MEP aides. In particular, I contacted MEPs who were new to the parliament 
(one year or less of service) and those who exhibited the highest dissent rate in plenary votes 
(identified through www.votewatch.eu) within their group.  
       The targeted populations among rank-and-file MEPs provided supplementary or even 
contrastive accounts of assertions made by leaders while staff interviews often provided 
informative behind-the-scenes accounts. Though interviews offered extensive insight, party 
group and working group meeting observations not only provided opportunities to view the 
behavior of members as well as staff in group settings but also to identify the extent to which 
party groups utilized group forums as dissent management tools. 
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       In turn, given the contributions of party caucus meetings in other legislatures toward party 
unity (See Forgette 2004), I expected that party group meetings and (where applicable) working 
groups would serve not only as vital forums for developing the group line, but also opportunities 
for group leaders to identify and mitigate the extent of dissent. As depicted below in Table 9.3, I 
observed every party group and horizontal working group meeting as possible given the confines 
of a restrictive parliamentary calendar that schedules meetings of all groups on particular days 
and nearly always during overlapping times. Nonetheless, my observations of party group 
meetings are a representative sample in terms of group size and given the time constraints, while 
observations of working groups apart from the Greens/EFA similarly are representative of the 
frequency of these forums during the legislative calendar across groups where applicable.  
TABLE 9.3: PARTY GROUP AND WORKING GROUP MEETING OBSERVATIONS 
   ALDE    ECR     EFD    EPP GREENS   GUE   S & D   TOTAL 
PARTY GROUP 5    2     2    6 5        3       4           27 
WORKING GROUP 2   NA     NA    2 0        NA     2             6 
Note: Table depicts number of observations of party group and horizontal working group meetings during 
the two phases of field research (2011-2012). NA (Not Applicable) refers to groups who do not have 
horizontal working groups. N of Cases (Observations): 33 
 
DEFINING DISSENT       
       In chapter three, I defined and assessed dissent in broad terms in order to convey on one 
hand the nuances associated with dissent but also to relate the possible forms of dissent 
expression to particular dissent management tactics employed by group leaders. The nuances of 
dissent expression refer to the multiple options available to MEPs to express dissent throughout 
the stages of the legislative process. Dissent occurs in the European Parliament when an MEP 
votes against or expresses opposition to the group line. The group line may be indicated by 
leadership and communicated to members prior to and during party group meetings and later 
through a voting list passed out during plenary. The group line may also reflect a majority view 
not directly sponsored by leadership such as when a majority of MEPs advocate a particular 
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position which becomes the group line. In some instances, this is done through votes in party 
group meetings. In other cases, no formal vote is taken and the group line is simply the ad hoc 
expression of a particular position by a majority of MEPs through voting and speeches. 
       How may dissent be expressed? As in other legislatures, dissent in the European Parliament 
is often expressed and at times addressed behind closed doors or at various stages prior to the 
floor or plenary session: committees, working groups, or party group meetings. As Morgenstern 
(2004) notes, “The degree of party unity revealed by voting may in fact conceal higher or lower 
levels of unity experienced prior to each vote or for that matter how the revealed degree of unity 
was obtained in the first place” (Morgenstern, 2004, 21). To measure dissent expression, I 
modified a scale constructed by Crowe (1983) to reflect the voting options and legislative stages 
associated with the European Parliament.  
TABLE 9.4: LEVELS OF DISSENT EXPRESSION 
1. Voice dissent in working group meetings 
2. Voice dissent in party group meetings 
3. Not voting (or not being in attendance)  
4. Speak against the group line in plenary debates and speeches 
5. Vote Abstain  
6. Vote against the group line on amendments  
7. Vote against the group line in early reading(s) 
8. Vote against the group line in the final reading (following the conciliation committee) 
 
       Each level of dissent in turn incurs costs tied to the form of expression and the stage in the 
legislative process in that the form of dissent expression at the higher end of the scale is more 
harmful to party group unity and in that dissent expressed prior to plenary voting may be more 
readily addressed by group leaders. Dissent management efforts by group leaders in turn should 
be centered upon the goal to secure maximum support for the group line or otherwise to produce 
a compromise with delegations or individual MEPs that results in dissent from the group line at a 
lower and less costly level on the scale. Voting against the group line on a final reading entails 
the most costly form of dissent expression in that not only the group line but as well the 
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institutional position of the parliament is at-stake. Similarly, group leaders should in lieu of 
universal consensus, pursue expressions of dissent which do not impact the group line on final 
reading. For example, lobbying and/or socialization may induce MEPs or delegations to oppose 
the group line on a particular amendment but adopt the group line on an entire report.  
       In turn, voting to abstain is a less costly form of dissent in that abstaining does not count 
against the passage of an amendment or report except in final readings where an absolute 
majority of MEPs is required. Otherwise, abstaining does not send as powerful signals of 
divisions to other members or those in other groups. Explanations of vote and interview 
responses reveal that when MEPs abstain they do so because they have mixed feelings about 
particular amendments or reports or because they want to dissent without damaging the group‟s 
plenary agenda or reputation. 
       MEPs also have the option of expressing dissent through plenary speeches. Plenary speeches 
occur during debates, explanations of vote following plenary debate, and catch-the-eye segments 
where the presiding officer may call on MEPs to address the parliament. Plenary speeches are 
assigned a less costly level because they may be followed with successful lobbying and/or 
socialization efforts to secure a vote to abstain or a contrary vote on an amendment rather than 
on an entire report. Furthermore, very few members are present for plenary speeches outside of 
debates which the more cohesive groups address by relegating the number of and reserving the 
last slot(s) for dissenting speakers as discussed in the following section. 
       Not-voting for those in attendance is similarly a less costly outlet for MEPs to express 
dissent though parliamentary rules linking payment of salary to a minimum number of roll-call 
votes limit the availability of this option. Expressing dissent in party group or working group 
meetings (where applicable) is the most preferred form of dissent expression by group leaders 
332 
 
because it provides them with the opportunity to address dissent prior to plenary. Members of the 
more cohesive groups may announce dissent in one of the group forums out of a sense of 
obligation to group norms or reflecting individual rationality in that group support is necessary in 
the future to secure the member‟s preferences. Dissent announcement in turn provides clear 
signals of the extent and the form of dissent to group leaders who may convince dissenting 
members/delegations to adopt the group line, secure a compromise to dissent at a less costly 
level, or in some circumstances reconfigure the group line to accommodate dissenting views.  
DISCIPLINE AS A DISSENT MANAGEMENT TOOL 
      Why do party group leaders rely almost exclusively on a whip structure and socialization to 
ensure maximum support for the group line and minimal dissent? In part, this stems from the 
supranational organization of the parliament. With national parties responsible for re-nomination 
of MEPs and with Europarties only recently (and in a limited extent) providing electoral support, 
party groups must rely on other dissent management tools. Party groups do assign committee 
seats and chairmanships but these are allocated internally in most groups along a points system 
associated with national delegation size with the group acting at times as mediator (See Hix et al. 
2007). Three other disciplinary tools available to party group leaders are: control over speaking 
time in plenary debates, rapporteur assignment, and their role as amendment gatekeepers in 
plenary. When I asked respondents about their perceptions of each, I found that disciplinary tools 
are considered as a limited resource for party group leaders. 
       Nearly eighty-six percent of respondents maintained that when a member dissents from the 
group line, they are either never denied plenary speaking time or they are assigned the last 
slot(s). Surprisingly, this was one of the few questions in which a respondent‟s party group 
membership was not a statistically significant predictor of providing a particular response.  Party 
group size and plenary influence do not appear to impact perceptions of plenary speaking time 
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allocation because group leaders and staff are confronted across groups with the challenge of 
often allocating finite time to an excess of applying members. In addition, as dissenting MEPs 
have alternate forums for expressing dissent in explanations of vote and catch-the-eye segments, 
group leaders are not only less concerned with but are also ill-equipped in this instance  to punish 
dissenting members. Instead, party group position (leadership, rank-and-file, and staff) and years 
of service (as MEPs and/or staff) in the parliament were more significant predictors.  
       Those respondents holding leadership positions and with more years of service were more 
likely to contend that dissenting members are never denied plenary speaking time but rather are 
assigned the last slot(s). Dissenting members are relegated to the last and limited spots because 
the group wants to ensure that the first speakers are those in leadership, who worked on the 
report, or in a few cases members from delegations who have lobbied for more high profile 
speaking slots. In this sense, leaders do not deny dissenting members speaking time just as they 
do not reward every member supporting the group with speaking time.  
       Responses and field research however indicate that party group leaders do consider a 
member‟s voting history when assigning rapporteurs but only in particular groups and almost 
exclusively on prominent reports. Rapporteurs are responsible for carrying reports (legislation) 
throughout the legislative stages and are awarded to each group on a points system reflecting 
party group size (See Hix et al. 2007). In turn, the larger groups tend to successfully bid on the 
more prominent reports or in the case of the Greens/EFA reserve their points for reports 
associated with particular policy areas. Each report is then assigned a shadow rapporteur by each 
group who represents the group in negotiations in the respective legislative stages. Rapporteurs 
(along with coordinators) are also important dissent management actors because they are 
regarded as experts to whom group members will often defer to (See Ringe 2010). 
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       Nearly half of respondents maintained that voting behavior is never considered when 
rapporteurs are assigned. Instead, group leaders (primarily coordinators) assign rapporteurs on 
the basis of individual expertise and work ethic in committees. In contrast, a little over twenty 
percent of respondents countered that voting behavior is considered when prominent reports are 
assigned but otherwise agreed with the assessment above. This latter perception increases over 
time among respondents as they acquire more years of service in the parliament and acquire a 
better understanding of the assignment process. Party group membership also influenced results 
in that respondents from the medium and smaller groups noted that the question was not 
applicable as their group only had one to three members on most or all committees. 
      The effects of party group membership are also evident in the trend among respondents from 
the more cohesive groups who were more likely to maintain that prominent reports are denied to 
dissenting members as the stakes associated with group reputation and plenary influence are at 
their highest. In contrast, members from the less cohesive groups were more likely to contend 
that only expertise and work ethic are considered on all rapporteur assignments. In this sense, 
leaders in the more cohesive party groups do punish dissenting members by not assigning them 
prominent reports to carry or shadow on a consistent or targeted basis. However, committee 
assignment mitigates this dilemma for group leaders in that a member who disagrees with the 
group line on a particular policy area is unlikely to be assigned to that committee. Whereas, in 
the smaller groups, limited committee membership and less emphasis on group cohesion also 
renders rapporteur assignment as a limited dissent management tool. 
       One final disciplinary tool available to group leaders is their role as amendment gatekeepers 
in plenary. In committees, individual MEPs may table amendments without group sponsorship 
whereas in plenary amendments must be sponsored by party groups unless the members can 
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obtain twenty-seven co-signatures of fellow MEPs (See Hix et al. 2007). When speaking with 
staff and MEPs and in my observations of each of the respective stages of the legislative process, 
I found that control over the plenary agenda is an important dissent management tool for group 
leaders but that groups either ignore or barely mention individually-tabled plenary amendments 
that dissent from the group line as they are nearly always assured to fail. 
       For example, aides to coordinators often described the behind-the-scenes process 
culminating in formation of the group line. Constant communication in most party groups 
between staff and MEPs, and among MEPs, culminates in the offering of amendments in 
committees that either reflect group policy preferences or are accepted by group leaders as 
compromises so long as they ensure the main content of the group position is preserved in the 
report. Dialogue and negotiation continues on through the working groups (where applicable) 
and into the party group meeting. In this sense, though party groups act as amendment 
gatekeepers, the group line is a reflection of ongoing and inclusive efforts within the group. In 
turn, individually-sponsored amendments in plenary are rare and often reflect the priorities of a 
few members within and across groups aside from the non-attached members.  
EXPLAINING PARTY GROUP UNITY 
       If disciplinary tools are limited, then what explains why the party groups are on the whole so 
cohesive and why do some groups have higher dissent levels than others? Turning to the 
literature, increasing legislative power in terms of co-decision authority and party group size 
provides some explanation. Even prior to Lisbon, group cohesion rates rose by eleven percent 
following the expansion of co-decision authority (Hix et al. 2007, 102). Since Lisbon, (setting 
aside the ECR) cohesion rates and patterns among groups have remained relatively stable (See 
Hix and Noury 2009). With more at-stake, party groups have more aggressively pursued higher 
cohesion and minimal levels of dissent expression.  
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       Ringe (2010) provides some additional explanation in that if MEPs are regarded as rational 
actors, they will defer to group leaders in most votes due to in part because group support is 
necessary for securing their individual preferences but also as a result of information overload. 
MEPs are confronted with votes on hundreds of reports and thousands of amendments each year. 
In turn, particularly when they are not members of the responsible committee, they are 
incentivized to defer to the positions of rapporteurs, coordinators, and other experts within the 
group unless the vote raises an issue associated with intense national interest (See Ringe 2010).  
TABLE 9.5: PARTY GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
Group Name                 Number/% of MEPs  
EPP (European Peoples Party)             271/35.9% 
S & D (Socialist and Democrats)         189/25.0% 
ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats)  85/11.2% 
Greens/EFA       58/7.7% 
ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) 56/7.4% 
GUE (Union of European Left)    34/4.5% 
EFD (Europeans for a Free Democracy)  34/4.5& 
NA (Non-Attached Members)   29/3.9%  
Total                756/100% 
Note: Table depicts the number of members per party group and non-attached members in the current 
parliament prior to the accession of Croatia in 2013 as well as each group‟s percentage of all MEPs.  
Data Source: www.europarl.europa.eu 
 
       Roll-call vote studies also reveal that a relationship between party group size and high 
cohesion rates in that a five percent increase in a group‟s seat share corresponds to a 0.19 percent 
increase in group cohesion (Hix et al. 2007, 101). As depicted above in Table 9.5, the larger 
party groups in the current parliament are the more cohesive. Larger membership requires 
constant communication among leaders and between leaders and rank-and-file in regards to both 
developing the group line as well as for dissent management. 
       In particular, larger groups face a collective action problem in that individual leaders cannot 
speak with every member who may be wavering in support or intending to dissent from the 
group line. Leaders in the larger groups respond to this collective action problem by assigning 
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clear dissent management roles such as placing coordinators in committees or assigning a vice-
president to serve as parliamentary secretary who can offer mediation and be as some 
respondents noted the “eyes and ears” of the group president. Leaders in larger groups also create 
additional forums (working groups) in order to build momentum for consensus prior to the full 
group meeting. In turn, because smaller party groups do not face such logistical challenges they 
may lack incentive to assign clear leadership roles or develop specific forums. However, small 
groups do have tools at their disposal to ensure high cohesion such as the party group meeting 
where leaders can in comparison to the larger groups more easily encourage participation. 
       I believe smaller party groups are less cohesive in part because of their attitudes toward 
group membership in that they are formed by national parties who are vehement in their 
opposition to the EU (EFD and GUE) or in the case of the ECR are outside the institutional 
mainstream in regards to support for further European integration. Opposition to the EU project 
as a whole or to further integration may undermine group cohesion in that despite the prevailing 
ideological consensus within the smaller groups, a leading rationale for cooperation is absent. In 
other words, the four largest party groups are motivated to secure high cohesion in part because 
they want to impact plenary outcomes in order to expand and shape European integration. In 
contrast, the EFD and the GUE rarely pursue group unity partly because they do not regard the 
parliament as a vital actor in EU policymaking and therefore any group line let alone dissent 
management is unnecessary. Whereas, in the the ECR, a lower priority on group unity reflects an 
incentive for group membership grounded in the accomplishment of national rather than 
„European‟ priorities which impedes dissent management.  
       However, while the larger party groups share logistical challenges and positive attitudes 
toward European integration, group membership size cannot fully account for variation in dissent 
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management strategies. In turn, the extent of a party group‟s ability to influence plenary 
outcomes shapes dissent management strategies and ultimately group cohesion rates in that 
higher plenary stakes incentivizes group leaders to more aggressively pursue maximum cohesion 
and lower levels of dissent expression. Plenary influence as depicted below in Figure 9.2 is 
measured as the percentage of times a party group is in the majority in plenary roll-call votes. 
However, party group size does not automatically correspond to extent of plenary influence as 
exemplified by the ALDE who are the third largest but the second most influential party group.  
 
Note: Graph depicts percentage of times each party group has been in the plenary majority in the current 
parliament and is arranged from the most to least influential group. Data Source: www.votewatch.eu 
 
       Plenary influence provides incentive for party group leaders to fully utilize all components 
of a whip structure but also to utilize all the dissent management tools at their disposal. If group 
size were the only factor, leaders might develop working groups for example to resolve 
collective action problems associated with policymaking, but plenary influence provides 
additional incentive to identify and manage dissent in working groups and to build a culture 

























Similarly, while group size encourages the creation of the group whip, plenary influence 
provides the incentive for the group whip to lobby dissenting members and to encourage 
members to adopt norms governing dissent announcement and expression.  
        However, Figure 9.2 raises questions about the extent to which party group size and 
influence explains dissent level variation among party groups. Specifically, why is the ALDE the 
second most influential yet only the fourth most cohesive party group? Perhaps more 
importantly, why is the Greens/EFA the fourth largest and fourth most influential group yet the 
most cohesive? I contend that the Greens/EFA is the most cohesive party group because they 
have been the most successful in utilizing all components of the whip structure and of fostering a 
sense of shared identity. In this sense, leaders and the decisions they take matter. Despite 
comparatively less incentive provided through membership size and plenary influence, 
Greens/EFA leaders have prioritized and successfully pursued high cohesion. 
       I often began interviews with the general question of what explains why your group is mostly 
unified in most (or in the case of the EFD a majority) of plenary votes? I did so in part to frame 
the remainder of the interview but also to obtain perceived explanations for group level processes 
contributing to cohesion levels often missing in the literature. In turn, I anticipated five potential 
responses: we are nearly always unified because we have shared beliefs and values, because 
there is constant communication within the group, because members know that plenary cross-
group coalitions and the group‟s plenary reputation are at stake, because members mostly defer 
to group experts when voting, and unity is not important for my group.  
       Respondents often offered two or more explanations for party group unity while EFD 
members were the primary source of assertions that party group unity was unimportant. The 
response of plenary coalitions was most often provided by ALDE respondents reflecting the 
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pivotal role played by the group in that when the EPP and S & D cannot reach agreement, both 
will first turn to the ALDE to build plenary cross-group coalitions. In turn, many ALDE 
members believe that the group is largely unified in part because each member knows that 
dissent from the group line will jeopardize the group‟s plenary agenda and its plenary reputation. 
       However, most respondents cited shared beliefs and/or communication as the main 
explanations for group unity. Shared beliefs refer to a shared ideology but also to shared values 
and attitudes toward membership. I found that respondents from the more cohesive groups 
defined shared beliefs differently with repercussions for dissent management. When respondents 
from the four most cohesive groups cited shared beliefs, they defined cohesion not only in terms 
of unity in plenary votes but also in regards to the extent to which members perceived that their 
colleagues shared similar values or backgrounds and the degree to which members adhered to 
particular norms of behavior. In contrast, when respondents from the three least cohesive party 
groups cited shared beliefs, they were referring not only to the extent to which members at times 
shared policy positions, but also to the shared perception that delegations/members remained in 
the group because they could freely pursue a separate line at any time.  
       In this sense, whereas the definition of shared beliefs offered by respondents from the more 
cohesive groups were conducive to unity, those offered by respondents from the least cohesive 
groups undermined group unity in that members shared the belief that group unity was 
unimportant or secondary to individual or delegation agendas. A shared identity may be derived 
from shared backgrounds or histories among party group members. For example, Greens/EFA 
members are mostly from Northwestern Europe and respondents regularly cited the desire to 
make reports “Greener”. Shared background and goals in this sense facilitate lobbying efforts by 
group leaders but also encourage widespread norm adoption.  
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       Similarly, S & D leaders appeal to a shared Socialist or social democratic heritage embodied 
by advocacy for the working class which translates not only into shared ideology but also a 
shared outlook toward group membership. For example, national party delegations will opt to 
express dissent from the S & D line at a less costly level because they do not want to jeopardize 
the broader group agenda and because they are socialized into believing that adherence to the 
group line or in extreme cases dissenting at less costly levels is the appropriate behavior.  
      In contrast, the ECR have not defined a shared group identity since their formation after the 
2009 elections. Therefore, while ECR members share a common ideology of reforming the EU 
and slowing the pace of integration, the group often splinters into national delegation positions. 
In this sense, the ECR are not only comparatively less cohesive in terms of plenary votes but are 
also less cohesive in that members do not closely identify with the group (See Brown 2000). The 
response of shared beliefs in this sense conveys not only the perceived extent of ideological 
homogeneity but also the perceived importance members place on group unity.  
       For example, an MEP‟s decision to dissent from or support the group line is framed in part 
by group membership in that social interactions influence individual perceptions of group 
leadership roles (group whips as mediators) and aid in the identification of appropriate norms of 
behavior (deferral to working groups or those governing dissent). In turn, if an MEP belongs to a 
party group whose leaders effectively communicate the necessity for and the importance of 
group unity and the MEP observes other members deferring to group leaders, the MEP is likely 
to adopt a positive view of the party group and copy the observed behavior. In turn, widespread 
adoption of shared beliefs and attitudes requires an effective communication network overseen 
by party group leaders. For example, MEPs in the S & D group may share the belief that the EU 
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has an obligation to promote economic and social equality. However, differences may arise on 
how best to achieve this goal in a report or in regards to a particular amendment.  
       Communication in this sense re-enforces shared beliefs through the utilization of group 
forums and by the persistence of group leaders to maintain a constant dialogue with membership.  
Responses citing communication and observation notes reveal that leaders assign particular tasks 
to group forums such as to communicate policy preferences, secure compromises, and if 
necessary, to manage dissent. In addition, respondents citing communication perceived that the 
group was cohesive because members were constantly talking to one another. Constant dialogue 
in turn acts as both a conduit for leaders to manage dissent and disseminate norms but also for 
members to convey beliefs and concerns while building logistical and social connections to the 
group. These explanations mirror the findings of Rasmussen (2008) of stronger communicative 
links between MEPs and party groups than with national parties back home.  
       In turn, party groups are on the whole highly cohesive because dialogue is accompanied in 
most groups by lobbying and socialization efforts by group leaders. For example, ALDE and 
Greens/EFA respondents often stressed how their group ensured extensive unity through mass 
participation in party group meetings. While the ALDE president often directed consensus-
building efforts in group meetings, Greens/EFA leaders and the secretary-general acted in 
concert with other leaders to secure support for the group line in the meeting. Accordingly, when 
members develop a sense of loyalty but also a sense of investment in the group line through their 
participation in the decision-making process as well as by leaders‟ appeals to shared perceptions 
of group identity, cohesion levels are likely to rise (See Garner and Letki, 2005). In contrast, 
when members do not value group forums or when group leaders fail to utilize all dissent 




       The explanations of shared beliefs and communication for party group unity repeatedly refer 
to the vital role of group leaders in ensuring widespread support for the group line or in ensuring 
minimal levels of dissent expression. Leaders accomplish this task through appeals on the basis 
of shared group identity/values, by lobbying on the political and/or legislative merits of 
respective reports or amendments, and through references to the group‟s plenary influence and 
reputation being at-stake. In order to ensure the maximum number of MEPs supports the group 
line and that dissent is expressed at minimal levels, leaders in the more cohesive party groups 
divide dissent management responsibilities. Leaders in these groups identify and address dissent 
at every legislative stage and if consensus or a compromise cannot be achieved at one level then 
the dispute is referred to another where additional group leaders may become involved.  
       The extent to which particular group leaders become involved is largely absent in the 
literature. Specifically, we know very little about the dissent management roles of group 
presidents, vice-presidents and whips. The literature in contrast has a lot to say on the dissent 
management roles of group coordinators and rapporteurs. Coordinators and rapporteurs in the 
more cohesive party groups build support for the group line at every legislative stage and group 
members often look to these leadership positions for voting guidance particularly when a report 
originates from a committee or (when applicable) a working group outside of their purview. As 
Ringe (2010) noted, “the official party line of a given proposal is the end result of this 
information distribution process, acting as a series of information filters” and “the two 
(coordinators and rapporteurs) tend to work in tandem and jointly lead their party groups through 
the decision-making process” (Ringe, 2010, 58-59).  
       My observations of party group and working group meetings confirm the important 
contributions made by coordinators and rapporteurs to group unity in that members holding these 
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positions took the lead role in not only presenting the group line but in also addressing objections 
raised by individual members or delegations. In turn, when asked to identify which group leaders 
were primarily responsible for building unity, respondents most commonly cited coordinators 
and rapporteurs followed by group vice presidents, presidents, and national delegation leaders. 
       However, my observations of group meetings also identified key dissent management roles 
for group vice-presidents (including whips) and to some extent presidents in the more cohesive 
groups. To ascertain the dissent management role of group presidents, I asked respondents to 
identify the attributes of an effective group president and when a group president becomes 
involved in ensuring group unity. Respondents most often identified an ability to convey shared 
beliefs and to build consensus as attributes of effective group presidents. In contrast, previous 
national government or European Parliament experience is perceived as welcomed but not 
necessary attributes of effective presidents.  
       In all, I found a distinctive difference in interpretation of the group president‟s 
responsibilities between respondents from the more cohesive and those from the least cohesive 
party groups. In addition, party group culture shaped responses in that it influences perceptions 
of when consensus is desirable and when the group president should (if at all) become involved. 
For example, when respondents from the more cohesive party groups cited shared beliefs they 
often referred to a shared conceptualization of the group identity conducive to unity 
accompanied by socialization processes encouraging the adoption of norms governing dissent 
and other behavior. In other words, when presidents of the more cohesive party groups cite 
shared beliefs, they are adopting a dissent management tactic of appealing to a shared priority of 
group unity and drawing upon positive attitudes toward membership.  
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       Across the more cohesive groups, presidents are viewed as the unifying figure who gives 
voice to the group‟s values as well as to its legislative priorities. The president helps to 
communicate a sense of what defines being a member of a particular party group and in turn 
guides the socialization of members to closely identify with the group (See Brown 2000). In turn, 
presidents in the more cohesive party groups are expected to build unity in group forums whether 
by identifying a common line or by appealing to members to adhere to the established group line. 
In contrast, when respondents from the less cohesive groups cite shared beliefs, they referred to a 
common rationale for group membership unrelated to expectations for adhering to the group line 
and defined consensus in terms of universal agreement among members and not a group line 
articulated to members by leaders with expectations for unity. In this sense, the responsibility of 
presidents in the less cohesive party groups is to ensure equal participation in group forums and 
that no member or delegation is pressured into supporting the group line.       
       Half of all respondents maintained that group presidents only become actively involved in 
building party group unity when prominent reports are at-stake, while the bulk of the remaining 
respondents associated a consensus-building or dissent management role for group presidents on 
all reports or when group forums were deadlocked. Most respondents perceive that group 
presidents normally defer to other leaders to carry the bulk of consensus-building or dissent 
management and then utilize their position as spokesperson for the group to issue final appeals. 
       ALDE respondents were more likely to identify an active role for the group president on all 
reports. Verhofstadt is expected to take the lead in building or identifying consensus on all 
reports in conjunction with the given rapporteur. In contrast, EPP, S & D and Greens/EFA 
respondents were more likely to assign a consensus-building role for the group president only on 
prominent reports or when group forums were deadlocked. Therefore, while most ALDE 
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respondents regard the group president as the most essential dissent management actor, most 
respondents in the other highly cohesive groups view the president as an actor of last resort.  
       In sum, though other leaders assume a more active dissent management role, party groups 
with lower dissent rates share in common a president who is perceived to contribute to group 
unity and to be engaged in dissent management on reports where the plenary stakes are high. In 
contrast, party groups with higher dissent levels are led by presidents who are perceived to either 
not be engaged in dissent management or are restrained in their efforts by a group culture that 
does not re-enforce consensus-building and does not value unity in general. 
       When asked to identify how vice-presidents contribute to group unity, a majority identified a 
key role for vice-presidents as chairs of working groups or as advocates for the group line in 
bureau or presidency meetings. In this sense, unless they are also the rapporteur, vice-presidents 
are largely perceived as moderators and advocates rather than as lobbyists. However, nearly forty 
percent assigned no role or only an administrative role to group vice-presidents with a few 
assigning a dissent management or consensus-building role for vice-presidents on all reports.  
       Positive perceptions of the contributions of group vice-presidents are more common among 
respondents in the more cohesive party groups though some ECR respondents identified a vital 
role for the group whip. To a degree, perceptions of vice-presidents reflect party group size in 
that working groups are absent in the smaller groups. However, the difference in attitudes among 
most ALDE respondents toward vice-presidents in comparison to those from the more cohesive 
groups underscores the limits of group size or plenary influence as explanations for group unity. 
Whereas EPP, S & D or Greens/EFA respondents identified dissent management roles for vice-
presidents as chairs of working groups or as lobbyists in group meetings when prominent reports 
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were at-stake, ALDE respondents largely viewed group vice-presidents as administrators rather 
than as agents for group unity.  
       My observations of group forums confirmed the more active dissent management role of 
group vice-presidents in the three more cohesive groups. This was particular evident in my 
observations of Greens/EFA group meetings where vice-presidents were not only active 
participants but also persistent lobbyists often taking dissenting or wavering members aside for 
private talks. In all, aside from the ECR, GUE and EFD, group vice-presidents contribute to 
various extents to dissent management whether as part of a whip structure, by fostering 
socialization processes, as well as promoting a shared conceptualization of the group identity. In 
turn, I find that those party groups with the highest cohesion rates (Greens/EFA, EPP, S & D) are 
those whose vice-presidents are assigned and perceived to hold a prominent dissent management 
role. In contrast, cohesion rates are lower in party groups who assign and whose members 
perceive an administrative or no role at all for vice-presidents (ALDE, GUE, and EFD) or in the 
case of the ECR who assign a clearly-defined role only to the group whip. 
       When asked to identify how group whips contribute to party group unity, EFD and GUE 
respondents noted that their groups did not have a whip or as it is commonly identified in the 
parliament as a vice-president serving as parliamentary-secretary. This response was also offered 
by many ALDE respondents which reflect the division of responsibilities among three persons 
(noting the group line-Valean, chairing the coordinators‟ meeting-Lambsdorf, and allocating 
plenary speaking time-secretary-general Beels) with none responsible for dissent management. 
In contrast, ECR, EPP and S & D respondents identified the group whip as a “coordinator-in-
chief” facilitating consensus when group forums are deadlocked or as chief lobbyists when 
prominent reports are at-stake.  
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       Most Greens/EFA respondents shared these attitudes but associated the role with the group 
secretary-general which I confirmed in my observations. The three party groups with the highest 
cohesion rates have a vice-president who serves as a parliamentary-secretary or have assigned 
these responsibilities to the secretary-general. This person is responsible for coordinating the 
group line and acting as an early alert system which may necessitate serving as a key advocate 
for the group line. The ECR whip (in addition to allocating plenary speaking time) brings 
divisions to the attention of the group meeting in the hopes of identifying a common line or 
minimizing dissent but his influence is restricted by the frequent emphasis within the group on 
national rather than „ECR‟ objectives.  
       When viewed separately, the absence of dissent management roles for group vice-presidents 
or of a parliamentary secretary does not explain variation in group dissent rates. Rather, it is the 
absence or minimal utilization of all leadership positions in combination that facilitates higher 
dissent rates. For example, one explanation for the ALDE having the fourth highest cohesion rate 
despite their influential plenary position is the administrative role assigned to group vice-
presidents and the division of the parliamentary secretary‟s administrative responsibilities among 
three persons with no assignment of whip responsibilities. Though the group president and others 
normally build consensus in party group meetings and achieve relatively high cohesion rates, the 
maximum potential for ALDE cohesion is not reached in part because a gap exists between the 
efforts of the president and other leaders in group meetings and plenary voting. 
GROUP FORUMS AND DISSENT MANAGEMENT 
       We know very little about how party group or working group meetings contribute to high 
cohesion levels which led me to arrange for multiple meeting observations and to ask 
respondents how they perceived the role of group forums. Group forums reduce information 
asymmetry, facilitate dissent management, and instill the norm of deference to decisions taken 
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by experts within the group. Party group and (where applicable) working meetings provide an 
opportunity for members to express their views and contribute to the development of the group 
line which in turn strengthen the cohesion of the group in that members who regard group 
meetings as productive and vital forums are more likely to support the group line in plenary (See 
Garner and Letki 2005). In this sense, group meetings provide an opportunity for leaders to 
socialize members into adopting the norm of adhering to the group line affirmed or identified in 
the group meeting and to announce dissent either before or during the group meeting. 
       When asked how working groups contribute to group unity, EPP and S & D respondents 
believed that working groups were key forums for building consensus on all or only on 
prominent reports. Similarly, though the Greens/EFA do not have working groups in the same 
organizational sense as the three larger groups their thematic working groups are positively 
viewed by members and are part of a whip structure that aggressively pursues unanimity at every 
stage. In contrast, ALDE respondents on the whole negatively viewed working groups as either 
unimportant forums accompanied by low attendance or as forums important only for those 
invested in the report. While the ALDE have secured relatively high cohesion, negative views 
toward working groups helps to explain their comparatively lower cohesion levels in that ALDE 
members are unlikely to attend working groups or defer to decisions taken in working groups.  
       ECR respondents often cited their policy development group which identifies long-term 
issues and positions as a working group. However, ECR cohesion remains far lower in part 
because separate national lines displace or accompany the group line identified in the policy 
development group and articulated in the party group meetings. Finally, I contend that while the 
smallest party groups do not require working groups, their lower cohesion is a product of their 
inability (or in the case of the EFD unwillingness) to fully utilize party group meetings to build 
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consensus and address dissent in conjunction with a group culture which undermines unity. In 
this sense, group size and influence contribute to the construction of specific forums, but unity 
for any party group is derived from the full utilization of party group forums by leaders and from 
a widespread perception among members that meetings are vital forums for forming a group line 
which embodies the values and goals of the group. 
       Seventy percent of respondents maintained that group meetings primarily contribute to 
group unity on prominent reports with the bulk of the remainder viewing party group meetings as 
forums primarily for discussing national politics. Respondents with more years of service in the 
European Parliament as MEPs and/or staff were more likely to assign a consensus-building role 
for party group meetings primarily on prominent reports whereas those with fewer years of 
service maintained that party group meetings were primarily forums for discussing national 
politics. This suggests that as members acquire greater understanding of party group level 
decision-making processes, they are more likely to view group meetings as important consensus-
building forums when group cohesion matters most. In addition, it suggests, that increased 
exposure to socialization processes within the group contributes to a greater likelihood of norm 
adoption at least in regards in attitudes toward group meetings.   
       Observations confirmed the prevalent perception among respondents in the more cohesive 
groups that party group meetings are primarily utilized by leaders to build consensus and manage 
dissent on prominent reports whereas the least cohesive party groups (EFD and GUE) primarily 
utilize group meetings to discuss national politics and to articulate separate lines. I also found 
that the ALDE president is far more active in consensus-building and dissent management in 
party group meetings than his counterparts, while the Greens/EFA are unique in their practice of 
including the secretary-general and other staff in meeting deliberations.  
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       In this sense, positive attitudes toward party group meetings facilitate efforts by group 
leaders to secure maximum cohesion and minimal dissent expression. The Greens/EFA 
exemplify this approach in that group co-presidents, the secretary-general, vice-presidents, and 
other leaders act in concert in group meetings to articulate and advocate for the group line. They 
accomplish this through lobbying on the policy and political merits of legislation but also 
through appeals to a shared conceptualization of the group identity and by encouraging the 
adoption of norms governing dissent announcement and expression. 
SOCIALIZATION 
       Kam (2002) defines socialization as “the process of exposure or learning through which MPs 
acquire certain norms” (Kam, 2002, 194). For example, party group members adopt particular 
behavior through exposure to group forums, appeals from group leaders, and by copying the 
behavior of colleagues through daily interaction. According to Brown (2000), “norms 
specify…certain rules for how group members should behave and thus are the basis for mutual 
expectations among the group members” and that “norms may serve to enhance or maintain the 
identity of the group” (Brown, 2000, 56 and 60). In this sense, group leaders are not only 
disciplinary figures and lobbyists but also role models or reference points for other members.  
       While party leaders will lobby members to support the group line or dissent at a less costly 
level on the basis of the political and policy merits of respective reports or amendments, group 
leaders as legislative entrepreneurs will also utilize socialization processes. In turn, successful 
socialization requires extensive and often long-term exposure to particular norms which requires 
leadership to act in concert with one another and with other members to establish clear 
guidelines governing MEP behavior. As Crowe (1983) notes, “socialization aims to establish 
conformity with group norms, ensuring regularized patterns of behavior and interaction among 
members of the group” (Crowe, 1983, 923). In this sense, the party group becomes more 
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cohesive over time in plenary voting but also in shared attitudes toward group membership and 
conceptualizations of the group identity (See Brown 2000) as members come to view that loyalty 
to the group is both the appropriate and rational choice.  
       In turn, socialization fosters a shared identity in which members and leaders each are 
assigned specific roles governing relationships and expected behavior. For example, whereas 
GUE members to do not associate a dissent management role with the office of group president 
but rather expect the president to ensure the independence of individual members, EPP members 
expect their group president to intervene when prominent reports are accompanied by deadlock 
while EPP leaders in turn expect group members to defer to the rapporteur‟s judgment in most 
instances. Furthermore, relatively high ECR dissent rates despite the coordination efforts of a 
group whip demonstrate that a fully utilized whip structure is one with clearly assigned dissent 
management roles for all group leaders while maximum cohesion is also a product of members 
viewing themselves as part of a party group rather than a collection of national delegations.  
       The extent of socialization within party groups was first examined through responses by 
MEPs to two questions in the extensive Farrell et al. 2011 survey asking whether unity is 
important to the MEP‟s party group and the extent to which MEPs regard themselves as 
European. I found that MEPs from the more cohesive groups were more likely to value group 
unity and to view themselves as European. The first question underscores the impetus for 
broadening the definition of group cohesion beyond roll-call votes in that when members place 
high importance on group unity and perceive that their colleagues share similar attitudes toward 
group unity, they will be more likely to support the group line or dissent at less costly levels (See 
Brown 2000). The second question exemplifies how shared conceptualizations of the group 
identity contribute to socialization. For example, party group leaders will appeal to dissenting or 
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undecided members on the basis of the European aspects of the group‟s identity through the use 
of language stressing a „community solution‟ or of the „community project‟ being at-stake. 
      Building upon the survey results, I asked MEPs and staff two questions measuring the extent 
of socialization: when is it acceptable to dissent from the group line and what help is provided to 
new MEPs to understand how the group is organized and what it believes? The first question 
sought to uncover the informal and formal processes governing dissent expression accompanied 
by the expectation that members in the more cohesive groups would be socialized into 
announcing dissent prior to plenary either in specific forums or to specific leaders.  
       Thirty percent of respondents noted that intentions to dissent from the group line should be 
expressed to their national delegation leaders while fifteen percent maintained that there were no 
expectations governing dissent announcement. However, a majority of respondents believed that 
dissenting members were expected to announce dissent in group meetings or in private to group 
leaders. In turn, as years of service in the parliament increase, respondents are less likely to 
contend that there are no expectations governing dissent announcement. This indicates that 
greater exposure to socialization and decision-making processes at the party group level helps to 
shape expectations governing dissent announcement.  
       Respondents identifying formal or informal processes governing dissent announcement hold 
positive views toward group membership but also share expectations that group leaders should 
be not only made aware of the extent of dissent but also be given the opportunity to address 
dissent. When responses are framed according to party group membership, respondents from the 
larger party groups were more likely to believe that dissent should be indicated to group leaders 
in committees, working groups, or in private as the full group meeting is largely viewed as a 
forum for addressing dissent only on prominent reports. For example, EPP respondents most 
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often indicated that dissent should be expressed prior to the party group meeting unless a 
prominent report was at-stake and the member was not part of the responsible committee or 
working group. In turn, ALDE members were more likely to contend that dissent should be 
announced in the party group meeting which is considered as the primary consensus-building 
forum. ALDE responses also underscore the impact of group size in that medium-sized groups 
may more easily facilitate discussion on multiple reports in the full group meeting.  
       In contrast, members of the less cohesive groups were more likely to maintain that dissent 
should be indicated to national delegation leaders or that there were no expectations for members 
to announce dissent prior to plenary. However, S & D members also often provided the response 
that dissent should be expressed to national delegation leaders. S & D members differentiate 
themselves from GUE members in that delegation leaders may try to secure support for the 
group line or will otherwise pursue a compromise with group leaders whereas delegation leaders 
in the GUE will likely make no such efforts 
       The second question was asked in order to not only close the gap in our understanding of 
what help is provided for new MEPs but also to provide an indication of the extent of 
socialization process in that the more cohesive party groups should provide targeted and ongoing 
assistance to new MEPs in order to acquaint them with the expectations and processes associated 
with group membership. While socialization of all members should be the goal of party group 
leaders, socialization efforts should target new members as they will be the least acquainted with 
prevalent norms within the group and likely to hold weaker ties to the group in terms of views 
toward group membership and in attitudes toward the importance of unity. New MEPs should 
also likely encounter higher degrees of information asymmetry as they encounter information 
overload and incomplete understanding of party group level decision-making processes. 
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       Opinion regarding the extent and source of help for new MEPs varied widely among 
respondents with a little over a quarter maintaining that no help is provided, with a little under a 
quarter viewing the committee as the primary source of information and socialization, and with 
the rest citing the influence of national delegations or ascribing various extents of assistance 
from party group leadership and staff.  
       In turn, members of the largest party groups were also more likely to maintain that help for 
new MEPs is mostly provided at the committee level by colleagues and staff, but especially by 
the group coordinator. With smaller membership, committees provide more targeted and 
personable forums for educating and socializing group members. EPP, ALDE and GUE 
respondents were more likely to maintain that no help is provided to new MEPs. Instead, 
members “learn by doing”. However, a majority of respondents from the four most cohesive 
groups believed that some help was offered by the group with extensive help provided at the 
committee level and by national delegations valuing group unity. In turn, when EFD respondents 
commented on the extensive help they received from members and staff, they were referring to 
general civility and not to efforts emphasizing group unity.  
EXPLAINING DISSENT LEVEL VARIATION 
       Party groups on the whole are highly cohesive because most groups to various extents have: 
(1) developed whip structures consisting of leadership offices and group forums for managing 
dissent, (2) socialized members into adopting norms governing dissent and other behavior as 
well as a shared conceptualization of the group identity, and (3) because most groups are fairly 
ideologically homogenous. A primary motivation for high cohesion rates is provided by an 
increasingly equal legislative role for the European Parliament which raises the stakes for 
plenary outcomes thereby encouraging party group leaders to pay closer attention to voting 
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patterns within the group. The extent of plenary influence along with group membership size in 
turn helps to shape the dissent management strategies employed by party group leaders.  
       However, party group size and plenary influence does not fully account for dissent level 
variation. While there are some characteristics unique to specific party groups, dissent level 
variation overall is further explained by the absence of particular components of a whip structure 
and by the failure to fully utilize all available dissent management tools including socialization. 
TABLE 9.1: PARTY GROUP COHESION/DISSENT RATES   
PARTY GROUP   COHESION RATE DISSENT RATE 
GREENS/EFA .947   0.053 
EPP   .931   0.069 
S & D   .928   0.072 
ALDE   .898   0.102 
ECR   .868   0.132 
GUE   .816   0.184 
EFD   .498   0.502 
Note: Party group cohesion/dissent rates are listed in descending order and reflect plenary roll-call votes 
during the current parliament (July 2009-March 2013) prior to the accession of Croatia into the EU.  
Data Source: www.votewatch.eu 
 
       Looking again at Table 9.1, party groups toward the middle of the list have not assigned 
dissent management roles to every leadership office or fully utilized group forums to identify and 
manage dissent. In turn, party groups at the bottom of the list have failed to fully utilize all 
dissent management tools, but are also missing particular components of the whip structure. 
Furthermore, party groups at the top of the list have cohesive group identities accompanied by 
norms governing dissent and other behavior. In turn, party groups in the middle display 
comparatively less socialization with no evidence of socialization for groups at the bottom. The 
checklist below starts with the most cohesive and ends with the least cohesive group. Each check 
reflects my assessment of what best accounts for dissent level variation among the groups.  
GREENS/EFA 
 Leadership team constantly communicating with one another and lobbying members. 
 Full utilization of party group meetings to manage dissent but also to instil a sense of 
investment by members in the proceedings and outcomes of the meetings.  
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 Group secretary-general acting as a whip who lobbies and socializes members  
 A shared conceptualization of the group identity embodied in the pursuit of making 
legislation “Greener” as well as containing a strong „European‟ component. 
 A common geographic origin for most members (Northwestern Europe) which spares the 
group of the significant East-West divisions found in most other party groups.  
 
EPP 
 A fully utilized whip structure which identifies and manages dissent at every stage.  
 The common deference of party group members to the rapporteur and working group 
position on most reports due to information overload and successful norm adoption.  
 The involvement of the group president and parliamentary secretary in key situations. 
 Ties of most member parties to national governments and of the group as a whole to 
leaders of key EU institutions (Commission President, Council President, etc.). 
 A shared conceptualization of the group identity grounded in a „European‟ outlook.  
 
S & D 
 A fully utilized whip structure which identifies and manages dissent at every stage.  
 The common deference of party group members to the rapporteur and working group 
position on most reports due to information overload and successful norm adoption.  
 The involvement of the group president and parliamentary secretary in key situations. 
 A shared conceptualization of the group identity grounded in the historical socialist 
movement and a shared commitment to shaping the direction of European integration.  
Deficiencies 
 National delegations within the S & D are more likely to dissent than those in the party 
groups at the top of the list though norms govern dissent announcement and expression.  
 
ALDE 
 Understanding of the group‟s high level of plenary influence and the impact of dissent 
upon plenary outcomes and reputation 
 Active socialization of group members evident in the adoption of norms governing 
dissent announcement and through widespread investment in party group meetings. 
 The aggressive pursuit of group unity by the group president who regularly identifies the 
foundations for consensus with the assistance of the respective rapporteurs.  
 A shared conceptualization of the group identity grounded in a „European‟ outlook and 
an increasingly close European party family. 
Deficiencies  
 The failure to assign dissent management responsibilities to group vice-presidents as well 
as to a single parliamentary-secretary acting as a group whip 
 Weak linkages between group members and working group meetings 
 Comparatively less ideological homogeneity  
 
ECR 
 Constant dialogue between party group leaders and national delegations 
 The full utilization of the group whip office to identify both potential dissent and possible 




 An evolving group identity often in conflict with national delegation priorities 
 The failure to assign dissent management responsibilities to group vice-presidents 
 Frequent turnover in group presidency in a relatively short period (3 since 2009) 
 
GUE 
 Strong historical and ideological foundation 
 Increasing pursuit of  group unity by new group president 
Deficiencies  
 Absence of norms governing dissent or those encouraging the importance of group unity 
 The absence of dissent management responsibilities for all leadership offices 
 Prevalent negative attitudes toward the „European Project” and its institutions 
 
EFD 
Most members do not care about the legislative process and most group leaders regard their 
positions as platforms for national rather than European Parliament politics. In turn, dissent 
management and socialization is completely absent.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
      While this study has provided insight into the dissent management processes within party 
groups, many questions remain not fully answered. In turn, I contend that an MEP survey is 
necessary in order to map the leadership and socialization effects associated with dissent level 
variation. The survey should target the general population of MEPs and be representative of 
rank-and-file as well as elite populations. While the elite focus of this study has uncovered 
hidden processes by interviewing and observing those responsible for dissent management, a 
survey of the entire MEP population is necessary in order to fully investigate dissent 
management in the parliament. In turn, while staff provided valuable insight for this study, a 
more complete understanding of dissent level variation requires a focus upon elected members as 
it is their behavior that ultimately determines the extent of successful dissent management. 
       The timing and in many ways the impetus for the survey is provided by the European 
Parliament elections scheduled for late May of 2014. Elections will result in a significant number 
of new MEPs across party groups and in change-over to various extents in group leadership. 
Elections will also potentially shape the parliament in that groups will gain or lose seats but also 
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in that new groups may be formed. In particular, the ALDE may not enjoy the same level of 
plenary influence. The Greens/EFA and ECR may grow in membership size while the two 
smallest party groups may barely meet the criteria for group membership or perhaps exceed 
expectations. Finally, the far right which is currently concentrated within the ranks of non-
attached MEPs may expand to the point of spurring the creation of a new party group. With these 
changes in mind, I contend that a survey is a timely response to as well as an effective tool for 
continuing to explore explanations for dissent level variation among party groups.  
       I believe the best approach to conducting a survey given the scheduled elections is to wait 
until September as group re-organization will occur over the summer and new members will 
likely be more receptive to surveys after having had some time to adjust to their responsibilities 
and surroundings. The survey should be made available in both French and English and MEPs 
should be more likely to complete a survey located on a website than offered as an attachment. I 
also believe my completion of a doctorate should encourage responses rather than one sent by a 
graduate student if my experiences booking interviews are any indication of prevalent attitudes.  
       The survey will examine the extent to which leaders and socialization contribute to group 
cohesion rates with socialization effects measured through responses to questions identifying 
whether group members identify with or feel isolated from their party groups. The survey will in 
turn contain modifications of questions offered by Garner and Letki (2005) presented to 
Canadian and UK MPs. Responses formed an “additive index for isolation” in that MPs scoring 
higher on the index placed greater value on group unity and more closely identified with group 
forums (Garner and Letki 2005, 472). An MP‟s voting behavior on particular legislation served 
as the dependent variable but I believe this would discourage responses as anonymity is missing.  
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       Instead, I will utilize gamma as a measure of strength of association as the responses are of 
an ordinal nature. This should indicate whether particular respondent characteristics (ideology, 
tenure, party group membership, etc.) influence response selection. P-values in turn will indicate 
whether any relationship between responses and respondent characteristics is statistically 
significant. Next, I will compare isolation and leadership index scores (see below) among the 
respective party groups to ascertain if there is a correlation between the indexes and group 
cohesion rates in plenary votes occurring from the start of the new parliament through the 
conclusion of the survey. In other words, are the more cohesive party groups those with higher 
averages of index scores which in turn would suggest that increased leadership activity and/or 
socialization contributes to higher party group cohesion.  
       I will ask MEPs to place themselves on a left-right ideological scale as well the integration 
scale featured in the Farrell et al. 2011 MEP survey. Garner and Letki utilized ideological self-
placement as an indicator of voting behavior but I will instead include it as a respondent 
characteristic. Next, to account for tenure effects, I will ask MEPs to record the number of years 
(or months) of service in the European Parliament to see if responses vary among newer and 
veteran members. To measure the extent to which MPs identified with their party, the authors 
constructed an isolation index consisting of responses to four questions which I will modify to 
ensure relevance to the European Parliament. Responses not arranged on a 1-5 scale such as Q3 
are coded as 1, 3 and 5 respectfully. The higher the placement on the scale, the more isolated the 
respondent feels from their party or in this case party group.  
Q1. Leaders in my party group often canvass members for their input prior to presenting policy 
positions to the parliament or to the public. 1: Always…….5: Seldom 
 
Q2. In general, how much influence do you think members in your party group have upon the 
decisions made by leaders in your party group? 
A1: Very much influential. A2: Somewhat influential. A3. Not enough influence. 
361 
 
Q3. In my experience, party group meetings are not effective forums for the airing of policy 




Q4. In your experience as an MEP, how would rate the overall responsiveness of leaders in your 
party group to the opinions and concerns of members? 1. Responsive….5. Unresponsive 
 
       Garner and Letki also accounted for the perceived impact of the whip‟s power. As I more 
interested in leadership effects overall, I will modify this question and add others to account for 
the impact of leaders in particular party group positions (party group president/co-presidents, 
vice-presidents, parliamentary-secretary, coordinators, rapporteur, and secretary-general) with 
the responses forming a „leadership effects index‟. Below, I have provided the example of the 
whip question which will be replicated for the other party group leadership positions.  
Q. In your experience as an MEP, how would you rate the impact of the group parliamentary 
secretary or whip upon the level of unity within your party group in plenary voting?  
A1: The actions and appeals by the group parliamentary secretary or whip have a substantial 
impact upon the unity of our party group in plenary voting. (Coded as a 1) 
A2: The actions and appeals by the group parliamentary secretary or whip have a limited impact 
upon the unity of our party group in plenary voting. (Coded as a 3) 
A3: The actions and appeals by the group parliamentary secretary or whip have no impact upon 
the unity of our party group in plenary voting. (Coded as a 5) 
 
       I will submit the findings of field research in this dissertation for publication after my 
defense is complete with an initial emphasis on a short article highlighting the contributions of 
party group leaders before submitting the research in its entirety in book form. I will 
subsequently submit findings from the survey described above for publication upon its 
completion. In a related effort, I will submit a review of 2014 European Parliament election 
results to the Electoral Studies journal and to the Monkey Cage (Washington Post). The review 
will consider the impact of election results upon party group formation and policymaking in the 
next parliament rather than a country-by-country account. In particular, I am interested in the 
                                                          
9 Note: I will also include a question concerning horizontal working groups. However, I will not include it in the 




performance of new parties at the national level (parties not in existence in June 2009) and which 
party groups they will join, if any. I will present election findings as well as this dissertation to 
the University of Nebraska-Omaha‟s October European Studies Conference.  
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